Carl D. Pettyjohn v. United States

formally placed appellant under arrest.2 BURGER, Before TAMM and ROBIN- SON, Judges. Circuit At there is somewhat testimony. hearing pretrial conflict A TAMM, Judge: Circuit suppress on motion to Appellant During seeks degree conducted hearing court. reversal of convic Sergeant tion of (22 first Brown testified that murder D.C.Code (1967)).1 immediately placing appellant un- § Since after we find allegations produced none of three der arrest he his PD-47 card reversal, began telephone error necessitate it. A inter- to read conviction Only ruption be must affirmed. and the officer hand- two of intervened these al legations require Upon com- discussion. card read. Sergeant pletion telephone call Undisputed testimony adduced at trial testified he Brown asked reveals approximately that at 1:30 m. a. if the card he had read and understood August 4, 1966, appellant drove his appellant responded in the affirma- alongside car another vehicle in the 46). Sergeant (Tr. tive Brown testified C., northwest of Washington, section D. queried appellant then as he shotgun and twice fired a into that vehi “legal neighborhood he whether wanted a wounding cle occupants. one of its three neg- lawyer.” Appellant answered in the Appellant “pulled” then Miss Barbara ative. Thomas, occupants, one of the into his Appellant impris- your sentenced life what are. You have onment on right this count. He was also con- to remain not re- silent. You are say any victed on quired anything two counts of assault with a time us at dangerous weapon (22 502) questions. any Anything D.C.Code § or to answer years you say you and was sentenced nine three to can be used count, concurrently on each run court. You have the to talk to a his life lawyer question sentence on the first count. for advice before we you you during him to have Exactly when the arrest occurred is not you questioning. If cannot afford disposition. crucial to our is at least lawyer one, lawyer will and want arguable soon an- provided you. you If to an- want nounced he taken someone’s life he questions lawyer swer now without longer precinct. was no free to leave the you present stop will have 3. The answering card states PD-47 as follows: time. You also have answering stop WARNING TOAS YOUR RIGHTS time lawyer. You are under arrest. Before we ask talk until to a you any questions, must understand (a Appellant Detective-Sergeant appellant. member and read it signed Squad (see who was called this form Tr. Govern Homicide 2) ment exhibit No. it was read to Precinct after the Twelfth ap signing approached Upon completion Brown) him. of this testified that again pellant, the officer him that asked advised charged typewritten wished to arrest, him that he was make a statement. and told again Next, Appellant Detective-Ser “no” and was with homicide. answered appellant following geant up if he had locked m. asked until 10:00 a. Crooke rights. Upon arraigned morning, an af his which time he been advised of was response testified the officer before a firmative United States Commissioner. appellant Detective-Sergeant PD-47 card to that he read his testified that (Tr. 61). addition, officer testi In he did not take before a com specifically told fied that he missioner at he 3:00 a. m. because was ** lawyer “if he couldn’t afford a “aware that a United States Com * ** (Tr. lawyer for him” would be obtained missioner is available at issuing warnings, 62). day night arraign De After these time of the or de tective-Sergeant charged (Tr. Crooke asked fendants with a crime.” crime 64.) if he to “talk about” wanted (Tr. 76). Appellant did and that he said Appellant during took the stand they conversed the officer testified that hearing. pre-trial Appellant’s this coun until approximately a. m. 2:50 sought suppress appellant’s sel all of shortly The officer tes m. after a. 3:00 other initial thresh statements than the con tified he took notes girl old admission that he had killed his officer testified further versation. During hearing appellant friend. this generally the described testified that he did make such an admis leading up Includ the murder. events however, initially denied, He sion. appellant’s ed within this narrative was gave Brown ever him the PD- already knew I statement that “[s]he (Tr. 79) 47 card read but on cross-ex going I her I was to kill her. told receive amination admitted that he did * * * Sunday” going last to kill her 79C-D). card, (Tr. it but never read (Tr. 67). dis of this At the conclusion Appellant further that no one testified appellant if he officer cussion the asked ever to him that when read the card give typewritten statement “wanted to asked him if he wanted a officers (Tr. 67). Appel he of what had said” thought lawyer own he meant his negative responded lant 83). appel “personal lawyer” (Tr. Since said: officer testified that pay for could such a lant not afford “No, already I told about it and lawyer Ap he want one. said didn’t (Tr. this time down” At

