180 Iowa 549 | Iowa | 1917
I. The defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of Colorado, and engaged in the business of making circus and menagerie exhibitions in different cities of the country, traveling by railway. It entered the city of Des Moines, May 17, 1906, having obtained a license from the city authorities to parade the streets and give an exhibition, and proceeded to unload from the train, in Southeast Fifth Street, where it crosses the tracks of the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railway Company, horses, Avagons, light and heaiw, tents and other accoutrements, elephants, camels, and animals in cages on Avagons, some of them Avith canvas flapping. The Avagons were run from the ends of the flat cars over plank- to the ground, pulled into the street north of the tracks, and backed on each side of the street. Animals were making the usual noises ' on being disturbed. A number of Avagons Avere left south of the tracks on the Avest side of the street, and on the east side, near the unloading, Avere the spectators, -among whom was Roscoe Carlisle, seven year's of age, Avho had left home at about 8:30 A. M. About this time, one Ungles approached from the north, driving a team of horses attached to a bakery wagon, and, when about 40 or 50 feet north of the tracks, he was signaled to stop, by the person superintending the unloading. After the wagon being taken from the cars was hauled to the north past Ungles’s team, the superintendent motioned him to proceed. The horses, though gentle, were excited and had been rearing about; and, as Fngles loosened the reins, they- plunged forward, and ran
It was made to appear that the odor of wild animals caused fear in horses; that the street was one of those most traveled in the south part of the city, and of unusual width between the curbs; that there were no ropes nor barricade, along the street, nor guards'on the ground to warn spectators or drivers of danger; and that, after the wagons were placed in the street, teams of 2, 4, 6, or 8 horses were hitched to the wagons, and these hauled to the grounds for the exhibition, on East Twentieth Street. This is a suit to recover damages to the child’s estate consequent on his death; and, as a verdict was directed for defendant, the sole inquiry is whether the evidence Avas sufficient to carry to the jury the issues raised.
What- seems to be charged is the commission of a public nuisance by obstructing or incumbering a public street otherwise than by fences or buildings. Sections 5078,
“They were unloading some of the wagons from the cars, and a crowd of people standing around here and there and every place. They were unloading these heavy wagons. There was a canvas over most of them, and they were loading them from the east to Fifth Street. The car stood east of Fifth, and the gang plank ran down to the approach of the cars there and landed them on Fifth Street crossing, and trailed them over there north to the K. D. tracks,, come across the K. D. tracks on both sides of the street. They had a - couple of snub teams with snub ropes. I should think about 25 feet. A man walks on the edge of the car, and hooks the ring on the corner of the wagon]
Ponies had been placed on the depot grounds — Iioav many does not appear. It is apparent that the wagons must have been unloaded from the ends of the cars; for, without the great inconvenience of turning on the car, .these could not have been taken from the side, and, as the tracks were considerably above the surface on either side except at the ' crossing, they must have been taken down on the street, if unloadted at the ends of the cars. As they were to be hauled away to the shOAv ground as soon as the facilities had would permit, it ought not to be said that defendant was negligent in backing the wagons to the curbing on. either side of the street, with tongues diagonally toward the center, so that the 2, 4,. 6 or 8-horse teams might be conveniently attached thereto when hauling them aAvay. The Avay between these rows of Avagons appears to have been, kept open, save during the process of lowering from the cars, ■ and' occupancy of the street during these brief
*555 “The liability of the appellant must rest on the doctrine of negligence. The gist of the action as claimed by appellee is the transportation of the hear, with knowledge that it was likely to frighten horses, without taking precaution to guard against fright. An animal ferae naturae,
“Wild animals collected and moved about the country for exhibition are always more or less likely to frighten domestic animals, but they may, nevertheless, be lawfully taken on the public highAvay under proper precautions.” Macomber v. Nichols, 34 Mich. 212.
