[¶ 1] Cоlleen Weflen, Marleen Weflen, Sharon Kruse, Catherine Harris, Norris Weflen, Windsor Bakken, LLC, Gulfport Energy Corp. and EOG Resources, Inc., appeal a district court judgment vacating a previous order granting Weflens’ motion for summary judgment, granting Capps’ motion for summary judgment and finding Weflens had no claim to a one-half mineral interest reserved by Ruth Nelson in 1975. We dismiss Weflens’ appeal, concluding the district court abused its discretion in directing entry of a final judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b).
I
[¶ 2] In 1975, Ruth Nelsоn conveyed real property in Mountrail County, North Dakota, to Olav and Rose Weflen. Nelson reserved to herself one-half of the minerals in the property. In 1979, Nelson executed a mineral deed conveying her mineral interest to Patricia Capps and Terrel Anderson (“Capps”). Nelson’s deed was not recorded until 2009. Colleen Weflen, Marleen Weflen, Sharon Kruse, Catherine Harris and Norris Weflen (“Weflens”) are the current surface оwners of the real property.
[¶ 3] In December 2005 and January 2006, the Weflens published a Notice of Lapse of Mineral Interest in the Mount-rail County Promoter for three consecutive weeks. On January 13, 2006, the notice of lapse was mailed by cеrtified mail, return receipt requested, with restricted delivery to the two last known addresses of Nelson. The addresses were obtained from the 1975 warranty deed from Nelson to Olav and Rose Weflen and from an oil and gas leasе dated January 12, 1973. The two notices sent by mail were returned undelivered to the Weflens. Nelson died in 1983. No Statement of Claim of Mineral Interest was filed by or on behalf of Nelson within sixty days after the first publication of the notice of lapse. Capps filed a statement of claim on October 30, 2008. Capps brought suit to quiet title in the mineral interest on December 18, 2009.
[¶4] The district court granted Wef-lens’ motion for summary judgment, quieting title of the disputed minerals in the Weflens. Subsequеntly, Gerald Wools, Penny Brink, Michael Lee, Melissa Kellor and Gwen Hassan (“Hassans”) were joined as plaintiffs and then designated as defendants. Hassans claimed an interest to the minerals as heirs of Nelson. Weflens moved for summary judgment against Hassans. Capps requested the district court deny the motion and reconsider its prior order quieting title in Weflens. Upon reconsideration, the district court vacated its prior order granting Weflens’ motion for summary judgment, granted Capps’ motion for reconsideration and found as a matter of law Weflens had no claim to the one-half mineral interest. The district court entered a final judgment adjudicating fewer than all of the claims of the рarties pursuant to N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b), concluding, “Because the ancillary claims in this case depend upon final resolution of the dormant minerals dispute, the Court agrees there is no just reason to delay entry of judgment on the main claim.”
[¶ 5] The following claims remain unadjudicated before the district court: (1) *608 Capps’ claim against Hassans and Has-sans’ counterclaim against Capps disputing ownership of the one-half mineral interest reserved by Nelson, (2) Caрps’ claim against Whiting Oil and Gas Corp. and Whiting’s counterclaim and crossclaim against Capps, Windsor Bakken, LLC and Gulfport Energy Co. disputing ownership of a 25 percent interest in a leasehold interest in the mineral rights of the land, (3) EOG’s counterclaim against Capps asserting a leasehold interest in the mineral rights of the land and (4) Windsor’s counterclaim disputing a leasehold interest in the mineral rights of the land.
II
[¶ 6] Before reaching the merits of Weflens’ appeal, we consider whether the district court appropriately directed entry of a final judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b) without first deciding the ancillary claims. “We ‘will not consider an appeal in a multi-claim or multiparty case which disposes оf fewer than all claims against all parties unless the trial court has first independently assessed the case and determined that a Rule 54(b) certification is appropriate.’ ”
Pifer v. McDermott,
[¶ 7] According to Rule 54(b),
“If an action presents more than one claim for relief, whether as a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim, or if multiple parties are involved, the court may dirеct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay. Otherwise, any order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time before the entry of а judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities.”
N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b). “Rule 54(b), N.D.R.Civ.P., preserves our long-standing policy against piecemeal appeals.”
Pifer,
[¶ 8] The district court’s discretion is measured against the interest of
*609
sound judicial administration.
Pifer,
“(1) the relationship between the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims; (2) the possibility that the need for review might or might not be mooted by future developments in the district court; (3) the possibility that the reviewing сourt might be obliged to consider the same issue a second time; (4) the presence or absence of a claim or counterclaim which could result in setoff against the judgment sought to be made final; (5) miscellaneous factors such as delay, economic and solvency considerations, shortening the time of trial, frivolity of competing claims, expense, and the like.”
Pifer,
at ¶ 10 (quoting
Union State Bank v. Woell,
[¶ 9] All of the parties in this case argue the district court properly granted Rule 54(b) certification and they agree the ownership of the disputed mineral interest must be resolved before various ancillary claims can be resolved. The parties generally rely on the district court’s own reasoning. However, as in
Pifer,
our review of the district court’s decision to enter a final judgment under Rule 54(b) is hindered “because the court did not articulate the specific factors supporting its judgment, but rather only recited the languagе of the rule in its judgment.”
“Because mineral interests are at issue in this case and most, if not all, of the minerals are subject to oil and gas leases, numerous counterclaims and cross-claims have been filed. The parties all urge that final resolution of the Dormant Mineral Act dispute should be reached before the ancillary claims are addressed, because the relationship between the dormant minerals dispute and the ancillary сlaims is such that resolution of the latter first requires resolution of the former. ‘Under N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b), the district court is authorized to enter a final judgment adjudicating fewer than all of the claims of all of the parties if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay and expressly directs the entry of judgment.’ Brummund v. Brummund,2008 ND 224 , ¶ 5,758 N.W.2d 735 .
“Because the ancillary claims in this case depend upon final resolution of the dormant minerals dispute, the Court agrees there is no just reаson to delay entry of judgment on the main claim.”
“A proper exercise of the trial court’s discretion under Rule 54(b) requires more than mere recital of the language of the Rule, and ... the trial court should articulate in writing the reasons supporting its decision.” Pifer, at ¶ 14 (quotation omitted).
[¶ 10] The parties argue this Court should resolve this issue because it is a lynch pin for a plethora of further proceedings. The district court’s logic was similar when it concluded certification was necessary because ancillary claims depend on the dormant mineral dispute. However, none of the parties, nor the district court, have demonstrated how this presents “out-of-the-ordinary circumstances or cognizable, unusual hardships to the litigants that will arise if resolution of the issues on this appeal is deferred.”
Pifer,
[¶ 11] As in
Pifer,
this case presents claims that arise “from the same series of transactions and occurrences” and are “logically related legally and factually.”
[¶ 12] “The burden is upon the party seeking Rule 54(b) certification to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances or unusual hardship.”
Brummund v. Brummund,
[¶ 13] The district court inappropriately certified the summary judgment under N.D.R.CivP. 54(b), and the court abused its discretion in directing entry of a final judgment. Therefore, we do not reach the merits of Weflens’ appeal.
Ill
[¶ 14] We dismiss Weflens’ appeal.