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Cardinell v. State
644 A.2d 11
Md.
1994
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*1 A.2d 11 Laura Beth CARDINELL Maryland.

STATE Term, 32, Sept. 1992. No. Maryland. Appeals of

Court of July *2 Colvin, Harris, (Stephen Mark Asst. Public Defender E. Bernhardt, Doyle Public Defender and Julia Asst. Public Defender, brief), Baltimore, for petitioner. both (J. Ince, Curran, Jr., Ann

Mary Atty. Joseph Asst. Gen. Gen., brief), Baltimore, Atty. both on for respondent. MURPHY, C.J., ELDRIDGE, Argued and before RODOWSKY, McAULIFFE,* CHASANOW, KARWACKI BELL, JJ.

McAULIFFE, Judge. principal questions: This case involves two did the trial judge authority have to reduce the defendant’s sentence when did; not, he and if any right did the State have action to of Special Appeals? question the Court The first is readily negative; answered under the facts of this case * McAuliffe, J., retired, participated hearing now in the and conference of Court; being- this case while an active member of this after recalled Constitution, IV, 3A, pursuant participated to the Article Section he also adoption opinion. in the decision and of this modify the sentence. authority had no judge the trial difficult, that we exam- requires more question second of the State law and trace a common ine jurisdiction. court acted without when the lower criminal cases of that applicability that we consider the requires It also case, and determine whether to the facts of this doctrine legislature. extinguished by has been

I. Court for pled guilty the Circuit Laura Beth Cardinell of cocaine and two to one count of distribution County Garrett impris- of cocaine. She sentenced possession counts of timely motion years. of three She filed onment for a total Rule pursuant Maryland for revision sentence seven months after sentence Nearly motion was denied. *3 for “supplemental” motion the defendant filed imposed, day on granted motion was of the sentence. This revision filed, execution of the judge the trial ordered that it was imprisonment three-year sentence portion unserved supervised placed and that the defendant be suspended, later, years. days appar- Two probation three court, action taken filed an answer ently unaware of the motion, court no arguing that had to the defendant’s on the motion. jurisdiction to entertain or act timely appeal Special filed a to the Court The State held, trial among things, That court other Appeals. in excess of his judge authority acted without and therefore and that the jurisdiction, appeal, that the State was entitled must be vacated. modifying trial court’s order the sentence Cardinell, Md.App. We to consider the petition the defendant’s for certiorari granted questions presented: two holding Special Appeals

1. the Court of erred Whether had a the lower court’s the State (1974, [Maryland clear Code despite language order Article,] Proceedings Courts and Judicial Repl.Vol.), 12-302(c)(2)? Special Appeals holding the Court of erred Whether revisory power the trial court lacked over the sen- tence? order. questions address these reverse

We

II. authority to modi clearly The lower court was without fy or reduce the defendant’s sentence when it did so. The sequence of relevant events is as follows: imposed.

4 Oct 90 Sentence 27 Dec 90 Defendant’s Motion for Revision of Sentence filed. denying

3 Jan 91 Order filed defendant’s motion. May motion for revision “supplemental” Defendant’s of sentence filed.

1 May granting “supplemental” 91 Order filed defendant’s reducing

motion and sentence. Maryland provided,1 pertinent part, Rule 4-345 as follows: (a) Illegal may illegal Sentence.—The court correct an sentence at time.

(b) Modification or Reduction—Time court for.—The revisory power upon has and control over a sentence days motion filed within 90 ... imposition after its court, an appeal circuit whether or not has been filed. The strike, may modify or reduce or but not increase *4 1, 1993, 4-345(b) January 1. Effective Rule was amended to read as follows: (b) revisory Modification or Reduction—Time For.—The court has power upon and control over a sentence a motion filed within 90 Court, (1) days imposition in the after its District if an has not (2) court, perfected, been and in a circuit whether or not an Thereafter, revisory power has filed. been the court has and control fraud, mistake, irregularity, over the sentence in case of or or as (d) provided may in section Rule. this The court not increase a imposed, except may sentence after the sentence has been that it correct an evident mistake in the announcement of sentence if the correction is made on the record before the defendant leaves the following sentencing proceeding. courtroom Thereafter, has reviso- the court of, a sentence. length fraud, in case of the sentence control over ry power mistake, irregularity----

(c) modify, re Hearing.—The may court Open Court court open only on the record duce, a sentence or vacate heard.[2] opportunity and an be parties to the after notice of sentence motion for modification first The defendant’s however, that motion, point, At was denied. timely. That following imposi- 90-day period when the and thereafter The so- pending. motion was expired, no tion of sentence was filed motion for modification “supplemental” called under the Rule. later, efficacy had no simply months a common law or inherent enjoy judge The trial did imposed. he had legal sentence modify to reduce or has, however, been revisory power common law A limited out for this Court Judge Digges pointed As recognized. State, 433 A.2d 1150 Ayre 155,. control of judgments are under the all Maryland

“[i]n entered, during they are the term which during court inherent out or power to strike the court has that time criminal cases.” Madi- civil and modify judgments both In 425, 431, son or rescind- modifying or rule either of a statute the absence authority survives. ing power, this such (some omitted). A.2d 1150 citations Id. 291 Md. 114, 123, 522 A.2d 945 also Christian (1987) that a court the common law doctrine (acknowledging during judgments its and orders authority over plenary has entered). they are the term which revisory power extends Assuming, arguendo, cases, and that it has not been in criminal imposed sentences judge comply with the passing trial did not We note in omission, (c) not to requirements of Rule 4-345. That while of section countenanced, point We are here concerned not the we address. act, authority and not whether the court with the requirements do not affect its procedural have failed to follow jurisdiction. *5 386 4-345,3

supplanted by Rule the principle applica- would not be ble here because sentence was imposed September, court, expired term which when the new term of court March, began Monday on the second 1991.4 The order reducing May, the sentence was not entered until 1991.

III. Having judge determined that the trial lacked the power did, this reduce defendant’s sentence when he we turn to question of whether this Court is authorized to IV, § entertain the noted the State. Article Maryland the Constitution of provides part that “[t]he Appeals of the Court of shall be co-extensive with the limits of may the State and such as now is or hereafter be A prescribed by part law.” of the law of which that constitu provision tional speaks is the common law as it existed in England and in this colony day July, on the 4th and is not inconsistent with the constitution of the State or its new See Declaration of institutions. political Rights Maryland, Buchanan, State v. 5; Article 5 H. & J. majority

A of Special Appeals’ panel consider ing statute, case held that was permitted by the alternative was permitted under the common law that principle appellate entertain an review contention that an inferior court acted in excess of its Cardinell, State v. jurisdiction. supra, Md.App. 1123. agree We do not that enough the statute is broad to authorize the State’s appeal, agree but we do pursuant will lie to common principles law that have not been legislature. abolished S., 510, 514, (1982) 3. In re (suggest- Glenn 445 A.2d 1029 Cf. ing dealing revisory power the civil rule with of the court has cases). supplanted the common law rule in civil 1206(1 ) Maryland (providing County Rule in Garrett begin Monday terms of court shall on the second in March and September). authority statutory suggested Article, 12-302(c)(2) Proceedings the Courts *6 (1974, provides perti That Repl.Vol.). section Code .in as follows: part nent

(c) case, provided In a the State criminal in this subsection.

[*]

(2) if the judgment from a final may appeal The State impose failed to alleges judge the trial State that mandated the Code. specifically by sentence panel reasoned majority Special Appeals’ A of the Court law,5 the force of by this Court have promulgated that rules authority granted him judge trial acted outside the that the 4-345(b), and that modified sentence was Maryland Rule Cardinell, State “by not authorized Code.” therefore 458-60, 601 1123. This Md.App. at broad in the that was belief interpretation adopted the statute a have that the State have legislature must intended “[t]he as these under circumstances such where contrary that to law.” Id. imposed trial court a sentence was that the Although agree legislature 601 A.2d 1123. we of the statute did not intend the enactment this section com- important long-standing deprive State power, mon law when court has exceeded its does, to, or agree do not that the statute was intended we codify right. Ordinarily, legislature speaks when the Code, more statutory it of the State. The means the law more, general encompasses including term “law” much law of the and the rules of this Court that have common State of law. think the used word legislature the force We 12-302(c)(2), § in its ordinary signification “Code” not consequently does authorize the State’s section in this case. does, however, law enjoy a common

The State Buchanan, In under these circumstances. Constitution, IV, 18(a). Maryland Article supra, 5 H. & J. at our predecessors noted that even statute, in the absence of a King might case; have a writ of error in a criminal since

it would be absurd to that a say man who had obtained judgment acquittal indictment, for a defect or on a verdict, special could again never be indicted for the same offense, until error, if reversed writ a writ of error not would lie.

Pointing out that Attorney General Luther Martin had prose- cuted writs of criminal error on behalf of the State in various Oyer Terminer, cases tried the Court of & c. for County, Baltimore the Court said: And there is no why sufficient reason the State should be entitled to a writ error a criminal It case. *7 perhaps exercised, a that should be seldom and never for purpose oppression, the of or necessity; without which rarely, can and it is supposed happen, would never would not be by public tolerated But as feeling. the State offender, has no in punishment interest the of an except for the purpose general justice public connected with the welfare, no such is to be apprehended; abuse and as the power of revision is calculated to produce uniformity decision, it is proper that the writ should for lie the in the proportion same as it is essential to the due justice, administration of the criminal law the land known____ should be certain and Id. In Rayner (1879), 52 Md. 368 Judge Alvey said for the Court:

It only where the Circuit proceeded Court has without jurisdiction right or to hear and decide the case that an appeal or writ of error may be taken to this court to reverse judgment the thus unwarrantably rendered.

