236 Mo. 575 | Mo. | 1911
Lead Opinion
Equity. Suit to enjoin the enforcement of a judgment in favor of defendant and certain executions issued thereon, for an account and for the redemption of certain corporate stock and bonds.
A temporary injunction issued, nisi, which was dissolved- on final hearing and the bill dismissed. Unsuccessful in his -motions for a new trial and in arrest, Cantwell saved his exceptions in a bill settled and allowed, and, on due steps, brings error, giving a supersedeas bond by our leave.
The Pleadings:
Summarized, the bill alleges that at a certain time (in 1902) Johnson loaned Cantwell $4000, taking as collateral security 500 shares of stock in the Columbia Lead Company and $3000 of bonds issued by the Topozark Orchard Company, all of a par value of $8000 and of an actual value in excess of the loan. That subsequently, Cantwell paid $800 on the loan, and thereafter (it being due) Johnson, having an eye to the consummation of a fraudulent scheme outlined further on, “falsely” represented to Cantwell that he, Johnson, was in “need of money,” and thereby persuaded Cantwell to borrow the money on the same collateral from the National Bank of Commerce, and repay him — promising at the same time that he would indorse Cantwell’s note by way of renewal from time to time in the bank until such time
Johnson answered admitting he obtained the judgment, admitting the executions and the levies, but denying fraud in the procurement of the judgment, denying the levies were excessive or fraudulent, denying all other allegations of fraud, etc., and asking the injunction be dissolved.
So much for the pleadings.
The trial :
To make his case, plaintiff put Mr. Cowan, assistant cashier of the National Bank of Commerce, on the stand, and by him proved that plaintiff’s note at the bank, secured by the stocks and bonds mentioned, matured June 8, 1904, was protested for non-payment and witness'notified defendant, Johnson, as indorser, to take it up. Johnson “had some conversation with our president, who thereupon ordered us to sell out the collaterals.” The sale was duly advertised, was regular in all respects and realized the net amount of $664.67, credited on the note. Johnson was the purchaser and the balance, $2559, was paid by him to
The note was in two parts. First, a straight note in ordinary form, bearing interest at 8 per cent from maturity, dated February 5, 1904, and due in four months, for $3200, signed by Cantwell and indorsed across its back: “J. B. Johnson.” Second, another part, also signed by Cantwell, evidenced the contract of pledge. It set forth the execution of the note, a desire to secure the same, and pledged to the bank as collateral security said stock and bonds, describing them; and provided that in case of default the bank was authorized to sell the collaterals at public or private sale at the Merchants Exchange or elsewhere, at its option, and apply the proceeds, first, to the expenses of the sale and, next, to the discharge of Cantwell’s liability. The final clause runs: “In case of a sale of said collaterals, said bank . . . may become the purchaser thereof without any right of redemption on my part.”
Cantwell took the stand in his own behalf, testifying he was a “lawyer and miner” and Johnson was “by profession a money lender.”
At the outset an attempt was made to show by him that he had known Johnson for 15 years or so; that their relations were intimate; that they had a large number of “transactions” together; that Johnson was familiar with, and had embarked with witness in a great many of, his mining transactions; that while they were engaged in the same enterprises (or during a great part of that time) Johnson “carried” witness to the extent of $20,000 or more, and witness paid him ‘ ‘ commissions and brokerage ’ ’ exceeding the highest rate allowed by law. These offers were refused and plaintiff saved the point.
Having shown that Johnson indorsed said note, an attempt was made to prove by witness that there was at the outset of the bank loan, an arrangement
An attempt was then made to show that witness called on Johnson and requested him to renew tbe note in accordance with tbe agreement outlined in tbe former offer. Tbe court, on objection, refused the offer — plaintiff excepting at tbe time.
Witness then produced and identified tbe following agreement, signed by him and Johnson, and read into tbe record:
Dec. 3, 1904.
