77 Conn. App. 578 | Conn. App. Ct. | 2003
Opinion
The defendant, Connecticut Landscaping Bruzzi Corporation, appeals from the judgment of the trial court in a breach of contract action awarding damages to the plaintiff, Cardi Materials Corporation. The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the court had subject matter jurisdiction.
The following facts and procedural histoiy are necessary for our resolution of that issue. In a complaint dated July 11, 2000, the plaintiff brought an action against the defendant for breach of contract. The parties to the underlying contract were the defendant and Cardi Corporation. Both the plaintiff and Cardi Corporation were incorporated and have their principal places of business in Rhode Island. The plaintiff conceded at oral
The plaintiff called Sean Corrigan, a project manager with Cardi Corporation, as its first witness, and the defendant objected to his testimony. The defendant informed the court that Cardi Coiporation was not named as a plaintiff in the case and that the named plaintiff was not a party to the contract at issue. The court directed the parties to proceed with the evidence and stated that it would entertain any motions to dismiss at an appropriate time. Upon conclusion of the evidence, the defendant made an oral motion to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiff did not have standing, thus depriving the court of subject matter jurisdiction. In response, counsel for the plaintiff stated that “I could move to substitute Cardi Corporation now, which I guess I would formally do to make this accurate.” The plaintiff, however, did not move to substitute Cardi Corporation as the plaintiff, nor did the court order that Cardi Corporation be substituted for the plaintiff.
“It is a fundamental rule that a court may raise and review the issue of subject matter jurisdiction at any time.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kizis v. Morse Diesel International, Inc., 260 Conn. 46, 52, 794 A.2d 498 (2002). “[W]henever a court discovers that is has no jurisdiction, it is bound to dismiss the case . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Millward Brown, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 73
“Where a plaintiff lacks standing to sue, the court is without subject matter jurisdiction. . . . Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless [one] has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dime Savings Bank of Wallingford v. Arpaia, 55 Conn. App. 180, 183, 738 A.2d 715 (1999). “Standing is established by showing that the party claiming it is authorized by statute to bring suit or is classically aggrieved. . . . The fundamental test for determining aggrievement encompasses a well-settled twofold determination: first, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest in [the subject matter of the challenged action] .... Second, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully establish that this specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the [challenged action].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) AvalonBay Communities, Inc. v. Orange, 256 Conn. 557, 568, 775 A.2d 284 (2001).
Here, the defendant argues that the plaintiff did not have standing to sue because it was not a party to the contract. We agree. The subject matter of the complaint
The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment dismissing the action.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
The defendant also claims on appeal that, assuming the existence of subject matter jurisdiction, the damages awarded by the court were not supported by the evidence. Because we conclude that the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction, we need not address the defendant’s second claim. See, e.g., Bailey v. Medical Examining Board for State Employee Disability Retirement, 75 Conn. App. 215, 216 n.4, 815 A.2d 281 (2003).
Such a substitution may be permissible pursuant to General Statutes § 52-109 and Practice Book § 9-20.
No evidence was produced at trial that demonstrated any specific, personal and legal interest in the contract by the plaintiff.