155 F. 321 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Northern West Virginia | 1907
(after stating the facts). Every proposition involved in this case has been so bitterly, and, I may say so ably, contested by counsel that upon my former considerations of it I thought it best to postpone all questions of demurrer and other technical objections until final hearing. Nevertheless, I have had grave doubt all along as to whether this bill could be maintained for many, if any, of the purposes for which brought. It is earnestly insisted by counsel that the bill is warranted by section 8 of the jurisdictional act of March 3, 1875 (18 Stat. 472, c. 137 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p.
. “It is the existence, before the suit in equity, is instituted, of a lien upon or interest in the property, created by contract or by contribution to its value by labor or material, or by judicial proceedings had, which distinguishes cases for the enforcement of such lien or interest from the case at bar.”
See, also, Sheffield Furnace Co. v. Withrow, 149 U. S. 574, 13 Sup. Ct. 936, 37 L. Ed. 853; Idaho, etc., Co., v. Bradbury, 132 U. S. 509, 10 Sup. Ct. 177, 33 L. Ed. 433; Davis v. Alvord, 94 U. S. 545, 24 L. Ed. 283.
But this last .cásé, to an extent at least, defines the extent to which suit can go in the enforcement of such lien, to wit, that it is “a suit in equity, requiring specific, directions for the sale of the property, such as are usually given upon the -foreclosure of mortgages and the sale of mortgaged premises.” It is to be remembered that this lien is not a general one like a judgment, binding the property generally of the debtor therein; but, on the contrary, is a limited one against a specific piece of property, and may, according to circumstances, involve no personal liability upon the owner of the property. The holder of such lien can bd interested only to the extent of. the specific property itself and the order of priority of his lien thereon. If such lien has, by compliance with the requirements of law, attached to the property, it is immaterial to the holder what mortgage or judgment liens may ■thereafter attach to it, and, I conceive, it is likewise ordinarily immaterial to him what conveyances, fraudulent or otherwise, may be made of the property. In other words, such conveyances cannot affect this specific lien, affecting not .the individual, but attaching solely ad
_ The single allegation contained in plaintiff’s bill asserting such lien is in these words:
“(13) Your orator is entitled to and has filed a mechanic’s lien for all its said claim of $14,889.98, with interest as aforesaid, against said real estate and manufacturing plant in accordance with the laws of the state of West Virginia, and claims and is entitled by virtue thereof to a lien on said property.”
Nothing can be better settled than the principles that every bill in equity must state the right, title, or claim of the plaintiff with accuracy and clearness; that every essential to the plaintiff’s title to maintain the bill and obtain the relief must be stated in the bill, otherwise the defect will be fatal; that no facts are properly in issue unless charged in the bill; that every material allegation should be put in issue by the pleadings, so that the parties may be duly apprised of the essential inquiry, and may be enabled to collect testimony in order to meet it; and that the bill must show sufficient matters of fact per se to maintain the case, and, if it be defective in this, the bill will be dismissed; Sand’s Suit in Equity 10; Story’s Eq. Pl. 284; Mitf. Eq. Pl., 125; Parker v. Carter, 4 Munf. (Va.) 273, 6 Am. Dec. 513; McGugin v. O. R. R. Co., 33 W. Va. 63, 70, 71, 10 S. E. 36.
Standing alone upon this single allegation and statement of fact in this bill, I have not believed plaintiff could maintain this suit to assert its claim as a mechanic’s lien. This allegation states the bare fact that it is entitled to and has filed a mechanic’s lien; but does not state when it filed it or where or any other essential facts showing whether it be in such form and substance as to constitute it such lien in fact. It fis true that on June 19, 1906, by leave of the court, plaintiff was permitted and did file in the cause what purports to be the record of such lien relied on from the clerk’s office of Monongalia county, W. Va., but this was two years after the bill was filed, after Sturgiss and his
Under these circumstances the controversy narrows itself down to two questions upon its merits: First. Can the cause be maintained for the benefit of petitioner Sturgiss to assert a valid mechanic’s lien against the property for the debt originally set up in the bill by his assignor, the Canton Roll and Machine Company? Second. Can it be maintained at his instance and for his benefit, and possibly that of other creditors represented by Corbin as the trustee of the Morgantown Tin Plate Company in the bankruptcy proceeding, to assail and set aside the sale in New York of the $100,000 of bonds deposited as collateral with the Kings County Trust Company to secure the notes of the Tin Plate Company for $21,500 borrowed money ?
