This appeal raises one crucial question: whether the Illinois Appellate Court’s determination that Carl Dixon was not deprived of the effective assistance of counsel in his state court murder trial was unreasonable in light of
Strickland v. Washington,
I. History
In an appeal from a ruling on a petition for habeas relief, we review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error.
See Denny v. Gudmanson,
... Patrick Marshall [and] ... Christopher Carlisle [were standing next to each other on the sidewalk] when a green car pulled up. A man got out and shot Marshall three times with a .25 caliber handgun. Marshall attempted to run away, but only made it a half of a block before collapsing and dying....
*696 Carlisle was standing next to the body when the first police officer arrived on the scene. He told the officer that his friend had been shot by a black male who got out of a car. Carlisle, however, did not identify the shooter by name. He then went to the police station at 103rd where he apparently stayed overnight and was interviewed by detectives investigating the case. Sometime the next day ... he was interviewed by an assistant state’s attorney named David Studenroth. After the interview, Car-lisle signed a three-page statement ... [identifying] Carl Dixon as the black male who shot Patrick Marshall. Spеcifically, the statement said that Dixon got out of the green car and asked Marshall, “where’s my shit at.” Marshall responded, “I’ll get it to you, man,” and Dixon then shot Marshall.
Dixon was indicted for first degree murder. He hired attorney William H. Wise (hereinafter, defense counsel) to defend him. Many months before trial, defense counsel learned that Carlisle— the only eyewitness against his client' — • was prepared to recant the May 12th statement he gave to the police. On January 26, 1991, Carlisle visited defense counsel’s office and gave him an affidavit, in which Carlisle stated that “Carl Dixon was not the person [who] pulled the trigger of [the] gun that killed” Patrick Marshall.
Although defense counsel had a signed statement, he tоok the extra step of having Carlisle repeat his recantation in front of a court reporter. Two weeks later, on February 9, 1991, Carlisle returned to defense counsel’s office and gave a court-reported statement. He again asserted that Dixon was not the shooter and further explained that he only signed the statement implicating Dixon because he had been held at the police station for 14 hours and was told he could go home if he signed it. Before trial, defense counsel assured his client that, because the State’s main witness had recanted, there was no need to prepare a defense and no need for Dixon to testify.
Dixon,
When the trial began on October 30, 1991, Dixon waived his right to a jury and a two-day bench trial took place. During trial, the state focused on an incident which it believed provided the motive for the murder. Ashadu McPherson, the victim’s cousin, testified that on the evening of May 11th he was with Patrick Marshall, Dixon, and a group of other men. Dixon was showing off his new black 9 millimeter gun. When the gun was handed to Marshall, he ran away with it. Dixon then ran into his house and came out with a shotgun, which he put in the trunk of his car (a Monte Carlo with a red panel, according to one witness).
Dixon drove around looking for Marshall for several hours, accompanied by McPherson, Charles Jemison, and another man. Dixon said that if he did not get his gun back he was going to havе to do something to Marshall. McPherson’s and Jemison’s testimony about the ride was similar in most respects but conflicted on one key point: whether Dixon had a .25 caliber handgun with him (the police had located .25 caliber shell casings at the scene). McPherson testified that, at one point in the evening, he saw Dixon sitting in the driver’s seat with a small handgun in his lap, which McPherson believed was either a .22 or .25 caliber handgun. Jemi-son, on the other hand, had been sitting in the front seat and testified that he did not see Dixon with a handgun.
The State’s only direct evidence that Dixon killed the victim was Carlisle’s May *697 12th statement. When called by the State, Carlisle testified that he did not know who had shot the victim. When specifically asked whеther Carl Dixon was the man, Carlisle invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. When the trial judge ordered him to answer the question, Carlisle said that Dixon was not the man who shot Patrick Marshall.
The State next attempted to question Carlisle about the May 12th statement that he signed at the police station. Carlisle admitted that he had been at the police station and had been interviewed by assistant state’s attorney Studenroth. When asked whether he signed the statement, Carlisle again asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege. The trial judge allowed him to invoke it and prevented any further questioning about the statement. Counsel declined to cross-examine Carlisle but asked that the writ of habeas corpus be carried over for the next day of trial in case he wanted to usé Carlisle as a rebuttal witness.
On the second day of trial, the state called Studenroth, who testified that he interviewed Carlisle on May 12th and that Carlisle signed and initialed each page of the three page statement Studenroth had written. When the State asked about the contents of the statement, the trial judge sustained defense counsel’s objection and asked the State to tell him “under what theory of exception to the hearsay rule you are attempting to get this hearsay document into evidence.” The State indicated that it was relying on Section 115-10.1 of the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure.
