Carle Foundation v. ILLINOIS DEPT. REVENUECarle Foundation v. ILLINOIS DEPT. REVENUE
delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiff, the Carle Foundation (Foundation), filed a complaint requesting a judicial declaration pursuant to section 23 — 25(e) of the Property Tax Code (Code) (
The circuit court, however, certified two questions for interlocutory review pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 308(a)), and we granted the Department’s application for leave to appeal. The first question concerns the proper interpretation of
I. BACKGROUND
In December 2007, the Foundation filed a complaint invoking
The Foundation alleged it then applied to the county board of review for an exemption of the four parcels for 2004 and 2005 but the board denied the applications and in February 2007, the Department upheld the denials. See
The Foundation sought a judicial declaration that the four parcels were, as before, exempt from taxation for the years 2004 through 2007 on the ground of charitable use. The Foundation also sought an injunction requiring the interim supervisor of assessments, Joe Meents, to issue certificates of error to that effect (see
In its motion for dismissal pursuant to section 2 — 615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (
The circuit court denied the Department’s motion to dismiss the complaint as legally insufficient. On March 3, 2009, however, the court certified the following questions pursuant to Rule 308:
“Question No. 1
Does the term ‘court proceedings to establish an exemption[,]’ in [section] 23 — 25(e) of the *** Code [(
(a) a cause of action, not otherwise specifically provided for by the *** Code, to establish a tax exemption for a specific assessment year for property determined to have been exempt, on comparable grounds, for a prior or subsequent year;
(b) proceedings following the filing of a tax objection complaint pursuant to [section] 23 — 10 of the *** Code [(35 ILCS 200/23 — 10 (West 2006))] in order to preserve defenses to the entry of judgment against properties in the delinquent list under [section] 21 — 175 of the *** Code [(35 ILCS 200/ 21 — 175 (West 2006))];
(c) proceedings to delay payment of property taxes during the pendency of administrative proceedings to contest a party’s eligibility for a property tax exemption; or
(d) some other category of proceedings?
Question No. 2
If the term ‘court proceedings to establish an exemption[,]’ in [section] 23 — 25(e) of the *** Code [(
On April 9, 2009, we granted the Department’s application for leave to appeal.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Certified Question No. 1
(1) Certified Question No. 1(a)
Certified question No. 1(a) is as follows: “Does the term ‘court proceedings to establish an exemption!,] ’ in [section] 23 — 25(e) of the *** Code [(
This question requires us to interpret both subsection (a) and subsection (e) of
These two subsections, (a) and (e), abound with citations to other sections of the Code, so we will take the subsections one at a time. Subsection (a) provides as follows:
“§23 — 25 . Tax exempt property; restriction on judicial determinations.
(a) No taxpayer may file an objection as provided in [s]ection 21 — 175 [(35 ILCS 200/21 — 175 (West 2006))] or [s]ection 23 — 10 [(35 ILCS 200/23 — 10 (West 2006))] on the grounds that the property is exempt from taxation, or otherwise seek a judicial determination as to tax exempt status, except as provided in [s]ection 8 — 40 [(35 ILCS 200/8 — 40 (West 2006))] and except as otherwise provided in this [s]ection and [s]ection 14 — 25 [(35 ILCS 200/14 — 25 (West 2006))] and [section 21 — 175 [(35 ILCS 200/21— 175 (West 2006))].”35 ILCS 200/23 — 25(a) (West 2006).
It is impossible to understand subsection (a) of
Whereas
“The circuit court for the county in which a property is assessed[ ] or some part of such property[ ] is situated may review all final administrative decisions of the Department [of Revenue (Department)] in administering this Code. The Administrative Review Law [(735 ILCS 5/3 — 101 through 3 — 113 (West 2006))] and the rules adopted under it apply to and govern all proceedings for the judicial review of final administrative decisions of the Department under [s]ection 8 — 35 [(35 ILCS 200/8 — 35 (West 2006))].”35 ILCS 200/8 — 40 (West 2006).
Subsection (b) of
With that introduction to the cross-references in subsection (a) of
“(a) No taxpayer may file an objection as provided in [s]ection 21 — 175 [(defense to application for judgment and order of sale)] or [s]ection 23 — 10 [(tax objection complaint)] on the grounds that the property is exempt from taxation, or otherwise seek a judicial determination as to tax exempt status, except as provided in [s]ection 8 — 40 [(applicability of Administrative Review Law)] and except as otherwise provided in this [s]ection and [s]ection 14 — 25 [(certificate of error)] and [s]ection 21 — 175.”35 ILCS 200/23— 25(a) (West 2006).
Because
Subsection (e) of
“(e) The limitation in this [s]ection shall not apply to court proceedings to establish an exemption for any specific assessment year, provided that the plaintiff or its predecessor in interest in the property has established an exemption for any subsequent or prior assessment year on grounds comparable to those alleged in the court proceedings. For purposes of this subsection, the exemption for a subsequent or prior year must have been determined under [s]ection 8 — 35 [(35 ILCS 200/8 — 35 (West 2006))] or a prior similar law by the Department or a predecessor agency, or under [s]ection 8 — 40 [(35 ILCS 200/8 — 40 (West 2006))]. Court proceedings permitted by this subsection may be initiated while proceedings for the subsequent or prior year under [s]ection 16 — 70, 16 — 130, 8 — 35, or 8 — 40 [(35 ILCS 200/16 — 70 , 16 — 130, 8 — 35, 8 — 40 (West 2006))] are still pending, but judgment shall not be entered until the proceedings under [s]ection 8 — 35 or 8 — 40 [(35 ILCS 200/8— 35 , 8 — 40 (West 2006))] have terminated.”35 ILCS 200/23 — 25(e) (West 2006).