Taking up the first question, there very naturally arises at the very threshold of the inquiry this question: Is it sufficiently shown in the bill, pleadings, or evidence that the machinery furnished was of the character that entitled the plaintiff to a lien? If it can be asserted at all, it must be by virtue of section 3111 of the Code of West Virginia of 1906, which reads as follows:
“Every mechanic, builder, artisan, workman, laborer, or other person, who shall perform any work or labor upon or furnish any material or machinery for constructing altering, repairing or removing a house, mill, manufactory, or other building, appurtenances, fixtures, bridge, or other structure, by virtue of a contract with the owner or his authorized agent, shall have a lien to secure the payment of the same, upon such house or other structure, and upon the interest of the owner in the lot of land on which the same may stand or to which it may be removed.”
It will not be contended by any one that this statute can be construed to give a lien to the man who may sell, under contract, the furniture that may go into a house, nor can it be any more seriously contended that this lien can be taken for tools and machinery to be operated in the house, unless they become part and parcel of the structure itself. There is no substantial evidence that I recall in this case that shows that this machinery furnished by plaintiff was to be attached to and made a part of the realty so as to authorize this lien. It might naturally be assumed that some of the heavy machinery was so attached, and, on the other hand, the presumption arises just as strongly that some of it was not to be so attached. For example: The contract provides for twelve pairs chilled rolls, six pairs to be delivered with the mills, balance when required. Manifestly to one unacquainted with these mechanical details it would be assumable that, whether the “mills” were to be incorporated with the structure or not, the rolls could not be, because they could be supplied independently at any time, and as needed. I confess myself in entire ignorance touching this class of machinery, and it certainly cannot be contended that courts must take judicial knowledge of such matters. On the contrary, the burden is upon the person asserting such lien fully to prove the facts and establish the character of the machinery or work; for it is not for all kinds of such that a lien is allowed, as decided by Davis v. Alvord, supra.
In Van Stone v. Stillwell & Bierce Mfg. Co., 142 U. S. 128, 12 Sup. Ct. 181, 35 L. Ed. 961, Mr. Justice Lamar says:
*332 “This lien is a creature of the statute, not recognized at common law. It may be defined to be a claim created by law for the purpose of securing a ■priority, of payment of - the price and value of work performed and materials furnished in erecting or repairing a building or other structure, and as such it attaches to the land as well as the buildings thereon. 15 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 5. Now, it is not the contract for erecting or repairing the building which creates the lien, but it is the use of the material furnished and the work and labor expended by the contractor, whereby the building becomes a part of the freehold, that gives the materialman and laborer his lien under the statute.” <
The same principles and conclusions are deducible from the rulings of the Circuit Court of Appeals of this circuit in the cases of Liberty, etc., B. & L. Co. v. Furbush & Son Machine Co., 26 C. C. A. 38, 80 Fed. 631. Withrow Lumber Co. v. Glasgow Inv. Co., 42 C. C. A. 61, 101 Fed. 863, both of which cases arose under the Virginia statute very similar to ours. In the latter case it was attempted, as in this case, to set up an “equitable lien” independent of the mechanic’s lien law, but the court expressly holds no such lien has existence at common law or equity except by statute for material or labor furnished. In this case both the validity and existence of this lien were denied and put in issue by the answers. It would therefore appear that the case of Central City Brick Co. v. Norfolk & W. R. Co., 44 W. Va. 286, 28 S. E. 926, is decisive of the point that the mere declaration of the lien on record was not sufficient proof. The Supreme Court of Appeals of this state, without dissent, therein held:
“It is not sufficient to file with such a bill the account filed with the clerk of the county court for the purpose of creating such lien, but the fact that the material was furnished to the contractor, to be used in the construction of the house, in pursuance of a contract with such contractor,' must be alleged iand proved before such lien will be enforced against the property.”
It may be said that this case applies to a case where the material was furnished to a contractor, and not direct to the owner or his vendee as in this cáse. It is impossible, however, to see why any less proof should be required of the claimant as against the owner building by a contract than should be required of him as against other lienors whose debts may be wholly lost if his be maintained.
