Carle v. PeopleCarle v. People
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Magruder
delivered the opinion of the court:
First—It is first claimed, on the part of the plaintiff in error, that he killed McKenzie in self-defense, and that the proof clearly shows the case to be one of self-defense. The testimony in reference to this matter was conflicting, and was left to the jury to determine under proper instructions from the court.
On the part of the State, the testimony on the trial below tended to show the following facts:
Plaintiff in error, although he had been at one time the keeper of a saloon on the west side in Chicago, was, at the time of this occurrence, engaged in running a tailor shop at 302 Thirty-first street in the south division of the city. The plaintiff in error came into Kelly’s saloon on the evening of October 10, 1899, about eight o’clock, and inquired’ for a package of tailor’s samples. He claimed
On the part of the defense, testimony was introduced with a view of showing, and tending to show, that, prior to the shooting, there had been some difficulty between McKenzie and Carle, and that the former had threatened to shoot the latter. Mary Mollway, or Morrissey, who had kept rooms at 25 North State street, and from whom, at different times, both McKenzie and Carle had rented rooms, stated that, about the first of September, Carle had come to her house, and had there been attacked by McKenzie and another man, and thrown over the bannisters and injured. She also appears to have been in the company of McKenzie on the evening of October 10, and went over to the north side with him, before she met plaintiff in error and went into Kelly’s saloon with the latter. The testimony of Mary Mollway, and of Marshall, and of the plaintiff in error himself, tends to show that, at the second visit of Carle to the saloon that evening, when the deceased
Second—It is claimed, on the part of the plaintiff in error, that the court gave three instructions to the jury in behalf of the State upon the subject of reasonable doubt, which were erroneous. It is not necessary to set out these instructions in full in this opinion. They give the ordinary and common definitions of reasonable doubt, which have so often been passed upon by this court. After a careful examination of the instructions thus complained of, we are of the opinion that all the statements and definitions, contained in them upon the subject of reasonable doubt, are fully sustained by the following cases: Miller v. People, 39 Ill. 457; May v. People, 60 id. 119; Connaghan v. People, 88 id. 460; Dunn v. People, 109 id. 635; Spies v. People, 122 id. 1; Collins v. People, 194 id. 506.
It is also claimed by the plaintiff in error, that the following instruction, given by the trial court for the State, was erroneous, to-wit:
“You are further instructed that, if you believe from the evidence in this case beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, Carle, with malice aforethought, either expressed or implied, inflicted upon the deceased, Hector McKenzie, the mortal wound or wounds in manner and form as charged in the indictment, not in self-defense as the same is defined in these instructions, and not upon a sudden heat of passion, caused by a provocation apparently sufficient to make the passion irresistible, and that the said Hector McKenzie did thereafter die from said mortal wound or wounds in manner and form as charged in the indictment, then the jury should find the defendant Carle guilty of murder.”
The instruction in the case at bar, unlike that in Steiner’s case, contains this clause: “Not in self-defense as the same is defined in these instructions.” This clause contains the element of apparent danger, which was wanting in the instruction in. Steiner’s case. In the latter case the instruction, before the conclusion thereof, did not contain every material element necessary to warrant the conclusion thereof. Here, instruction numbered 11, does contain all the elements of the crime of murder in the facts which it assumes to exist; and if those elements were established by the testimony, it was the duty of the jury to find the defendant guilty of murder. This being so, the concluding words were proper. It is not error to give an instruction, reciting every essential fact necessary to constitute the crime of murder, and authorizing the jury to find the accused guilty thereof, if they believe the facts recited therein to have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, because, if all the facts constituting such crime, have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the law does not authorize a conviction for a less offense. The distinction between such an instruction as that in the case at bar, and such instructions as were under consideration in the three cases referred to by counsel, is pointed out in the recent case of Crowell v. People, 190 Ill. 508. In the latter case, this court, in speaking of Steiner’s case, said (p. 518): “The instruction was condemned for ignoring
For example, the court gave, on behalf of the plaintiff in error, instruction numbered 2, which is as follows: “The court further instructs the jury that a person need not be in actual imminent peril of his life, or of great bodily harm, before he may slay his assailant; it is sufficient if, in good faith, he has a reasonable belief, from the facts as they appeared at the time, that he is in such imminent peril. The rule of law on the subject of self-defense is this: Where a man in the lawful pursuit of his business is attacked, and when, from the nature of the attack, there is reasonable ground to believe that there is a design to take his life or to do him great bodily harm, and the party attacked does so believe, then the killing of the assailant under such circumstances will be excusable or justifiable homicide, although it should afterwards appear that no injury was intended and no real danger existed.”
Several other instructions to the same effect were given to the jury upon this subject. We are of the opinion
Third—It is furthermore contended, on the part of the plaintiff in error, that the trial court erred in not compelling the State to call Charles S. Marshall, an eyewitness of the shooting, and whose name was endorsed upon the back of the indictment. The court committed no error in this respect. It has been held by this court that, under the practice in this State, the prosecution is not compelled to introduce all the witnesses, whose names are on the back of the indictment. (Bressler v. People, 117 Ill. 422).
