Case Information
*0 FILED CLERK U.S. DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK LONG ISLAND OFFICE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT For Online Publication Only
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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ANNEMARIE CANTAVE AND SHIYAH 3/12/2021 3:32 pm TEITELBAUM, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON
BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,
Plaintiffs, ORDER -against- 19-CV-5796 (JMA) (AYS) THE CBE GROUP, INC.,
Defendant.
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APPEARANCES
Jonathan M. Cader
David M. Barshay
100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
Garden City, NY 11530
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Brendan H. Little
50 Fountain Plaza, Suite 1700
Buffalo, NY 14202
Attorney for Defendant
AZRACK, United States District Judge:
I. BACKGROUND Plaintiffs Annemarie Cantave and Shiyah Teitelbaum (“Plaintiffs”) bring this action against The CBE Group, Inc. (“Defendant”), a debt collector, for alleged violations of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (“FDCPA”). (ECF No. 1 at 1.) The claims arise from
two debt collection letters Defendant sent to Plaintiffs. Defendant sent the first letter, dated
October 20, 2018 (the “Cantave Letter”), to Plaintiff Cantave to collect an outstanding debt of
$579.53 owed to Verizon Wireless. (ECF No. 1-1 at 1.) Defendant sent the second letter, dated
November 10, 2018 (the “Teitelbaum Letter”), to Plaintiff Teitelbaum to collect an outstanding
debt of $55.81 owed to Charter Communications. (ECF No. 1-2 at 1.)
Both the Cantave and Teitelbaum Letters are the initial communications Defendant sent to Plaintiffs. (ECF No. 1 at 4.) In both Letters, Defendant informed Plaintiffs that their debts had
been referred to Defendant for collection and offered to discuss payment options if Plaintiffs were
unable to immediately pay their debts in full. (ECF No. 1-1 at 1; ECF No. 1-2 at 1.) Both Letters
contained the following features that are relevant to this litigation: • The front of each Letter included the same validation language, (ECF No. 1-1 at 1; ECF
No. 1-2 at 1):
Unles you notify this th rty (30) d th you ute the validity of this d will s-.u I debt l va d. (30} days r rec.el ng th n th or y portion thereof, thl-. o I
a copy of a Judgment and you • copy of such f you requnt th o • In writing th )
notice, this offln wll pn,vld you w • credltOf' tf rent from th• current or.
Unless you noUfy this office within thirty {30) days after recelv]ng th.ls 1n,ot1ce that you dispute the valldlty of thiti debt or any portion mereof,. thl$ office wilt assume t [1] hls debt Is valid, If you no111'y this office In writing within thirty (30) days after receiving this notice, tnat you dispute tlo:i• valldlty of thl$ debt or any portion thereof, this office wlll obtain verific,i,tlOn of the •debt or obtaln a copy of a Judgment and mall you a. copy of sueh judgment or veriflcatilon. Jf )'OU request this offloe In mitlng within thirty (311') days after receMn,g this notice, tlhls offl,ce will provide you wl.tlil the nartt(l a:nd address or the original creditor If different from the current 1;Teditor.
• Under the validation language, the Letters listed Defendant’s “mailing address,” (ECF No. 1-1 at 1; ECF No. 1-2 at 1):
terklo,, ~ 50704-2635 • The top left corner of the Letters contained Defendant’s name and logo, an address without any description, and what appear to be hours of operation, (ECF No. 1-1 at 1; ECF No. 1-2 at 1):
• The CBE Group, Inc .. • The CBE Group. Inc. 'w,,fl -.,,.,,,I ( CBE >~~:::r:~:.--"' CB lr" ) 1309 Tec:hnology Pkwy, Cedar Falls, IA50613 1309 TeclV'iology P!My, Cedar Fal Is, IA 50613 7:00 a.m. • 8:00 pm. CT Mor¥1ay-Ffiday ,:;;, 10/'20/18 group
group 1111011s
The Letters differed, however, in that they offered the recipients different options for making
payments:
• The Cantave Letter contained three payment options, including: online, by mail, or over the phone. An address was listed in the box describing payment by mail, (ECF No. 1- 1 at 1):
PAYMENT CAN BE .. ADE AS FOLLOWS: .... 6 omoN t: Online payments can be made free
of charge with checking accouni
debit card, or credit card by going to www.verkCIOV!1reJess.com/~mtb1ft
.. .. ...