I hereby agree to resell to H. J. Cantwell the 500 Columbia Lead Company stock and 3M Topozark Orchard Company Bonds pledged for note of Feb. 5, 1904, and sold July 8th for the said note, interest and costs, and interest to date of resale at 8%, and upon payment in full to cancel said note. This option of resale to extend not later than Jan. 15, 1905, Cantwell paying now $200, which shall he applied as part payment, if resale is perfected at or prior to date, otherwise to he a consideration for this option, time being the essence.
I-t is further agreed that he may exercise this option, by ' paying $500 ádditional cash, and executing his note with the securities as collateral for four months from date of resale, with interest from that date at 8% per annum.
Continuing, be testified be paid Johnson $200 at tbe time of that agreement, “as well as $500 subsequently.” He could not say whether tbe last payment was before or after January 15, 1905. On motion that part of tbe answer relating to tbe $500 payment was stricken out — tbe grounds not appearing and plaintiff saving tbe point. [Note: We do not find in briefs of counsel a claim that reversible error lurks in that particular ruling. But whether so or not, tbe witness thereafter testified fully in regard to that payment and tbe chancellor was fully advised.]
Oct. 12, 1905.
J. B. Johnson, Third Floor Roe Building, St. Louis, Mo.
Will remit to-day commission of one Hundred and interest eight per cent to date and costs of suit if you will extend redemption contract ninety days and continue case meanwhile. Important that I remain here another week. Answer stating amount if satisfactory.
H. J. Cantwell.
St. Louis, Mo., 12th.
H. J. Cantwell, The Panama Co., 11 Bway., N. Y.
Accepted if taxes I paid in July for you, also attorney fee $100 with interest and court costs named will make total $651.96.
J. B. Johnson.
3:25 P. M„ Oct. 12, 1905.
J. B. Johnson, 3rd Floor Roe Building, St. Louis.
That is more cash than I have, can send you three hundred fifty, and add balance to option. Is this satisfactory?
H. J. Cantwell.
St. Louis, Mo., 10-13.
H. J. Cantwell, The Panama Co., 11 Bway., N. Y.
No, I cannot do it.
J. B. Johnson.
*585 Oct. 13, 1905, New York.
J. B. Johnson, 3rd Floor Roe Building, St. Louis.
Can send you check for three hundred and fifty to-day, and will have and pay remainder when I reach there Tuesday. Will this be satisfactory? Answer.
H. J. Cantwell.
St. Louis, Mo., 10-13.
H. J. Cantwell, The Panama Co., 11 Bway., N. Y.
Send four hundred dollars New York exchange and balance next Thursday. Answer yes or no.
J. B. Johnson.
New York, Oct. 14, ’05.
J. B. Johnson, 3rd Floor Roe Building, St. Louis.
Yes.
H. J. Cantwell.
Subsequently, tbe following agreement, made and signed between Johnson and Cantwell, of date February 15, 1906, was read into tbe record '(omitting signatures and a conventional beginning):
That whereas the said Cantwell, party of the first part, believes that by reason of certain agreements heretofore made between him and R. M. Scruggs, now deceased, he is entitled to redeem $50,000 of said R. M. Scruggs; and, whereas, whether or not he has such right is a legal question, and the result of a judicial determination thereof uncertain; and whereas the said party of the second part is desirous of purchasing said bonds if they can be legally redeemed; now, therefore, this agreement witnesseth:
That the party of the second part agrees to furnish the party of the first part the sum of $30,000 in legal tender for the purpose of tendering said sum to the executor of said Scruggs, and demanding the return of said bonds, and if said bonds are delivered by said executor of Scruggs, the party of the second part agrees to pay therefor the sum of $32,000 and amount of any attached matured coupons, on the unpaid accrued interest on said bonds.
In the event that the said executors of Scruggs shall refuse to deliver said bonds on said tender and demand, a suit shall be instituted against them and the said Johnson shall hold himself in readiness to pay and shall pay the said sum of $32,000 and accrued interest as aforesaid (in the event of a judicial determination in favor of the right to redeem) for said bonds.