wrote it pellant ever denied that either officer the of terminated and the discussion was one” “free told him that he could have a ap Precinct with ficer left the Twelfth (Tr. essence, 79-B). thrust the main pellant him to the Homicide and took testimony appellant’s was to contradict Squad Upon homi at the office. arrival testimony simultane the officer’s while approximately asserting m. ously 3:15 a. cide office at a claim happening. produced police understand form PD-54 what the officer pre-trial Appellant mo the PD- testified form is identical 4. The PD-54 suppress hearing following for the limited tion to of the card with the addition purposes hearing alone and he did paragraph: of that speak Fifth Amendment not waive his Consent my rights Simmons I am will- self-incrimination. what are. I know answer a statement to make (1968) ; Bailey lawyer. questons, I L.Ed.2d 1247 Unit want a do not U.S.App.D.C. 354, prom- doing. 389 F. am No ed understand what I me 2d have been made to or threats ises against me. used organized country argument by counsel crime should both in this After oral judge suffice to ruled undercut credence the trial Thus, Detective-Sergeant proposition. portion of Crooke latter today, that, we under the law the PD-54 form conclude admissible but that possible person regarding it testimony to waive it were inad- for a judge and to wish explanation, to remain silent missible. In he had action that questioning at discuss the stated that weigh- recently so taken must have Twelfth Precinct violation no.t heavily mind. so but that constitutional brought before he should possible, must is. Since commissioner soon he indicated meaning appellant did look to see if now didn’t wish to the matter discuss At this fully counsel. waive judge’s rul- more. We affirm the unlike this is a we note that ing.. entering police person a Miranda,, of a and, of a the utterance station before confessing mur by police, ato word the allegation Appellant’s first fact, Miranda the Court in der. In by error is him that all made specifically not that it did stated Detective-Sergeant were inad given missible at trial because purport inad- to find all confessions appellant’s rights in violation proper missible. Confessions remain a Arizona, Miranda v. 384 U.S. 86 S. Any element in enforcement. law (1966). Ct. We given freely and statement recognize agree certainly and is, any compelling influences without * * * course, interrogation The in continues admissible evidence. [i]f attorney import privilege presence without of an and fundamental of the custody heavy not taken, in a a statement is burden while an individual government he to talk rests on the to demonstrate is allowed whether police warnings knowingly in- that the and without the benefit defendant counsel, in- telligently privilege can be he waived his but whether requirement terrogated. re- no There is self-incrimination and person a appointed (Cita- police stop enters tained or a who counsel. omitted.) police tion wish- station states (footnote crime es to confess U.S. at at 1628. S.Ct. * * omitted) state- Volunteered *. At the of our we wish outset discussion by ments of kind are not barred reject, judge, proposi- did the trial ad- their Fifth the missibility Amendment submerged murky tion waters that in by hold- our affected not meaningful surround are waivers. We ing today.6 accept one unable to that no thesis intelligently important course, We, not can ever an do waive unable right voluntarily probe appellant’s or that mind in an constitutional endeavor intelligent attempt no he made a one who is reasonable or to discover whether meaningful Instead, A must would criminal act. ever commit a waiver. glance quick upper apply objective echelon of in deter- standard7 an Arizona, credibility police (s) 6. Miranda v. 384 U.S. officer testi- mony. objectively L.Ed.2d 694 The will then court assess all aforementioned factors determine whether the waiver was valid. By objective Supreme type mean that standard we set down Court validity waiver Miranda must of standard before Miranda in John- even inspection Zerbst, determined the court’s son v. U.S. particular Thereafter, involved, in- circumstances 82 L.Ed. 1461 cluding experience education, in re-asserted this stand- Court Miranda 1602, 16 conduct of the accused as well as the ard. mining not proper resolution of this reduced not to that he did claim allegations doing proffers but that Appellant no understand what he was issue. repu- was, retrospect, police, what he did in unwise he never of coercion thing the de- for him to A or do. reversal based altered diated his confession prior upon equally thereof, make un- did not such a claim would be tails and he addition, confessing. In wise. denials before intensely harassed not II interrogated the defendant as was Illinois, S. Escobedo Appellant’s is that second contention (1964). Rath- 12 L.Ed.2d Ct. promptly not tak after arrest er, appellant and approached the officer en before a United Commissioner States talk about asked him if “he wanted 5(a) of the Federal violation of Rule questions Appellant it.” all answered Rules of constru Criminal Procedure as freely easily, observ- all while by Mallory to, objecting the officer but not 1356,1 449, 77 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 1479 taking con- notes. It was applicable The standard in this area discussion, our re- unlike clusion the law has been enunciated Su States,8 cent decision Frazier v. United preme Court. McNabb v. appellant expressed view 608, 87 typewritten state- make wish (1943), L.Ed. 819 made it the Court clear questioning ment.9 At that officers of could detain the law ceased. person periods of a for time unreasonable by in a an effort to obtain a confession appellant’s Thus, reject we must degree” Subsequently, “third