Id. at 374. Judge Alvey further stated:

If judgment the of the court below had been rendered power jurisdiction case; without or to hear and decide the instance, for law, if the not appeal had been authorized by or if judgment had against been rendered the party his notice, of defend- opportunity or legal and without absence had, in rights, court the asserting or his or the himself ing jurisdic- the limited of its transcended judgment, rendition preju- the it; party in all such cases conferred upon tion appeal. would have had the the diced words, have would been want In other there judgment, and for Court to render the in the Circuit would exist. the of review reason Id. at 376. legislature provid- Laws of Chapter

By proceedings were entitled parties ed that the to criminal proceedings, civil exceptions the same manner bills cases taken in the same in criminal could be appeals and that Markell, for Judge writing in civil the Court manner as cases. Adams, (1950), noted State Act, “presents only not that under review questions also questions presented by exceptions bills but record, only formerly on the reviewable appearing face on writ of error.” Fisher, 104 A.2d 403

In State authority judge challenged suspend the trial This sentence. Court said: [Sjtate challenge suspension form of does

order; it creating contends that Statute misdemean- sentence, power of all stripped suspend specified on the conditions the Statute itself. except appears statutory it the face of Since the record *8 met, question were the the legality conditions jurisdictional.... is suspension While State’s chiefly “as on” in has Maryland writ of error been quashed, in was we recognized cases where indictment application, and has a somewhat wider principle think in instant lies the circumstances of the case. 312, 104 Id. at A.2d 403. 1957, Maryland provided that January

Effective Rule securing by method of review this Court was the sole law, except permitted by appeal, where certiorari that writs of error A were abolished. committee note to the Rule stated that writs of error had been abolished because they disuse, had fallen into Poe, and cited 2 John Prentiss (5th Pleading and Practice 1925) at 782 Tiffany ed. for proposition is no “there distinction in principle be- tween writs of error In Liquor Board v. appeals.” Handelman, 152, 161, (1957), 129 A.2d 78 this Court said with respect Rule 810 that “the views which led to its adoption make it clear that it effected no change substance in the law it previously existed regard with to the absence real difference between on appeal review and review as on writ of error.” Jacob, State v.

In (1964), 199 A.2d 803 State’s challenged authority of a magistrate trial grant probation without verdict. The initially State had chal- lenged the action petition writ of certiorari filed with a court, circuit and its appeal was from a denial of relief court. This Court held that trial magistrate had no authority, jurisdiction, and thus no to grant probation without verdict. The Court further jurisdiction held that trial magistrate properly tested the circuit court by certiorari, and that because circuit court acted in its capacity as a common jurisdiction law court of original ruling petition, from that court would lie. Significantly, the Court contrasted the lack of authority of the trial magistrate, which it jurisdictional, characterized as with a irregularity mere in the proceedings.

No question presented with regard to- the magistrate case; the trial to try the his power to dispose it by probation issue, this, without verdict is in we think, presents a question which is essentially juris- one of diction, rather than of mere irregularity the proceedings. Id. (footnote omitted). 199 A.2d 803 Shearin, State ex rel. Sonner v.

More recently, 325 A.2d 573 questions before the Court power involved the of a circuit court judge suspend sentence which the legislature had mandated should not be

391 Court, This appeal. to of State suspended, and punish- to and fix the authority “the define recognizing that States, 242 legislative,” Ex Parte United for crime is ment that the trial L.Ed. 129 held 37 S.Ct. U.S. Concerning of the authority. his judge had exceeded to this Court said: appeal, Fisher, light language of the holding in considered [T]he Handelman, supra, and the subse- Board v. Liquor used Jacob, from for an authority is quent holding sentence, the issue of the trial illegal since imposition of it jurisdiction involved in the sense of whether court’s is prescribing penalty powers vested it exceeded thus exceeds its contrary to law. A lower court which it of last resort. Were must be bridled power otherwise, could Assembly mandates of the General public only protection and the impunity defied with which process judicial be the torturous of removal would error. correcting specific would not have effect clear, Sonner, It is supra, 272 Md. at therefore, Sonner, the common up that at least to the time of to from an action of lower law the State remained in- jurisdiction court that was outside that court’s tact. case us no judge

The trial in the before had inherent authority, any authority by common law nor virtue of or rule, or at the time statute reduce defendant’s sentence power so. in this case authority he did The absence jurisdiction, as that judge means the trial acted without dealing has used cases with State’s term been (absence See, at e.g., Rayner, supra, 52 Md. appeal. Fisher, jurisdiction); equated supra, to absence of power (where stripped at 104 A.2d 403 trial legislature Md. sentence, power suspension judge suspend legality Jacob, at jurisdictional); supra, 199 A.2d 803 is probation without verdict (power magistrate grant pres question jurisdiction irregularity rather than mere ents Sonner, 325 A.2d 573 proceedings); court’s (stating that the “issue of trial *10 powers involved in the sense of it the whether exceeded vested Warden, it”). 654, 658, In Czaplinski v. 75 A.2d (1950), the 766 Court stated:

Where the sentence has been decreased term, the the after cases which reported we have been able to find discuss the court, that point beyond hold this is also of the power upon the generally ground when a sentence has been enrolled, and has passed, jurisdiction become court concluded and the court is has no further authority. in original). (Emphasis

Federal cases are in accord. Rule “virtually 4-345 is identi- 35(b).6 cal” to former Federal Rule Criminal Procedure Johnson v. 29, 39, (1975). 333 A.2d 37 Our review of the cases considering federal rule7 and similar state modeled federal rules after the rule8 indicates that here, pertinent substantially 6. For reasons federal rule was 1984, amended in and the new version became on effective November 1, provided revisory 1987. The earlier rule that a court could exercise power over a sentence motion days if a were filed within 120 (1966). imposition of sentence. Fed.R.Crim.P. 35 appeals considering 7. The courts federal have issue been unani jurisdictional. mous in their conclusion the time limit is Hill, 507, (7th 1987); v. United States 826 F.2d 508 Cir. United States v. Jackson, 712, (4th denied, Cir.1986), 802 F.2d 716-17 cert. 480 U.S. 931, 1568, (1987); Ames, 107 S.Ct. 94 L.Ed.2d 760 States v. United 743 denied, 46, (1st Cir.1984), 1165, 927, F.2d 48 cert. 469 U.S. 105 S.Ct. 83 (1985); Blanton, 209, (6th L.Ed.2d 938 United v. States 739 F.2d 213 Rice, Cir.1984); 455, (11th Cir.1982); United States v. 671 F.2d 459 Janovich, 1227, denied, (9th Cir.), v. United States F.2d 688 1228 cert. 915, 228, (1982); 459 U.S. 103 S.Ct. 74 L.Ed.2d 180 United States v. Ferri, 147, denied, (3d Cir.1982), 1211, 686 F.2d 154 cert. 459 U.S. 103 1205, Colvin, (1983); S.Ct. 703, 75 L.Ed.2d 446 United States v. 644 F.2d Counter, (8th Cir.1981); 374, 704 United States v. 661 F.2d 376 (5th Cir.1981); Kahane, 491, (2d United States v. 527 F.2d 492 Cir. 1975). Supreme expressed The Court has the same view in dictum. Addonizio, 178, 189, 2242, 2235, See United States v. 442 U.S. 99 S.Ct. 60 L.Ed.2d 805 States, 511, (D.C.1991); 8. See v. United Alston 590 A.2d 514 State v. Parrish, 599, 1371, (1986); 110 Idaho 716 P.2d 1372-73 Letourneau, Saft, (1989); Kan. 244 769 P.2d 678 State v. (R.I.1982); Therrien, State 140 Vt. 442 (1982); (Wyo.1982). Stewart P.2d jurisdictional, require are therein encompassed limits time Practice if In 8A Moore’s Federal not observed. dismissal (2d Ed., Rev.), author states: § 35.06[1] to reduce sentence requirement that motions The Rule 35 a rigid is days triggering events filed within district court to decide limit motion. Federal and Proce- Wright, A. Practice

Similarly, 3 Charles (2d 1982) the author concludes: at 410 ed. dure 35(b) jurisdictional; if are limits of Rule time rule sentence is a untimely motion is under the and the one, act. powerless lawful *11 omitted). (Footnote important and the limited have examined traced but

We has from the earliest right appeal law that existed common Sonner, we time of and have through of this State days sufficiently that it is broad embrace determined that, although in this case. taken We note Court, jurisdic- appellate exclusive initial originally was to the Court of in this of case has been transferred type tion (1974, Repl.Vol.), Appeals. Maryland Code Special Article, § Proceedings (providing and 12-308 Judicial Courts has initial Special appel- “the Court of exclusive Appeals that decree, any judgment, order late over renewable ...” a circuit for the limited except or other action of 12-307). pursuant to this We jurisdiction reserved has, question legislature then to the of whether the now turn Sonner, that any right. statute enacted since abolished (1957,1968 in applied The statute that Sonner Md.Code provided: § 14. RepLVol.), Art. That section may appeal Special Appeals to the Court of State dismiss, judgment granting from a or a motion final order information, indictment, dismissing quashing any pres- or or action, inquisition in a criminal but entment have in criminal action where shall no acquitted. has been the defendant tried statute, That in first enacted this form by Chapter 399 of the Acts defined certain instances when the State could expressly stated when the State could not appeal. Sonner This Court considered that statute said 5, § “Art. 14 specified some instances which there was a right of appeal by the State. It did not purport to limit the of appeal.” 272 Md. at 325 A.2d 573. part

As a process, Code revision the laws governing appeals were recodified in the Courts and Judicial Article, See Chapter Proceedings 1,1974. effective January 1,§ Acts of the First Extraordinary Session of 1973. Section the Courts Article granted general rights of appeal. 12-302(c) Section contained the following exception applicable to the State’s a criminal case: case,

