Ricky G. Cantrell, plaintiff-appellant, was arrested on criminal charges and incarcerated on May 5, 1993; he was unable to make bond. He was held in the Bartow County Jail in the custody of Sheriff Donald E. Thurman and Deputy Sheriff William (Bill) Hart, chief jailor, defendants-appellants. Plaintiff remained in сustody until August 10, 1993.
On July 28,1993, plaintiff hurt his foot. The foot became infected without observable evidence, and the infection went undiagnosed by the treating physician, because there was no open wound. Plaintiff developed a fever that reached 107 degrees. A couple of days lаter, his foot became inflamed and severely swollen. Plaintiff described the foot as having turned red, blue, and purple; it became black and developed gangrene. Plaintiff could not wear a shoe or walk, and he was in pain. Plaintiff was unaware that he was diabetic; therеfore, he told no one at the jail that he had diabetes or a family history of diabetes. Such diabetic condition was not diagnosed until he was hospitalized for his foot condition.
Plaintiff made written and oral requests for medical care and was examined and treated by Dr. Robert W. May. On examination of the injured foot, Dr. May made a diagnosis that the plaintiff had two broken toes causing the swelling; Dr. May concluded that there was no treatment for plaintiff’s condition. However, there was no fracture of the foot or toes. Dr. May performed no blood tеsts or x-rays and administered only 600 mg. of ibuprophen. No antibiotics were admin *511 istered. Plaintiff saw Dr. May on August 2, 6, 7, 9, and 10; Dr. May repeatedly noted no infection, only swelling.
On August 10, 1993, plaintiffs worsening condition caused the defendants to take the plaintiff to Cartersville Medical Center, where he was admitted, and his foot was diagnosed as infected for the first time. Surgical procedures had to be performed on the foot to save it from amputation; the foot was saved but with extensive tissue damage. Subsequently, plaintiff underwent several operations which resulted in the loss of sevеral toes. Plaintiff contended that he was permanently partially disabled, so that he could not work as a carpenter-framer or common laborer.
On July 28, 1995, plaintiff sued the defendants, both individually and in their official capacities, under 42 USCA § 1983 for an Eighth Amendment violation of the fedеral constitution and under Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XVII .of the 1983 Constitution of the State of Georgia for wilful and wanton denial of adequate medical care of an inmate in their custody. The defendants answered and raised defenses of qualified/good faith immunity and official immunity. On July 1, 1996, the defendants moved for summary judgment.
Defendant Hart, by affidavit, testified that the jail used two registered nurses and Dr. May to provide medical care and that the plaintiff received medical treatment from them thirteen times while in jail. He was examined by the medical staff on August 2, 1993, for soreness of his foot with follow-up trеatment on August 7, 9, and 10. On August 10, 1993, Dr. May sent the plaintiff to the hospital. Defendant Hart denied that the plaintiff received inadequate medical care or was denied treatment.
Defendant Thurman, by affidavit, testified that it was the jail policy to provide appropriate medical trеatment with the jail’s medical staff for all prisoners and that the plaintiff received adequate medical care on 13 occasions. Thurman had no direct contact with the plaintiff and knew nothing about his medical condition. He denied any intentional or negligent deprivation of medical care to the plaintiff.
Dr. May, by affidavit, testified that he was an independent contractor for medical services with the jail and that he saw the plaintiff 13 times for treatment while the plaintiff was an inmate. On August 2, 1993, plaintiff reported soreness of his toes and was seen in followup on August 7, 9, and 10 before being referred to the hospital. Dr. May testified that the plaintiff was provided with appropriate medical treatment at plaintiff’s request.
On June 30,1997, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal.
The only enumeration of error is that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. Plaintiff’s theory of liability is based *512 upon 42 USCA § 1983 in that his right to due process and Eighth Amendment right not to be subject to cruel and unusual punishment were violated by not being provided proper, adequate, and timely medical attention while he was an inmate under the defendants’ custody and control. Such allegations are without merit.
1.
Eighth Amendment Analysis.
“Not every governmental action affecting the interests or well-being of a prisoner is subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny. After incarceration, only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment. To be cruel and unusual punishment, conduct that does not purport to be punishment at all must involve more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s interests or safety. It is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertеnce or error in good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, whether that conduct occurs in connection with establishing conditions of confinement, supplying medical needs, or restoring official control over a tumultuous cellblock. . . .
Whitley v. [Albers,
“To state an Eighth Amendment violation for inadequate medical care under
Estelle v. Gamble,
[
The facts and circumstances of this case fail to reach this standard. Therefore, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to the defendants on Cantrell’s claims under the Eighth Amendment.