method. unwillingness to make contention that his 5(a) promulgated requiring Rule typewritten statement, of the the end at arraigned person that an arrested clearly questioning, indicates officer’s delay.” unnecessary The Court “without meaningfully his waived that never Upshaw then held in v. United right silent. constitutional to remain 410, 170, 93 L.Ed. 335 69 S.Ct. “No, exactly appellant was: What said Mallory (1948) the “stand 100 and that already it and wrote told delay’ unnecessary im ard of ‘without coupled language with This down.” plied no of the doc relaxation McNabb Detective-Sergeant testimony that (Mallory States, supra, triné” specifically times told several 77 at (1) silent to remain that he was entitled lawyer (2) afford a and if he could not Upon inspection of record be him, con for would be obtained one low, pre that cannot we find meaning that us vinces Mallory vail his two contention fully knowingly Fifth his waive disagree First, appel reasons. we with right remain silent. Amendment right to be lant’s claim that he has a analysis reality, objective all after an given “warnings” by impartial his an in judicial magistrate and circumstances involved despite factors the fact that really already waiver, position is informed of his appellant’s he had his “voluntary in waiver States 694. See also United L.Ed.2d (4th 1967), Hayes, F.2d Cir. full of the word.” Frazier v. Unit sense denied, States, supra U.S.App.D.C. cert. -, finding n. 20 L.Ed.2d In so appellant we have determined (de U.S.App.D.C.—, 419 F.2d effectively “adequately apprised his 14, 1969). cided March rights.” —, Id. argued 31, quoting 9. At the time this case was n. 419 F.2d from Mir yet Arizona, supra, issued and Frazier had decision anda by appellant’s upon Thus, coun relied was not feel that under fully court, course, cogni sel. in the test set out Frazier know teaching ingly meaningfully right find and we zant of Frazier’s waived to remain silent. agreed long ago, rights police in where the accused a case police feel a few confessed within crime them. We with discuss police argument borders at the here minutes after arrival eight Surely does not station then the law was detained on the absurd. days arraignment, prior person discuss allow just he has confessed crime to which illegality of Mitchell’s detention twenty period of some minutes retroactively change cir- does twenty appeal that then claim on cumstances under he made the which they spoke period * * * minute These disclosures. delay prejudicial in viola constituted through illegality. elicited Their not admission, therefore, arraignment. rapid tion of use would not be sight of and What has lost by the Government of the fruits of what needs illumination area wrongdoing by Being rel- officers. its interplay Miranda the law is the between evant, could be excluded Mallory. appellant, and by validly find that We punitive unrelated measure waiving his Miranda wrongdoing duty police. Our by agree attorney, silence and an shaping rules of evidence relates to speak police, has there propriety admitting evidence. Mallory to be power This is not to be used as brought magistrate quick before a “as disciplining indirect mode of miscon- ly possible.” supra, Mallory, duct. Indeed, occasion 77 S.Ct. 1356. we had Mitchell, United States v. recently to articulate limitation 88 L.Ed. 1140 upon Miranda has earlier effected agree (1944). We with Mr. Justice Mallory short, decision. In we held (the Frankfurter’s author of both Mc necessarily [a] valid Miranda waiver Mallory) description eloquent Nabb and * * * also immediate a waiver of an proper judicial power use of judicial warning of constitutional regard promotion justice (footnote omitted.)10 society in which we live. Thus, case, appel- in this hold that any Mallory lant im- claim to Lastly, appellant argue seems to voluntarily arraignment tacitly mediate agreeing Mallory an absolute bar speak police. Ac- questions, regardless with the of the ac cordingly appellant’s statements, given willingness crime, cused’s to discuss the during period, properly this admit- were appearance between arrest before a ted magistrate. into evidence. putWe this contention to rest in 1965 in Alston v. United Secondly,appellant’s Mallory con U.S.App.D.C. prevail tention because, cannot notwith (opinion Judge McGowan): of standing any waiver, Miranda state complained given ments here were not of reading in the Mal- literalness of during period delay unnecessary a lory (the argument question that no delay bring hence the seven hours may be asked of the accused between ing appellant magistrate before a cannot arraignment) arrest and is an exces- retroactively vitiate an otherwise valid opinion decision, exaltation of sive over Supreme confession.11 The held Court that, absent further direct ad- States, supra 10. Frazier v. United applied retroactively. should be See Om -, U.S.App.D.C. 419 F.2d at nibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (1968) ; 82 Stat. 197 District Bill, Columbia Crime 81 Stat. 734 Mallory 11. Since we find that there was no regard, In this see also Frazier v. United violation, thorny we do not reach the States, supra questions Mallory of whether has been (dissent Congressional -, limited nn. recent enact- F.2d at Burger). statutory opinion Judge ing ments or whether standards given warnings duly con- Supreme lant Court monition from in-custody stitutionally prerequisite questioning no whatso- there can be and, so, police interrogation if opinion whether ever, * * * in Mitchell earlier its understandably voluntarily vitality waiv- continues present dur- ed his provides the admissi- to have counsel the warrant Sergeant bility his conversation with threshold confes- of so-called Crooke. sions. further admonition has ema- Such questions and are Miranda2 These Supreme Court since

