RENATO CAPPUCCITTI, оn behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v. DIRECTV, INC., a California Corporation
No. 09-14107
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
October 15, 2010
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING October 15, 2010
[PUBLISH] D. C. Docket No. 09-00627-CV-CAP-1
versus
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
Before TJOFLAT, WILSON and EBEL,* Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
On July 19, 2010, we issued an opinion in this case. Cappuccitti v. DirecTV, Inc., No. 09-14107, slip op. (11th Cir. July 19, 2010). We based our decision on our interpretation of the jurisdictional requirements of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA“),
I.
DirecTV, Inc. (“DirecTV“), a California corporation, is the largest direct-to-home satellite television provider in the United States, beaming a wide variety of programs
On March 6, 2009, Cappuccitti, on behalf of himself and a putative class of DirecTV subscribers in Georgia, brought this action against DirecTV in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. Although Cappuccitti had not рaid the cancellation fee, his complaint sought recovery of the fee in Count I, a claim for “Money Had and Received,” and in Count II, a claim for “Unjust Enrichment.” In Count III, Cappuccitti sought a declaratory judgment invalidating the cancellation fee on the ground that it is unlawful and therefore unenforceable under Georgia law.3 On May 11, 2009, DirecTV filed a motion to compel arbitration under the arbitration clause of the Customer Agreement or, alternatively, to dismiss Counts I and II, undеr Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, on the ground that Cappuccitti had not paid the cancellation fee.4 On July 17, 2009, the district court issued an order denying the motion to compel arbitration and granting the motion to dismiss Counts I and II. Count III remained undisturbed. DirecTV now appeals the part of the order denying arbitration. We have jurisdiction under
II.
In subpart A., we address the question of whether CAFA afforded the district court subject matter jurisdiction to entertain this class action. Concluding that the court did possess jurisdiction, we address, in subpart B., the question of whether the district court erred in denying DirecTV‘s motion to compel arbitration.
A.
Under
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action in which the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is a class action in which—
(A) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any defendant ....
A “class action” includes “any civil action filed under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or similar State statute or rule of judicial procedure authorizing an action to be brought by 1 or more representative persons as a class action.”
Additionally, the putative class must contain at least 100 members for a district court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction under CAFA.
There is no requirement in a class action brought originally or on removal under CAFA that any individual plaintiff‘s claim exceed $75,000. See, e.g., 14AA Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3704 (Supp. 2010) (“CAFA . . . extends federal subject matter jurisdiction to class actions when there is minimal diversity and the total amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and provides for aggregation even if no individual class member asserts a claim that exceeds $75,000.“).5 Eleventh Circuit precedent does not contradict this proposition.6
Applying these requirements to the controversy at hand, it becomes clear that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction as an original matter. Cappuccitti brought the action on behalf of himself and all persons similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23. The putative class exceeded 100 persоns,7 and the amount of controversy—in the aggregate—exceeded $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs.8
residents, there was sufficient diversity, since DirecTV is a California corporation. These factors alone were sufficient to allow the district court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction, and the further requirements and exceptions to jurisdiction under CAFA neither apply nor warrant discussion here.
In sum, Cappuccitti properly requested that the district court certify his proposed class pursuant to Rule 23(c) in order to obtain declaratory and injunctive relief under Rule 23(b)(2) and damages under Rule 23(b)(3).
B.
Contractual disputes between Cappuccitti and DirecTV are subject to binding arbitration9 in accordance with Section 9 of the Customer Agreement. Section 9 states:
You may, in arbitration, seek any and all remedies otherwise available to you pursuant to your state‘s law.... Unless we agree to pay your fee for you, you only need to pay an arbitration initiation fee equal to [the] filing fee [you would be charged by the state court], not to exceed $125.... We also agree to pay the costs of the arbitration proceeding. Other fees, such as attorney‘s fees and expenses of travel
to the arbitration will be paid in accordance with JAMS Rules.10 The arbitration will be held at a location in your hometown area unless you and we both agree to another location or telephonic аrbitration.
The JAMS Rules in effect at the time the contract was made and when Cappuccitti cancelled his service provide that the arbitrator can award attorney‘s fees and expenses if allowed by applicable state law, here Georgia law. JAMS Streamlined Arbitration Rules & Procedures 18–19 (2007), available at http://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMS-streamlined_arbitration_rules-2007.pdf.
Section 9 also states: “Neither you nor we shall be entitled to join or consolidate claims in arbitration by or against other individuals or entities, or arbitrate any claim as a representative member of a class or in a private attorney general capacity.”11 Section 9 therefore requires that Cappuccitti, proceeding individually, arbitrate his claim that the early cancellation fee is invalid.
Under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA“),
unenforceable,
The Georgia law of contracts deems an arbitration clause unenforceable if, “in the light of the general commercial background and the commercial needs of
the particular trade or case, the clause[ ] involved [is] sо one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the contract.” NEC Techs., Inc. v. Nelson, 478 S.E.2d 769, 771 (Ga. 1996) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).14
Georgia‘s unconscionability doctrine contemplates both procedural unconscionability, which “addresses the process of making the contract,” and substantive unconscionability, which “looks to the contractual terms themselves.” Id. (internal citations omitted). When considering procedural unconscionability, the Georgia courts examine “the age, education, intelligence, business acumen and experience of the parties, their relative bargaining power, the conspicuousness and comprehensibility of the contract language, the oppressiveness of the terms, and the presence or absence of a meaningful choice.” Id. at 772 (internal citations omitted). As for the substantive element, “courts have focused on matters such as the commercial reasonableness of the contract terms, the purpose and effect of the terms, the allocation of the risks between the parties, and similar public policy concerns.” Id. (internal citations omitted). It is obvious from these quotations that
resolving the issue of unconscionability under Georgia law is a fact-intensive exercise.
