53 N.Y. 14 | NY | 1873
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *16 The court was not justified in nonsuiting, the plaintiff if there was any evidence of the want of probable cause for causing his arrest and imprisonment, or unless the case upon the whole proof was such that a verdict for the plaintiff upon that issue would have been set aside by the court as against evidence. (Marsten v. Deyo, 2 Wend., 424; Davis v. Hardy, 6 B. C., 225.) If the evidence on the part of the plaintiff would have justified the jury in finding that the defendant acted without probable cause, then, although the proof on the part of the defendant tended to the opposite conclusion, the nonsuit was erroneously *17 granted. There was no independent or conceded fact shown on the part of the defendant which, admitting the case made by the plaintiff, established the existence of probable cause. In considering the propriety of the nonsuit, the plaintiff is entitled to the concession that the facts existed as they appear in the evidence on his part, and upon these facts, aided by any fact favorable to the plaintiff proved by the defendant, the right of the court to nonsuit is to be determined. Probable cause, which will justify a criminal accusation, is defined to be a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in his belief that the person accused is guilty of the offence with which he is charged. (Munns v. Dupont, 3 Wn. C.C., 37;Foshay v. Furguson, 2 Denio, 617; Bacon v. Towne, 4 Cush., 218.)
It does not depend upon the guilt or innocence of the accused or upon fact, whether a crime has been committed. (Baldwin v.Weed, 17 Wend., 224; Bacon v. Towne, supra.) A person making a criminal accusation may act upon appearances, and if the apparent facts are such that a discreet and prudent person would be led to the belief that a crime had been committed by the person charged, he will be justified, although it turns out that he was deceived and that the party accused was innocent. Public policy requires that a person shall be protected, who in good faith and upon reasonable grounds causes an arrest upon a criminal charge, and the law will not subject him to liability therefor. But a groundless suspicion, unwarranted by the conduct of the accused, or by facts known to the accuser, when the accusation is made, will not exempt the latter from liability to an innocent person for damages for causing his arrest. A man has no right to put the criminal law in motion against another, and deprive him of his liberty upon mere conjecture that he has been guilty of a crime. He cannot be allowed to put a false and unreasonable construction on the conduct of another, and then justify himself for causing an arrest, by claiming that he acted upon appearances. The application of *18 these familiar principles to the facts in this case leads to a reversal of the judgment. It is not claimed that any larceny was committed, and there was not upon the plaintiff's narration of the circumstances any ground for charging the plaintiff with an attempt to commit a larceny. The case, as made by the plaintiff, is this: While upon the boat his attention was attracted to the defendant's child by her severe coughing and he went to the place where the defendant was sitting with his wife and child to inform him of a remedy, and not being able to pass in front of the defendant, he went behind him and touched him once or twice on the shoulder to attract his attention, saying he wished to speak with him. He was roughly answered and turned to leave, but turned back and stated to the defendant that he intended to speak with him about his child, and the defendant again replied with great incivility, and soon afterward caused the plaintiff to be arrested on the charge of an attempt to steal his diamond pin. The defendant wore a valuable pin in his shirt bosom, but it does not appear that the plaintiff saw it, nor had he touched the defendant's person, except when he put his hand upon his shoulder. Upon these facts, there was no reasonable ground to suspect that the plaintiff had a criminal motive. His conduct was neither unusual or improper. There was no act of the plaintiff which could be construed as an attempt to commit a crime. If the defendant entertained a suspicion that the plaintiff designed to take his pin, it was not justified by the circumstances. The evidence on the part of the defendant materially conflicted with that of the plaintiff, but we can consider only the case made by the plaintiff, and we are of opinion that the evidence on his part disclosed a want of probable cause for the arrest, and that the nonsuit was improperly granted.
The judgment should be reversed and a new trial ordered, with costs to abide the event.
PECKHAM, RAPALLO and FOLGER, JJ., concur.
CHURCH, Ch. J., GROVER and ALLEN, JJ., do not vote.
Judgment reversed. *19