*1 was in the doing something course of on employer. behalf of his nothing There was in the master-servant agreement here for calling such an indem- nity, and there is nothing to indicate that Samons in way negligent. authority We find plaintiff’s urgence to agency extend the contract beyond corners, its four but there is au- thority to contrary.1 CALLISTER, J., ELLETT, C. TUCKETT, CROCKETT and JJ., concur. CANNON, Appellant, Jacki Plaintiff al., Paula et Defendants OVIATT Respondent. Eugene MARTIN, ad W. litem Guardian Wall, Wall, B. Gregory Salt H. Brant Martin, minor, Jackie A. Plain appellant. plaintiff and City, for Lake Appellant, tiff and Berry Worsley, Snow & Raymond M. Christensen, City, for defendants Russell, Jay C. and Harold G. JACKSON respondents. Respondents. Defendants
Nos. HENRIOD, Justice: Court Utah. summary judgment Appeal from a March costs Affirmed with plaintiff.
defendant. Samons, was
Metcalf, employee of an er- manager to run by the latter’s
asked understanding store,
rand for the mileage for us- paid Metcalf would car, nothing While else.
ing his own collision, now errand, he had Samons, pay the dam- employer,
asks he theory, —that principal-agent
age, on a Agency (1953); 438 Restatement Cal.App.2d McCoy, Sec. 1. Earll v. 2d. *2 Thurber, City, M. Lake Anthony Salt for Cannon. Oberhansley Stephen W.
Curtis K. Cook, Oberhansly & Kinghorn, O’Connell, City, Lake for Martin. Salt Gunn, Gary D. Christian and H. Steven City, for Kipp Salt Lake & Oviatt. Hanson, Hel- City, Don J.
sley, Moffat and Moffat. West, Rawlings, Armstrong, David E. Schaerrer, City, for West & Salt Lake and Russell. Jackson CALLISTER, Chief Justice: plaintiffs, appeals separate arose ac- unrelated tions, they in- have consolidated since question law, common volved one name- ly, 41-9-1, U.C.A.1953, un- was Section plaintiff, Each constitutional? vehicle, in motor moving public state, per- sustained sonal injuries a vehicular accident. plaintiff Each initiated an action host, vehicle, driver to re- damages cover for the negligent operation of the vehicle. Each host asserted Section 41-9-1, 1953, as a de- U.C.A. defense and plaintiff nied Each urged unsuc- cessfully before the trial court that Statute, Guest denied equal protection him of the law under (14th Constitution the United States Amendment) and the Constitution of Utah I, (Article 24). appeal plaintiff
On
each
relies on the
Merlo,1
reasoning set forth in Brown v.
wherein the
Court of California
proffered
held
jurisdiction’s guest
statute did not
constitute a rational basis for the differen-
tial treatment accorded by
Cal.Rptr. 388,
Cal.3d
permitted
highway”
recovery by
therefore
lie
but
and was
of classification
scheme
law.
under other circumstances.
protection of the
equal
a denial
court,
According
rationality
forth two distinct
Brown decision
tripartite
classification
scheme must be
justifications for
light
purposes
prevention of collu-
evaluated
hospitality and
*3
protec-
legislation.
adjudi-
No other case had
found the
lawsuits. The court
sive
defec-
cated the constitutional
on this
fatally
rationale
issue
basis.
tion of
It failed to ex-
grounds:
(1)
tive on the
The court stated that
hospitality jus-
differential
why
statute accorded
plain
provided
inadequate explana-
tification
an
as distin-
guests
to automobile
treatment
tion for the differential treatment accorded
light of
guests.
(2)
from other
guished
guests
distinguished
to automobile
as
from
comparable legal
developments recent
guests.
law,
guests
Under California
hospi-
doctrines,
protecting
the interest
recipients
hospitality may generally
the with-
tality
rationally justify
could
demand that their hosts exercise
care
due
guests.
protection from
legal
drawal
injure
so as not to
them.2 In a footnote
prevalence of
ignored
(3)
explained
the time
today,
under-
coverage
which
insurance
enactment,
a
statute had closer
be-
any alleged rational connection
mines
doctrine,
general
since
pro-
and the
prevention of lawsuits
tween
property
at that
duty
time
owners owed a
prevention of
hospitality. The
tection of
only
care
(business
invitees
determined
lawsuits rationale was
collusive
only
visitors)
owed
some lesser
overinclusive,
it barred
as
since
defective
of care
(social
to licensees
Pres-
guests).
the fraudulent
along
valid suits
ently, California,
general duty
of ordi-
The
further found
claims.
nary
governs
a landowner’s
all
duty to
series
aggravated by a
classification was
those
on his property,
guests
social
op-
loopholes,
stayed the
limiting
which
gen-
visitors
business
alike.