Our discussion of subsection (e) will follow the same pattern as our discussion of subsection (a): we will provide a brief introduction to the cross-references in subsection (e), and then, armed with that introduction, we will return to subsection (e).
We already have mentioned
We also have encountered
Section 16 — 130 (
Those are the cross-references in subsection (e) of
“(e) The limitation in this [sjection shall not apply to court proceedings to establish an exemption for any specific assessment year, provided that the plaintiff or its predecessor in interest in the property has established an exemption for any subsequent or prior assessment year on grounds comparable to those alleged in the court proceedings. For purposes of this subsection, the exemption for a subsequent or prior year must have been determined under [selection 8 — 35 [(Department’s procedures for deciding exemptions)] or a prior similar law by the Department or a predecessor agency, or under [s]ection 8 — 40 [(applicability of the Administrative Review Law)]. Court proceedings permitted by this subsection may be initiated while proceedings for the subsequent or prior year under [s]ection 16 — 70 [(initial decision by the board of review on an application for exemption and final decision by the Department)], 16 — 130 [(same, except in Cook County)], 8 — 35, or 8 — 40 are still pending, but judgment shall not be entered until the proceedings under [sjection 8 — 35 or 8 — 40 have terminated.”35 ILCS 200/23 — 25(e) (West 2006).
“The limitations in this [s]ection” refers to the limitation that subsection (a) (
In light of our foregoing explication of subsections (a) and (e) of
The answer is yes. When we interpret a statute, our goal is to give effect to the legislature’s intent, and the best evidence of that intent is the language the legislature used in the statute. People ex rel. Devine v. Sharkey,
Subsection (e) of
Common law recognizes, for example, a cause of action to enjoin the taxation of property that is legally exempt from taxation. The supreme court held, in Owens-Illinois Glass Co. v. McKibbin,
In Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Allphin,
2. Certified Question No. 1(b)
Certified question No. 1(b) is as follows: “Does the term ‘court proceedings to establish an exemption[ ],’ in [section] 23 — 25(e) of the *** Code [(
The record does not appear to suggest that the county collector has in fact applied for a judgment and order of sale against the four parcels for which the Foundation seeks an exemption. The Foundation represents that it has fully paid the taxes on those parcels (thus its request for a refund). Our answer to question No. 1(b) would be merely advisory. Therefore, we decline to answer that question. See Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason,
3. Certified Question No. 1(c)
Question No. 1(c) is as follows: “Does the term ‘court proceedings to establish an exemption[,]’ in [section] 23 — 25(e) of the *** Code [(
It does not appear that the Foundation has initiated proceedings to delay payment of property taxes. Therefore, our answer to certified question No. 1(c) likewise would be advisory, and we decline to answer that question.
Question No. 1(d) is as follows: “Does the term ‘court proceedings to establish an exemption[,]’ in [section] 23 — 25(e) of the *** Code [(
This question appears to be, essentially, a repetition of question No. 1(a), which we have answered. We decline to answer question No. 1(d), because it is moot. See Santiago v. Kusper,
B. Certified Question No. 2
Question No. 2 is as follows: “If the term ‘court proceedings to establish an exemption[,]’ in [section] 23 — 25(e) of the *** Code [(
The answer is no. If the taxpayer initially invokes an administrative remedy, that remedy is exclusive. Owens,
“[W]here an application for relief is made before the board of review, in pursuance of the statutory remedy, then that remedy becomes exclusive when the board denies the application. The party ‘can[ ]not then, after an adverse decision, go into chancery for relief ***. Having selected his forum[ ] — one which affords a completely adequate remedy[ ]■ — he must adhere to it. *** If the party elect[s] the remedy provided by this section, he will not be allowed to abandon it and then go into equity, but he may go into equity in the first instance, and have relief. *** The [statutory] remedy is adequate, and when that forum is selected and its decision invoked, it becomes exclusive.’ ” Illinois Institute of Technology v. Skinner,49 Ill. 2d 59 , 62-63,273 N.E.2d 371 , 374 (1971), quoting Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Hodges,113 Ill. 323 , 326 (1885).
Again, the only limitation that subsection (e) of
The Foundation argues that if we find the doctrine of election of remedies to be applicable to the situation described by certified question No. 2, we should hold, for purposes of the present case, that the doctrine has only a prospective application, considering that no reported decision has ever interpreted
In Board of Commissioners of the Wood Dale Public Library District v. County of Du Page,
“ ‘First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied [citation], or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed [citation]. Second, it has been stressed that “we must *** weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.” Linkletter v. Walker[,381 U.S. 618 , 629,14 L. Ed. 2d 601 , 608,85 S. Ct. 1731 , 1738 (1965)]. Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for “[w]here a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the ‘injustice or hardship’ by a holding of nonretroactivity.” [Citation.]’ ” Wood Dale Public Library District,103 Ill. 2d at 426-27 ,469 N.E.2d at 1372 , quoting Chevron Oil,404 U.S. at 106-07 ,30 L. Ed. 2d at 306 ,92 S. Ct. at 355 .
No reported decision has ever interpreted
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we answer yes to certified question No. 1(a); we decline to answer certified question Nos. 1(b), (c), and (d); and we answer no to question No. 2. We remand this case for further proceedings.
Certified question Nos. 1(a) and 2 answered; certified question Nos. 1(b), (c), and (d) not answered; cause remanded.
TURNER and POPE, JJ., concur.