It is claimed, however, that the court erred “in allowing the State’s attorney to discredit him (Marshall) in advance with the jury.” The charge, that the State’s attorney discredited the witness, Marshall, is based upon the fact that the State’s attorney, just before closing his case, announced to the court as follows: “If the court please, there is another witness, Charles Marshall, who, the evidence discloses, was in the saloon at the time, and whom the State does not want to call as a witness. He is here, and either side can call him, or the court can call him. I shall request the court to call him, so both sides can cross-examine him. He is a witness at the scene and I think ought to be called.” The attorney for the defense then said: “I think it is the duty of the State to place upon the witness stand all witnesses present at the shooting, especially such as are placed upon the back of the indictment.” The court then said: “Is there any reason why this course should be pursued?” The State’s attorney replied: “Because the State will not vouch for his testimony—will not guarantee its truth.” The court then stated that “the court will call him.” Marshall then took the stand, and was examined by the court, and was cross-examined both by counsel for the plaintiff in error and by the State’s attorney.
Fourth—The defense charges, that the trial court erred in excluding evidence that the deceased was a dangerous, vicious man, accustomed to go armed, and that the plaintiff in error had knowledge of this fact.
The rule upon this subject, as stated by Wharton in his work on Criminal Evidence (sec. 84), is as follows: “It is admissible for the defendant, after having first established that he was assailed by the deceased, and in apparent dang‘er, to prove that the deceased was a person of ferocity, brutality, vindictiveness and excessive strength.” In Cannon v. People, 141 Ill. 270, this court, in commenting upon the statement thus made by Wharton, said (p. 281): “When the defendant is the assailant or commences the affray, he will not be entitled to show in defense the vicious or wicked disposition of the person whom he has slain. Having* sought and brought on the affray, he cannot shield himself from punishment for the homicide by showing that he aroused the vicious or wicked passions of the party killed. But when evidence is submitted from which the court can see that the jury may,
At the time when counsel for plaintiff in error sought to call out evidence of this character upon cross-examination of one or more of the witnesses of the State, no evidence had been introduced that in any way tended to show that the deceased, McKenzie, had made an attack upon the plaintiff in error. On the contrary, it appeared up to that time, that McKenzie was shot while he was unarmed and standing at the bar of the saloon, and had his. back turned to the plaintiff in error. After plaintiff in error had introduced testimony, tending to show that the deceased had threatened to shoot the plaintiff in error, and had drawn a revolver upon him, then it was proper for the plaintiff in error to introduce evidence showing that the deceased was a dangerous and vicious man; and thereafter such evidence was introduced, and was admitted. The trial court did not exclude proper evidence, when offered at the proper time, that the deceased was a dangerous and vicious man and accustomed to go armed; nor was evidence of the defendant’s knowledge of this
Fifth— Several other objections are made by counsel for plaintiff in error to the action of the court below, one of which is that the court excluded the testimony of a witness, named Neil O’Brien, as to what was said by plaintiff in error to him and by him to plaintiff in error, in reference to going into Kelly’s saloon to get the package already spoken of. Plaintiff in error sought to show that, after he had been twice in the saloon of Kelly that evening, and at about eleven o’clock, he met O’Brien near the saloon, and had a conversation with him in reference‘to going after the package. There was no error in excluding this testimony, as it was not competent. O’Brien was a witness called by the defense, and it was sought to show by him what Carle had said to him in the absence of the deceased, and while they were alone together, standing upon the street. To admit proof of this kind would have been to permit the plaintiff in error, Carle, to make evidence for himself by proving statements that he made to third persons, not in the presence of the deceased. Plaintiff in error was permitted to state, when he was on the stand, that he went to the saloon, as well when he visited it the third time as when he visited it the first time, in order to get the package already referred to. He thus succeeded in placing before the jury his own statement, that his object in going” there was to get the package, and not to provoke a difficulty with the deceased, or to kill the latter.
It is also claimed by plaintiff in error that the court erred in permitting the State, upon the cross-examination of the woman, Mary Mollway, to ask her about her separation
It is insisted upon by plaintiff in error that the attempt to impeach the plaintiff in error was unsuccessful. Two witnesses testified that the reputation of plaintiff in error for truth and veracity in the neighborhood in which he lived, was bad, and that they would not believe him under oath; and no testimony was offered by the defense to contradict or offset this impeaching testimony, introduced by the State. Whether or not the effort to impeach plaintiff in error was successful, was a matter for the determination of the jury, and was entirely a question of fact.
It is also strenuously urged by the plaintiff in error that he was a reputable citizen working for his living as a tailor. Whatever evidence there was, showing that he was a reputable citizen, was presented to the jury, and was for their consideration. There was evidence, tending also to show that he was an associate of criminal characters, both men and women, and a frequenter at all hours of the night, of saloons where intoxicating liquors were sold. No ruling of the trial court is called to our attention upon the question, whether the plaintiff in error was a reputable character or a disreputable character, that requires any action on our part.
We discover no error, which would justify us in reversing the judgment of the criminal court of Cook county. Accordingly, that judgment is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.