Since
variety
eration of the statute under
modified,
eral tort doctrine
has been
illogical
The
circumstances.
diverse
singles
guests
automobile
for a
excep-
explained
the numerous
special
arbitrary
burden and thus creates an
pat-
produced
illogical
tions
absurd
and unreasonable
classification.
rationality
eliminated
tern which
purpose
reasoned that
state
no realistic
for the
might conceivably be claimed
which
supported the classification scheme of the
persons
respect
since
situated with
purpose
(recipients
of the law
the stat-
The
court stated that
California
hospitality) do not
like treatment.
receive
ute established three distinct levels of clas-
act treated automobile
(1)
sification:
statutory pur-
court stated that the
paying passengers.
guests differently from
pose
fostering
hospitality cannot ration-
differently
guests
It treated automobile
ally justify
protection
lowering
recipients of
guests
from other social
class, namely,
one
guests
automobile
as dis-
from auto
withdrew
tinguished
paying passengers.
from
negligently
from
inflicted
court relied on Rowland Christian4 and
injuries generally enjoyed by
just
stated that
as it was unreasonable to
distinguished
other contexts.
act
lower the
standard
care to a
visitor
private
guests,
of auto
with-
property
subclasses
because he was a social
recovery from
holding
guests injured
rather
invitee,
than a “paying”
it was
“during
“upon
“in a
a ride”
vehicle”
unreasonable to
out an automobile
Cal.Rptr.,
2. Rowland
69 Cal.2d
Cal.
3. No.
6 at
no. 6 at
Rptr. 97,
Brown
is a
conse
effect,
v. Merlo5
Merlo,
Brown v.
elevated this
quence
jurisdiction stemming
in that
from device for social
to the
engineering
level
prior
their
determination to abandon
First,
constitutional doctrine.
this
traditional tort
that the status of a
doctrine
device as utilized in
v.
Rowland
person
duty
him.
determined the
owed to
the traditional
between
distinction
invitees
jurisdiction
this
In
the distinction
nullified,
between
resulting
was
licensees
in the
“invitees” or
“licen
“business visitors” and
automobile
alone
denied the
sees” or
guests”
“social
has
duty
of
his host. Second-
preserved.6
an
ly,
Thus the classification of
nullify
hospitality justification,
to
automobile
in Section
directly incorporated
the underly-
1953,does
group
out this one
ing
engineering, namely
rationale
social
treatment
than
different
accorded
other
that there should be an allocation of liabili-
Likewise,
guests.
ty
protect
society
distinction
between
so as
from the im-
paying passenger
an
pact
such injuries.
automobile
has been
widespread
retained
correlative
distinc
that the
use of
insur-
tions between an invitee and
part
licensee.
ance shifted all or
burden of
Thus,
jurisdiction
this
an automobile
loss from the
individual
the mo-
guest has not
public.
process
been isolated
toring
Through
from all
so-
guests
recipients
engineering
cial
a legislative enactment in
alone denied a
due care
the area of
social
economics and
welfare
host.
into
thrust
conflict
modified
1, supra.
1, supra.
5. Note
7. Note
County,
6. Stevens v.
2d
Utah
(1970) ;
Wood,
burden of
should be
rejected
this rationale on the
public
borne
lia-
motoring
through
prior
though
caselaw intra-
*6
bility insurance is an economic and social
family
immunity
rejected.
tort
had
properly subject
legisla-
solution that is
to
The
cited Klein
it
court
v. Klein wherein
rejected
possibility
a claim
that
tive
Legislature
determination. The
is the
fraudulent lawsuits between a husband and
proper forum to consider the alternative
wife
as a
served
sufficient
to
problem
solutions for the
interspousal negligence
bar all
actions.
guest.