In a criminal appeal only [S]tate from a final granting motion to dismiss or quashing or indictment, dismissing any information, presentment, or in- quisition a criminal case. 12-302(c). Art., §

Md.Code Cts. & Jud.Proc. There is no indication legislature intended to change the meaning the law this change language. We have said repeatedly

[rjecodification presumed of statutes is to be for the purpose of clarity change Thus, rather than of meaning. even a change in phraseology of a statute a codification will *12 not ordinarily modify the law unless the change is so material that the intention of the General Assembly to modify the law appears unmistakably from language the the Code. 236, Special

In re Investigation No. 573, 576-77, 295 Md. 458 (1983). See also Monumental A.2d 75 Ins. v. Co. Trust Life ees, 442, 449, (1991); 322 Md. State v. Burning 588 A.2d 340 Club, Inc., Tree 254, 265-66, 366, 315 Md. cert. 554 A.2d denied, 493 U.S. 110 (1989); S.Ct. 107 L.Ed.2d 33 G, Nationwide v. USF & 314 Md. 131, 147, (1988); 550 A.2d 69 Stern, Rohrbaugh v. Estate 443, 449-50, 305 Md. (1986); Pub., Consumer Protection v. Consumer (1985); 731, 768, Conaway, Duffy 501 A.2d 48 Moreover, the Revisor’s Note 12-302(c) no intention to alter it that there was § makes clear 5, § The Art. 14. that existed under rights the substantive briefly § how the new explained 12-302 Revisor’s Note to predecessor: from differed its statute (c) essentially the lan- NOTE: Subsection REVISOR’S an § The language proscribing of Art. 14. guage omitted State acquittal is since by the State after an in the set forth in the limited situations may only appeal in any section event. Extraordinary § Session

Chapter Acts of the First as not be read Thus, § like 12-302 should predecessor, its appeal. Even an limitation on State’s absolute cannot now “only” in the new statute inclusion of the word limiting, that word reading mandate a of the statute Laws 49 of the Chapter 1976. See deleted amendment again amended of 1976. When the statute was that “only,” but again bill once included word proposed 493 of the prior Chapter to enactment. See word was deleted are deter- Laws in mind that we bound Keeping of 1982. legislature, mine the intent of the Jones and enforce 398, 405, think facts A.2d 471 we these legislature codify indicate enacted circumstances, but not to appeal in certain State’s by common law. strip rights already established State it significant is also articulated The amendment bring appeal. another instance which State 1976 version read:

(c) case, may appeal: In a criminal the State (1) a motion to judgment granting From a final dismiss information, indictment, pres- dismissing any or or quashing entment, inquisition;

(2) alleges final if the From a mandat- judge impose specifically the sentence trial failed ed Code. *13 (1974,1976 Art., §

McLCode Cts. 12- Cum.Supp.), & JucLProc. change 302. This is consistent approach with the taken legislature it right whenever has dealt with the State’s appeal: specific out spelling may instances when the State abolishing right without the common law to jurisdiction. has when the lower court acted outside its Those provisions of the essentially statute have remained the same nothing intent, since 1976.9 We see legislative to indicate a or strip either 1976 to to State of the recognized fact, In in Fisher. language the statute and subsequent its amendments indicate that it not should 12-302(c), construed a limit right. as State’s Section predecessor, § like its Art. lists instances where the may may appeal. not said in What we 14§ § Sonner about Art. to applies equally 12-302: “It did to purport appeal.” not limit the 272 Md. at § to say A.2d 573. That is not 12-302 should be used as finding rights a basis for of appeal; merely new we hold that § 12-302 operate did eliminate the long-standing State’s firmly of appeal judgment established from a final involving action outside the of the lower court. statute, above, legislature again 9. As mentioned amended the time, 1982. At that it identified another circumstance in which the appeal. State has the The amended statute also contained reads, language changes. part, minor It in relevant as follows: (c) case, may appeal provided In a criminal the State in this subsection. (1) may appéal judgment granting The State from a final a motion indictment, information, quashing dismissing or dismiss or presentment, inquisition. (2) may appeal alleges The State from a final if the State judge impose specifically that the trial failed sentence mandat- ed the Code. (3)(i) involving a case In crime of violence as defined 643B Article the State from a decision of a trial court requires that excludes evidence offered the State or the return of property alleged to have been seized violation of the Constitution States, Maryland, Maryland United the Constitution of or the Rights. Declaration of (1974, Jud.Proc.Art, Repl.Vol., Cum.Supp.), Md.Code Cts. & § 12-302. *14 in which this recent decisions acknowledge In we holding, so right concerning the State’s questions has entertained State, 288, 83 v. 577 A.2d Shilling 320 Md. See appeal.10 of State, State (1989); 568, (1990); Telak v. A.2d 225 315 Md. 556 Hannah, cases 390, 514 A.2d Those v. Md. 16 307 “ if it question, in serious ‘placed the statute contain dicta that an eliminate, right appeal to the State’s completely did not and reiterat in the earlier cases illegal recognized sentence ” Telak, 573, 225 at 556 A.2d Sonner.’ 315 Md. ed 16). Hannah, supra, 307 Md. 514 A.2d (quoting 83. now Shilling, supra, also Md. at 577 A.2d We 320 of right appeal law the limited common make clear that State’s the was not abolished have described herein which we thereto. subsequent §of 12-302 or amendments enactment criminal, occasions, civil11 and many Court has on both This of means curtail- recognized that there must be some effective beyond the gone completely who bounds ing judge trial has just to judicial authority. applies, of Judicial review errors, of prevent usurpation power. legal correct but to the post-Sonner legislation that codified certain of The fact to, mean it intended rights appeal State’s to does not that was appropriate at this 10. A word about the basis those decisions Hannah, (1986) juncture. In v. 514 A.2d State (1990), Shilling appealed 577 A.2d judge impose judgment probation to before decision of trial Thus, despite statutorily cases mandated sentence. both those 12-302(c)(2) express § appeal an in the statute. relied to find Although legislative respect scope both discussed intent with to statute, required go beyond the neither was statute. Likewise, we 556 A.2d in Telak untimely. was based on the fact was Our decision ruled judgment” “final based on Hannah to the extent that it found that the order, probation purposes and not the later order was Thus, denying illegal an Telak was the motion to correct sentence. too exclusivity alleged something than the based on other presented directly question here. did not rule on the McNeece, See, County e.g., Montgomery (“[Ejven (1987) conferring of a the absence statute appeal, appellate an entertain an to review a conten- court its appellate an trial acted in excess of tion that inferior or jurisdiction.”). did,

or abolish the challenge beyond jurisdiction of an inferior court.

IV.

Conclusion judge The trial authority power had no to reduce a pursuant criminal sentence to a motion filed seven months This imposition after sentence. defect is not simply procedural, jurisdictional. it is The State has a continuing common law action was outside the court, jurisdiction of the lower and this case was therefore *15 of properly Special Appeals. before the Court THE JUDGMENT OF COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS.

ELDRIDGE, BELL, JJ, RODOWSKY dissent. ELDRIDGE, Judge, dissenting.

I agree (1974, with the that majority Repl.Vol.), Code 12-302(c)(2) Proceedings Article, of Courts and Judicial not does authorize the in I appeal State’s this case. totally with the disagree majority’s holding does, “[t]he however, a common to enjoy right law under these By circumstances.” a “common law to finding right appeal” pertinent under circumstances statutory provisions where provide right do not appeal, of majority has overruled a of Maryland multitude and ignored legal princi- cases settled ples. Moreover, Maryland history neither nor the cases relied by the majority support the majority’s position. The Court, in order reach what it as a regards desirable result case, in particular roughshod rides years over more than 200 Maryland jurisprudence.

I. in Numerous cases this Court firmly have established the today, there is no principle that, common appeal. law authorized, Except constitutionally Judge As Smith dependent upon statutes.1 entirely is wholly stated, “[t]he recently for the Court expressly Therefore, Assembly must statutory. the General JJM, Inc., County Howard grant right.” such a 256, 261, A.2d (1980), 1021, 1024 143, 147,422 Bailey, A.2d

State v. sought appeal, in which the State a criminal case for the Court stated: Judge Cole any right recognizing begin our consideration

“We case, must find criminal its a civil or appeal, either legislature.” in an act of the source 1055, 1057(1984), In Jones this Court held: law the State’s Maryland

“Under limited; may only so when authorized it do criminal case is statute.” Special Appeals to the Court the State’s Because statute, reversed the authorized we Jones had been Appeals and instructed Special Court appeal. court to dismiss the 113, 116, Sprenkle

Similarly Lohss and Court directed saying appeal, to dismiss the State’s Appeals Special *16 Levine: by Judge opinion IV, 22, Constitution, expressly § autho- Maryland Article does

1. The in banc,” although any right of appeals to a "court in additional rize losing appellee is before the court in appeal in such cases limited to banc, appeal "to Court of to in which an and is limited those cases makes Appeals may allowed Law.” While the Constitution places, appellate jurisdiction in other appeals to or reference II, (Article original jurisdiction Appeals, of on the Court confers certain IV, III, 5, 4B(b)), explicitly § § 6(g), and Art. it does Article Nevertheless, right cases. one to other confer "on the basis of our this has found a to instance judicial power repository constitutionally the final created status as Washabaugh Washa- Maiyland conclusive.” v. whose decisions are 1027, 393, 402, (1979). baugh, 1032 See also 285 Md. 404 A.2d bar, 5, Case, (1824). majority Ringgold’s 7 the case at 1 Bland In appeal. authority grant of for the State’s does not find a constitutional 400 question presented