nated from the in the properly each answered affirmative, in perceive I no crucial sum, today Mallory.3 we hold For valid “[a] volvement with police properly necessarily, were for the Miranda waiver waiver, admitted since the record reveals waiver also a duration meaning- warning judicial of con immediate an fully rights. Miranda, to remain silent. waive And stitutional what thereby Further, interpretation, waiver was leaves a constitutional ** may ar- liberty yield, waiver immediate accused at event, raignment and, appel- Mallory. forego equally Provided given exacting statements were lant’s for waiver standards delay. Mallory period unnecessary Accord- overriding purpose met, ingly, appellant’s re conviction if Miranda served.”4 And has been in this quirements satisfied were Affirmed. Sergeant qual the statements evidence, un into ROBINSON, ified for introduction III, SPOTTSWOOD W. delay by subsequent incidental Judge (concurring result): affected Circuit judi appearance before colleagues join my in affirmance cial officer.5 appellant’s conviction, for reasons not entirely coinciding they ex- with those hearing testimony adduced press. sep- Hence for this the occasion state- suppress those motion to opinion. arate issue sharply on the conflicted ments warnings were Appellant does not contest the admis Miranda whether sibility Sergeant he handed given. said of his unsolicited utterances Brown warnings immediately upon Brown made card on which entry appellant, after written, into the Precinct stationhouse.1 Twelfth and that card, controversy ead, stated having apparently Inst read warnings rages that beyond-the-threshold over his the that he understood Sergeant Crooke, is unneces- to which desire counsel. he did not highly damaging to sary express contained admissions as whether a view to cogent compliance premedita acceptable to the deliberative and as a procedure is degree Sergeant tes- Miranda, murder. tive elements first for warnings ap aspects of this the Framed two broad himself read tified that peal, appel- questions responded appellant are whether that he 1, Arizona, Compare Mitchell, supra 1. Miranda v. 384 U.S. v. 5. States United 436, 1602, 896, 478, 70, 694 88 L.Ed. 16 L.Ed.2d 86 at 64 S.Ct. 322 U.S. ; Mitchell, (1966) States, 1140; 322 126 U.S. United States v. Mathies v. United 65, 69-70, 896, 312, 98, 101, App.D.C. L.Ed. 315 88 F.2d U.S. 374 States, (1944). ; (1967) 119 U.S. 1140 Coor v. United 784, App.D.C. 259, F.2d 785 340 supra Arizona, note 1. v. 2. Miranda (1964), 86 S. cert. denied Bailey Mallory (1966) ; States, 3. L.Ed.2d 527 15 Ct. U.S.App.D.C. 241, States, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 117 v. United, 542, 544-545, denied cert. F.2d U.S.App. 244 4. Frazier L.Ed.2d (March 14, D.C.-, lawyer. declining appel- corporal. True is that held the rank of There was “upset” suggest capacity that he was too little to lant avowed that lacked Sergeant simple read the card tendered to fathom the rather advice and Sergeant Brown, incorporated warn- that Crooke never admonitions into the warn- him, that he understood ings.7 Sergeant ap- Brown testified that attorney proffer to refer of an latter’s pellant appeared normal and rational lawyer,” “personal did to a which he questioned stationhouse, when at that, cred- have. But it is evident Sergeant “calm,” him as Crooke described ibility fa- in the Government’s resolved “very cooperative.”8 “coherent” sup- vor, sufficient the evidence was surrounding nothing There in the warnings port its thesis that susceptible peculiarly circumstances given.6 actually interpretation misap- tending Also introduced was evidence prehended he was what the officers said comprehension of appellant’s to establish ample told.9 This evidence afforded age, he warnings. years of Then 34 conclu- foundation an affirmative through ninth had school attended understanding sion Army for grade, and had served warnings given.10 actually during he had years, two three Moreover, the rea- 16 L.Ed.2d 694. Appellant not contend does 6. declining sign gave son warnings not sat- the card written on already simply that “I told isfy to content. exactions as Miranda Significantly, wrote it down.” it and sup- District Court 7. Not before police headquarters when apparently hearing, pression nor again sign a statement refused to written report trial, time reason, related —once more for the stated by Sergeant Crooke, psychological examination already “I had trial. of his a month within conducted already had statement and that he report our Appellant tendered * * * ”— happened had told me what consideration, Government which the signed a form con- he nevertheless taining waiver report discloses, objection. The has no warnings had the Miranda average alia, low “of an evaluation inter given These cir- at the stationhouse. “any intelligence” average seri- without distinguish remand in cumstances our memory, general attention, ous defects supra Frazier v. United knowledge knowledge norms of social permit note- where the accused refused culturally prescribed behavior.” taking had narrative and we nei- on his findings dissipate appel- ther evidence nor found that can be The most development potential Sergeant an indi- of that this score favor on lant’s legal ef- cation that he misunderstood seemed Crooke’s statement ficacy quite depressed,” confession. See id. of an oral a reaction “a little to be happened. 