113 Kan. 398 | Kan. | 1923
The opinion of the court was delivered by
The board of education of the city of Belle-ville and its officers were enjoined from discharging the plaintiffs from the Belleville high school for nonpayment of an additional tuition charge. Defendants appeal.
The case was submitted on facts alleged in defendants’ answer and upon which there is no dispute. An accredited high school with a four-year course is being maintained by the board of education of the city of Belleville, a school district of Republic county. There are enrolled in the high school one hundred and seventy pupils, fifty-three of whom reside in Republic county, but not within the Belleville school district. There is no other class “A” accredited high school in Republic county, and the plaintiffs reside outside of the district but in other districts of the county where there is no high school, and in communities where there are not a sufficient number of high-school pupils to organize and maintain another high school. Some of them do reside near to other high schools which are outside of Republic county. It is conceded that the plaintiffs are minors, having the qualifications to enter and attend the high school,
The right of plaintiffs to high-school privileges in the district is based upon a section of the statute cited which reads as follows:
“In eveiy county in this state in which provision is not otherwise made for free high-school tuition for every qualified pupil residing in said county, any pupil residing in any school district which does not maintain a high school with a four-year course accredited by the state board of education shall be admitted to any acpredited high school in said county, on presentation of a common-school diploma signed by the county superintendent of public instruction and certifying that said pupil has completed the course of study prescribed by the state board of education for elementary rural or graded school; and the tuition of such pupils shall be paid as hereinafter provided: Provided, That any pupil residing in any school district, which does not maintain a high school with a four-year course accredited by the state board of education shall, if he desires, be admitted to the high school nearest his residence in the county of his residence or adjoining county; whether such high school maintain a four-year course or less and his tuition shall be paid in the same manner and from the same fund as provided when attending an accredited high school maintaining a four-year course.” (Laws 1915, ch. 314, § 1; Gen. Stat. 1915, § 9361).
Defendants contend that the statute is so ambiguous and inconsistent in its provisions as to be incapable of enforcement, that its operation would be oppressive and unjust, and that if applied to the present situation would violate provisions of the state and federal constitution. It may be granted that the act is not free from ambiguity, but if it is open to interpretation or admits of two constructions, one of which will destroy it and the other preserve and give effect to the manifest intention of the legislature, it is the duty of the court if it is reasonably possible, to adopt the latter construction. (Young v. Regents of University of Kansas, 87 Kan. 239, 124 Pac. 150.) The obvious purpose of the legislature was that pupils residing in districts not having an accredited high school should be given free high-school privileges at public expense and to that end prescribed entrance qualifications and provided a fund to pay the tuition of such pupils. It is said that the provisions of the
It was next urged that so construed the act would operate unfairly and oppressively in that nonresident pupils from all parts of the county might demand admission to the defendant high school so that it might become overcrowded, and also that the expense of providing facilities and instruction for nonresident pupils might greatly exceed the revenue derived from the levy made by the board of county commissioners under chapter 242 of the Laws of 1921. This is a problem for legislative consideration, and presumably the legislature has given attention to the matter of facilities and the cost of providing them lor the nonresident pupils. It has created a school system for the state, of which the defendant is a part. It is an auxiliary organization of the state and all of its powers and'rights have been acquired from the state, and it can only exercise them in accordance with the conditions annexed by the legislature. It is subordinate to the legislative will, and it may require school districts to impose taxes, erect buildings, employ teachers and fix the conditions upon which pupils shall be admitted to the schools. The matter of the maintenance of common and high schools is not a matter of mere local interest but is one of state concern, and the legislative power in respect to such schools is supreme. (The State v. Freeman, 61 Kan. 90, 58 Pac. 959.) If the conditions imposed upon the district prove to be too burdensome an appeal should be made to the legislature and not to the courts. So far as the present case is concerned it does not appear that the buildings of the de7 fendant district- are overcrowded, nor yet That its facilities are insufficient to care for the nonresident pupils, and it was for the legislature to determine the amount of compensation which the district should receive for the facilities and instruction furnished to such pupils. It cannot be held that the measures provided are so burdensome, oppressive or unjust as to invalidate the act.
It is further contended that the act violates the constitutional provision requiring a uniform and equal rate of taxation. The contention is that it imposes a burden upon the district not only for pupils within the district but also to maintain schools for the benefit of those outside of the district, and therefore there is a lack of uniformity and equality. It is enough that the tax to be raised for the purpose shall be uniform and equal within the taxing district.
There is no ground either for the contention that the act is obnoxious to section four of article eleven of the -constitution, which provides that:
“No tax shall be levied except in pursuance of a law, which shall distinctly state the object of the same; to which object only such tax shall be applied.”
While the action is not an attack upon the levy of a tax, it may be said, in response to the objection that the tax to- provide a fund for the purpose named, is to be levied in pursuance of a general law in which the object was stated and the tax is to be applied to that purpose. (The State, ex rel., v. French, supra.)
We discover no merit in the contention that the act as it is interpreted infringes the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution.
The judgment is affirmed.