Carl WOODS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. INDIANA UNIVERSITY-PURDUE UNIVERSITY AT INDIANAPOLIS, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 92-2334.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Argued Jan. 20, 1993. Decided June 14, 1993.
Accordingly, we answer the question posed to us—whether deregulation by the ICC of TOFC/COFC service under the Staggers Rail Act exempts common carriers from liability under the Carmack Amendment—in the negative.15
We find no authority to support the district court‘s theory that the statute authorizing the ICC to create exemptions,
We therefore remand the matter to the district court with instructions to allow plaintiffs to replead their cause of action under the Carmack Amendment,
Albert J. Velasquez, Office of University Counsel, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN (argued), Michael E. Morkeh, Austin, Rowe & Hamilton, Indianapolis, IN, for defendants-appellees.
Before CUMMINGS and ROVNER, Circuit Judges, and SHADUR, Senior District Judge.*
SHADUR, Senior District Judge.
We deal here with a proposed Amended Complaint that seeks to bring individual defendants into a federal civil rights action—persons who were not named as defendants before the expiration of the normal two-year statute of limitations after they had engaged in the conduct that allegedly violated plaintiff‘s constitutional rights. Because the district court did not properly take into account the provisions of
* Honorable Milton I. Shadur, Senior Judge for the Northern District of Illinois, is sitting by designation.
swered here. Accordingly we remand the case to the district court for that purpose.
Legal Framework
In a sharp departure from the old “sporting theory” of litigation, “[t]he Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and affect the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits” (Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48, 78 S.Ct. 99, 103, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1958)). But competing considerations enter the fray when a lawyer‘s mistake (either of fact or of law) can prejudice the other side‘s defense. It may then become difficult or impossible to avoid a result dictated by the skill of counsel rather than by the merits of the client‘s case.
That tension of competing values is exemplified in
An amendment of a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when
(1) relation back is permitted by the law that provides the statute of limitations applicable to the action, or
(2) the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, or
(3) the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party against whom a claim is asserted if the foregoing provision (2) is satisfied and, within the period provided by
Rule 4(j) for service of the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by amendmеnt (A) has received such notice of the institution of the action that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and (B) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the party.1
It is well settled that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are to be liberally construed to effectuate the general purpose of seeing that cases are tried on the merits and to dispense with technical procedural problems. To this end, amendments pursuant to
Rule 15(c) should be freely allowed.
And as we said in Hill v. Shelander, 924 F.2d 1370, 1375 (7th Cir.1991):
Rule 15(c) ... recognizes that legitimate legal claims may not be squelched when a party mistakenly identifies a party to be sued within the meaning ofRule 15(c) .
This case is on appeal from a grant of summary judgment in defendants’ favor on the ground that the claims of plaintiff Carl Woods (“Woods“) against them were found to be time-barred—as is plainly the case unless Woods can successfully invoke
On appeal Woods argues principally that the district court misapplied
Factual Background
Carl Woods joined the Indiana University Police Department as a police officer in March 1973. Over twelve years later (on July 17, 1985) other officers allegedly witnessed Woods wearing hospital uniforms (“scrubs“). Based on that information Lieutenant Frank Ingram signed an affidavit that served as support for a search warrant of Woods’ home. During the search officers uncovered and seized such items as scrubs, marijuana and drug paraphernalia. On July 22, 1985 Indiana University suspended Woods, and then on July 26, 1985 it fired him.
On August 19, 1985 the Marion County prosecutor brought criminal charges against Woods. Those charges led to Woods’ conviction on a Class A misdemeanor: possession of drug paraphernalia. However, because “no reasonable well-trained officer could have held an objectively reasonable belief the search was constitutional” (Woods v. State, 514 N.E.2d 1277, 1283 (Ind.App.1987)), the Indiana Court of Appeals threw out the conviction.