10-13. after what normal knowledgeable finding hardly suggested and intelli A a conclusion Such partic gent properly waiver rests on “the reveal his difficul refusal surrounding sign ular facts and circumstances a written or to deceased ties with the including background, orally ex- [the] re he had of the events confession erienee, light the accused.” and conduct In the Crooke. lated to Zerbst, willingness Johnson and where how to delineate unwilling See homicide, 82 L.Ed. his he committed the Hayes, logically 385 F.2d why also United States explain in he did it ness to (4th 1967), pain topic merely cert. denied Cir. was that the dicates impending 20 L.Ed.2d 106 U.S. the than ful reasons other for (1968) ; F. talking Narro v. legal consequences it. of (5th 1966), sign Cir. cert. denied 387 2d 329 a written statement to The refusal completed 87 S.Ct. had came after Crooke, Sergeant on his to oral version hearing pro at the sergeant There was little contest notes without took which the comprehen- specifically issue appellant, on the and the discussion test Appellant’s immediately upon the claim was not that sion. terminated warnings Arizona, that were misunderstood su Miranda v. the refusal. Cf. all, forthcoming his pra at were note U.S. at prove for the Government voluntarily walked into the sta suitably warned.11 that purpose informing tionhouse for the surrendering Beyond that, heavy police rest[ed] burden “a the of the homicide and government that mself,14 demonstrate on the a circumstance other tri hi intelligently knowingly and bunals signifi the defendant as well have considered against self-incrim- privilege cant determination as to waiver.15 ap- ruling retained ination His on the motion embraced the counsel,”12 that demonstra- pointed conclusion that Miranda as well as Mal subjective application lory requirements tion involved had been observed. submitted were Both issues test.13 Thus urged the Miranda facets here on the judge, decision trial and his the fully explored hearing, in a plausible basis no leaves motion Miranda, judge’s the trial conclusion that foünd deci- doubting he each that on ready support demands were met draws sively appellant. from intensity the evidence. The of the litigation warnings over the trial sharp- hearing focused suppression judge’s sensitivity to the matter of waiv- warn- question ly whether on the er satisfactorily demonstrate that his major engendering given, ings were ruling encompassed the factual conclu- the mo- Disposition of dispute. factual which sions suffice sustain the Gov- unavoidably resolution tion involved position. Certainly ernment’s passing judge, dispute. The trial of that future, experience after the in this acutely motion, remained on the part it is the better wisdom re- as problem of waiver alert judges expressly to rule on waiver and gards appellant’s statements to delineate on the record the reasons rejected the emphatically He Crooke. inducing reached. whatever decision is no circumstances argument Here, however, judge’s statement so He possible. intelligent waiver explicated far his treatment afford as at appellant’s conduct distinguished acceptance of the reliable basis for decided stationhouse, he which precinct ruling embracing intrinsically subsequent evidence, let into findings problems of vital to the warn- police form the waiver execution ings and waiver. Mal- on he excluded headquarters, which particular lory grounds. BAZELON, Judge, attached He Before Chief fact weight TAMM, WRIGHT, uncontroverted McGOWAN, LEV- evidentiary presentation concentrated morning ar- of his was undertaken expressly judge claim. The rest.” on testimony friend of a credit declined determining prime importance 15. “Of ciga- smoked a had was an effective waiver whether there “dope” containing on kind of some rette appellant, is the these fact month date some undefined parental apparently acting under some homicide occurred. guidance, surrendered himself supra Arizona, 11. Miranda telling police with the intention of them 16 L.Ed. happened.’ had That tell ‘what so 2d 694. police very within a short time after interrogation begun is likewise Id. 86 S.Ct. 1602. considering significant. the conduct appellant, therefore, as it bears on supra 13. Frazier v. United question waiver, think it mani- -, person, fest was not such n. decision, contemplated the Miranda interroga- who, by all re- information at custodial reason “[H]ow suddenly spect tion, placed compul- came to defendant first under a to this authorities,” police speak might said sion to where he other- attention respect Md.App. bearing State, judge, “has a so.” Brown v. 3 the wise do mind, (1968). and as state A.2d Com- the defendant’s of 239 766 throughout pare States, what- v. F.2d state of mind continued Davidson United interrogation, period questioning, (10th 1966). ever Cir. Yes, ROBINSON, sir. DEFENDANT:

