6 Ohio St. 3d 212 | Ohio | 1983
Lead Opinion
The question presented in this case is whether the defense of sovereign immunity is available to a board of education in an action seeking damages for injuries allegedly caused by the negligence of the board’s employees. Appellant argues that the board of education is not protected under the doctrine of governmental immunity. We agree.
In Enghauser Mfg. Co. v. Eriksson Engineering Ltd. (1983), 6 Ohio St. 3d 31, 32-33, this court held that “* * * immunity from tort liability heretofore judicially conferred upon local governmental units is hereby abrogated.” Enghauser is merely an extension of the recent pronouncements by this court in which the doctrine of sovereign immunity was set aside in specific areas. See, e.g., Haverlack v. Portage Homes, Inc. (1982), 2 Ohio St. 3d 26; Strohofer v. Cincinnati (1983), 6 Ohio St. 3d 118; Dickerhoof v. Canton (1983), 6 Ohio St. 3d 128.
We see no reason to retreat from this position today. The elimination of governmental immunity to all public bodies within the state is consistent with accepted tort principles and the reasonable expectations of the citizenry with respect to its government. Accordingly, in keeping with our prior expressions on the subject, e.g., Haverlack, supra; Enghauser, supra; Strohofer, supra; Dickerhoof, supra, boards of education are now liable for tortious acts in the same manner as private individuals.
In reaching this conclusion we have considered the two frequently ad
We therefore hold that the defense of sovereign immunity is not available to a board of education in an action seeking damages for injuries allegedly caused by the negligence of the board’s employees. Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
In Russell v. Men of Devon (1788), 100 Eng. Rep. 359, 362, the doctrine of sovereign immunity was supported on the grounds that (1) there was no fund from which the judgment could be paid and (2) “* * * it is better that an individual should sustain an injury than that the public should suffer an inconvenience.”
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. I dissent from this opinion based upon my commentary in other recent opinions of this court which judicially abolish sovereign immunity. See King v. Williams (1983), 5 Ohio St. 3d 137, 141; Enghauser Mfg. Co. v. Eriksson Engineering Ltd. (1983), 6 Ohio St. 3d 31, 37-38; Strohofer v. Cincinnati (1983), 6 Ohio St. 3d 118, 126; Dickerhoof v. Canton (1983), 6 Ohio St. 3d 128, 131.
Additionally, here, I must emphatically dissent, in that boards of education have had no statutory authority to purchase liability insurance to insure themselves as corporate bodies against tort liability. R.C. 3313.203(A) only allows a board of education to purchase liability insurance for individuals acting in their official capacities as members of the board or employees of the board.
Also, the Ohio Attorney General has opined that “in the absence of [specific] statutory authority, a board of education has no power to purchase insurance for a liability arising out of risks other than certain ones pertaining
Accordingly, at the very least, this court, in its extension of its policy of abrogation of the doctrine of sovereign immunity to school boards, should do so prospectively only, as should be the application of such abolition in the instance of all governmental entities.
Consequently, I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.