But another question comes in this matter, and that is whether the lien claimed in this case was secured by a strict compliance with the requirements of the statute. The allegations of the two answers of the original defendants 'and of Corbin, the trustee in bankruptcy, are fully sustained by the evidence. Briefly, these facts may be stated to be: That, by the terms of the contract, plaintiff was to furnish, together with other machinery', six pairs of rolls unconditionally, and six additional pairs.' when required by-the purchaser. The first six were furnished,- and plaintiff was substantially notified not to furnish the other six pairs. When the plaintiff had furnished all the machinery unconditionally, required by the contract, it undertook ■ to file in the clerk’s office a declaration of mechanic’s lien, which was duly recorded, ■p.pd suit was brought to enforce it, when it appears to have been discovered that this, declaration had been-filed 61 days after the last item had been- delivered, 1 day too late, and that other defects were apparent on the face thereof. Thereupon plaintiff dismissed its suit, and nearly
Under these circumstances, I do not believe this lien to be valid for several reasons:
First. Because it was not filed within the time required by the statute. It is earnestly insisted by counsel that:
“A contractor is entitled to one valid mechanic’s lien, and, if the first one filed is faulty and defective, he may file another and perfect one within 90 .lays (by our statute 60) from the time the work is finished.”
Also:
“When a contractor files a perfect mechanic’s lien for work done and materials furnished, as required by statute, such lien is valid, not only against the party with whom the contract was made, hut also against its assignee, who takes with notice and ■who assumes to pay its creditors itself, nor. will the fact, if the contractor has accepted money due on his contract from the assignee, affect the validity of the lien against the assignor.”
And the case of Williams v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 112 Mo. 463, 20 S. W. 631, 34 Am. St. Rep. 403. is cited.
Grant these propositions without a moment’s hesitation, wherein are they applicable to this case? A contractor is entitled to one valid mechanic’s lien if taken within the 60 days after he has finished the work or ceased furnishing the material. If he is not satisfied with his first declaration of lien, or finds it faulty, he may file another, within that 60 days. I am not sure but that he may file as many as he desires within such time, and, when he institutes his suit to enforce his lien, may rely on one or all of these declarations so filed. An examination of this Missouri case, so confidently relied on, shows that the contractor filed his faulty declaration on March 13, 1888, and his valid one on April 16, 1888. There is an error in stating this date on page 427 of the report of the case (112 Mo. 20 S. W. 631) as given in 34 Am. St. Rep.. It is there given as April 16, 1889,. and this may have misled counsel. By turning back to the statement of facts at the top of page 409, and also to page 429, this error is apparent. The date fixed by the contractor upon which he finished work was January 19, '1888, so that both the faulty and valid lien were filed within the period of 90 days provided by the statute. The whole question turns upon the 'words of the statute: ' •
“Within sixty days after he ceases to labor on, or furnish material or machinery.” ' .
Who determines the date of that “ceasing” ? The contractor, and he must fix it correctly, at his peril, with no qualifications or reservations, and he must swear to it. The whole proceeding tip to the bringing of the suit to' enforce is purely ex parte,.and, being so, it must be done.
Turning again to Davis v. Alvord, we find it distinctly decided that “occasional repairs, if subsequently made, could not be added to the work performed in the erection of the buildings months before, so as to render the whole work one continued performance, for which a single lien could be claimed within sixty days after the last repairs.” By a parity of reasoning, I am persuaded that the shipment by this plaintiff of some extra rolls which it knew could not be delivered, and could not in the very condition of things become part of the building or structure, cannot be added to the material and machinery furnished nearly a year before, so as to render the whole one continued performance for which a single lien could be claimed within 60 days after the last shipment. But, again, the statute only gives this lien for machinery used in constructing, altering, repairing, or removing the structure, and I have shown that it must be proved that it is used for this purpose. The evidence shows that these rolls were extra ones; that the mill was complete without them; that they were not fixtures, and in my judgment .could not be subjects of this lien if they had been delivered in time. And yet again I do not believe that the contractor, knowing the Rolling Mill Company to be dissolved and its successor, the Tin Plate Company, to be in bankruptcy, could possibly, in good faith, make this shipment with any expectation that it could be used in “the construction” of the mill. Por these reasons I think this mechanic’s lien void.