ENTHAL, MacKINNON Judges, ROBB, in Chambers. Circuit why you are THE COURT: Is pleading? ORDER Yes, DEFENDANT: sir. Curiam. Per your I will not take THE COURT: sug- On consideration very right. plea. you Thank All rehearing banc, is gestion it en sorry, I much. am Mr. [Defense ap- en banc Court Ordered the Counsel]. suggestion denied. pellant’s aforesaid Yes, Your DEFENSE COUNSEL: Judge Bazelon as of Chief Statement Honor. rehearing grant en why he would Subsequently, the defendant tried banc. first-degree and convicted of murder Judge: BAZELON, Chief imprisonment.1 to life sentenced murder, first-degree ap- Indicted for We are a diffi- therefore faced with attempted pellant trial and before important concerning question cult but government full consent guilty standards to be used District plea of withdraw second-degree accepting rejecting in bar-. guilty Courts charge plead gained pleas guilty.2 clear During It question- seems murder. course appellant’s attempt guilty plead plea, validity to determine fact, second-degree was, murder colloquy following occurred: likely bargained plea. Yet it seems right. All THE What COURT: that, accepted had the District Court say say? you want want You inquiry, plea without further it would something take I do not want open on attack have been to collateral on your plea tell me what unless grounds This of involuntariness.3 your mind. might support last statement seem to nothing anyone It is DEFENDANT: does, the result if it in this case. But It time over else has done. de- we have established a doctrine that jail. been there may fendants free on bail avail them- months. selves of the benefits4 substantial THE Since when? COURT: plea bargaining, who have whereas those 14 months. DEFENDANT: About subjected to the in- theretofore been being THE Are de- COURT: human conditions all too common in .tired not, may tention over facilities5 unless there? transcript appear “county jails” pending It does trial. carceration in except plea invalid insofar Memorandum for United States quoted may States, in- as the in text Shelton United (1958). dicate. States, Amsterdam, Segal, 2. See United 4. See A. B. M. Mil- Griffin v. & (1968); ler, App.D.C. 108, F.2d Trial Manual the Defense of U.S.App. McCoy United Criminal Cases 206-219 §§ For a D.C. 363 F.2d 306 Speaking long-term facilities, detention problem, aspect see different of the same on Law En- the President’s Commission Scott v. of Jus- forcement and the Administration -, (Feb. at ---, “ [ojvercrowding tice concluded that some, are idleness the salient features of brutality corruption General of a one the Solicitor few others.” least jails plea guilty then [in based his conclusion that added that “local partly pretrial place] improperly obtained least most incarceration takes every generally inadequate on the fact the most defendant jail way.” Report; insistence Task Force 18 months Corrections likely in- trial was to result in further