*586 The said Cantwell agrees to render his legal services in preparation of a brief for such a suit without expense, and the said Johnson agrees to employ Chester H. Krum or some other good lawyer to conduct the same at the said Johnson’s expense.
It is understood and agreed that such demand shall be made within sixty days from this date.
It is further agreed that as a consideration for the agreement of Cantwell to sell said bonds to Johnson in the event of their redemption at the sum aforesaid, said Johnson shall continue from term to term not to exceed six months a suit now pending in circuit court, Room 9, of the city of St. Louis, Mo., entitled Johnson vs. Cantwell, until a judicial determination of the right of redemption of said bonds or until said executors shall consent to surrender said bonds, and that in the event said bonds can be redeemed, the surplus between the amount necessary to pay for said bonds and the' sum of $32,000, or as much as may be necessary, shall be applied on account of the sum due Johnson for the controversy in said suit or under a certain agreement between Johnson and Cantwell for settlement of same, which agreement is continued with the option of said Cantwell to receive the 500 shares of Columbia Lead Co. stock and 3,000 Topozark bonds upon payment either out of said surplus aforesaid, or otherwise of said sum due Johnson as pending in court and contract and 8% interest from date of-
The introduction of that contract was opposed by defendant’s counsel and it went in over tbeir protest and exception.
Continuing, witness said lie discussed tbe facts (relating to that contract) with Johnson at tbe time be entered into it and from time to time, bad told bim be was ready wben Johnson was with tbe tender; that at one time Johnson said be didn’t know whether witness bad a cause of action against Scruggs or not, and gave bim to understand that be, Johnson, bad talked to Judge Krum about it. On tbe Saturday before Johnson v. Cantwell was set for trial, witness called on Johnson and told bim be was ready for that tender “whenever be was ready to discuss tbe matter again, ’ ’ and told bim tbe case against witness was set for tbe following Monday. Johnson then told witness be was satisfied be bad no case against Scruggs. [Note: Tbe Scruggs mentioned was R. M. Scruggs,
Harry, I cannot consent to another continuance. You will just he drifting hack into the old rut of procrastination and renewal. Johnson.
Witness had filed a general denial as an answer on April 5, 1905, and did not “find out” a judgment had gone against him until the day after it was rendered. In due time, he filed a motion to set the judgment aside. That motion was overruled.
At this point, witness was asked the value of the collateral stock and bonds. On objection, an offer was made to show they were then and now worth $8000. The offer was refused and plaintiff saved the point by an exception.
An attempt was then made to show a tender, after judgment, on the 15th day of August, 1906, of $2750, which tender included the amount bid at the sale of the collaterals and which (it was offered to show) was as much or more than was due on the whole matter. [Note: While it is not quite clear, yet we infer the offer was made to sustain the allegation in the petition of the tender and a demand for a return of the stock and bonds.]
On plaintiff’s offer to show the worth of his equities over and above the encumbrances, an objection was made and sustained — plaintiff excepting. An offer was then made to prove that the equities in those properties “if properly handled” exceeded $100,000. The court refused the offer. Plaintiff saved the point by an exception.
On cross-examination witness admitted that on the day of the trial he was called up by Smith, by telephone. Smith told him no judgment had yet been rendered. Witness told Smith that Johnson certainly did not insist on taking the judgment in violation of the agreement. Smith asked what agreement. Witness told him “it was contained in more than the telegrams.” Witness also told Smith he could not leave the matter he was engaged in and hoped he, Smith, would see Johnson and insist on his carrying out the agreement to continue the case, adding that he was not prepared to go to trial, “since he had filed only a general denial.” That afternoon witness received another telephone message from Smith asking him to come to court. Witness replied that if he took a judgment he would move to set it aside as in violation of the agreement. Witness did not go near the courthouse. He filed a motion for a new trial, accompanied by a copy of the agreement with Johnson, dated February 15, 1906 (the Scruggs redemption matter). He had paid Johnson “on the note” 1350 odd dollars, less the taxes. That amount included “bonuses and brokerages and everything else. ’ ’ It included the $200 for the original option, and the $651.96 referred to in Johnson’s telegram of October 12, 1905, and $500 besides. Witness admitted he stated in his affidavit,
At this stage of the trial and in this connection, defendant offered in evidence the petition, answer, motion to set the judgment aside, plaintiff’s affidavits in support and the affidavits of Smith, Carter and Johnson contra and the counter or answering affidavit of Cantwell, the record overruling the motion for a new trial and. the bill of exceptions signed by Judge Poster, June 1, 1906, filed the same day, in the case of Johnson v. Cantwell.
