101 F.2d 254 | D.C. Cir. | 1938
A question arises under the Employees’ Compensation Act of the District of Columbia.
Section 2 of the act, “Definitions,” states in paragraph (12) that: “‘Compensation’ means the money allowance payáble to an employee or to his dependents as provided for in this Act, and includes funeral benefits provided therein.” This seems clearly to exclude the medical benefits of Section 7. The argument for the insurer rests on the fact, which is obvious, that certain sections of the act nevertheless use the term “compensation” in a sense which includes those benefits. Examples are Section 4 (a), which requires the employer to secure the payment of “the compensation
We are concerned only with the meaning of “compensation” in Section 14 (m). The word is there used in such a context that it can hear either sense. It would seem to follow that the statutory definition should he applied. Moreover, Section 14(j) makes provision for the discharge of an employer’s liability for “compensation” by the payment of “a lump sum egual to the present value of future compensation payments commuted, computed at 4 per centum true discount compounded annually.” This contemplates mathematical accuracy. As it is impossible accurately to forecast the cost of medical benefits, it follows that the “compensation” to be commuted does not include them. And there is no reason to suppose that the word has one meaning in section 14 (j) and another in 14 (m). Both are parts of Section 14, which is headed “Payment of compensation.”
We conclude that medical and similar benefits under Section 7 are not to be counted in applying the $7,500 limit of “total compensation” in Section 14 (m). The same conclusion follows from the principle that compensation acts are to be “construed liberally in furtherance of the purpose for which they were enacted.” Baltimore & Philadelphia Steamboat Co. v. Norton, 284 U.S. 408, 414, 52 S.Ct. 187, 189, 76 L.Ed. 366. We find nothing inconsistent with our views in Union Stevedoring Corp. v. Norton, 98 F.2d 1012, or Liberty Mutual Insurance Company v. Parker, D.C., 19 F.Supp. 686, which the insurer cites.
Reversed.
44 Stat. 1424, U.S.C.A. Tit. 33, Ch. 18, § 901 et seq.; made applicable, to the District of Columbia by D.C.Code, Tit. 19, Ch. 2, §§ 11, 12.