Card v. CardCard v. Card
PER CURIAM:
¶1 Devin John Card appeals the district court‘s denial of his request to dismiss a protective order that his ex-wife, Aria Rebekah Card, who is now known as Aria Rebekah Marshall (“Marshall“), obtained against him. We affirm.
¶2 In April 2012, Marshall obtained a permanent protective order based upon allegations of physical violence and sexual assault by Card. In April 2015—after the permanent protective order had been in effect for more than two years—Card moved to dismiss the protective order under
¶3 This court recently clarified the standard of review applicable to a district court‘s decision on a motion to dismiss a protective order under
¶4
In determining whether the petitioner no longer has a reasonable fear of future abuse, the court shall consider the following factors:
(a) whether the respondent has complied with treatment recommendations related to domestic violence, entered at the time the protective order was entered;
(b) whether the protective order was violated during the time it was in force;
(c) claims of harassment, abuse, or violence by either party during the time the protective order was in force;
(d) counseling or therapy undertaken by either party;
(e) impact on the well-being of any minor children of the parties, if relevant; and (f) any other factors the court considers relevant to the case before it.
¶5 Card argues that in determining whether Marshall “no longer has a reasonable fear of future abuse,” the district court failed to apply the definition of abuse found in
¶6 We disagree with Card‘s characterization of the record. During oral argument and in the district court‘s written ruling, the district court acknowledged, and did not reject, the definition of “abuse” advocated by Card. And, after evaluating the six statutory factors in
¶7 The district court further correctly stated that, in determining whether a petitioner has a reasonable fear of future abuse,
¶8 Applying the factors from
He ferreted out Ms. Marshall‘s banking information, without Ms. Marshall‘s knowledge or consent, and deposited child support checks into her account. He reasoned that it was reasonable to do so because it was consuming fewer public resources by not requiring a mail handler or someone else to do the same job. That such conduct by Mr. Card would be alarming and disconcerting to Ms. Marshall, or any other reasonable person, did not dissuade Mr. Card. The Court finds that this was a deliberate act to harass, intimidate and emotionally upset her while Mr. Card justified it as innocent and practicable.
The district court further found that Card demanded that Marshall be physically present at a parent-time exchange “at a location he selected on short notice, when there was no order requiring Ms. Marshall to personally receive the child.” The district court noted Card‘s “pattern of self-justified behavior [that was] designed to harass and adversely affect the emotional stability of” Marshall. Card did so “in a manner to walk as close to the line, as he sees it, between compliance with, and committing a violation of, the Protective Order so that he feels he has not technically crossed it.” The district court also found that Card hired a process server to serve Marshall with child support checks, after being notified that she had opened a case with the Office of Recovery Services
¶9 Card argues that the district court did not make sufficient subsidiary findings to demonstrate how he violated the protective order. The argument lacks merit. Among other things, the protective order prohibited Card “from directly or indirectly contacting, harassing, telephoning, e-mailing or otherwise communicating with” Marshall. As demonstrated above, the district court‘s ruling provided sufficiently detailed subsidiary findings to demonstrate a basis for its finding that Card harassed Marshall while the protective order was in place. Furthermore, the district court found that Card continued to take actions that the district court found were “calculated to intimidate, harass and ensure the emotional distress of” Marshall. See
¶10 Based on these findings, the district court‘s ultimately found,
A reasonable person in these circumstances would find Mr. Card‘s actions to be threatening, troubling, and disconcerting, and they would cause fear of future abuse and domestic violence. The Court finds that Ms. Marshall has been harassed, intimidated and has a reasonable fear of continued abuse, and that the Protective Order should remain in effect.1
¶11 It is abundantly clear from the district court‘s ruling that the court considered the relevant statutory factors in reaching its determination that the protective order should remain in place because Card had not demonstrated that Marshall no longer had a reasonable fear of future abuse. Significantly, the district court further found that Card had not demonstrated a change in his behavior from the time that the protective order was issued and that he continued to justify the behavior that the court found to be threatening, intimidating, and harassing. Under these circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to dismiss the protective order.
¶12 Card claims the district court erred in adopting prior findings made by the court commissioner. Because the district court‘s findings based on the testimony from the September 1, 2015 hearing were sufficient to support its determination that Marshall had a reasonable fear of future abuse, even without considering the commissioner‘s findings, Card has not demonstrated any basis for reversal based upon the inclusion of those findings in the court‘s ruling.
¶13 Finally, Card claims that the district court erred in imposing a sanction under
¶14 Affirmed.