According to appellant’s abstract there was no call for the foregoing documents in the bill of exceptions in the instant case — although, barring certain affidavits, they were read in evidence. Appellant summarizes them as a petition in. ordinary form to recover $2559.61 with interest at eight per cent., from June 8, 1904, an answer in form a general denial, “and the motion for a new trial, and entry overruling the same are in the usual form.” The court admitted all said proofs, except the affidavits of Smith, Carter and Johnson filed in opposition to the motion for a new trial.
Witness, continuing, stated he was represented on the motion for a new trial by Isenberg, an attorney; that there was no testimony from Cornelius in the hill of exceptions filed in that case; that he had endorsed the $200 on a certain paper as “paid for
St. Louis, Mo., June 3rd, 1903.
For and in consideration of the sum of twenty-eight thous- and five hundred dollars ($28,500) to me in hand paid, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, I have this day sold to R. M. Scruggs bonds of the Catherine Lead Company numbered 164 to 213 inclusive and certificates numbered 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 of the St. Louis Prospecting Company, aggregating five thousand shares of the capital stock of said company.
H. J. Cantwell.
St. Louis, Mo., June 3rd, 1903.
For and in consideration of the sum of one dollar to me in hand paid and the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, I hereby grant to H. J. Cantwell the right to purchase, at any time before September 15th, 1903, unless this option be sooner terminated by notice in writing to that effect given at least five days before such termination, bonds of the Catherine Lead Company numbered 164 to 213 inclusive, with all coupons attached, said bonds aggregating fifty thousand dollars in amount, and certificates numbered 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the St. Louis Prospecting Company for five thousand shares of the capital stock of said company, upon payment to me of the sum of thirty thousand dollars, at any time before September 15th, 1903, or the earlier termination of this option as above set forth.
It is understood that time is the essence of said agreement and the said option of purchase hereby given said H. J. Cant-*591 well shall expire on September 15th, 1903, or upon the giving of such notice to sooner terminate this option as above set forth.
R. M. Scruggs..
For and in consideration of the sum of one dollar, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, I hereby give and grant to H. J. Cantwell, of the city of St. Louis, Missouri, the right to purchase at any time prior to three o’clock in' the afternoon of November 1st, 1903, the following described personal property, at and for the sum of $93,255.11:
50 $1,000.00 bonds of the Catherine Lead Company.
1,667 shares of the capital stock of the Catherine Lead Co.
10,000 shares of the capital stock of the St. Louis Prospecting Company.
It is expressly understood and agreed that time is the essence of this contract, and that upon the failure of said H. J. Cantwell to pay said sum of $93,255.11, on or before three (3) o’clock on the said 1st day of November, 1903, he shall forfeit all right under this option.