“Our consideration here neces- sarily recognition commences with a that in principle jurisdiction Maryland, appellate dependent is upon a statu- power, Mace v. Attorney, Produce State’s grant tory 251 503, 508-09, (1968); Subsequent Md. 248 Injury A.2d 346 Pack, v. 306, 309, Fund 242 (1968); 250 Md. 506 McShain, Switkes v. John 340, 343, 202 Md. 96 A.2d 617 (1953); Appeals, Johnson v. Board Zoning 400, 196 Md. State (1950); Railway v. North. Cent. 76 A.2d 736 Co., 193, (1862); see Insurance v. 18 Md. 210 Comm’r Ins., Allstate 428, 444-45, (1973); 268 Md. 302 A.2d 200 this Denisio, true, course, cases, is less State v. no in criminal State, 159, (1974); 21 Md.App. Neal v. 318 A.2d 559 20 Mather, 20, 22, (1974); State v. Md.App. 314 A.2d 710 7 Adams, 549, 552, (1969); v. Md.App. State 256 A.2d 532 see 341, 351, 196 Md. 76 A.2d 575 include, e.g., Cubbage v. Other cases the same effect 241, (1985) (“In 304 Md. 498 A.2d 634 Mary- land, criminal is statutory conviction ”); Estep Estep, 416, 422, ... 285 Md. 404 A.2d (1979) (“It being established that the appel- late courts of this State ‘is by statute,’ at this time delimited ... look pertinent we to the enactment scope determine the ... Taylor, authority act”); Smith courtfs] basic 143, 146, (1979) (“The 285 Md. 400 A.2d basis of appellate review State in both civil and criminal cases is Rams, Peat Co. Los Angeles statute”); & v. delineated 86, 90, (1978) (“the 394 A.2d appellate jurisdiction of the courts of this both civil actions and criminal is at this Jolley by statute”); causes time delimited 353, 355, (1978) 384 A.2d jurisdic- (“Appellate tion in both civil and criminal dependent actions causes is upon a statutory Inj. Comp. Criminal Bd. v. grant power”); Gould, 486, 500, (1975) (“An appellate entirely statutory is in origin and no person agency may prosecute such an unless the conferred statute”); Mace Produce v. Attorney, State’s 503, 508, *17 (1968) (“ 346, 248 A.2d 350 ‘The take an is

401 an prosecute or agency no entirely statutory, person ” Subse statute,’ quoting given by is unless the 506, Pack, 306, 309, 242 A.2d v. Fund 250 Md. quent Injury 468, State, 89, 93, 162 A.2d v. (1968)); 223 Md. Woodell 509 statute”); (1960) (“the is a creature 471 406, 400, 76 Appeals, 196 Md. Zoning v. Board Johnson (“It (1950) course, is, accepted principle an 736, A.2d 738 appeal except will entertain Appeals the Court law, to review before it undertakes prescribed by when tribunal, must authority of a subordinate proceedings 22, v. Md. Stationery Bank Co. 196 Amer. shown”); (1950) (“ statutory right 28-29, 86, A.2d 88 ‘Where 75 ” Anne exclusive,’ quoting is remedy granted, 689, 348, 692 342, 46 A.2d County Snyder, Arundel v. 186 Md. Anderson, 17, 25, 575 also, v. (1946)). e.g., State 320 Md. 396, v. (1990); 312 Harper 1227, 1231 Md. A.2d Elza, 208, 211- v. (1988); Md. Clark 124, 127-129 286 540 A.2d Apper, Associates v. (1979); Eastgate 212, 922, 406 A.2d 924 Eisel v. (1976); 661, 698, 700-701, 663 350 A.2d 276 Md. Howell, v. (1959); Switkes 587, 509, 584, 511 220 Md. 155 McShain, 617, 340, 343-345, 96 A.2d Md. John 202 (1951); Barshack, 543, v. (1953); A.2d 32 State 197 Md. 80 Rosen, (1942); v. 167, 169, 829 Md. 181 (1929); 160, 164, 145 Sprague, Brooks v. 157 A. 377 Md. Co., 577, 581, 95 A. v. Hendrickson Standard Oil Ault, v. 635, 84 61 Peoples (1915); A. Md. Co., Ins. (1912); 394- Dillon Conn. Mutual Life Rosenfeld, Barth (1876); all cases and ignores the above-cited majority simply Nevertheless, innumerable same effect. many others that a common law clearly cases in this Court establish appeal does not exist. right fact, In of a common law majority’s recognition by the specifically in an addressed appeal, area particularly present problems. constitutional Assembly, may well General Johnston, al., et years ago, Wylie More than 100 court, sitting circuit claimed that the appellant by issuing an order authority had its equity, exceeded *18 decree, reopening a final as two against appellees, allegedly the of after term court at which the decree was rendered had (29 301). at In

expired dismissing Md. the the statute, ground that it was not authorized the applicable (id. 302): Court out initially pointed this at “The powers Appeals, and duties of the Court of are defined and limited. It cannot appellate jurisdic- entertain except prescribed tion when law. it by the under- Where tribunals, takes to review the proceedings of subordinate authority the must be shewn.” that, The Court on to went state if it were to entertain an statute, appeal not authorized by its decision would violate the (id. 303-304): separation powers constitutional principle “In regard cases where appeals are allowed from Equity, Courts of from law the Code to which we have adverted, very specifically defines boundaries of our appellate jurisdiction. For beyond this Court to it extend range, would be to Legislative invade the domain of the Department Government, its and exercise functions. It is not for us to go legislation.” outside of the limits Moreover, the law appeal recognized common majority in this a right case is to the Court of Special Appeals. of Special Appeals The Court anis interme- appellate IV, pursuant 14A, diate court created to Article Maryland Constitution. That provision constitutional added): states as (emphasis follows “Section 14A. Creation of intermediate of appeal; courts jurisdiction

prescribing and powers. “The General Assembly by law create such interme- appeal, may diate courts of necessary. The General Assembly may prescribe the intermediate appellate juris- diction these appeal, courts and all powers other necessary for the operation of such courts.” Under the constitutional language, appellate jurisdiction Court of Special Appeals appear would be entirely Assembly may prescribe.2 what the General dependent upon 14A, IV, § of Article language have indicated We upon may be conferred which jurisdiction delimits v. Supervisor, Shell Oil Co. Special Appeals. Court of Superintendent See also (1980) 426, 429, 1220, 1222 Zeserman, Md.App. it is (“we any case unless to review power not have do To the extent legislature”). granted jurisdiction nonstatutory appellate recognize any might such would judgments, review circuit *19 Instead, this of likely Special Appeals. in the Court vest to be invoked within jurisdiction would have appellate Court’s judgment or order the circuit court’s prescribed the time after Washabaugh taken. See Wa appeal from which the was 1027, 393, 9, 1032 n. 9 402 n. 404 A.2d 285 Md. shabaugh, (1979). in the Washabaugh, in the State appellant Unlike the jurisdiction case not invoke this Court’s within present did thirty appealed from.3 days of the order 14, Constitution, IV, relating language § Compare of Article Court, jurisdiction jurisdiction stating "[t]he of to the of this that Appeals be co-extensive with the limits of the State the Court shall Thus, prescribed may by or be law.” and such as now is hereafter Special Appeals's jurisdiction prescribed is while the Court Assembly,” jurisdiction “prescribed this Court’s is as “General law.” majority opinion suggests over the common law 3. The right appeal, majority today recognizes, first which the for the time Special Appeals by Assembly the General vested in the Court of (1974, Repl.Vol.), § 12-308 of the Courts when it enacted Code Proceedings Article. Section 12-308 states that "the Court Judicial appellate jurisdiction Appeals over Special has exclusive initial decree, a judgment, action of circuit reviewable order other 12-308, § Revisor’s Note to contained in the 1974 court....” The Article, Proceedings indicates that of the Courts and Judicial edition § dealing right has “other statutes with the to 12-308 reference to Therefore, application appeal.” to law it would have no a common spoke of appeal. Legislature, that the when it It seems obvious referring § judgment” in was not to "reviewable appealable. Legislature 12-302 had determined was not which Moreover, Washabaugh, Washabaugh 285 Md. this Court §of n. 1032 n. 9 made no mention court, that an from a circuit not authorized when it indicated Nevertheless, statute, directly would to taken to this Court. have Regardless what have been the law at earlier period history with to from respect appeals the trial courts Court, it is now settled that from circuit court Special wholly to the Court of is Appeals statuto- ry. Since the Court holds that the State’s in this case authorization, did not fall statutory within the Court of Special Appeals should appeal. be instructed dismiss the

II. In addition to overruling myriad holding cases entirely is dependent upon statutory authorization, the also majority overrules our opinions recent concerning State’s in criminal cases under present statutory provisions. majority opinion flatly inconsistent with our interpretation of those statutes (1990); Shilling 577 A.2d 83 State v. Anderson, 1227; Telak v. (1989); Hannah, 556 A.2d 225 and State v. 514 A.2d 16 opinion

The majority today acknowledges some inconsisten- Telak, Hannah, with cy opinions Shilling, but the *20 majority characterizes the pertinent portions opinions of those “dicta.” portions as The of those opinions which undermine majority’s today Rather, the view are not they “dicta.” are integral of parts holdings in those cases. point

The starting any discussion of present statuto- ry provisions governing the State’s to a crimi- right appeal in Shearin, 502, nal case is rel. State ex Sonner v. (1974). Sonner, course, A.2d 573 of did not concern the present statutory provisions but was decided under former (1957, 5, RepLVoL), § Code Art. Washabaugh fully cognizant § Court was 12-308 at the On the time. filed, day Washabaugh opinion same Estep was we filed 416, 4,