And, now, touching the hypothecation and sale of the bonds: It s,eems to me from the testimony: That Humbert induced these New York men' to organize the original company and locate its plant at Connellsvillé under representation that a six-mill plant there could be built for $100,000. That they subscribed this sum in stock among themselves, Humbert taking $10,000, and paid it into the treasury of this company and that of the reorganized one, the Tin Plate Company, in cash. That Humbert brought to them Sturgiss’ proposition
“I cannot and will not advance any money to pay off existing indebtedness. Mr. Meurer and his colleagues have put up, as I understand, $100,000 of the bonds as collateral to secure a loan .of $20,000. Whether these bonds were put ■up to secure a loan made to the Tin Plate Company, and were treasury bonds, or were put up by the bona fide holders of the bonds or not, I do not know, but' he and his colleagues must take steps at once to protect the property of 'the company and their associates as stockholders and bondholders from the Claims of the parties here who have ordered suits to be Instituted.”
Did,he not know that these bonds were put up to secure a debt of the.'Tin Plate Company? I think, he did. If the bonds had been sold to bona- fide holders for money, he would have been very quick, I think, to have demanded the application of .the proceeds of sale, if sold below par, to have-called for explanation, if at par, to know why .any debts were allowed to remain unpaid. As I construe this language, .it. was, a plain declaration to the New York stockholders that they •fijust 'riot only pay’ this, loan without any assistance from him, but 'cb.ñtifiúé. paying debts of the company out of their personal funds. ,Wrs‘ tlíéré any obligation, due to him as either bondholder or co-,Stockholder.that,required them to do this? 'Meurer very naturally declined tó. pa'y these notes on October 19th, and in consequence the '$í'00,0Ó‘Q of bonds were placed in .the hands of Adrian 'H. Muller •& Sofi, auctioneers, and, although expressly by the note contracts not required to' be advertised, were so advertised for sale in the Tribune, Tost, Times, and-Wall Stréet Journal-on the 20th, and sold at public aubtion on the' 21st to R. J. Kimball & Company, brokers. The contention on behalf of defendants is that this broker firm bought these bonds for Frank Logan, and that he.is' now the owner thereof. On íhé other' hand, it is contended that this shle to Frank Logan is a pretense, that they, were, in fact, bought, through'him by W¡ J. Logan, the former 'president and director and then stockholder - of the Tin'Plate Company, and that the -latter so 'bought them for the benefit of him.self and the other New York stockholders, and the sale arid purchase were made in fraud of creditors and other stockholders. This' contention, is now made by Corbin, 'trustee in bankruptcy," in his answer, and by Sturgiss and his assignee bank in their -petition-. In this connectiorij it is-proper to consider the facts, -shown in testimony by copies from the records,' that prior to the bringing of this- brie in this court, two suits had'been instituted, in-the circuit -court of Monongalia county, W. Ta.,'the*one by-thé Dunbar Fire-Brick Company and-other-creditors,
“Further answering, respondent says that, for the purpose of completing said tin plate mill, the Morgantown Tin Plate Company borrowed divers and sundry sums of money, namely, of Jacob Meurer $2,500, of W. J. Logan $2,-500, and of Dick S. Ramsey $2,500, which remains still due and unpaid, and on the-day of August, 1903, it borrowed from the Kings County Trust Company of New York the sum of $21,500 on a promissory note of the said Morgantown Tin Plate Company, and deposited and placed with said trust company as collateral security to further secure the payment of said sum the $100,000 par value of the first mortgage bonds that still remained in its possession and treasury, which note was a demand note, and.payment thereof was demanded in October, 1903, and said Morgantown Tin Plate Company was unable at that time to sell the said bonds or raise the money to pay off said note, which, with its interest and renewals of said note or some parts thereof, amounted on the 22d day of October to the sum of $22,055.67, and thereupon said trust company caused said bonds of the amount aforesaid to be advertised and sold at public auction at 12:30 o’clock at the New York Real Estate salesroom, No. 161 Broadway, by Adrian II. Muller & Son, through Andrew J. McCormack, auctioneer, and said bonds were sold on said day, at said time and place, for the sum of $22,500, and the costs and charges for advertising and selling said bonds amounted to $254, leaving a net balance of $190.33, which was paid over by said bank, and the liability and indebtedness of said Morgantown Tin Plate Company to said bank thereby extinguished, and the sum of $190.33 aforesaid was received by said Tin Plate Company by its attorneys. Further answering, respondent says that he is not informed, and does not know, who became the purchaser or purchasers of the said $100,000 of bonds, nor to whom they were delivered by said Kings County Trust Company, nor who is now the holder of the same, but he avers that, so far as the record of said sale discloses, the said bonds were sold in the due and -ordinary course of business and according to the custom and practice in such case in the city of New York, and that such hypothecating and pledging of said bonds to secure said loan, and said sale and delivery were upon their face bona fide, and so far as this respondent or the said Morgantown Tin Plate Company is concerned, were in good faith, and not intended to hinder, delay, or defraud the creditors of the said Tin Plate Company, nor to give any preference to any of its creditors over any other creditors, but only to secure the payment of the debt created at the time the bonds were hypothecated or put up with said Kings County Trust Company as collateral security for money said Tin Plate Company borrowed, and which said moneys were actually used by said Tin Plate Company in the construction of- its buildings and mill.”