R. M. Scruggs.
Defendant, to sustain the issues on Ms part, took tlie stand. He admitted be got the $200 on the option to repurchase, and the $651.96 hereinbefore referred to, but denied receiving the $500. When the Scruggs agreement was made, he had seen no papers bearing on the transaction, but took Cantwell’s statement as correct. Afterwards, he saw Carter, Scruggs’ executor. Carter told Mm “he had been buncoed.” After-wards, he saw the papers (those hereinbefore copied, bearing date June 3, and September 16, 1903). Cant-well did not tell witness he had sold Mr. Scruggs the Catherine Lead Co. bonds and had made a bill of sale for them. Witness made the contract on Cantwell’s statement that he had a right to redeem. Before taking judgment, witness had seen these papers and told Cantwell he had seen them and that he was satisfied, in fact knew, he had no case on the face of those papers and that he, witness, would have nothing further to do with the matter. Witness put his repudiation on the known character of Mr. Scruggs for probity and the terms of the Scruggs-Cantwell papers, and ae
On cross-examination, after reiterating that he told Cantwell he would not grant a continuance, but could not recall the words, he testified that Cantwell did not produce the contract between him and Scruggs. He interpreted it, said he had a case. When witness saw Carter he knew Cantwell had no case and that Cantwell had made representations as to the contents of the paper that were not true. Cantwell said he had pledged stock to Mr. Scruggs and had a right to redeem. Mr. Carter said he could not redeem. Witness paid Smith a fee as his lawyer to advise him in that matter. He had not given Cantwell credit for the $100 commission and the $100 attorney’s fee remitted from New York because he had forfeited that; nor for the $200 original option because he had forfeited that; but did give him credit for $333.68 and sued him on “an account” and produced the note as evidence.
By Mr. Smith, Johnson’s attorney in Johnson v. Cantwell, defendant showed that in October, 1905, on account of the telegrams between the parties, the case was continued. When set again for trial on April 23, he saw Cornelius, Cantwell’s lawyer, at about 9 a. m. Conrelius came to witness’s office and said there was an understanding between the parties that the case should be continued “and asked me if I was so instructed by Johnson. ’ ’ Witness told him his instructions were to try the case. They went together to
By Mr. W. P. Carter defendant proved that several days before filing his affidavit in the case of Johnson v. Cantwell, he exhibited the contracts between Cantwell and Scruggs to Johnson. In the last contract securities are mentioned Cantwell never owned, viz., shares of stock in the Catherine Lead Company and in the St. Louis Prospecting Company. Witness testified also that when the Scruggs-Cantwell contract was made on July 3, 1903, Mr. Scruggs surrendered Cantwell’s note to Mm and there was nothing showing an indebtedness on Cantwell’s part. When Johnson called for the papers they were not in witness’s
Cantwell, recalled, testified his note to Scruggs was not surrendered until after the four months mentioned in the two papers had expired. Pie was certain it was not surrendered on July 3, 1903.
Carter, recalled, testified there' never was a four-months’ option, that the option of July 3, 1903, expired September 15, 1903, and the option of September 16, 1903, embraced entirely different property and expired November 1, 1903. That ho claim was ever made upon him as Scruggs’ executor, nor was he ever advised of the pretense of a claim on the part of Cantwell, prior to the inquiry Johnson made of witness.
Such are the facts and rulings on which plaintiff predicates his claim of error in the decree.
Questions ^ on such record naturally group themselves under these heads:
(a) . Of the exclusion of evidence (and herein of the personnel of the parties litigant).
(b) . Of fraud in tolling plaintiff into contractual relations with the bank and subsequent fraud in bringing about a foreclosure sale of his collaterals.'
. (c). Of usury.
(d) . Of fraud in the procurement of the judgment in Johnson v. Cantwell (and herein of res judicata).
(e) . Of the right to redeem the bonds and stocks independently of the right so set aside the judgment for fraud (and herein of the tender).
(f) . Of excessive levies.
Considering those questions in their order, we make some observations and rule as follows:
I. (1) There is a tang in briefs springing an inference that plaintiff hopes (or expects) aid from
“The man of independent mind,
He looks and laughs at a’ that.”
The record shows that neither litigant had any advantage over the other in foresight and alertness, and that both rose to rather a high water mark in that behalf — both were able to take care of themselves and hence, were not wards of chancery.