661 judge and to least two willing damned.8 is -vulnerable lie to to trial The first played no constitutional attack. lines of say have conditions that these guilty. upon the individual plead of these would focus to part decision their guilty plea operates A defendant. faced that we are not believe I do by jury, trial a waiver of the to resolution, impossible of problem awith and cross-examine to confront will although that resolution I do believe right against accusers, and one’s pres- easy. In the context not be Alabama, Boykin self-incrimination. v. pre- possibilities case, at least two ent 238, 243, 1709, 23 L. 395 89 S.Ct. U.S. themselves: sent effective, any (1969). To Ed.2d 274 be properly re- plea here was The rights must “volun- waiver of these be allowing a defendant jected because McCarthy knowing.” tary Unit- and v. second-degree guilty mur- plead States, 459, 466, 89 S.Ct. return for dismissal der 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 first-degree charge an unneces- plea guilty A is “more than a con sary unconstitutional6 therefore and fession which admits that the accused guilty pleas and encouragement of Boykin Alabama, supra, various acts.” v. waivers attendant their 395 U.S. at 89 at 1711.9 If this S.Ct. jury, by trial, so, very then at least those stand self-incrimination; or developed ards to test voluntariness practice above mentioned 2. The guilty apply of confessions should plea constitutional, im- field, pleas. classical coercion rejected properly because the rigorous theory developed a has test: inquiring judge continued should * * * inquiry “the constitutional surrounding the circumstances into whether the confession was ‘free quilty plea determine the tendered voluntary: is, ex must not be [it] desire the defendant’s whether any vio tracted sort of threats or independent guilty plead had a basis lence, direct im nor obtained simply apparent to be desire of his ” slight.’ plied promises, Mal however other an institution transferred loy Hogan, v. 84 S.Ct. jail.7 than the D.C. quot (1964), States, 168 Bram v. United U.S. I. 542-543, 18 42 L.Ed. 568 plea bargaining guilty practice (1897). Therefore, any plea has The discussed, widely praised by promises in fact that was induced Jackson, Newman, U.S. The De- 6. See United States v. 8. See D. Conviction: 20 L.Ed.2d Innocence With- termination of Guilt or sup- (1966) (extensive empirical Of course would Trial out study) ; Note, case; present port Inducements the result Official ground decision, Guilty: Suggested should Morals for a this is the Plead (1964) certainly explicit. Marketplace, be made 32 U.Chi.L.Rev. 167 proper (practice absent constitutional present could also judicial Guilty case participation); Note, result Plea ground supported counsel Bargaining: Compromises Prosecutors Guilty to have Pleas, his client’s to Secure U.Pa.L.Rev. rejected by failing (a) guilty plea to ob- (1964) (practice proper limited ject rejection judicial it was encouraged) ; Note, the time participation plead (b) made, the motion to to renew Unconstitutional Condi- Another Look at trial, guilty tions, (1968) (prac- at the commencement 117 U.Pa.L.Rev. (c) close of unconstitutional). motion at renew the tice government’s dubious case. While argument, validity 9. See also such Machibroda United ground 487, 493, L.Ed. if that is the I note here (1963) ; 2d Kercheval should be told. decision the bar 71 L.Ed. guaranteed escape pen attack death vulnerable to leniency be would ap alty) exchange guilty pleas involuntary in of confession.10 This an by “encourages” pleas. Under Jack taken such proach the one in essence is then, bargain son, practice Bailey plea MaeD v. of in Circuit the Fourth dissenting ing justified constitutionally only by can be ougall,11 the two grounds necessity.15 on judges United States.12 in Shelton v. Jackson, 390 U.S. United States (1968), L.Ed.2d 88 S.Ct. II. starting line second for a plea bargaining constitutional, If it bargaining. plea Court on attack go unsupervised.16 should not Yet the dealing provision of awith there was present places state of law even the allowed Kidnapping Act Federal judge most conscientious trial in dif- by trial on who insisted defendants noted, position. already ficult As I have Rather jury to death. to be sentenced judge the trial in this case was almost considering the effect of stat- than certainly accepting in correct not particular defendant who ute on plea on the basis of the evidence before rights,13 examined the Court problem by him.17 The is that remain- system It held that as a whole. ing constitutionality plea silent federal statute is evil bargaining, provide any we do not indi- pleas guilty necessarily coerces it inquiry might cation that further simply jury it waivers plea. uphold validated the If we are encourages needlessly them. bargained pleas, I think we must also power duty delineate the (em and the at 1217 at 88 S.Ct. courts, faced with a situation such as hardly de original). phasis It can be present one, offering to conduct a further in- defendants shorter nied that us, (or, quiry. in the case before sentences subsequent guilty plea every made guilty 10. That a that plea defendant who enters a leniency would, promise charge to a to a under the Act does so necessarily imply approach, involuntarily.” 390 U.S. at 88 S.Ct. promise, product it was the at 1217. See United States tainted. therefore Jackson, pleads guilty 14. A defendant who to sec- plea ond-degree exchange was influenced But if the murder in for dis- involuntary. promise, first-degree charges it would missal of murder es- capes possibility put being all to death (4th subject precisely pressures 11. Cir. 392 F.2d 155 condemned in Jackson. (5th Cir.), en reversed 242 F.2d 101 1957), (5th banc, re 15. The 246 F.2d 571 Cir. briefs in Jackson devoted consider- space possible confession of error the Soli able versed on to a discussion of the General, impact practice citor of the decision on the Admitting plea bargaining. Note, See Another Look tainted, plea Conditions, the Soli view the Unconstitutional 117 U.Pa. long petitioner’s Although citor General relied on L.Rev. 179-180 government’s at pains confinement and on lpast the Court in Jackson took some (aside arguably improper emphasize importance guilty conduct itself). bargain pleas Memo process, from the mere to the criminal it did not plea bargaining. 13-14. for the United randum mention 390 U.S. at 584-585, of these For a more extensive discussion 88 S.Ct. 1209. States, supra cases, see Scott v. U.S.App.D.C. supra 16. See Scott at 135 at ---. at ---, 419 F.2d 264 at F. 272-274. 264; 2d id. 419 F.2d 264 Kidnap- (concurring opinion Judge the Federal fact “[T]he at 279-281 discourage ping Wright). Act tends to defendants insisting upon from demanding their innocence implies jury hardly pp. supra. See 1-2 are who to defendants already requires tem available course, Rule 11 Of they comfortable, either because more inquiry the circumstances surround- into are in or because out bail guilty plea certain that make prison. fully spread upon bargain, any, better appears that a record.18 When the proffered appellant’s rea- A full examination guilty a plea the result is guilty might pleading well have sons for bargain,19 particular ex- must be care plea was volun- established accepting it,20 only but By ercised accepted. tary and should have been it-, bargain rejecting it well. If simply pun- terminating inquiry, we plea, is not a factor vitiates self imprison- lengthy appellant for his ish rejected simply be- should not be D.C. Jail. ment may other, impermissible factors cause acting upon the defendant have been plea Particularly a a is