Estep, 1040, (1979), 420 n. 1042-1043 n. in § Washabaugh Estep which 12-308 was discussed. Both were Judge Dudley Digges. authored J. III opinion, prior more detail in Part of this discussed in As 14, 5, § Acts by Ch. 399 to of former Art. the enactment in a 1957, literally gave parties all pertinent statute (1951), 5, Art. appeal. case a Code criminal broad as 86, part § in relevant follows: thus stated to be entitled criminal shall parties proceedings “The to proceed- in civil in the manner as exceptions same bills in cases may criminal appeals judgments from ings, cases____” manner in civil in the as taken same encompassed appeal by statutory clearly language The sentence, and held illegal this Court had challenging an State 311-312, 104 Fisher, Nevertheless, lie. Ch. appeal that such an would all of Article 5 of repealed § the Acts of 1957 former parties” “the to Code, including broad general 399, 4,§ a new enacted section criminal cases. Ch. (Art. 12) to containing general right § a broad appeals by was to defendants. criminal cases limited which 14, which 399, § Art. read also enacted new Ch. follows: By Right Appeal

“14. State. Of Appeals the Court of from “The State dismiss, or or a motion judgment granting final order indictment, information, dismissing pres- or any quashing action, criminal but the State inquisition entment criminal action where have no shall acquitted.” the defendant has been tried Shearin, right of issue in State ex rel. Sonner The 583-586, A.2d at was whether 272 Md. at change intended prior of the Acts of was Ch. 399 from an illegal which to appeal law under the State had a impose court in had sentence. trial Sonner refused Code, by and thus the sentence there sentence mandated Court, This the cases and the examining imposed illegal. *21 to a particularly with reference Rules Com- legislative history, 5, 14, § new Art. see proposed mittee discussion 584-585, 522-523, A.2d at concluded that the 1957 Md. at statute was intended to abolish the State’s right Furthermore, from an illegal sentence. the Court in Sonner held that the State could file the circuit court a motion to sentence, correct illegal an and could file a timely appeal from the circuit court’s on that ruling motion. majority

The opinion today states that Sonner left “intact” right “common law the State to from an action of ” the lower court that was outside jurisdiction.... that court’s of the Sonner opinion dealing with portion appeal, 520-526, 583-586, at 325 A.2d at at no time refers to a “common law right of appeal.”4 recognized As cases, in subsequent Sonner the' holding upon interpretation 5, based an § of Code 14. Art. Shilling supra, 294, 320 Md. at 577 A.2d at 86 (stating that “the appeal, State’s authorized Art. 14, § permitted by the State from imposition Sonner”); illegal of an sentence ... as Telak v. documented supra, 315 Md. at 556 A.2d at (point- ing out that provisions § “[t]he Art. were construed ” by the Court in State ex rel. Sonner v. Shearin and that the Sonner was “that Art. holding in ... permitted ‘an ’ imposition from the illegal ”); of an sentence ... Hannah, 307 Md. at 514 A.2d at 20 (observing that Sonner “concluded that the statutes relating appeals- which were in effect the time applicable in Sonner ... had not limited the State’s” to appeal an illegal sentence but “Sonner left open interpretation provi- then §§ sions of CJ 12-301 and 12-302 dealing generally with courts”). appeals from circuit Although Ch. 399 of the Acts of as construed in Sonner, did not restrict the State’s to appeal from an sentence, illegal the General Assembly clearly limited that right when it enacted the Courts and Proceedings Judicial Except for an historical reference in a footnote and a reference in a quotation to a circuit court as a original "common law court of jurisdiction,” pertinent portion opinion the Sonner does not even phrase use the "common law.” *22 1974, 1, it enacted Ch. and when January effective Article of Acts of 1976. the 572- 315 Md. at supra, in Telak pointed we out

As 573, 227, A.2d at cases, § 12- ... to circuit court criminal regard

“[w]ith Article, as 302(c) Proceedings and Judicial of the Courts 5, § 14. Art. enacted, depart from former did originally 12-302(e) case, ‘In state criminal the provided: Section to a motion only judgment granting from a final indictment, informa- or quashing dismissing or dismiss (Em- in a criminal case.’ tion, inquisition presentment, added).” phasis 12-302(c), the of referring § to omission

The Note to Revisor’s 5, § Art. that “the former stated language certain from in the in limited set forth may only appeal situations state ” 12-302(c), § as original The section.... enactment Rodowsky in State by Judge for the pointed out in Hannah, “placed at 514 A.2d at eliminate, if completely the State’s question, serious it did in the earlier recognized an sentence as illegal Later, Shilling in and reiterated Sonner.” cases Judge opinion by 577 A.2d at in an supra, 320 Md. “[sjection 12-302, as Cole, position took the flatly we enacted, 5, § 14 virtually from by Art. originally departed illegal an sentence ehminating the State’s .”5 documented Sonner bar, arguing majority opinion case at that the enactment in the 1, 1974, 12-302(c), change January right of §of did not effective sentence, general illegal rule invokes presumed is to be statutory that recodification of statutes construction clarity change meaning, that a purpose rather than by phraseology will not "ordinari- change in of a statute recodification course, majority ly” forth modify the law. Of rule set process does result in recognizes that sometimes the recodification § example, change 12-301 of in the law. For enactment Proceedings changed respect to Judicial Article the law with Courts and special exercising a limited a circuit court was when statutory jurisdiction. v. Glen See the discussion in Litton Bionetics Co., Construction Moreover, change statutory language as a result sometimes

The critical statutory change, for purposes of the issue case, brought about Ch. 49 of the Acts 1976. In the Sonner case obvious response very and the restrictive 12-302(c) §in language of the Courts and Judicial Proceed- Article, ings and for the purpose of authorizing a State appeal when a trial judge failed to impose a sentence specifically (which mandated statute actually what happened in Sonner), 12-302(c)(2) Ch. 49 enacted new which authorized *23 the State to appeal a criminal case

“(2) From a final if alleges State trial judge impose failed to the sentence specifically mandat- ed by the Code.” majority opinion

The states that nothing original Courts and Proceedings Judicial Article or in 49 of Ch. Acts of 1976 was intended to change the law concerning the State’s right appeal to an illegal sentence which had been Sonner and earlier cases. recognized 2 Section of Ch. 49 of 1976, however, the Acts of stated as follows: “SECTION 2. AND BE IT ENACTED, FURTHER That this Act shall be construed only prospectively not applied be or interpreted to have effect upon or application to any event or happening occurring to prior effective date of this Act.” The Title of Ch. 49 read as follows: purpose

“FOR the of extending the right of the State to cases; in certain criminal giving the extension only prospective effect.”

Obviously the General Assembly believed that original 12-302(c) as well as 49 changed Otherwise, Ch. the law. there would have been no need for 2 section of Ch. 49. Moreover, the Title legislative shows a intent to extend the change recodification will be construed to the law even in the absence calling See, of a revisor or recodifier specific change. attention to the Gernert, 322, 323-325, e.g., Covington 624, 280 Md. 373 A.2d Redmiles, 137, 4, and Dean v. 161-162 n. 374 A.2d (1977), dealing 342-343 n. 4 change with a resulting in the law from a

recodification of the Motor Vehicle Code.

409 judge the trial to situation where State’s Code. mandated impose specifically a sentence failed that, aas result Assembly’s position reflects the General This original Judicial Proceed- of the Courts and of the enactment Article, an illegal had no the State ings sentence, type involved illegality even if the law cannot simply The majority’s view Sonner. 49 of the Acts of language Ch. with the Title reconciled that, principle also violates the where majority’s view specified under particular allows action expressly statute circumstances, legislature it a reasonable inference that circumstances. the action under other to allow intended Md., County, 329 See, Montgomery Md. Mossburg v. e.g., (1993); Employees 892 & A.2d Prof. Office MTA, (1982); 88, 96, 453 A.2d Int’l 155, 162-163, Montgomery 212, 218, (1981); re No. In Appeal illegal sentence By allowing circumstances, in Legislature obviously specified under if illegal of an sentence preclude a State tended *24 Otherwise, lan present. were not the those circumstances 12-302(c)(2) § no guage purpose. would have and Judicial Our cases since the enactment Courts have Proceedings Article and Ch. 49 of the Acts of 1976 made does not have the same broad it clear the State was illegal recog- from circuit court sentence which Sonner, limited the in and that the State’s nized impose trial failed to a sentence judge situation where the Thus, Hannah, by the in State specifically mandated Code. two were the the determinative issues whether State’s supra, the trial judge was from a final and whether mandated specifically failed to a sentence the impose had 399-400, out, initially pointed 307 Md. at Code. We upon the dependent State’s Ch. 1976. We went on to hold that the trial 49 of Acts of imposition for judge’s probation judgment, par- before involved, there Handgun violation of the Act ticular constituted a failure to impose five-year minimum sen- Code, 402-403, tence mandated 307 Md. at 514 A.2d at in Hannah If we had believed that the State had a right sentence, to appeal any illegal it would have been entirely unnecessary to determine whether there had a failure been impose a sentence specifically mandated the Code.

In Telak v. judge the trial imposed had an Sonner, sentence, illegal and the like it did filed a motion to illegal correct the sentence. Thereafter the trial Sonner, judge denied the motion. As in took a timely appeal from the denial of its motion to correct Sonner, sentence, illegal although, again as in the State’s appeal was not within days the trial original court’s Telak was essentially the judgment. The argument State’s bar, same as the majority’s position the case at namely that “the State position the same it [was] under [was] Sonner decision,” 315 Md. at 556 A.2d at 228. The Telak opinion went on to point out that “[t]he State asserts: enjoys

‘The State the same to appeal illegal sen tence that it had under the controlling law in Sonner 12-13).” brief, Ibid. (respondent’s pp.

In rejecting argument, and directing that the intermedi- appellate ate court dismiss the State’s appeal, we held Telak (315 225): as follows Md. at “Moreover, of the Sonner and earlier opinions language would authorize the State to appeal where there was an ‘illegal’ 49, however, sentence. Ch. specifies type illegality which must be alleged the State to be entitled appeal.