On July 15, 1987 Woods filed a federal civil rights action against “Indiana-University-Purdue University at Indianapolis and Indiana University Police Department of Indianapolis.” That original Complaint and the accompanying summons were served on the University‘s Police Chief John Mulvey two days later. Because Indiana University enjoys the same Eleventh Amendment immunity as the State of Indiana itself (Shannon v. Bepko, 684 F.Supp. 1465 (S.D.Ind.1988)), on November 10, 1988 the district court granted defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. That dismissal was specifically stated to be without prejudice.
On December 12, 1988 Woods filed an Amended Complaint, naming as defendants George W. Cоmbs, John Mulvey, Scott Evenbeck, Clifford Robinson, Maurice Smith, Clyde Rogers, Douglas Cox, Francis Ingram and Larry Propst, all of whom were employees of the University or its police department during 1985. On March 2, 1990 the district court, citing Brunken v. Lance, 807 F.2d 1325, 1329 (7th Cir.1986), dismissed Woods’
Finally, in an opinion dated May 6, 1992 the district court granted summary judgment dismissing Woods’ claims against those defendants in their individual capacities as time-barred. That decision—which resulted from the district court‘s reading of
Rule 15(c)
Once an action has been timely filed, fairness militates against allowing a limitations defense to an opposing party who knows of the action within the required time frame—even though that party is named as a defendant only later, in an amendment that arises out of the same conduct, transaction or occurrence addressed in the original pleading (see generally 6A Charles Wright, Arthur Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 1496, at 64; id. § 1498, at 107 (2d ed. 1990 & 1992 pocket part)). That conceрt, which has its roots in the equitable notion that dispositive decisions should be based on the merits rather than technicalities, has been embodied since 1937 in
The principal function of procedural rules should be to serve as useful guides to help, not hinder, persons who have a legal right to bring their problems before the courts.
Consistent with its history and purpose,
But the path has not always been smooth. Most notoriously, Schiavone reached a result incongruous with
If a plaintiff files a timely complaint,
But if the plaintiff had named an improper defendant and had then cured that flaw only after the limitations period had run, in the absence of a relation-back principle the newly named defendant would be dismissed even though served with process before the
Schiavone aroused pointed criticism not only from the very outset (see Justice Stevens’ dissent, speaking for the Chief Justice and Justice White as well, especially 477 U.S. at 38-40, 106 S.Ct. at 2388-90) but thereafter. That criticism culminated in the 1991 amendment to
Because the record before us is unclear as to just when the individual defendants other than Chief Mulvey were first notified of Woods’ lawsuit, we cannot tell whether Woods does or does not need to invoke the current version of
We have not had occasion to consider whether and under what circumstances the 1991 revision to
In this instance the authority that promulgated the package of Rules amendments that included the
That the foregoing additions to and changes in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims, and the Civil Forms shall take effect on December 1, 1991, and shall govern all proceedings in civil actions thereafter commenced and, insofar as just and practicable, all proceedings in civil actions then pending.
precede or follow the date of the amendment.
But in the wholly different situation before us—one that unquestionably involves a “civil action[] then pending” before the district court on December 1, 1991—we honor the Supreme Court‘s express directive, and we therefore hold that the district court should have determined whether it was “just and practicable” to determine the parties’ rights and obligations under the new version of
(A) has received such notiсe of the institution of the action that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and (B) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the party.7
Given the district court‘s awareness of the 1991 amendment to
For the present case, the rule provides that if additional defendants receive notice within the applicable statute of limitations, and would not be prejudiced in defending, the amended complaint adding defendants would relate back.8
Consequently the district court failed to consider whether the result as to any defendant would be different under the old and the new versions of
Whether or not it proves necessary to apply the new version of
Both versions of
It is somewhat difficult to understand the path traveled by the concurrence on these issues of mistake and of what defendants should have known on that score. What it comes down to purely and simply is (1) that it was the legal blunder of Woods’ counsel—his “mistake“—that caused his continued (and fruitless) pursuit of state agencies rather than individual state actors as defendants in the case and (2) that the law ascribes to everyone, including the later-named individuals, the knowledge of the law that prescribes the potential Section 1983 liability of those individuals and not of the State itself—so that if it had not been for counsel‘s legal blunder, those individuals would have been the direct targets of the Complaint from the outset.