Section 115-10.1 is аn Illinois statute which allows prosecutors to introduce prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence rather than solely for impeachment purposes. 725 III. Comp. Stat. 5/115-10.1.
1
“Passed by the Illinois legislature in 1984, Section 115-10.1 was an attempt to solve the problem of the ‘turncoat witness,’ who makes a statement to the police implicating the defendant but then comes to trial and recants.”
Dixon,
After the State indicated that it was relying on section 115-10.1 to admit the May 12th statеment, the trial judge asked how the statement was inconsistent with Carlisle’s in-court testimony. The State explained that, in court, Carlisle said that Dixon was not the shooter but his May 12th statement indicated that Dixon was the shooter. Counsel then objected, contending that the statement should not be considered as substantive evidence. Rather than arguing that one of the three statutory requirements had not been met, however, defense counsel relied upon an *698 Illinois Supreme Court rule that was irrelevant and a case which predated the passage of section 115-10.1.
The trial judge interrupted defense counsel’s arguments and told him that he was “still going to have to deal with 115-10.1.” Counsel continued to arguе that the State could not use the statement substantively because “[i]t’s been the law in Illinois and still is.” The trial judge again rejected his arguments, none of which addressed the statutory requirements, and ruled that the statement could come into evidence. Studenroth then resumed his testimony and explained that Carlisle identified Dixon as the man who got out of the car and shot Marshall. After minor stipulations, the State rested. The defense did not recall Carlisle as a rebuttal witness. Instead, the defense rested without putting on any evidence. After closing arguments, the trial judge found Dixon guilty of first degree murder.
Defense counsel moved for a new trial. By this time, counsel apparently had been made aware of sеction 115-10.1, because he argued that the three foundational requirements for admitting a prior inconsistent statement under that section had not been met. In particular, he argued that Carlisle’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment on direct rendered him unavailable for cross-examination. The State responded by noting that defense counsel never even attempted to question Carlisle. The trial judge denied the motion and sentenced Dixon to twenty years imprisonment.
On direct appeal, but still represented by the same counsel, Dixon alleged a number of errors, including that the May 12th statement should not have been admitted as substantive evidence because Carlisle was not available for cross-examination. The Illinois Appellate Court rejected this argument: “[defendant cannot claim a lack of opportunity to cross-examine Car-lisle when he did not even attempt to call [him] to the stand.”
People v. Dixon,
After exhausting his options on direct appeal, 2 Dixon engaged new defense counsel. On May 5, 1995, Dixon filed a two-count state court petition for post-conviction relief. This petition set forth the allegation now alleged in Dixon’s habeas petition: that defense counsel “did not know or understand [section 115-10.1] and assumed throughout the trial that [Car-lisle’s] out-of-court statement had no substantive force and that the State had, therefore, completely failed to make its case.” Dixon’s Petition for Post-Conviction Relief at 1. In Count I, Dixon argued that defense counsel was ineffective because he did not present a defense including, inter alia, the two statements Carlisle gave at defense counsel’s office (the affidavit and the court-reported statement). In Count II, Dixon argued that counsel was ineffective for not cross-examining Car-lisle. Both counts alleged that counsel acted as he did because he was not aware of section 115-10.1.
Dixon’s post-conviction petition was dismissed as “frivolous and/or patently with *699 out merit” in a three-page order dated June 23, 1995. People v. Dixon, No. 90-CR-14327, slip op. at 1 (Cook County Circuit Court June 23, 1995). The court concluded, with respect to Count I, that defense counsel could not be considered ineffective for not presenting the affidavit and court-reported statement because they were inadmissable hearsay. As to Count II, the court noted that “[t]he inquiry into the competency of counsel will not generally extend to the exercise of judgment, discretion, trial tactics or strategy” and found that defense counsel’s decision not to cross-examine Carlisle was reаsonable “because his testimony was favorable to defendant.” Id. at 2-3.
The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the post-conviction petition.
People v. Dixon,
Dixon subsequently filed a federal habe-as corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. That petition alleged that: 1) Dixon was denied the effective assistance of counsel when his defense counsel’s ignorance of the governing law resulted in the admission of the sole piece of evidence relied upon to support Dixon’s conviction; 2) Dixon was denied the effective assistance of counsel when defense counsel’s ignorance of the law led him to decline to present a defense; and 3) the only possible way of justifying defense counsеl’s actions was to conclude that Carlisle’s May 12 statement was, in fact, inadmissible because Carlisle’s unavailability for confrontation had already been demonstrated.
