This аppeal stems from a Chapter 11 bankruptcy filed in the Eastern District of Louisiana. The sole issue on appeal is whether the bankruptcy judge abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees at half the hourly rate for time spent traveling but not working. Finding no abuse of discretion, we AFFIRM.
I. BACKGROUND
During the Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding involving The Babcock & Wilcox Company, the bankruptсy court approved the appointment of the law firm of Caplin & Drysdale as national counsel for the Asbestos Claimants’ Committee pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1103(a). Ultimately, Caplin & Drysdale filed a fee application seeking $5,642,218.75 in attorney’s fees and $745,303.35 in expenses. The United States Trustee objected to paying the full hourly rate for travel time not spent working. The bankruptcy cоurt held a hearing in which Elihu Inselbuch (Inselbuch), a partner of Caplin & Drysdale, testified. Inselbuch testified that it was the practice of Caplin & Drysdale to bill travel time “the way we bill for any other time.” He also testified that, from 1969 to 1986, he was a partner at the firm Gilbert, Siegel & Young, which had the same practice as Caplin & Drysdale of billing the full rate for travel time. Inselbuch’s “general understanding based upon conversations” he had with other lawyеrs in New York was that “law firms create their billing rates on the assumption that they will bill clients for travel time at full rates and be paid for them.” He stated that if this was not the practice, firms would have to change their billing rates, resulting in discrimination between the clients who require travel time and those who do not.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the bankruptcy judge denied “those portions оf the fee application that seek payment at the full hourly rate for travel time.” The court awarded attorney’s fees at 50% of the full hourly rate for travel time not spent working. The disallowed portion of travel time compensation at issue is $135,685.80. Caplin & Drysdale filed a motion to reconsider, which the bankruptcy court denied. Caplin & Drysdale then filed an apрeal of those orders to the district court. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s orders, finding that Caplin & Drysdale had failed to carry its burden of demonstrating that the customary comрensation for nonproductive travel time in the New York and Washington, D.C. markets was for the full hourly rate.
In re Babcock & Wilcox Co.,
Slip Copy,
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“We review the district court’s decision by applying the same standard of review to the bankruptcy court’s conclusions of law and findings of fact that the district court applied.”
In re Cahill,
*827 III. ATTORNEY’S FEES
The bankruptcy court awarded attorney’s fees pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 330. The statute provides that the court may award “reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services, rendered by the ... attorney.” § 330(a)(1)(A). The statute also provides as follows:
In determining the amount of reasonable compensation to be awarded, the court shall consider the nature, the extent, and the value of such services, taking into account all relevant factors, including—
(A) the time spent on such services;
(B) the rates charged for such services;
(C) whether the services were necessary to the administration of, or beneficial at the time at which the service was rendered toward completion of, a case under this title;
(D) whether the services were performed within a reasonable amount of time commensurate with the сomplexity, importance, and nature of the problem, issue, or task addressed; and
(E) whether the compensation is reasonable based on the customary compensation charged by comparably skilled practitioners in cases other than cases under this title.
§ 330(a)(3).
Prior to being amended in 1978, this statute “favored economy of the estate over comрetitive compensation” to attorneys for the debtors.
In re Busy Beaver Bldg. Ctrs., Inc.,
In the case at bar, Caplin & Drys-dale argues that the bankruptcy court erred in awarding only half of the hourly rate because the evidencе was undisputed that its usual custom and practice was to bill clients full hourly rates for its nonworking travel time. “The burden of proving the reasonableness of compensation and reimbursement pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 330 is on the fee applicant.”
In re WNS, Inc.,
Here, the district court found that during the hearing Caplin & Drysdale “did not even identify any other comparable firms, much less produce evidence оf what they billed for nonproductive travel time.” We agree that Caplin & Drysdale did not make a sufficient showing with respect to how other comparable firms billed nonworking travel time. Although Inselbuch did testify that his previous law firm, Gilbert, Siegel & Young, had the same practice as Caplin & Drysdale of billing the full rate for travel time, he left that firm in 1986 and provided no evidence with respect to that particular firm’s current practice. Additionally, although Inselbuch testified as to his general understanding of other firms’ billing practices, Caplin & Drysdale introduced no specific evidence of other firms’ billing practice in this situation. It appears undisputed that the other law firms involved in this bankruptcy were not objecting to the award of 50% of their hourly rate for non-working travel time.
This Court has not addressed the issue of billing non-working travеl time pursuant to § 330. However, in the context of a Voting Rights Act case, we held that the
*828
court did not abuse its discretion when it discounted the hourly rate billed for travel time.
Watkins v. Fordice,
On the other hand, there are bankruptcy cases to support an award of a reasonable, full hourly rate for travel time that is necessary pursuant to § 330.
See, e.g., In re Cano,
Accordingly, as courts have recognized, there is not a consensus regarding the billing of travel time under § 330.
In re Matter of Cano,
The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
Notes
. We reject out of hand Caplin & Drysdale's contention that, by proving other lawyers in its own firm billed the full rate for non-working travel time, it satisfied the burden of demonstrating what "comparably skilled practitioners” would bill pursuant to § 330.
Cf. In re Geraci,