2.
42 USCA § 1983 Analysis.
“The allegations of one denied medical attention and incarcerated [when injured] have been held to state a cause of action under 42 USCA § 1983.
Hughes v. Noble,
295 F2d 495 (5th Cir. 1961). The federal courts have demonstrated concern that where needed medical care is refused the denial or improvident delay of such aid may constitute deprivation of constitutional due process.
Fitzke v. Shappell,
468 F2d 1072 (6th Cir. 1972).”
Davis v. City of Roswell,
However, plaintiff must establish a causal connection between any policy of inadequate mеdical care or omissions of medical care and the constitutional deprivation of due process rights.
City of Roswell v. Davis,
Any acts or omissions in failing to diagnose and treat plaintiff appropriаtely were those of Dr. May in his professional capacity as an independent contractor physician. Therefore, any deprivation was caused by someone for whom the defendants were not responsible, and his conduct is not chargeable to the defendants as imputed liability. Plaintiff failed to show a causal connection between the deprivation of his constitutional rights and his untreated infection, because the defendants provided and arranged repeated medical attention over 13 times through Dr. May. The trial court did nоt err in granting summary judgment to the defendants.
3. Tort Theory Analysis. Also the plaintiff has asserted a number of claims under various state tort theories to which the defendants asserted a defense of sovereign and official immunity.
Under the 1991 amendment to Art. I, Sec. II, Par. IX of the Georgia Constitution of 1983, sovereign immunity has been held to extend to all levels of the political subdivisions of the state.
Gilbert v. Richardson,
4.
Ministerial Acts Analysis.
A ministerial function has been defined as “one that is simple, absolute, and definite, arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and requiring merely the execution of a specific duty.” (Punctuation omitted.)
Vertner v. Gerber,
Providing adequate medical attention for inmates under defendants’ custody and control is a ministerial act by the sheriff and his or her deputies and does not involve the exercise of discretion to provide medical carе, because medical care is a fundamental right and is not discretionary in requiring medical care; thus, such act is
not
subject to either sovereign immunity or official immunity. OCGA §§ 42-4-4 (a) (2); 42-5-2 (a);
Davis v. City of Roswell,
supra,
5.
Sheriff’s Bond Analysis.
Also applicable to this case, the requirement of the posting of bond under OCGA § 15-16-5 waived sovereign and official immunity for acts and omissions that come under the bond coverage. The amendment in Ga. L. 1994, p. 747, was passed by the General Assembly after the 1991 amendment, and the
*515
General Assembly had the clear intent that the sheriff and deputy sheriffs continue to be liable under bond, notwithstanding the 1991 constitutional amendment. A sheriff’s bond under OCGA § 15-16-5 is a statutorily mandated written contract with the claimant as the designated third-party beneficiary; such statutory bond comеs within the written contract exception of Art. I, Sec. II, Par. IX (c) of the Georgia Constitution of 1983, which is subject to the limitations of
Gilbert v. Richardson,
supra, for tort actions for discretionary acts. See
Merrow v. Hawkins,
6.
Independent Contractor Analysis.
In addition, had Dr. May been an employee of the sheriff rather than an independent contractor, his acts would have been discretionary in diagnosing and сhoosing a course of treatment. See
Schmidt v. Adams,
supra at 157. As a government employee-physician, he would have had the protection of official immunity for medical malpractice.
Keenan v. Plouffe,
7.
Proximate Cause Analysis.
Moreover, no act or omission by the defendants was either the proximate cause or a concurrent proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury; the cause or supervening cause, if any, was the treatment by Dr. May. “Here, the evidence, without question, leads only to the conclusion that [the defendants were] not the proximate cause of [plaintiff’s] injuries. [Plaintiff was injured as the result of an accident and such closed injury became infected and worsened, not by any acts or omissions of the defendants, but by the allegedly negligent acts and omissions of the independent contractor physician, Dr. May.] Although ordinarily a jury question, lack of proximate cause may be decided as a matter of law when the causal connection between the defendants’] conduct and the injury is too remote for the law to countenance a recovery. (Citation and punctuation omitted.)
Strickland v. DeKalb Hosp. Auth.,
In sum, the trial court erred in finding that the defendants were entitled to official immunity; however, the grant of summary judgment was correct as a matter of law under the other tort principles discussed above. Thus, the grant of summary judgment must be affirmed, because the judgment was right for any reason.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
The State Tort Claims Act, OCGA § 50-21-20 et seq., does not apply to counties. OCGA . § 50-21-22 (5); Woodard, v. Laurens County, supra at 405.