A finding that enforcing a contract provision would be unconscionable is a finding of an ultimate fact; it is inferred from a variety of circumstances depending on the nature of thе case.15 In a sense, a court must conduct a mini-bench trial to reach the finding.16 The precise issue we
In the district court, Cappuccitti argued that it would be unconscionable to require him individually to submit his claim that the early cancellation fee is
invalid to arbitration for two interrelated reasons. First, he claimed that the amount he could recover in arbitration, $420, would be far less than the expenses he would incur in obtaining the recovery. This was so because his claim was labeled as one for money had and received or for unjust enrichment, and Georgia law did not afford a claimant prevailing on either claim the right to reimbursement for attorney‘s fees and costs. Second, Cappuccitti argued that his inability to recover attorney‘s fees and costs in combination with Section 9‘s bar against consolidating claims for arbitration or pursuing them as a member of a class worked effectively to preclude him from obtaining legal representation. As a result, DirecTV was charging and being paid an invalid cancellation fee with impunity.
The sine qua non of Cappuccitti‘s argument was, and remains, the unavailability of attorney‘s fees and costs. DirecTV met the argument head on by drawing the district court‘s attention to Georgia‘s Fair Business Practices Act (“FBPA“),
[i]f the court finds in any action that there has been a violation of [the FBPA], the person injured by such violation shall, in addition to other relief provided for in this Code section and irrespective of the amount in controversy, be awarded reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses of litigation incurred in connection with said action.
(Emphasis added).17
The FBPA, in
In determining whether requiring Cappuccitti to submit his сlaim to arbitration would be unconscionable, the district court faced the same question we face here: would it have been be unconscionable “under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the contract“? NEC Techs., 478 S.E.2d at 771. To answer that question the district court needed to consider all of the remedies available to Cappuccitti under Georgia law at the moment he contracted with DirecTV. The FBPA provided the basis for one of those remedies in
According to Cappuccitti, he was “entitled to have DIRECTV‘s motion evaluated on the basis of his complaint as filed, not based on additional causes of action he could have pleaded.” Id. at 18. The district court bought this argument. In doing so, the court disregarded the circumstances prevailing at the time of the contract, and, instead, substituted for those circumstances the circumstances Cappuccitti‘s attorneys created in limiting their client‘s remedies to money had and received20 and unjust enrichment.21 In effecting
was able to conclude that Cappuccitti could not recover his attorney‘s fees and costs if he prevailed individually in arbitration.22
The court erred. As Cappuccitti readily conceded in opposing DirecTV‘s motion to comрel arbitration, attorney‘s fees and litigation expenses would be available to him if he prevailed on the theory that the early cancellation fee is invalid as “[u]nfair or deceptive” under
In light of this, it is apparent that the district court‘s order denying arbitration must be vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. We therеfore VACATE the order and REMAND the case for further proceedings.23
SO ORDERED.
Notes
A written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
Doctor‘s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686, 116 S. Ct. 1652, 1655, 134 L. Ed. 2d 902 (1996) (quoting Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281, 115 S. Ct. 834, 843, 130 L. Ed. 2d 753 (1995)). In Doctor‘s Associates, the Court mentioned “unconscionability” as a typical contract law basis for declining to enforce an arbitration agreement. 517 U.S. at 687, 116 S.Ct. at 1656.What States may not do is decide that a contract is fair еnough to enforce all its basic terms (price, service, credit), but not fair enough to enforce its arbitration clause. The Act makes any such state policy unlawful, for that kind of policy would place arbitration clauses on an unequal “footing,” directly contrary to the Act‘s language and Congress‘s intent.
Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted); see generally Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Folsom, 349 S.E.2d 368 (Ga. 1986). Although we need not decide the issue, it appеars that a cause of action for money had and received is not available in this case because the dispute at issue arises out of an express contract, the Customer Agreement.[a]n action for money had and received, although legal in form, is founded on the equitable principle that no one ought to unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another, and is a substitute for a suit in equity. Such a claim exists only where there is no actual legal contract governing the issue.
Morris v. Britt, 620 S.E.2d 422, 424 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Tuvim v. United Jewish Cmtys., Inc., 680 S.E.2d 827, 829–30 (Ga. 2009) (quoting Engram v. Engram, 463 S.E.2d 12, 15 (Ga. 1995)) (“Unjust enrichment applies when as a matter of fact there is no legal contract, but when the party sought to be charged has been conferred a benefit by the party contending an unjust enrichment which the benefitted party equitably ought to return or compensatе for.“). As we observed in note 20, supra, the dispute here arises out of an express contract, not a quasi contractual obligation.The theory of unjust enrichment is basically an equitable doctrine that the benefitted party equitably ought to either return or compensate for the conferred benefits when there was no legal contract to pay. The concept of unjust enrichment in law is premised uрon the principle that a party cannot induce, accept, or encourage another to furnish or render something of value to such party and avoid payment for the value received.