(2).. The chancellor excluded evidence tending to show plaintiff and defendant, during a long business acquaintance, had many joint transactions in mining enterprises, in which defendant carried plaintiff for large sums and exácted usurious interest under cloak of commissions and brokerages. That ruling was right. Those gone-by transactions were not ger
Plaintiff undertook to show that when he sought the bank for aid in paying Johnson off, the latter made an oral agreement with him to indorse the original and renewal notes at $50 per indorsement; that this arrangement was to continue until plaintiff was put in position to pay the same by realizing on his other collaterals, and that Johnson at a certain time refused to accept the $50 and declined to indorse again. It is not pretended that any memorandum was made of this contract and signed by Johnson. It is not clear it was to be performed within one year. Contra, as an arrangement in the nature of a going concern, it ran, on plaintiff’s own theory, until Cant-well “realized on his other collaterals.” When would that be? Certainly not within a year in the light of .the terms of the contract, or in the light of the facts of this record.
The premises considered, it seems to ns the contract would not support an action under the Statute of Frauds (R. S. 1909, sec. 2783). Hence the testimony was properly excluded.
But our ruling need not stand on that ground alone. There was no tender of proof that thé bank was willing to accept Johnson’s new indorsement, none that Cantwell had other collaterals on which to realize, or had made any reasonable attempt to fulfill his part of the agreement “by realizing on his other collaterals,” and none that he made any attempt to avert his injury by securing another indorser at the bank, or tried to place his loan elsewhere, or help himself
There was no error in the ruling.
There was an offer to show a conditional tender several months after the judgment in Johnson v. Cant-well; also one to show that Cantwell’s equities, levied on under executions issued on the judgment in that case, were worth so much as $100,000 “if properly handled.” Errors predicated of the chancellor’s adverse rulings on those offers- will naturally resolve themselves with the determination of main propositions further on.
II. ' The bill alleges a cunningly laid and fraudulent scheme on Johnson’s part in getting plaintiff into the bank and thereafter fraudulently springing the trap of a foreclosure of his collaterals. But there is not a particle of proof to sustain those allegations. Plaintiff went into the bank because Johnson said he was “in need of money.” We take judicial notice that the need of money is an abiding infirmity natural and common to all men. There is no fraud or element of fraud in such need, in and of itself, and a statement by A to B that he needs money but announces an elemental, goading and eternal fact. But, closer home, there was no offer tó show that Johnson did not need money and that particular money, none to show that he contrived and thereafter harbored the roundabout
Again. There is no attempt'to show the invalidity of that foreclosure. Indeed learned counsel for plaintiff assumes, for argument’s sake, a valid sale
III. Something is made of alleged usury.
In answer respondent denies the usury, but goes further and contends that if we hold the money paid on the options was usurious, as plaintiff claims, yet equity does not lend its aid to recover back usurious interest once paid nor grant relief against usury, especially where the borrower, has omitted to plead it at law, and shows no proper excuse for such failure —all of which latter facts were present, he says, in the case of Johnson v. Cantwell, the suit on account of the liability of the recalcitrant principal to the paying indorser of the note.
On which contentions, we observe:
To consider usury is waste time. This, because of the frank admission of plaintiff in his reply brief, viz.: “Plaintiff seeks no relief on the ground that defendant took usurious interest, nor does he seek the recovery of such usurious interest, hence the entire argument of the defendant on that branch of the cases falls to the ground.”
Be it so. And with that fall there also fell the allegation in the bill that by virtue of the statute in such cases made and provided the taking of usurious interest cut away the lien, if any, held by defendant on the collateral bonds and stocks.
With the case clarified by setting the foregoing questions at rest, we reach the main three propositions — one of them being:
IV. Should the judgment in Johnson v. Cantwell be annulled?
On the theory that a case well stated is half decided, we have set forth at length all the facts, among them those on which plaintiff relies to show fraud and
We rule he is not entitled to that relief and put our ruling upon several grounds, viz.: On failure in the proof to show fraud; on a decree against him below with conflicts in the testimony on material facts; on the maxim that equity assists ignorance but not carelessness (and herein of plaintiff’s laches)• and on the further ground that plaintiff had his day in' court in the law case, and matter, vital here, was adjudged against him.
