In
Canty v. State,
“In a ruling on a motion to suppress, a trial court’s findings as to disputed facts will be reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard and . .. the trial court’s application of the law to undisputed facts is subject to de novo appellate review.” (Citation omitted.)
State v. Ray,
On July 19, 2002, Canty was being held in the Bulloch County jail on unrelated charges involving robbery and damage to property, and he was called in for an interview regarding these charges by Detective Terry Briley. 1 Detective Katrina Marson also attended this interview, and, at one point, she asked Canty if he knew anything about the attempted robbery at the Sonic. Canty responded that he believed that the attempted robbery had been committed by Levi and Lenzie Wilkerson. He did not implicate himself. Marson testified that, at this point, she “was encouraging [Canty] that — from his demeanor that he was involved [with the Sonic attempted robbery], that was my thought. So I was encouraging him that if he’s involved in this, since he already had pending charges, that we would put them all together.”
At the motion to suppress hearing, Marson described her statements to Canty in the following way:
Detective Briley and I explained to [Canty] that if he or any of the other parties that he’d mentioned were involved in any other things we’d like to put them ... all in one basket so that we can . . . work in everything together so when the DA’s office looks at that, they’re aware of all the charges and then nothing will come up and sneak up behind him later and be charged with something else. So that maybe everything can be worked out altogether rather than as separate incidences. . . . The only thing I indicated to him was that I could speak with the DA’s office about keeping all the cases in one and hope that when he went to court that he could have them all adjudicated together rather than as separate incidences . . . [a]nd hope for a shorter term. ... I advised him that if we could put every — if he was involved in any other incidences, that we could put everything together and that the DA’s office could work it altogether as one charge rather than putting them as separate charges, which is what I referred to as the shorter time, rather than each — each incident being separated. ... I probably mentioned that we could speak to the DA’s office and probably put it all together so that he wouldn’t have to do each charge separately and that it would be — you know, he could run it — I wasn’t sure he would understand what concur *610 rent or consecutive would mean. So I kind of broke it down in that . . . regard.
Later, during trial, Marson confirmed that she gave Canty this information “[i]n reference to putting things together for the DA’s office in hopes of a shorter sentence if they were all put together.” Canty implicated himself in the Sonic attempted robbery only after receiving this “encouragement” from Marson.
Based on these facts, Canty’s confession must be considered involuntary and inadmissible.
Under Georgia law, only voluntary incriminating statements are admissible against the accused at trial, and the State has the burden of proving the voluntariness of a confession by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Ritter,268 Ga. 108 (1) (485 SE2d 492 ) (1997). OCGA § 24-3-50 requires that an admissible confession “must have been made voluntarily, without being induced by another by the slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury.” “The promise of a hope or benefit that will render a confession involuntary under OCGA § 24-3-50 must relate to the charge or sentence facing the suspect.” White v. State,266 Ga. 134 (3) (465 SE2d 277 ) (1996). Generally, the “hope of benefit” to which the statute refers has been construed as a hope of lighter punishment. Preston v. State,282 Ga. 210 (2) (647 SE2d 260 ) (2007) (in the absence of an explicit promise of a lighter sentence, officer’s discussion of the death penalty and life without parole was not a hope of benefit but an explanation of the seriousness of the defendant’s situation); Brown v. State,278 Ga. 724 (3) (609 SE2d 312 ) (2004) (no evidence of hope of benefit in the absence of evidence a detective led defendant to believe he would receive a lighter sentence or immediate freedom if he confessed); Evans v. State,277 Ga. 51 , 53 (586 SE2d 326 ) (2003) (no evidence of hope of benefit in the absence of evidence an officer referred to any possibility of a lighter sentence when questioning defendant).
Foster v. State,
Judgment reversed.
Notes
There is no contention that Canty was not properly Mirandized. for purposes of this interview.