Hence the issues that the district court must address on remand do not include the tautological existence of a presumptively known mistake of the type specified in
Before we turn to what are indeed entwined issues—those of notice and prejudice—one other point should be clarified. Because the district court mistakenly thought that the original complaint was filed on August 13, 1987 (instead the case was actually filed on July 15, 1987), it apparently perceived the lawsuit as having been filed more than two years after the operative
Now for the issues that
In that respect the district court‘s analysis was incomplete. As to Chief Mulvey, the district court determined that service of the original complaint on him could not serve as proper notice. As to the other defendants, the district court concluded that Woods “notified the individual defendants on December 12, 1988, when [he] filed his First Amended Complaint.”
Both of those conclusions misperceive the thrust and the impact of
It has been suggested that the requisite notice must be given by the сontent of the original pleadings. Other cases have taken a broader view and have held that it is sufficient if the opposing party was made aware of the matters to be raised by the amendment from sources other than the pleadings, a position that seems sound since it is unwise to place undue emphasis on the particular way in which notice is received. An approach that better reflects the liberal policy of
Rule 15(c) is to determine whether the adverse party, viewed as a reasonably prudent person, ought to have been able to anticipate or should have expected that the character of the originally pleaded claim might be altered or that other aspects of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth in the original pleading might be called into question.
And both Hill, 924 F.2d at 1376-7811 and its reading of Kirk v. Cronvich, 629 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.1980)12 could not have been more explicit that the statute of limitations does not insulate from suit an individual who did not initially receive service (or other notice) in the correct capacity, so long as no prejudice resulted.
For purposes of the analysis it must be kept in mind that the Rule‘s language also expressly contemplates the prospect of the retrospective application of an amended complaint to a defendant who was not named originally but who was added only later, when plaintiff or plaintiff‘s attorney realized that the defendant should have been named at the outset. And that of course includes (indeed, it would far more commonly involve) a defendant who was not named at all to begin with (as was true in Kirk in the Section 1983 context, and as is true in virtually every lawsuit out of the Section 1983 context), rather than a defendant who was named at the beginning but was originally sued in the wrong capacity.
On the first aspect of the linked issues of “notice” and “prejudice,” Woods has claimed before us that all of the defendants conceded below that they did receive timely notice of the action. Whether or not that is so (a
As to defendant Ingram, the district court‘s holding plainly makes sense. Ingram‘s affidavit says that he left the police department before the original Complaint was filed and that he never received any notice of the suit before December 12, 1988. Woods has not identified any contrary evidence sufficient to defeat summary judgment. But as to each of the other defendants, neither the record on appeal nor the district court‘s opinion suffices to support the district court‘s holding. Instead the district court must determine both the accuracy of Woods’ assertion as to when those defendants knew of his suit14 and the factors that bear on the issue of prejudice.
In summary, on remand the district court should determine as to each defendant the date on which the limitations period began to run, the time and nature of the notice that he received and whether he would be prejudiced by relating back the Amended Complaint. Only after that is done can it be determined whether the requirements of
Other Issues
Like most appellants, Woods has advanced some fallback arguments as well as a few other bones to pick with the district court‘s rulings. None is persuasive, nor do they deserve much expenditure of time. We address the only two that merit discussion.
1. Official Capacity
Woods argues that even if his Amended Complaint does not relate back, both (1) his suit against the original defendants and (2) his claims against defendants in their official capacities were and are proper. As authority he directs this court to such cases as Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908) and Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116
2. Statutes of Limitations
Except for
Conclusion
We conclude that the district court erred by refusing to relate back Woods’ Amended Complaint without adequately addressing the interplay of
ROVNER, Circuit Judge, concurring.
I agree that we must remand this case to the district court for further consideration of the amended version of
Both the old and new versions of
(A) has received such notice of the institution of the action that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and (B) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the party.