But these quoted allegations were not original with Corbin, trustee. They were almost exact copies incorporated in an original draft pre
After Sturgiss had purchased these claims involved in these two suits brought in the state courts. in which these answers were filed, they were, on motion of the plaintiffs and with the consent of defendants, dropped from the docket. The property of the Tin Plate Company was, in the bankruptcy proceeding about June, 1904, appraised regularly by appraisers at a value of $84,100, as shown by a letter of the trustee filed in evidence; that at that time it was not expected to sell at public auction for more than $50,000 to $75,000, and, if the creditors assailing the transfer of the property, the mortgage, and sale of- the bonds, on the grounds of. fraud, in these two suits in the state court should succeed, little or nothing could be realized on such bonds either those held by Sturgiss or by any one else. It is not denied that Frank Logan, the alleged purchaser of the bonds, is the brother of W. J. Logan, and that' doing business with his brother to an extent, at least, the payment therefor was directed to be charged to their funds in bank standing in the name of the brother W. J. Logan.
There is evidence tending to show statements made by Jacob Meurer and Palliser indicating an interest on their part in the purchase and ownership of these bonds, but such interest and the utterances alleged are expressly denied by them. In this condition of affairs, when a sale of the property in bankruptcy proceeding, at a ruinous sacrifice, seemed inevitable, Sturgiss, naturally enough, sought ways and means to save himself. He first sought to buy up the stock and bonds of the company. By communication with Palliser, he ascertained that the latter could control and negotiate a sale of these or a part thereof, and as a consequence he took an option from Palliser to purchase $75,000 of the bonds, and 825 shares of the stock for 30 days at $30,000, for which option he paid $1,000. Upon consideration, however, he was not satisfied to buy less than the whole amount of the bonds and forfeited the option. Subsequently he offered $35,-000 for the whole $100,000 thereof and said stock. Palliser informed him that his client who held them declined this proposition, and thereupon the negotiation' fell through. Sturgiss then entered into some kind of contract, which is not disclosed, with the American Tin Plate Company. By this contract he agreed to buy the property of the Morgantown Tin Plate Company at the sale thereof to be publicly made and sell it to said American Tin Plate Company, it may be assumed, at an agreed price free from incumbrances. This agreed price must have been in the neighborhood of $130,000, for he admits in his testimony that the $200,200 which he paid for the property finally , was over $70,000 more than he had agreed to sell it for.
The property was sold in the bankruptcy cause and, to the surprise of all, was knocked down at $154,200 to one John G. Frazer. Sturgiss filed ah upset bid of $160,000, and on his motion the bidding was reopened in court, and there sold to him, Sturgiss, at $200,200. Frazer then came in, filed upset bid,, and on his motion this' sale was set aside, bidding reopened and sale made to Frazer for $220,000, Sturgiss bidding as much as $219,900. This last sale to Frazer was excepted
It may be stated, also, that the last sale at $220,000 would have paid substantially all the debts of the company, including the par value of the bonds. It is fairly to be assumed from the evidence that either before or after his purchase of the property, and in view of the probable requirements of his apparently unfortunate contract to buy and sell it to the American Tin Plate Company, that Sturgiss bought up the outstanding debts of the company. Certain it is that by his petition he shows himself to be the owner of all the debts involved here, and the evidence shows that the original plaintiff, the Canton Roll & Machine Company, was but the American Tin Plate Company in fact, all of its stock belonging to and all its acts being controlled by the latter, and that its debt was obtained by Sturgiss through the direction of the latter by assignment by its attorney acting as secretary of plaintiff company under the American Tin Plate Company’s directions. Under the circumstances, can Sturgiss successfully assail the sale of these bonds ? I think not for several reasons.