“Ch. 49 of Acts of 1976 embody also did not procedure which was deemed permissible in Sonner. Al- though Sonner position had taken the that the State’s right to appeal stemmed from Art. and predecessor *25 statutes, the Sonner opinion also indicated that the appeal- able was the order denying the motion to correct sentence, the and that the thirty-day period for a filing of appeal notice ran from that order. Under language the by Article Ch. Proceedings to the and Judicial added Courts 1976, however, clearly is to appeal the of the Acts of verdict, order, which after the from the trial court’s taken ” in the case.... a criminal imposes sanction 293-296, 577 supra, Md. at A.2d at Shilling In maintain an was entitled to we held that the State because, had because, judge the trial failed only appeal by mandated statute. We specifically the sentence impose Sonner that, cases would “although it clear earlier made there was an right appeal a where have allowed the State 12—302(c)(2) § sentence, seeks to the enactment ‘illegal’ when trial does appeal that the State specify clearly has mandated.” legislature impose not sentence Anderson, also 86. State at at (“The right of 575 A.2d at 1231 State’s § and Judicial is Courts appeal [of conferred excep- It is limited Proceedings then all Article]. 12-302”). forth in tions set in this case not authorized the State’s

Since Proceedings of thé and Judicial §§ 12-301 and 12-302 Courts Article, dismissal of the require the above-discussed cases appeal.

III. case, finding law in this right In a common history, into majority particularly reaches back al., course, v. Buchanan et H. & J. Of Maryland if a common had existed at even law case, the Buchanan today it is clear the time not entirely statutory and that the relevant statutes do Nonetheless, appeal by the State. present authorize little Maryland furnishes or no history In nonstatutory appeal. reviewing for basis support find, suggested by majority one history, does of a law recognition common opinion, statutory language provide failed to situations where Rather, statutory language one finds broad autho- appeal. *26 412 judicial

rizing appeals and decisions which often construe the narrowly. statutes

At very early period English law, in the common of appellate upon review writ of appears error to have been recognized civil actions at law. In century, the fifteenth if however, earlier, the matter of appeal provided was for regulated In Maryland, statutes. as early as Ch. 6 of regulation the Acts of of appeals statutory. was For a detailed discussion of history of statutes authorizing appeals England Maryland, see Chancellor Bland’s Case, (1824). 1 opinion Ringgold’s Bland Another early excellent discussion of the Maryland history is contained Bond, in Carroll T. The Appeals Court Maryland, 5-57 (1928).

The statute during period the colonial most often referred is Ch. of the Acts of which related to appeals and writs of error from judgments of the Provincial Court and courts, county and, setting after forth procedural certain requirements, broadly §in provided all appeals “[t]hat made in manner aforesaid shall be admitted and allowed by the superior made, courts to whom such appeal shall be as afore- error____” said, in nature of a writ of A series of statutes shortly thereafter authorized appeals from the Court of Chan- Case, cery. See Ringgold’s Bland at 13. See also M’Kim, Thompson 6 H. & J. After the Revolution, 87 of Ch. the Acts of broadly granted power the “full appeal” “any party parties or aggrieved by any judgment or determination any county action, court in any civil suit or or prosecution fine____” recovery added). any penalty, (Emphasis [or] early history criminal cases is somewhat only reported obscure. The pre-Revolutionary War case is apparently v. Lord Proprietary, 1 H. & McH. Jenifer (Provincial 1774). Jenifer, Daniel the former Sher- iff of County, Charles was convicted of receiving unlawful fees as sheriff and was fined 5,000 the value of the fees plus pounds Court, tobacco. He appealed the Provincial which heard Jennings Attorney General April 1770 term. argument at its dismissed, as no argued that the case should or the common law English statutes under either the allowed Thomas 1 H. & McH. at 536-538. or Act of Independence, Stone, signer of the Declaration later writ of error lies argued “[a] representing appellant, and that felony,” under except in all in treason cases *27 lies.” lie a writ error appeal Act “an will whenever Chase, signer also later a McH. at 538. Samuel See 1 H. & Judge as Chief well Independence the Declaration Supreme United States justice Court a the General in that of error all criminal Court, proper a writ was argued an 1 H. & at 539. The Court appeal, not McH. cases but term then September case its the until continued no would holding that appeal, apparently dismissed the lie. Ibid. the reported criminal after Act of

The first (General State, 4 H. Peter v. McH. Court seems to be The & 1797), appeal by the General Court entertained where error, defendant, contending on writ of with the defendant Court, that on its face violated a statute. The the indictment of error agreed that writ opinion, apparently without sound, it was argument would lie and the defendant’s later, county years A few court. reversed (General State, 1 H. in & J. 340 Court Cummings The 1802), writ of in a criminal case was availability of a error Court, the writ was again argued before the General but quashed procedural ground. on a opinion by in reported first discussion of the issue a

The (June Queen J. 232 Term Court in v. The 5 H. & was 1821), held that an writ of error where question in a of law was criminal case to review authorized exceptions apparent on the record but that bill holdings squarely upon The authorized. Court based these give of 1785 does not saying the Act of Act “[t]he enumerated,” in criminal there but exceptions bill of cases record,” “the that, Legislature “if on the then appeared error gave the party complaining an election to carry up the case either appeal____” writ error or 5 H. & J. at 234. this Court in The State v. term, Later at its December al., supra, Buchanan et 5 H. & J. at held that a writ of error in a criminal case would lie at the instance of the State where county had quashed the indictment. majority opinion case cites Buchanan as its present principal authority for a “common law to appeal.” Noth the Buchanan ing opinion however, suggests statute; fact, that case was not authorized Court at no time refers the common law as the basis for the appeal. As Buchanan was decided several months after Queen v. The the source of the right Buchanan would seem to be the Act of 1785. recognized the Buchanan Moreover, opinion specifically also relied on the Clarke, of 1713. See 5 H. & at Act 331. But Isaac v. J. cf. (1837) (stating G. & J. 107 that the Act of 1713 applies civil While the Buchanan opinion did cite some only). cases English authorities and unreported cases, General Court purpose of such apparently citations was to counter the defen *28 dant’s common jeopardy law double argument and the defen dant’s attempt to draw a distinction by between appeals appeals by 1785, State and the defendant. The Act of howev er, drew no such distinction. right

The broad of appeal set forth in the Act of 1785 was continued in later (1860), 5, statutes. For example, Code Art. 3,§ “any party” authorized to to appeal the Court of Appeals alia, “any prosecution in, inter for recovery of any penalty fine,” [or] stated that “writs of error may be sued out cases____” in civil or criminal Ch. 316 of the Acts of 1872 added a Code, new section to Article 5 of the which provided as follows:

“In all upon any trials or presentment indictment in any court of this State having jurisdiction, criminal it shall be accused, lawful for party or for the Attorney, State’s behalf of Maryland, the State of to except any ruling court, determination of the and to tender the court a bill of exceptions, which shall signed sealed the court exceptions, may ...; tendering such bill party and the or determination to the Court ruling from such ” Appeals.... cases, by in criminal both general right A broad statutorily provided continued to be defendants 5, 78; See, (1888), §§ 77 and Code Art. e.g., for until 1957. (1924), 87; (1939), §§ Art. §§ Art. 86 and Code 86- Code 88; 5, §§ Code Art. 86-89. cases, in a few criminal such

Consequently, when the Court Fisher, 204 Md. 104 A.2d relied on supra, v. State case, majority present upheld in the by the by statute. clearly it was conferred appeal, State majority supports None of the cases relied of statute. As independent common law mentioned, of the decisions general tendency previously the State in criminal preclude was to literally which seemed to despite statutory language cases See, Adams, v. 196 Md. appeal. e.g., authorize an State (1950); 158, 36 A.2d 674 Lingner, 76 A.2d 575 State v. Jones, (1943); (1944); State v. State Shields, Rosen, 829; (1878). Md. 301

IV. Finally, asserting right,” there is a “common law statute, from an action of independent “to the lower jurisdiction,” majority court that was outside that court’s Alvey’s opinion quotes portions Judge opinion selected majority 52 Md. 368 Rayner the Court Judge from for the opinion quotes opinion also McAuliffe’s *29 McNeece, County in v. 311 Md. 198- Montgomery Court (1987), that, A.2d 533 671 the effect even absent statute, an court entertain an where it is appellate appeal in jurisdiction. contended that a lower court acted excess of its passage opinion The entire from the McNeece is as follows (311 673): at Md. 533 conferring in of a statute that even the absence

“It is true may entertain an appellate an court appeal, or appellate contention that an inferior to review a appeal Pr. Geo’s Co. jurisdiction. its court acted in excess of trial Federation, 424 A.2d 770 v. American 289 Md. Mobile, 458, 272 v. Urbana Civic Urbana (1981); Steward, Med. Examiners v. Bd. of (1971); A.2d 628 Biscoe, Darrell v. (1954); 574, 580, 102 A.2d Cockey, (1902); Webster 684, 687, 9 Gill 51 A. 410 Appeals cannot a well settled rule that the Court Tt is an from order appeal entertain spe- an tribunal under sitting appellate Court as Circuit no ex- statutory authority cial where in the Court exceeded given, except cases where pressly Steward, Bd. Med. Examiners v. jurisdiction.’ its 580, 102 A.2d 248.” 203 Md. at Rayner case and the cases cited An examination of the McNeece, cases, is no discloses that there as well as similar a lower court acts “common law” whenever Instead, set forth jurisdiction. principle of its excess statutory a matter of construction. entirely those cases was from Bd. case, Rayner above-quoted passage Steward, 574, 580, Med. Examiners the McNeece (1954), and the other opinion, contained McNeece, from all involved a passage in the cases cited above early this in the nineteenth rule which was created (or its a circuit court century. The rule was follows: When statutory juris- limited exercising special predecessor) diction, jurisdiction, and ordinary law-type and not its common statutory jurisdiction, no the court acted within when lie, outside of or would but when the went further jurisdiction, could special statutory excess be taken. was in earliest discussion of the rule