“Why not so much as I could see, more than they were —seemed to be noisier, and practically a - little later than the others. Q. They were in a little bigger hurry on account of being a little late in the morning? A. I should judge that was their reason for being in a little bigger hurry. They were moving these wagons away pretty rapidly. As fast as they could get them off the car, they had an extra team there, a man carrying doubletrees, and another man holding the lines. These á and 6 and 8 horses hauled these wagons up to Grand, and out to Twentieth. The circus grounds was at East Twentieth. That was the regular circus ground. The manner of taking the wagons off the*559 cars was the same as I have always seen other circuses, practically.”
Appellant argues as though defendant’s superintendent directed Ungles to drive his team through. He had no control .over Ungles or his team, nor had he the right to dictate when and how he might use the street. All the superintendent undertook to do was to signal the team to stop until the wagon being taken from the car was hauled
■ -(b) It is insisted, however, that both counsel and court had knowledge of what - was to be included in the amendment, and that it' would be ■ filed before the court ruled -on the motion to direct verdict. The attorney who
“When I ruled on the motion for a new trial, I had no knowledge there was any amendment on file at all. When I ruled on the motion to direct a verdict, I had no agreement or understanding with anybody that an amendment was to be filed whatever. I never make such an agreement with anybody, for it is surely difficult enough for a court to rule correctly upon things that are on file, and on which he has knowledge, and I would never attempt to rule upon allegations of negligence that were not made when -ruled upon and were to be made in the .future.”
On the other hand, one of the attorneys for plaintiff swore that, in making oral argument, in resistance of the motion to direct a verdict, in the course of argument he said:'
“We would want to amend our petition, setting out specifically the grounds of negligence. Not that I thought it was necessary, but in order that the grounds might be set out more clearly, and that the pleadings and the proof might conform in any event.”
He stated also that he had a sheet of paper on which the said grounds to be included in the aniendment were written, and read them to the court in presence .of appellee’s attorney. Another of appellant’s attorneys testified that, in his argument, he directed attention to the evidence bearing on each' ground of negligence alleged in the amendment, and urged these facts as being negligent acts, and that he attached to the motion for new trial a written argument
“Code Section 2689, which permits a party ‘at any time’ to amend his pleadings, contemplates that it shall be done pending the proceedings in the case, and not after the case is decided, the rights of the parties settled, and a judgment entered finally disposing of the questions involved. If a party may amend a pleading in nine months or a year after final judgment, he could do so in five- or ten -years. Judgments are settlements of controversies, and parties cannot be permitted to relitigate, after judgments, by filing new pleadings raising new issues. Amendments under the statutes, in proper cases, may be ‘at any time’ during the pendency of the action; but when there ceases to be a case for litigation, when th.e plaintiff’s claim is merged in a judgment, and the rights of the parties involved in the issues are decided qnd settled by a judgment, then all pleadings must cease. It may be that after •judgment an amendment may be permitted to conform a pleading to the proceedings, but this is very -different from an- amendment setting up new claims or new issues.'”
In Harrington v. Christie, 47 Iowa 319, the court refused 'leave to file an amendment, after verdict, -'alleging that annual interest -had not been paid, and the court, in approving of the refusal of-leave, said:
“It was not a mere amendment to make the pleading correspond with the proof. It Avas a material allegation upon which the defendant would have had. the right to take issue.”
These and the .other cases cited indicate plainly enough that neAv issues or allegations of negligence may not be added by amendment to the petition, or neAv defenses to the answer, after submission or verdict, and that, at best, amendments then filed are only permissible to clarify these,
Some of these may touch the allegations in the original petition, but manifestly not for the. purpose' of clarifying or rendering these more specific. All, with the possible exception of the 4th and 7th, assert entirely new grounds of negligence, and for this reason, the amendment was not such as was permissible subsequent to verdict returned, unless, as contended by appellant, a proposition to so amend was made prior to the submission of the motion to direct; and, as to that, more later on. It was not an amendment to conform the pleadings, to the proof, but to assert new grounds of negligence; and, though the. evidence -may have borne-'on some of these,-all introduced was admissible and received on the allegations
Motion to strike appellee’s amendment to abstract is overruled. — Affirmed.