First. Because from the evidence I believe Frank Logan to be the bona fide purchaser and owner thereof; at least, I believe the evidence to be wholly insufficient to show the contrary. All the undisputed facts that tend to the contrary can be reasonably accounted for. The fact that he was the brother of W. J. Logan and used his bank account to pay for them is not sufficient, in the absence of any evidence that he was not a man of means and had no authority to do so. It is to be remembered that plaintiff called these defendants, made them its witnesses, and, contrary to all rules of evidence in this state and at common law, proceeded to subject them as its own witnesses to the most extended cross-examination. W. J. Logan was so subjected, yet no effort was made to substantiate these facts. Again, it is no badge of fraud that Frank Logan may have had business connection with Hitchings and Palliser, and was on intimate relations with them. The fact that this was so is a very reasonable explanation of how he was led to purchase these bonds. Finally, the fact that he authorized Palliser to give Sturgiss the option for the purchase of them can very reasonably be explained upon the theory that, finding after his purchase that he was in danger of losing in the transaction, he may have very well concluded that he had better sell $75,000 of them for what substantially he gave for them, but retaining the other $25,000 in hope of a happier turn in affairs. As I have heretofore said, the declaration of Meurer and Palliser tending to show interest are fully denied and on their face seem to me to be improbable. On the other hand, these defendants by answer and in evidence have denied any and all interest in these bonds. They have done so upon their introduction by plaintiff as its witnesses, arid I think it must be bound by their statements in regard thereto.
Third. If it be held that this sale of bonds was in ■ fact made to W. J. Logan and that other New York stockholders have an interest in them, even then I conceive Sturgiss cannot make this assault for another reason. He was an attorney at law, and was clearly acting as such for this bankrupt company and' for these nonresident stock-' holders. He prepared for them substantially-the charter papers, revised and corrected the minutes and records of its directors’ -and stockholders’ meetings, prepared the mortgage, defended the suits, and sent written opinions to the New York officers, defendants here, as to the validity of these debts and the liens claimed for them. It
Finally, the Morgantown Tin Plate Company was adjudged bankrupt. By election of creditors Corbin was elected trustee. He thereby became clothed by the bankrupt law with full and plenary power, as the legal representative of these creditors here, to institute suits to recover the bankrupt’s property, to set aside its fraudulent conveyances, to intervene in pending suits instituted by others for such purposes, and to contest claims asserted against such bankrupt’s estate. In discharge of his duties, and without protest, so far as shown, from any of these creditors whose legal representative he was, he did intervene in the suits pending in the state courts, filed his sworn answers wherein he repudiated all effort to impeach the sale of these bonds, denied all fraud charged, and set forth the details under which it was made. The allegations of his answers in this respect have hereinbefore been set out. He is clearly estopped by this action on his part from now, in this suit, changing front and from assailing this transaction. As well said by Mr. Bigelow in his work on Estoppel (3d Ed.) c. 34, p. 601:
“If parties in court were permitted to assume inconsistent positions in the trial of their causes, the usefulness of courts of Justice would in most cases be paralyzed, the coercive process of the law, available only between those who consented to its exercise, could be set at naught by all. But the rights of all men, honest and dishonest, are in the keeping of the courts, and consistency of proceeding is therefore required of all those who come or are brought before them.”
And in Railway Co. v. McCarthy, 96 U. S. 258, 24 L. Ed. 693, Mr. Justice Swayne says:
“When a party gives a reason for his conduct and decision touching anything involved in a controversy, he cannot, after litigation has begun, change his ground, and put his conduct upon another and a different consideration. He is not permitted thus to amend his hold. He is estopped from doing it by a settled principle of law” — citing .authorities.
For reasons indicated, I do not believe this cause can be maintained, either by the original plaintiff or by the intervening petitioners, and it must be dismissed, with costs against them.