Apparently Court’s Condon, Susq. & R.R. Co. & J. Wil. G. from a applied rule was to dismiss an where the

417 concerning jury inquisition a judgment reviewing county court a railroad. The for use of lands condemned the value (8 448): stated G. & J. there Court Appeals, the Court of given to appeal expressly is no “There with County Court Assembly, investing Act of under the aside setting reviewing confirming, of power nature and course From the present. like the inquisitions subject for is a fit power of review proceedings, of their Court, to wholly inappropriate is County a but litigation juris- It limited special of this Court. jurisdiction Court, from the decision of County to the given diction other no lies tribunal.” which county of a court judgment to the applied The rule was in Savage a road exercising statutory jurisdiction open (1846) (“It is a 3 499 Owings, Co. v. Gill Manufacturing rule, will not lie to a sound that a writ error general and does not jurisdiction, and which special vested with Court law”). The to the forms of the common proceed according county of the courts applied judgments rule was same justices peace, reviewing courts decisions the circuit Mister, Parke, (1848); 5 Md. 7 237 State v. Crockett v. Gill (1863); (1853); Md. 451 Kelsey Gray, v. & 19 Hough 15 Adams, (1874); judgment Md. 309 to a Herzberg v. People’s City reviewing Court

Baltimore Herrmann, v. City, Montgomery of Baltimore Ward (1948); 405, 408-411, to judg- 58 A.2d 678-680 190 Md. reviewing courts and the circuit courts county ments of the officials, Cockey, v. government of local Webster decisions (1850); Jay, Co. Commrs. Co. Gill Harford (1914); Crisfield, v. M. & C. Stephens 89 A. 715 (1914); 190, 192-193, to certain decisions of 89 A. 429-430 (1855); to trial courts, Lammott v. 8 Md. 5 orphans Maulsby, agency judicial review of administrative judgments 456, 460-461, decisions, Boyd, Simpler (1960); Zoning Appeals, supra, v. Board Johnson 738; types 76 A.2d at other 196 Md. at special statutory to a pursuant circuit court decisions rendered Church, Balto. M.E. jurisdiction. Sugar North 487, 498-500, collecting many types 165 A. cases. such rule was one of special for this basis discussed, As Ch. 87 statutory previously construction. stated broadly Acts of 1785 *31 or parties aggrieved by any judgment

“That or any party Court, in civil suit or any County any of determination action, any recovery any penalty, or for the of prosecution damages, power shall have full and fine or determination to the General judgment from such Court.” Court, appellate jurisdic- the its

Upon the abolition of General of Appeals, to the Court of Ch. 55 the tion was transferred Parke, 239-240, supra, In Crockett at Acts of 1804. Gill of from a involving attempted appeal Appeals an the Court justice of county reviewing of a a decision of a acknowledged literally this the peace, the statute, that, the Court held be- was authorized the but decisions, judicial of the 1785 act would prior cause Judge Dorsey to authorize the Chief appeal. construed (7 Court, after Ch. 87 of the Acts of stated quoting the 239-240): atGill Assembly, Act of ... of

“Literally interpret this in civil judgments exists from all or determinations of County yet passage of a Court.... And from the actions present day, judicial interpreta- Act ... down to the its cases, denied, the existence of the of tion has such to the of this appeal. appellate power So also a like denial Court, Court, again again pronounced by has and been judgments County it from the of appeals brought before justices of appeals judgments Courts on from the Assembly speedy under the Acts of for the peace, rendered decisive recovery principle, equally of small debts. And a us, against case against of before adjudicated Act of the literal construction Wilmington Appeals, the Court of the case Condon, vs. & J. Susquehanna Company Railroad 8 G. vs. Company Manufacturing Savage The case of [at], 498.” 3 Gill Owings, times, the rule more recent through early cases

From were circuit courts in cases where concerning appeals was based statutory jurisdiction limited special within a acting appeals. authorizing statute general a construction upon cases, my to the best special of these None “common law” rule as a to the ever referred knowledge, Zoning Appeals, Board Thus Johnson principle. of the cases one Md. at explained again this Court opinion, in McNeece upon relied construction, stating: statutory rule was result that the the Court course, principle that is, accepted an “It prescribed except when not entertain will Appeals proceedings to review the law, it undertakes and before tribunal, must be shown. authority of a subordinate law from courts of authorizing appeals statute general any judgment or determination ‘From provides: *32 prosecution in any or action or any civil suit court of law any damages, or fine or of recovery penalty for the ** *.’ Code Appeals of appeal to the Court party mean that 5, this statute to 1939, construe art. sec. We or determination any judgment from can be taken an therein, originating in an action of law entered of a court of the court from a decision cannot be taken an but exercising a or when sitting appellate as an tribunal when an is authorized jurisdiction, unless statutory special Parke, 237, 240; Baltimore & 7 Gill v. by statute. Crockett Co., Ry. v. Northern Central Turnpike de Co. Havre Grace 190, A. 122 Md. 89 193; City Crisfield, v. Stephens 15 Md. of Jay, v. 122 County 429; County Com’rs Board Harford of of v. 327, 715; & Co. 324, Montgomery A. Ward Md. 89 677; Herrmann, 405, Berlinsky v. Eisen- 58 A.2d 190 Md. 327; Md. Robb v. 190 59 A.2d berg, A.2d 211. 60 exists to

“So, that no hold specifically we sitting appellate as an Circuit Court review a decision 420 case, zoning Legislature

court in a unless the has authorized appeal.” an also, Peco, 200, 202, Pharmacy Md. Board v. e.g., (“It (1964) provisions 274 is well settled that the apply

of Art. sec. do not to cases where the trial court special exercises a or limited conferred statute jurisdiction”); ... the trial court exceeds its v. Sugar [unless] Church, 498-500, Balto. 164 at supra, North M.E. 165 A. Meline, 707-708; 370, 371, at 38 A. Goldschmid Cumberland, (1897); Swann v. M. & C. 154 Gill 1925). (1849); Poe, Practice, § Pleading (Tiffany ed. carved an out of Consequently, exception Court general authorizing appeals statutes to this cases courts, courts, county which the and later the circuit were acting special statutory jurisdiction. within a limited grant If statutory the circuit court exceeded this limited special i.e., jurisdiction, if it acted special outside limited statutory jurisdiction, longer its action would no be within exception general carved out of the appeal statute. Therefore See, general appeal under the statute would lie. Johnson v. Board e.g., Zoning Appeals, supra, 196 Md. 406-410, 738-740; 76 A.2d at v. M. & Stephens Crisfield, C. 429-430; supra, Md. at 89 A. at Manu- Savage facturing Owings, Co. v. at 499. supra, Gill earlier,

As out pointed Rayner supra, upon relied today, the majority furnishing and the authorities the basis previously quoted Montgomery County for the statement McNeece, all concerning appeals involved the rule from exercising special jurisdiction. lower courts limited statutory In Rayner, justice the defendant had been convicted before peace fishing County in Charles with an illegal trap *33 fishing or net and of without a license. He was and fined his and nets boat were confiscated. The defendant took an to the County Circuit Court Charles which affirmed. The error, sought defendant then review this Court on writ of statute, contending pertinent that the which drew distinctions residency, on In opinion by based was unconstitutional. an (52 stating Md. appeal, the Alvey, this Court dismissed Judge added): 375-376, emphasis at upon the hearing adjudicating in and Circuit Court

“[T]he ordinary of its common law was not in the exercise limited special as Court of acting but jurisdiction, provisions the and conform to jurisdiction, bound observe statute, if, the was valid. Its judgment, in its statute however, the spe within limits rendered the judgment, only binding, conferred,, is not but jurisdiction cial final. it, consequently review the power This Court has no and The cases of the of errors must dismissed. assignment be Mister, Md., Md., 11, and State vs. Bogue, State vs. R. Susq. Co. vs. following cases of Wilm. & previous Condon, Gill, 92, J., Cockey, 9 & and vs. Gill Webster Hough vs. in all of this. also respects are conclusive Md., Kelsey Gray, & 451.” on, quoted part by majority in language

The Court went had today, out if the circuit court acted point opinion jurisdiction, or had “tran- special statutory limited outside (id. 376), it” at upon the limited conferred scended Appeals. there in the Court of then would be review Rayner suggest Court did Instead, law” right. be a “common

such situation would be longer would lie case would no within because the Condon, which & R. Co. v. Susq. the area the Court Wilm. Parke, carved out of the supra, Crockett had portion opinion final general statute. The Rayner entirely made it clear the decision was based statutory concerning construction rule the exercise of statutory jurisdiction. Alvey Judge limited concluded special (52 added): 376-377, emphasis follows that, rights urged personal liberty “It has been as the involved, it private strange be a property are would law, if the great hardship, party defect resorting denied the to this have statute, under question constitutionality which invaded, supposed rights his unjustifiably it is have been But, finally though party may decided. be denied *34 right of such resort in the mode and under the circum- case, stances of this it does not follow the law denies to a himself party feeling aggrieved reaching the means of Court, If, on such a question, by proper proceeding. statute, instead of the under party had certiorari, applied for the writ of upon specific ground statute, unconstitutionality of the and the consequent power jurisdiction want of and magistrate proceed to it, the Circuit Court then would have been in the under exercise, not the special jurisdiction, limited but its ordinary jurisdiction; common law and from its judgment in the premises writ of error or an could have been State, this Court. Hall vs. The prosecuted J., 12 Gill & c., Cumberland, 329; Mayor, Swann vs. & Gill, 150, 155.”6