In appealing to equity to set aside a judgment rendered at law, the precepts are: Equity does not incline to introduce new and unusual things. It is not vague and uncertain in that behalf, but has determined boundaries and limits, although it desires the spoiled, the deceived and the ruined, above all things, to have restitution where the facts call for such relief.
In the affairs of men there is no place under the sun where fraud should be permitted to take sanctuary and claim immunity from pursuit, discovery and punishment. The solemn judgments of courts of justice of any degree afford it no sanctuary. But courts have a wise and natural aversion to overthrowing judgments. There must be an end to litigation in the interest of the State and for the repose of society; therefore when the help of a court of equity is asked to undo what has already been done and adjudged by a court, fraud in the cause of action itself, in false allegations or false testimony, will not suffice. Such fraud was within the issues on the merits. The complainant had his day in court and the question is foreclosed. So, where fraud, accident, surprise or mistake is the ground for equitable relief against a judgment, plaintiff must come into court with a cause unmlxed with his own negligence or fault; for “no man is entitled to the aid of a court of equity, when that aid becomes necessary by his own fault.” So,
On the facts of this record, applying the principles announced, we think they preclude the annulment of the judgment. Plaintiff, through policy, indifference or whim, deserted his case at law. He knew in advance Johnson was pressing for trial, in a case long pending. If he had a defense, it is not made clear why the data for that defense were not accessible. But if not accessible, and if he had been lulled into fancied security by Johnson’s options or attitude up to a time so close to the trial that he had grounds and
We find no error in the refusal of the chancellor to disturb the judgment in Johnson v. Cantwell. The right to set aside that judgment was res judicata when the court ruled adversely on his motion for a new trial and he slept on his right to appeal, or bring error. [Johnson v. Latta, 84 Mo. l. c. 142; Reilly v. Russell, 39 Mo. 152; Miller v. Bernecker, 46 Mo. 194; Murphy v. DeFrance, 101 Mo. 151.]
The merits became res judicata at the same time, for the doctrine of the thing adjudged, under the broad policies of the law, is that those issues which are germane and should or might naturally have been tendered are precluded by the judgment once for all. [Spratt v. Early, 199 Mo. l. c. 501; Donnell v. Wright, 147 Mo. l. c. 647, and cases cited.] Those points are precluded under the doctrine of the thing adjudged which belongs to the subject of the litigation, and which, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, might have been brought forward at the time. (Donnell v. Wright, supra.) Res judicata, in full bloom and vigor has drastic results — witness the maxim: Res judicata facit ex albo nigrum; ex nigro album; ex curvo rectum; ex recto curvum.
Plaintiff argues that res judicata is not formally pleaded. To that we say: Both sides plead the jndgment, the testimony on that score went in without objection, and the case was tried below on the theory the matter had passed into the realm of a thing adjudged.
The point is not well taken.
V. It is argued that, in the event the judgment stands (as we have just ruled it must), yet under the facts and pleadings plaintiff is entitled to redeem the stocks and bonds.
Some parts of the testimony faintly suggest a right to redeem, but the broad trend of it points to a conditional sale — an option to repurchase. The right to redeem presupposes a pledge or mortgage and an indebtedness for which the pledged property stands as security. It is by such inferences that plaintiff constructs the fabric of a pledge to secure indebtedness and create a right to redeem — the precepts to go by being: Once a mortgage, always a mortgage. Equity looks favorably on the right of redemption. Equity resolves mere doubts so as to further that right. But a careful consideration of the facts leads us to conclude there was no pledge, no mortgage, no indebtedness for which the stocks and bonds stood as a security as between Johnson and Cantwell, and, therefore, no right of redemption. Contra, as said, there was a conditional sale, an option to repurchase that was not exercised within the time limited by any of the options. The original pledge of the collaterals to Johnson had subserved its purpose and come to an end when the collaterals were surrendered to Cantwell by the payment of Johnson’s original loan and repledged to the bank by him. To hark back to that old relation is but to amuse ourselves with an echo or reminiscence. When Johnson subsequently bought the collaterals at an admittedly regular foreclosure sale, he became the absolute owner of them. His bid money did not, by that act, become an indebtedness from Cantwell to him. When Johnson subsequently responded to his liability as indorser and paid the residue of Cantwell’s debt to the bank, from thence forward that part ’of
The burden was upon plaintiff to allege a mortgage or pledge between Johnson and him, and make out his case by a satisfactory preponderance of evidence. [Jones v. Hubbard, 193 Mo. 147.] That burden he did not well carry.