See
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 14, 17, 19. The district court granted Dixon’s petition on the first two grounds.
See Dixon,
II. Analysis
Our review of Dixon’s petition for habeas corpus is governed by the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254, because Dixon filed his petition for habeas relief after the effective date of that Act. AEDPA provides that habeas relief may be granted if a state court’s adjudication of a mattеr “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
*700
§ 2254(d)(1). A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court precedent “if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law” or “if the state court confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result opposite to [that reached by the Supreme Court].”
Williams v. Taylor,
Dixon’s petition alleges that the Illinois Appellate Court’s determination that he was not deprived the effective assistance of counsel in his state court murder trial was unreasonable in light of
Strickland v. Washington,
A. Whether Counsel’s Representation Fell Below an Objective Standard of Reasonableness
The Illinois Appellate Court found that it was “perfectly sоund trial strategy” for counsel to decide not to cross-examine Carlisle, though it did not determine whether counsel’s failure to present impeachment evidence was unreasonable (it found that, even if it was unreasonable, Dixon was not prejudiced). We review both issues
de novo,
but the former with “a grant of deference to any
reasonable
state court decision.”
Schaff v. Snyder,
After reviewing the record, the district court determined that counsel could not have been aware of section 115.10-1 at the time of trial. The court summarized the events as follоws:
After the State indicated that it was relying on § 115-10.1, the trial judge asked how the prior statement was inconsistent with the in-court testimony. The State explained that Carlisle on direct said Dixon was not the shooter and in the statement he said that he was. Defense counsel then interrupted and argued that the statement should not be considered as substantive evidence. Rather than arguing that one of the three statutory requirements had not been met, as you might expect him to do, counsel instead relied upon a separate Illinois Supreme Court rule and case — neither of which had any direct relevance to § 115-10.1. Counsel first said that the “controlling” rule in this case was Illinois Supreme Court Rule 238, which discusses under what circumstances a party may attempt to cross-examine its own witness. The trial judge interrupted this argument and told defense counsel that he should address the statute cited by the State: “First, before you get into [Rule 238], you’re still going to have to deal with 115-10.1.”
Rather than heeding the trial judge’s directive, defense counsel then cited to an Illinois case, People v. Bryant, for the proposition that a prosecutor may not try to “impart substantive character to prior inconsistent statements under the guise of impeachment.” He explained that there was “no question” that the State was trying to introduce the May 12th statement under the “guise of’ impeachment because the State had no other way to introduce direct evidence against the defendant. Defense counsel insisted that the State could not use the *702 statement substantively because “[i]t’s been the law in Illinois and still is.”
The trial judge rejected these arguments and ruled that the statement could come into evidence. [Yet counsel continued to] ask[ ] that the State explain how it was using the prior statement.
Dixon,
Yet, as the district court noted,
Strickland
focuses on whether an attorney’s performance was deficient, not on whether he was perfectly knowledgeable about the law.
Dixon,
Subsequent to the district court’s decision, however, the Supreme Court clarified the role of federal courts conducting habeas review.
See Williams,
The Illinois Appellate Court’s opinion stated that deciding whether or not to cross-examine a witness “is generally not an appropriate basis fоr a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.”
People v. Dixon,
*703
It seems very likely that the district court was correct in finding that counsel was not aware of section 115-10.1. Indeed, the appellant has conceded that counsel was unaware of it. If counsel was unaware of the statute, then his decision not to cross-examine Carlisle cannot be accorded the same presumption of reasonableness as is accorded most strategic decisions because it was not based on strategy but rather on a “startling ignorance of the law.”
Kimmelman v. Morrison,
We thus determine that, assuming counsel was unaware of the statute, it was unreasonable under Supreme Court precedent for the Illinois Appellate Court to conclude that the decision not to cross-examine was a decision that could be considered “sound trial strategy.” Even if counsel was aware of the statute (and all indications are that he was not), it would still have been an unreasonable trial strategy to decide not to attempt to render the sole piece of direct evidence against your client inadmissable, even if you were not certain you would be successful. Indeed, it would have been even more unreasonable for counsel to have made the decision not to cross Carlisle if he had been aware of the statute and equally unreasonable for the appellate court to have found it to be a reasonable strategic decision.
As for defense counsel’s decision not to present Carlisle’s previous recantations, the Illinois courts did not rule on this issue thus we may determine, de novo, whether counsel’s actions fell below the permissible level of performance. We find that there was no rational explanation for why counsel did not introduce Carlisle’s two recantations as evidence. There was absolutely no risk in dоing so. It seems clear that defense counsel did not think he had to put on a defense because he was certain that the May 12th statement could not come in as substantive evidence.