See also 510, 512-513, 28 A. Judefind McNeece, Rayner, Like the cases relied on in for the statement concerning when the lower jurisdiction, exceeds its all involved the relating special rule Pr. jurisdiction. limited statutory Geo’s Co. v. For example, procedural obtaining justice 6. The method for this Court’s review of a peace’s jurisdiction, by Judge Alvey of the which was recommended Jacob, Rayner, was followed in State v. 199 A.2d 803 (1964), majority’s opinion a case present discussed in the case. Jacob, original In the State filed common law certiorari action in the challenge 'jurisdictional” grounds circuit court to the action of a justice peace, appealed and the State to this Court from the circuit court’s petition. dismissal of the certiorari Such certiorari jurisdiction action in the circuit court to test the of an inferior tribunal law, original proceeding is an and the in Jacob was autho- general authorizing appeals rized statute from circuit court judgments in actions at law. See Kawamura v. 283- (1984) (pointing 442-43 out "that a circuit court has jurisdiction purpose to issue a writ of certiorari ato lower court for the inquiring jurisdiction,” discussing into that tribunal's various cases Jacob, including observing State v. that "the common law remedy jurisdiction of certiorari in the circuit court to test the exist). support lower court” continues to The Jacob case does not right law, present in the case. case at bar is not an action at inquire in which the circuit court was asked to into the of some other tribunal. Federation, 388, 398-400, 424 A.2d American in part that the rule was embodied pointed out 12-302(a) (1974, Repl.Vol.), the Courts Code rule to Article, this Court Proceedings applied Judicial officials government local a circuit court’s review action *35 the circuit conferring jurisdiction on under local ordinance a 461, Mobile, 458, 272 260 v. Md. Civic Urbana court. Urbana (1971), that, of an 628, pointed “[i]n A.2d out the absence 630 we cannot review express appellate jurisdiction of grant special statutory proceed- of the circuit court in this decision added). ing jurisdictional grounds.” (Emphasis on except Biscoe, cited in 94 51 A. 410 also Darrell v. McNeece, appeal circuit by was a case decided court by justice peace. a of the from a decision that, sum, principle regardless is no law” In there “common statute, contends appeal an will lie whenever the appellant jurisdiction. of its the court below acted outside in McNeece this Rayner proposi- case and the cited cases concerning tion involved from deci- appeals have all the rule special statutory jurisdiction. to a This pursuant sions limited construction, involving rule an simply statutory one authorizing statutory provisions generally interpretation appeals.7 Court, acknowledged very by early this construction As general appeals statutory language. statute no basis in the Fur- had thermore, any legislative supported by history other it was City legitimate statutory principles. construction v. Kaczorowski Baltimore, 628 rule, Moreover, largely Assembly abrogated the General has expressly, unfortunately, a although it has left small class of cases (1974, § Repl.Vol., Cum.Supp.), Code 1993 12- within the rule. 1989 Article, that, Proceedings provides except the Courts and 301 of Judicial 12-302, appeal judgment § from a exists as set forth in final limited, “special, statutory jurisdic- exercising a court is a even when that, 12-302(a), however, Section states tion.” unless law, permit granted by § from expressly is 12-301 "does not an appellate of a court or made in the final entered exercise Court, reviewing an adminis- decision District Nevertheless, agency, legislative body.” certiorari trative or a local decision, upon appeal by this Court of a court from the review circuit Court, by § Judicial District is authorized Courts and

424

There is no “common law” simply because Rather, “jurisdictional.” is issue as the cases discussed earlier hold, today of appeal entirely dependant upon grant statutory authority. or constitutional Under decisions, Court’s a claim that an “jurisdictional” issue is does appellate not entitle an if entertain an See, e.g., pertinent is not authorized statutes. supra, Jones 298 Md. at 471 A.2d at 1056- 1057; Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, supra, 285 Md. at 401- Howell, Eisel v. 1031-1032; supra, 220 Md. at 404 A.2d at Steward, Medical Examiners v. 511; 155 A.2d at (1955); Md. at Judefind Stoner, 405-406; Shueey 28 A. at (1877).8 addition, Proceedings judicial Article. In review actions under the Act, appeals State Administrative Procedure from circuit court deci- (1984, Repl.VoL,

sions áre Supp.), authorized. Code 10- *36 223 of the State Government Article. bar, majority opinion very In the case at takes a broad view of "jurisdictional." majority, is what like a few older cases in this Court, tribunal, appears by to view decision a which is inconsistent with, rule, by, beyond or unauthorized a statute or to be the tribunal’s subject jurisdiction. basic matter The more recent cases in this Court See, Ward, rejected position. e.g., Montgomery County have such a 521, 526-528, (1993) (administrative agen- 331 Md. 629 A.2d 622 cy’s setting rehearing, allegedly statutory a case for after the time for rehearings expired, beyond jurisdiction); agency’s had is not Transit, 225, 233-235, Comm’n on Human Rel. v. Mass 294 Md. 449 (1982). State, generally Pulley A.2d 389-390 See 287 Md. 412 A.2d 1248-1251 This Court in First Feder- Comm’r, 329, 335, (1974), ated Com. Tr. v. 322 A.2d opinion by Judge Dudley Digges, in an J. stated as follows: court, authority judicial "If that law which defines the of the a body given power to render a over that class of cases falls, particular within which a one then its action cannot be assailed subject jurisdiction.” want for matter test, present Under this the trial court’s order in the case was not beyond jurisdiction. the court's case, Court, language directly applicable present In speak- to the Cole, 11, 16-17, ing through Judge said in Parks v. (1980): period "A statute which seeks to limit the in which a court should Thus, authority deprive jurisdiction.... exercise its does not it of if V. recognizes history, in its the first time today, The Court Furthermore, appeal. law” a “common applies regard to right with this common law recognizes Court legisla- subject comprehensive which has been matter twenty during past Assembly General enacted tion 12-302(c)(l) (right §§ (1974, Repl.Vol.), Code years. dismissing charging an order from State to of the 12-302(c)(2) specified to appeal document), (right 12-302(c)(3) sentences), (right the State illegal types conditions, from circumstances particular under appeal, returning proper- excluding evidence of a court decision seized), 12- unconstitutionally it was ground that ty on the most orders 302(f) side from by either (appeal permitted Nevertheless, upholds the Court panel). of a sentence review statutory these circumstances where under Finally, the Court appeal. not authorize an do provisions appel- intermediate to an law finds a common Constitution, only has which, Maryland under the late court jurisdiction. appellate statutorily prescribed discovered law the common Although scope, limited to be of a somewhat today may appear majority far-reaching majority could have approach the basic out for Judge Murphy pointed As Chief consequences. 442, 460, of Educ., Bd. in Harrison v. Mont. Co. judg- period, its power prescribed exercises its outside the court only thereby void but voidable.” is not rendered ment 266, 269-270, In Block v. guilty verdict in a criminal judge’s revision of a held that a district we *37 case, Maryland District Rule expired under former the time had after verdict, revisory power did not constitute exercising over a 770 for holding present majority’s in the case jurisdiction.” "lack of the or Block. The ramifications reconciled with Parks cannot be “jurisdictional” be concerning what is could majority’s present position substantial, lacking jurisdiction by is rendered a court quite as an order absolutely void. Nonetheless, the circuit court my does not matter whether view it subject jurisdic- matter present in excess of its basic in the case acted statute, by it should be appeal is not authorized Since the State’s tion. "jurisdictional.” regardless whether the issue is dismissed static; 456 A.2d “the common law not its life dynamism—its ability keep pace and heart is its to with the just world constantly searching while and fair solutions to Thus, pressing problems.” societal a “common law ... doc- Maryland subject judicial trine in is ... to modification by Adler v. American decision,” 31, 42, Corp., Standard If a common law to of Special Appeals today, presumably the Court exists it could by judicial extended to encompass be decisions various situa- tions an is not by where authorized statutes but where may justify appeal. circumstances be deemed to Moreover, approach majority utilized would not appeal. many seem be confined to the There are which, other areas of the law at an earlier period history, governed by equity principles, were common law or which but today generally entirely statutory. are considered to be Pre- areas, sumably, of these if circumstances arise under which a of this majority Court does like the result of applying statutory provisions, current the Court can in- pre-statutory judicial voke I simply decisions. cannot sub- scribe the view that this Court reach into a repository of alleged “common law” doctrines whenever it desires ignore limitations set forth the General Assembly. case, to the facts

Turning present agree I with the majority that the circuit court’s action was inconsistent with Maryland If Assembly Rule 4-345. the General had autho- circumstances, rized an State under these I would agree the circuit court had committed reversible join error and would judgment. this Court’s Because the Assembly General has not authorized an appeal by the State case, in this we should vacate the Special Appeals and direct be dismissed.

Nevertheless, if the issue on the merits is deemed sufficiently important, we could set forth our views even while directing be dismissed. Although portion opinion setting forth such views not technically would case, constitute the holding it would advise trial judges, *38 accomplish likely and would and others law lawyers, has action This course of holding. as a purpose same For past. by this Court occasionally been taken 510, 28 A. example, Judefind constitutionality of the merits concerned the issue required to Sundays. While certain work on prohibiting laws appellate lack of appeal because dismiss the Court, express opinion on to went predecessors in this our 513-516, A. constitutional, Md. were that the statutes also, Refuge, Boyle v. House e.g., Roth and at 406-407. (1869). Thanos v. 334-335 Cf. today The Court same manner. the merits this case should deal -with tome and BELL have authorized Judges RODOWSKY expressed herein. they concur with the views state 644 A.2d 34 CHRIST, Jr., Minor, Next R. His Charles and Father Charles R. CHRIST Friend MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES. Sept. Term, 1992.

No. Appeals Maryland. July

Case Details

Case Name: Cardinell v. State
Court Name: Court of Appeals of Maryland
Date Published: Jul 14, 1994
Citation: 644 A.2d 11
Docket Number: 32, September Term, 1992
Court Abbreviation: Md.
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