well. when charged,21we than the one lesser offense deny defend- slow to both the

should be government disposition ant and the SCHRAIER, Appellant, Charles in- in their best that both believe to be terests.22 Secretary HICKEL, Walter J. bargaining be held Plea should Interior. per- sub If it is constitutional missible, silentio. No. 22616. de- not be defendants should arbitrarily Appeals prived either United States Court its benefits Circuit. District Columbia governmental through It misconduct. or thing say in- that extended is one 24, 1969. Argued April carceration, despicable prison condi- or July 1969. Decided guilty tions, may plea and al- void subsequently to demand low a defendant quite another for

a trial. us despicable con-

hold incarceration may prevent from

ditions a defendant sys-

availing himself of the benefits of 2d D.C. at (emphasis added). McCarthy produce plea [the] States, supra (1969) is entered voluntariness — at — - —, —, v. United complete : “Rule See record at the States, ^[11] factors relevant determination.” 419 F.2d is intended 22 L.Ed. U.S.App. Scott time normally defendant. er than could unlikely differential guilty was he will defendants guilty plea, uncertainty not he liable to impose who insist on rejected. Although apply defendants whose have been greater the same he will even punishment expense trial would seem imposed upon sentence judges sentencing be forced plea great- trial, upon who any- shy away normally 22. Courts 19. This should not be a difficult deter- thing mination, appears plea be an interference deemed to since it that most except prosecutorial discretion, bargaining in the District of Columbia plea guilty cases collect- most extreme cases. See the lesser involves to a offense Washington charged. ed in than the one See Scott v. Unit- supra 922- 401 F.2d note 2. Foster, (1968); United States v. 20. This is so because the line between (D.C.Mun.App.1967), and cases A.2d permissible bargains impermissible reject judges If are free to bar- cited. may pp. be a fine one. See 661-662 judicial gained pleas, the result supra and cases there cited. prosecutorial min- control of discretion plea sought If a individ- to be entered imal when it is exercised to an rejection charged, detriment, to the offense its substantial when will ual’s consequences have far less in his favor. serious for the exercised

Case Details

Case Name: Carl D. Pettyjohn v. United States

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit

Date Published: Nov 19, 1969

Citation: 419 F.2d 651

Docket Number: 21666

Court Abbreviation: D.C. Cir.