We thus find that the Illinois Appellate Court unreasonably concluded that counsel was not ineffective for deciding not to cross-examine Carlisle; we also find that it was unreasonable for counsel not to introduce the statements. Yet Strickland requires us to determine whether the defendant was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance. We turn to that inquiry now.
B. Whether Counsel’s Deficient Performance Prejudiced the Defense
The Illinois Appellate Court determined that, even if Dixon’s cоunsel
*704
was deficient, Dixon was not prejudiced. We review this determination as we did the first prong: to determine whether the state court decision was contradictory to or unreasonable in light of
Strickland.
“The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”
Strickland,
Dixon was convicted on a record so weak that the trial judge spoke directly to the issue:
“[A]bsent Carlisle’s impeachment there is no evidence connecting [Dixon] with the acts which led to the death of Mr. Marshall. There is no direct evidence. There is circumstantial evidence. But that circumstantial evidence ... just goes to [showing] the existence [of] motive, and the fact that Mr. Dixon was looking for the deceased after the events in that school yard.
Report of Trial Proceedings at B33 (Oct. 31, 1991). After determining that Illinois law permitted Carlisle’s May 12th statement to come in as substantive evidence, the court proceeded to sentence the defendant with the following analysis: “[the May 12th statement] stands unimpeached other than the fact that Mr. Carlisle is a convicted felon [thus] taken along with the other evidence in this case ... the court is going to enter a finding of guilty.” Id. at B35.
Given our determination that counsel was deficient for not cross-examining Car-lisle (to attempt to establish his unavailability) and for not introducing Carlisle’s pre-trial recantations, we agree with the district court that there is a reasonable probability that the outcomе would have been different had counsel not been deficient. First of all, notwithstanding the appellant’s protestations, it is reasonably likely that had Carlisle been cross-examined by Dixon’s defense counsel, Carlisle would have invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege. He did so on direct examination on the advice of his own counsel, and, during the course of Dixon’s appeal, Car-lisle provided an affidavit stating that he would have invoked the privilege on cross (of course, counsel did not have the benefit of this affidavit at trial). Even if Carlisle had not taken the Fifth, or if the trial judge had not permitted him to do so, Carlisle had already provided Dixon’s defense counsel with two signed statements indicating why the Mаy 12th statement was not true, and he would likely have explained this again on the stand.
Further, even
if
Carlisle had
not
taken the Fifth on direct, or had not explained why the May 12th statement was false, defense counsel still had the ability to impeach the May 12th statement by introducing Carhsle’s pre-trial recantations. There is a very reasonable probability that the judge would not have entered a finding of guilty had the statement — the sole direct evidence of guilt — been impeached. It is true that the judge did hear Carhsle’s trial testimony denying many of the facts contained in the May 12th statement; however, counsel did not explain the reason for Carhsle’s inconsistency and the judge drew
*705
a logical conclusion: that Carlisle’s recantation at trial was not credible.
See Washington,
We thus find that there is a reasonable doubt that, absent defense counsel’s errors, the trial judge would have had a reasonable doubt respecting Dixon’s guilt.
See Strickland,
C. Confrontation Clause
As we have already determined that the petition should be granted under Dixon’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we need not analyze the claim that Carlisle was unavailable for confrontation.
III. Conclusion
For the above stated reasons, we find that the Illinois Court of Appeals’ determination that Carl Dixon was not deprived the effective assistance of counsel was the result of an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. We therefore Affirm the decision of the district court to grant Dixon’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner is ordered to be released from custody unless the State of Illinois grants him a new trial within 120 days from the issuance of this opinion.
Notes
. At the time of trial the statute was Ill.Rev. Stat.1989, ch. 38, ¶ 115-10.1.
. Dixon filed a petition for leave to appeal with the Illinois Supreme Court, which was deniеd on April 6, 1994. On November 7, 1994, the United States Supreme Court denied his petition for certiorari.
. The district court’s opinion was issued on March 29, 2000, prior to the April 18th issuance of the Court's decision in Williams.
. Indeed, the Illinois Appellate Court recognized, in its opinion denying post-conviction relief, that “the issue of a trial counsel's competency is [not waived] for purposes of post-conviction relief ... when defendant's trial counsel also represents that defendant on direct appeal.”
People v. Dixon,
.Dixon’s habeas petition frames the issues slightly differently than how they were presented in his petition for post-conviction relief but for ease of review of the Illinois Appellate Court's opinion, we review the issues in the context presented there.
. We address appellant's argument that Car-lisle would not have invoked the Fifth Amendment, and thus that the statement would have come in regardless, infra.