The majority resolves the second prong of this two-part inquiry, leaving only what it perceives to be the distinct questions of notice and prejudice for the district court on remand. I would also have left for the district court the question of whether Woods made a mistake concerning the identity of the proper parties and whether the individual defendants knew or should have known that, but for that mistake, they would have been named as defendants.
The majority first concludes that Woods made a legal mistake and that beсause of the nature of the mistake, the individual defendants necessarily knew or should have known of it. On the question of mistake, the majority writes:
Nor, properly understood, is there an issue as to whether plaintiff made a “mistake” as to the identity of the proper party for this Section 1983 action, or as to whether Woods would have sued the proper party but for that mistake (cf., e.g., our opinion in Hill, 924 F.2d at 1374-78, and the explicit statements in Hampton v. Hanrahan, 522 F.Supp. 140, 144 (N.D.Ill.1981)
and cases cited there (“mistake” as used in
Rule 15(c) applies to mistakes of law as well as fact)).
(Ante at 886-87.) The majority then assumes that because the mistake was one of law, the individual defendants “should have known” that he intended to sue them:
Where as in this case ... the plaintiff‘s mistake was one of law, the proper analysis of that factor poses a question much like that of determining qualified immunity in Section 1983 actions: whether the legal proposition at issue was “clearly established.” As taught by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-19 [102 S.Ct. 2727, 2736-39, 73 L.Ed.2d 396] (1982), Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) and their numerous progeny, for that purpose the inquiry is objective and not subjective—in essence, all public officials are presumed to know clearly established law, whether or not they have in fact ever cracked a law book. Here there can bе no doubt that every state‘s sovereign immunity from, and all state employees’ personal exposure to, Section 1983 liability for constitutional torts was clearly established when this lawsuit was filed (even though that realization came only belatedly to Woods’ lawyer).
(Id. at 887.)
Although I agree that the concept of “mistake” can encompass mistakes of law, there is no support for the majority‘s matter-of-fact application of qualified immunity principles to
The majority‘s analysis effectively eviscerates the “knew or should have known” requirement, for subpart B of
Finally, qualified immunity principles are ill-suited for application to
I also am uncomfortable with singling out the “mistake” prong of the
Our decision in Hill v. Shelander is instructive. In that case, the plaintiff attempted to amend his complaint in order to sue a prison sergeant in his individual as opposed to his official capacity. 924 F.2d at 1371. The defendant had notice of the suit because he was already before the court, although in a different capacity. Id. at 1375, 1378.3 The court therefore concerned itself solely with the requirements of prejudice, mistake, and knowledge. In considering those issues, the court focused on the original complaint and found that its allegations should have notified the defendant that an individual capacity suit was intended. The original complaint in Hill had focused on the defendant‘s specific conduct, including the injuries he allegedly inflicted on the plaintiff. Id. Thus, the court found that the defendant “knew at all times that the suit against him was for the alleged constitutional injuries he personally inflicted on the plaintiff.” Id. at 1377; see also id. at 1378 (“We reiterate that whether the suit was against him in his official or individual capacity, Sergeant Shelander always knew that the lаwsuit was being brought against him.“). Moreover, although the plaintiff purported to state an official capacity claim, he had not identified “an official policy or custom adopted by the county and carried out by Sergeant Shelander” on which to base such a claim. Id. at 1378. In short, because the complaint focused on the defendant‘s own conduct and did not allege an official policy or custom, it provided sufficient notice that the plaintiff intended to sue the defendant individually.