SI OPTION 2: Send your check or money order
payable to Verizon
PO BOX 25505, LEHIGH VALLEY, PA 18002-5505. .. Ii.. .. J omoNJ: .... ~ C II u at (855) 552~2499 to discu paying wlh a check by phone, credit
""'
card or debit card.
'" • The Teitelbaum letter only contained an option to pay online. No address was listed in this part of the Teitelbaum letter, (ECF No. 1-2 at 1):
Pay Onfine Account rosolutkm The eesy way:
Login to your account at www .. paycbeg1roup.com to qu l:oldy and easily pay your
balance rn fu11 or setup pa.yment arrangements,. • The Teitelbaum Letter did, however, contain a detachable payment slip with two addresses. One address, which appears to have been positioned in the lower right corner to be visible through a window on the return envelope, contained the same address as the address labeled “mailing address” earlier in the letter. A second address in the upper left corner of the slip contains no description other than “change service requested,” (ECF No. 1-2 at 1):
. l'I.Eo\SE DETACH N-1) RETIJRH LO',VER Pa\TIO!I wmt UICI.OSSO E""1cLOPE 29_:00CBEG04_01 47
POBOX2635 IVISA ~ ·· ""~~t..3 WATERLOO, IA 50704-2635
CHAMGE SERVICE REQUESTED D D □ D
ACCT#:M&0130012li01155 CS #21-7Hll62JO REF#:0147 DATE; 11110tlS CALL: (866)!113-3133 21714052 80-1-316-3679327:3 111,1,111 [1] 11•111 [1] [1] 1l1 1111••1•11•1 [1] [111] 1l1 [11] h [11] 1l'1•11 l1ll [11] 61AS 8th StApt3D 1111 h Shiyah Teitelbaum Brooklyn NY 11249-5963 121,241130 Waterloo, IA 50704-0300 THE CBE GROUP, INC. PO Box300 Payment Processing Center
• The Cantave Letter did not contain a detachable payment slip. However, like the Teitelbaum Letter, it contained an address without any label or description other than “change service requested,” (ECF No. 1-1 at 1):
PO B0X2635 WATERLOO, IA 50704-2685
CHANGE SERVICE REQll TED
104520668 •1• 1 1l1l•ul111111•'"1• 1 •1 1 1'lh•111••1111'• 1 1l1 [1] 1 11 1111 [1] 1•I••••
Ann m r1e C ntave
PO Box 3954
New Hyde P rk NY 11040-8954 Plaintiffs initiated the instant litigation on October 14, 2019, alleging that the Letters violate the FDCPA because they contain multiple addresses. In particular, they argue that the
multiple addresses would confuse the least sophisticated consumer as to which address to use to
send written disputes or to inquire as to the name and address of the original creditor. (ECF No. 1
at 5-16.) Additionally, they claim that the multiple addresses “overshadow” Plaintiffs’ rights to
dispute the debt, receive verification of it, or request the name of the original creditor. (Id.)
After appearing for a pre-motion conference before the undersigned, Defendant now moves to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), (ECF No. 13-1), which Plaintiffs
oppose, (ECF No. 14). For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED in its
entirety.
II. DISCUSSION The Court dismisses the complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) because Plaintiffs have failed to allege plausible claims to relief under the FDCPA.
A. Standard
1. Rule 12(b)(6)
To survive a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), Plaintiffs must allege sufficient facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible only “when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556). Mere labels and legal conclusions will not suffice, nor will “a formulaic recitation
of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. When reviewing a motion to
dismiss, the Court accepts the factual allegations set forth in the complaint as true and draws all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Cleveland v. Caplaw Enters., 448 F.3d 518, 521
(2d Cir. 2006).
Ordinarily, on a motion to dismiss, a court is confined to “the allegations contained within the four corners of [the] complaint.” Pani v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, 152 F.3d 67, 71 (2d
Cir. 1998). However, this standard “has been interpreted broadly to include any document attached
to the complaint, any statements or documents incorporated in the complaint by reference, any
document on which the complaint heavily relies, and anything of which judicial notice may be
taken.” Young AE Kim v. Advanced Call Center Technologies, LLC, No. 19-CV-4672, 2020 WL
5893964, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2020) (citing Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152
(2d Cir. 2002)). In cases brought pursuant to the FDCPA, courts that have broadly interpreted this
standard have also included debt collection letters that complaints allege violate the FDCPA. Id.
2. Section 1692e
The FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from using “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. There
are sixteen subsections that outline a non-exhaustive list of practices that fall within the prohibited
conduct under § 1692e. A catch-all subsection, § 1692e(10), bans “[t]he use of any false
representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” Since the list in the
subsections is non-exhaustive, “a debt collection practice can be a ‘false, deceptive, or misleading’
practice in violation of § 1692e even if it does not fall within any of the subsections of § 1692e.”
Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1318 (2d Cir. 1993). A debt collection letter is deceptive if it
is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, at least one of which is inaccurate. See
id. at 1319; see also Easterling v. Collecto, Inc., 692 F.3d 229, 233 (2d Cir. 2012). -- --- -----------------
3. Section 1692g
Section 1692g requires debt collectors to provide consumers with specific information within five days of initiating contact. [1] The required information under the statute includes
providing a consumer with a statement that “unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt
of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to
be valid by the debt collector.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3). The validation notice is intended “to
protect consumers from ‘debt collectors dunning the wrong person or attempting to collect debts
which the consumer has already paid’ by ‘inform[ing consumers that they have] certain rights,
including the rights to make a written request for verification of the debt and to dispute the validity
of the debt.’” Hochhauser v. Grossman & Karaszewski, PLLC, No. 19-CV-2468, 2020 WL
2042390, at *4-5 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2020) (quoting Lotito v. Recovery Assocs. Inc., No. 13-CV-
5833, 2014 WL 4659464, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2014)) (alterations in original).
A validation notice is not legally sufficient “if that notice is overshadowed or contradicted by other language in communications to the debtor.” Jacobson v. Healthcare Fin. Servs., Inc., 516
F.3d 85, 90 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Savino v. Computer Credit, Inc., 164 F.3d 81, 85 (2d Cir. 1998)).
“A notice overshadows or contradicts the validation notice ‘if it would make the least sophisticated
consumer uncertain as to her rights.’” Jacobson, 516 F.3d at 90 (quoting Russell v. Equifax A.R.S,
74 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 1996)). “Since 2006, this prohibition against ‘overshadowing’ has also
been enshrined in the text of the FDCPA itself: ‘[a]ny collection activities and communication
during the 30-day period may not overshadow or be inconsistent with the disclosure of the
consumer’s right to dispute the debt or request the name and address of the original creditor.’”
Belichenko v. Gem Recovery Systems, 17-CV-01731, 2017 WL 6558499, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Dec.
22, 2017) (quoting § 1692g(b)).
4. Least Sophisticated Consumer
In evaluating whether a communication violates § 1692e, the Court applies an objective standard by considering how the “least sophisticated consumer” would understand the debt
collection letter. Carlin v. Davidson Fink, LLP, 852 F.3d 207, 216 (2d Cir. 2017); Clomon, 988
F.2d at 1318. Though the “least sophisticated consumer” does not have the astuteness of a
“Philadelphia lawyer,” they are neither “irrational nor a dolt.” Ellis v. Solomon & Solomon, P.C.,
591 F.3d 130, 135 (2d Cir. 1996). Additionally, the “least sophisticated consumer” can be
expected to possess a “willingness to read a collection notice with some care.” Greco v. Trauner,
Cohen & Thomas, LLP, 412 F.3d 360, 363 (2d Cir. 2005). The purpose of the “least sophisticated
consumer” standard is to protect “the gullible as well as the shrewd.” Jacobson, 516 F.3d 85 at
90. This objective test protects consumers against deceptive debt collection practices while also
protecting debt collectors from liability for “bizarre or idiosyncratic” interpretations of debt
collection letters. Clomon, 988 F.2d at 1320. While “courts are divided on whether breach of the
least sophisticated consumer standard is a question of law or fact, the trend in the Second Circuit
is to treat this question as a matter of law that can be resolved on a motion to dismiss.” Diaz v.
Residential Credit Sols., Inc., 965 F. Supp. 2d 249, 256 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting Rozier v. Fin.
Recovery Sys., No. 10-CV-3273, 2011 WL 2295116, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. June 7, 2011)).
B. Application
Plaintiffs contend that Defendant’s letters violate sections 1692g(b), 1692e, and 1692e(10) of the FDCPA because they contain multiple addresses. (ECF No. 1 at 5-16.) They first allege
that the least sophisticated consumer would be confused as to which of these addresses to use to
send a written dispute or to request the name and address of the original creditor. Because the least
sophisticated consumer would understand that disputes or requests for information should be
mailed to the address explicitly labeled “mailing address,” the Court finds that the Letters do not
violate the FDCPA as a matter of law.
Recently, two cases were brought in this district to challenge letters Defendant sent to consumers that were nearly identical to the Teitelbaum Letter at issue here. See Truckenbrodt v.