While the bill alleges a tender, yet it does not allege, nor was there proof to show, a tender in pur-, suance of the time, terms of a conditional sale and an option. Time is of the essence of an option contract and prompt performance by the holder of the option must be tendered. [Donovan v. Boeck, 217 Mo. l. c. 92, et seq., and authorities cited.] In that view of it the exclusion of evidence of the tender was well enough. Mark, also, the tender was a conditional one. It was not made for the purpose of paying the judgment debt and costs, but for that, and further, to recover the stocks and bonds. Johnson was not obliged to accept it on those terms- — this regardless of the value of stocks and bonds. The valuation of mining stocks and bonds notoriously fluctuates and depends on speculative features and the state of the
YI. Finally, it is argued that the injunction should have been made permanent against the levies of the executions on the ground they were excessive.
We think the weight of authority is aginst plaintiff on that proposition. It is admitted the lands were all incumbered. The amount of incumbrances is not shown, but that feature is not a controlling one. There could be but one satisfaction of this judgment. The duty of a sheriff in selling land on execution under the hammer is to subdivide it and sell only enough to satisfy the debt. [R. S. 1909, sec. 2206.] Moreover, an execution defendant may elect the part he wants sold first. [Ibid. Sec. 2207.] Equity will not anticipate that sheriffs will violate their duty and discretion in that behalf. Not only so, but if that duty was violated and that discretion ' abused there was left plaintiff, as execution debtor, his remedy by timely motion to set aside the sale and prevent an abuse of legal process.
That any mere levy upon land is not “excessive” seems the general doctrine. [11 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2 Ed.), p. 652, notes and cases cited; Drake v.
We rule the poiilt against plaintiff. That ruling carries with it a disposition of the proposition that the court committed error in excluding testimony of Cantwell as to the value of the equities in the lands levied upon “if properly handled.” That ruling of the chancellor might stand .on the further narrower ground that there was no offer to show that Cantwell was' qualified to testify upon the value of these lands.
The premises all considered, the judgment is affirmed.
Rehearing
PER CURIAM ON MOTION FOR REHEARING.
It is insisted in that motion that Thornton v. Irvin, 43 Mo. 153, is in point, is controlling and has been overlooked by counsel and court. Briefly the Thornton case breaks on the theory that a mortgagee buying at his own sale under a mortgage with power of sale in the mortgagee, holds subject to redemption by the mortgagor. That case, therefore, is' not in point. Johnson was not a mortgagee under the circumstances present here. He might have been entitled to subrogation to the mortgagee’s rights to the securities had he paid the debt prior to foreclosure and when so subrogated might have the right to foreclose. But that is not the case here. Johnson did not buy at his own sale. There is not a particle of testimony that he procured the sale to be made covinously or at all. The sale was made by the bank itself and in open market on full notice. Johnson bought thereat and he had the clear legal right to buy. Why foreclose twice, when the first was effectual?
We are cited to McDaniel v. Lee, 37 Mo. 204; Perry v. Craig, 3 Mo. 516; Greer v. Bank, 128 Mo. 559. None of those cases are in point. They but
On further consideration of the motion we rest content with our original opinion. The chancellor passed on the alleged contract relating to the Scruggs securities and on substantial evidence found the issues of fact against plaintiff as to the binding force of that option. Not only so, but the law court had the same contract before it in the motion for a new trial in the case of Johnson v. Cantwell. The motion for rehearing is overruled.