Hill therefore requires that we look to the original complaint to determine whether, despite the mistake, the individual defendants knew or should have known that they were intended as defendants. The majority here fails to consider the allegations of Woods’ original complaint and relies instead on the
have been named as defendants in the original complaint.6
Although the majority shies away from the allegations in the original complaint, it briefly touches on the knowledge problem in discussing notice. (See ante at 888.) The majority suggests that even if the original pleading did not reveal the nature of the intended amendment, it is sufficient that the defendant “was made aware of the matters to be raised by the amendment from sources other than the pleadings.” (Id. at 888 (quoting 6A Charles Wright, Arthur Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 1497, at 92 (2d ed. 1990))).7 I agree, for example, that if Woods had notified one of the university police officers within the limitations period or within the 120-day period for service of process that he intended to name the individual officer as an additional defеndant (e.g., in the course of a deposition), there would be no question that the officer received adequate notice and possessed the requisite knowledge regardless of the nature of the allegations in the original complaint. But I have seen no evidence to that effect in this record. At most, Woods has suggested that the individual defendants knew of the existence of the original lawsuit against the university entities. In light of the original complaint‘s general allegations, however, knowledge of the lawsuit proves very little because it would not have caused a reasonably prudent police officer to expect to be named as a defendant. Our precedents
In Wood v. Worachek, 618 F.2d 1225, 1228 (7th Cir.1980), for example, the plaintiff alleged that certain police officers and city officials, as well as other unidentified police officers, had conspired to deprive him of his constitutional rights. When the plaintiff subsequently amended his complaint to substitute actual police officers for the previously unidentified defendants, the district court found the new claims barred by the statute of limitations. On appeal, we observed that although one of the added defendants was deposed by the plaintiff‘s counsel within the limitations period, so that he had knowledge of the lawsuit and that it somehow involved his conduct, the officer “did not receive such notice that he would not be prejudiced in defending the suit on the merits.” In other words, the deposition did not place the officer on notice “that he would be named as a defendant in the action.” Id. at 1230. Thus, in Wood, the officer knew of the incident at issue and that a lawsuit had been filed, yet we declined to apply
Norton v. International Harvester Co., 627 F.2d 18 (7th Cir.1980), also supports the view that notice of the lawsuit alone is insufficient. In Norton, the plaintiff filed suit against International Harvester (“IH“) when her husband died in an accident involving an IH tractor-trailer. After the statute of limitations expired, the plaintiff amended her com- 8 9
plaint to add as a defendant the gear division of TRW, Inc. (“TRW“), which had manufactured the steering gеar mechanism in the IH tractor-trailer. We did not apply the relation-back doctrine to this additional claim, despite the fact that TRW had knowledge of a potential problem with its steering mechanism and that a negligence action had been filed against IH. Because the plaintiff‘s original pleadings had focused on IH and failed to mention TRW or its alleged negligence, we concluded that “neither the initial pleadings nor the fact that TRW conducted an inspection of the gear mechanism provided TRW with sufficient notice that it might be named as a defendant.” Id. at 21.
In sum, I agree that the district court must consider anew the issues of notice and prejudice. I would also leave for the district court the related questions of mistake and knowledge. Depending on the nature of any notice provided here, Norton and Wood may be controlling, for they clearly hold that knowledge of the lawsuit alone is insufficient. My overriding concern, and the concern of those cases, is not whether the individual defendants merely had notice of the lawsuit, but whether each defendаnt had notice sufficient to indicate to a reasonably prudent person that he eventually might be named as a defendant.
Notes
With respect to the other defendants named in their individual capacities, I don‘t see that as a problem for the Court, because those people were notified about the complaint.Neither that statement nor any other part of that hearing transcript provides any basis for discrediting defense counsel‘s assertion during oral argument that the complaint referred to in the quoted excerpt was the December 1988 Amended Complaint, which obviously could not have served to notify defendants of the suit either during the limitations period or during the 120 days provided for service of process in Rule 4(j). At oral argument Woods’ counsel also maintained that the district court deprived him of the opportunity, which he had sought, to introduce evidence at the summary judgment hearing that all defendants knew of the suit. He also claimed that defendants’ counsel had stipulated in writing that all defendants knew of the initial complaint, but that he had not included that document in the record on appeal becаuse he thought that the transcript of the summary judgment hearing sufficiently demonstrated defendants’ concession of notice. Counsel must recognize that when compiling a record on appeal it is better to include and not to need an item than to need it and not to have included it. Nonetheless, defendant‘s counsel did acknowledge during oral argument that he thought he had told defendant Propst about the initial Complaint during the limitations period.