CBE Grp., Inc., No. 19-CV-2870, 2020 WL 6161254 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2020); Pinyuk v. CBE
Group, Inc., No. 17-CV-5753, 2019 WL 1900985 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2019). Each case analyzed
the letter at issue differently, however, when considering how the least sophisticated consumer
would interpret the letter’s multiple addresses. In Pinyuk, the court granted the plaintiff leave to
amend, crediting the argument “that when a least sophisticated consumer receives a collection
letter which she does not understand and the letter contains multiple addresses without clear
direction as to where to mail a written request, the consumer would end up, as here, not disputing
the letter at all because she ‘is frightened of calling a collection agency where highly trained
aggressive debt collectors answer calls’ was plausible.” 2019 WL 1900985, at *7 (citation
omitted). In contrast, in considering the plaintiff’s similar argument regarding confusion caused
by the multiple addresses on the letter at issue, the court in Truckenbrodt observed that “[a]ny
reasonable consumer—even an unsophisticated one—would understand that a dispute about the
debt’s validity should go to the mailing address immediately following the instruction for how to
dispute the debt, while any payment should be sent to the ‘Payment Processing Center.’” 2020
WL 6161254, at *3.
Ultimately, the Court finds the analysis in Truckenbrodt more persuasive. Simply because a debt collection letter includes multiple addresses “does not render it misleading . . . unless it is
unclear which address a consumer should contact.” Kucur v. Fin. Recovery Servs., Inc., No. 19-
CV-5453, 2020 WL 1821334, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2020) (citing Park v. Forster & Garbus,
LLP, No. 19-CV-3621, 2019 WL 5895703, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2019)). A letter is materially
misleading if it “explicitly misdirects consumers . . . to the wrong address.” Id. (citing Carbone
v. Caliber Home Loans, Inc., No. 15-CV-4919, 2016 WL 8711197, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30,
2016)).
Here, the Letters are not misleading, even though they contain multiple addresses. On both Letters, the mailing address is listed immediately below the validation notice and clearly labeled
using the language: “The CBE Group, Inc. mailing address Po Box 2635, Waterloo, IA 50704-
2635.” (ECF No. 1-1 at 1 (emphasis added); ECF No. 1-2 at 1 (emphasis added).) The least
sophisticated consumer, who is “capable of ‘making basic, reasonable and logical deductions and
inferences,’” would do so here and therefore know to send mail to the mailing address if they were
to read the Letters in their entirety. Kucur, 2020 WL 1821334, at *4 (quoting Dewees v. Legal
Servicing, LLC, 506 F. Supp. 2d 128, 132 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)). In addition, the location of the
mailing address, printed directly below the validation notice, provides important context that
would further lead the least sophisticated consumer to understand that this address is to be used
for disputing the debt or requesting more information. See Truckenbrodt, 2020 WL 6161254, at
*3 (“The proximity of this (ungrammatical) mailing address to the explanation of how to dispute
the debt makes clear that this address is where disputes should be sent.”) Consequently, the least
sophisticated consumer would send a dispute or inquiry to the only address explicitly labeled
“mailing address” and printed in closest proximity to the validation language.
Relatedly, Plaintiffs also allege that the presence of the multiple addresses “overshadows” Plaintiffs’ rights to dispute the debt, receive verification of the debt, and request the name of the
original creditor. (ECF No. 1 at 5-16.) The Court finds this argument meritless because “[t]he
collection letter plainly states that the recipient has a right to dispute the debt, and to request
information about the original creditor.” Dillard v. FBCS, Inc., No. 19-CV-968, 2020 WL
4937808, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2020). The presence of multiple addresses on the same letter
in no way contradicts the articulation of Plaintiffs’ rights. Plaintiffs’ “nitpicks fail to undermine
Defendant’s letter, which provides effective notice regarding the debt and how to dispute it, inquire
about it, or pay it.” Id. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claims fail because the presence of multiple
addresses does not render the letter deceptive or misleading, nor does it overshadow the clear
validation notice.
III. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is hereby GRANTED , and Plaintiffs’ complaint is dismissed in its entirety. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to enter
judgment accordingly and close this case.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 12, 2021
Central Islip, New York
/s/ (JMA) ____ JOAN M. AZRACK UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
[1] In particular, the required information is: (1) the amount of the debt; (2) the name of the creditor to whom it is owed; (3) a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the debt’s validity, or any portion of it, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector; (4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion of it, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector; and (5) a statement that, upon the consumer's written request within the thirty-day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g.