Act,
The No Fault Insurance
31-
Gisseman,17
Rubalcava v.
this
held
court
seq.,
41-1 et
provides
U.C.A.
a com-
that a wife
not maintain
action
promise,
compen-
receives limited
against her
This
husband or his estate.
injuries,
hospitality
sation for
is en-
while
to
declined
follow Klein v. Klein and
couraged by
exposing
the host to un-
legislature
stated that
this
liability
staggering
limited
insurance
proper
change
court was the
forum to
suggested simplistic
rates. The
solution
in
rule. Thus Utah the
statute does
motoring public
that the
bear the
should
not create a distinct classification for auto
injured guests ignores
costs of the
the eco-
mobile
compared
as
to others insofar
consequence
nomic
that
increased claims
as collusive
are
lawsuits
concerned.
be
will
reflected in increased insurance
The court stated in Brown v. Merlo18
rates, creating
hardship
economic
exceptions
statutory
that the
had
numerous
recovery
chilling hospitality.
recovery
host and
or
un-
rendered
lack of
Mower,
(1963).
294 P.
14 Utah 2d
4 Utah 2d
der
irrationality to
out of the ride
....
element
another
added
explained
statutory
The court
scheme.
interpretation of
rise
giving
to
by this
has averted the al
might
occupant
the driver
irrationality
leged
classifi
the course
during
fluctuate
cation which disturbed the court in Brown
within
brought them
ride,
circumstances
Furthermore,
Equal
v. Merlo.
Protec
the statute.
language
and without
compel
tion
does not
to
Clause
the State
distin-
the statute
observed
aspect
every
problem
attack
or
re
to
(1) whether
basis of
guests on the
guished
all;
frain
action at
suffi
momen-
to a
journey had come
or not the
rationally
cient that the State’s action be
guest was
halt;
whether
tary
based
free
from invidious
outside
inside or
physically located
discrimination.21
on a
car;
car was
whether the
rulings
of the trial
courts
these
private
or
land.
lic
actions
sustaining
constitutionality
oper-
statutory exceptions
that these
found
41-9-1,
are affirmed.
ine-
serious
to cause
illogically as
ated so
Costs are awarded to defendants.
bear the re-
they did not
and that
quality
objective of
to either
relation
motest
TUCKETT, JJ.,
ELLETT and
concur.
preventing collu-
protecting
court concluded
lawsuits.
sive
HENRIOD,
(concurring).
Justice
limiting
circumstances,
these
under
concur, except
say
I
to
I can see
fur-
constituted
provisions of the statute
relevancy
whatever
the case of Andrus
equal protection.
ther denial
Allred,
opinion,
cited
as to the
Allred,19
this court
In Andrus v.
problems
facts
in the instant
involved
U.C.A.19S3,
should
that Section
case.
sufficiently
reason
practical and
given a
which
incidents
cover
application
able
CROCKETT,
(concurring spe-
Justice
This
the ride.
integral part of
occur as
cially).
such
give
court declined
impelled
joining
I am
to forswear
in ex-
as to
interpretation
and literal
narrow
patiation
state,
a case of
sister
occur
might
which
eliminate incidents
anyway.
we decline
follow
stopped, however
vehicle was
addition
us
binding on
*7
purpose. This court
any
and for
briefly
event,
any
is decided
back-
different
significantly
:20
of law
own,
impresses
mainly
and it
me as
our
a sensible
opinion that
is our
with rationalizations toward
concerned
of this
application
realistic
repudiating
desired result of
their statute.
ective, requires
obj
conformity
its
with
Consequently,
my
briefly
I desire to state
entire
extend over
refusing
own reasons
strike down
relationship in connection
host-guest
our own:
ride.
taking of the
giving
(1)
was enacted
relationship here
Our
host-guest
. the
legislature advisedly, to
alle-
car at
into the
getting
include
must also
viate actual
had oc-
abuses which
of it when
getting
beginning curred,
occurring.1
and were
any incidents
completed and
the ride is
1.
See discussion of
stat
Utah 2d
404
such
ute based on the use of automobiles as
2d,
of 404
at
110 of
Utah
20. At
aspect
important
an essential
of modern
P.2d.
living
subject
spe
appropriate
that it is an
thereon,
legislation
Williams,
Dandridge
cial classification and
note
Although it
completely
has not
Inasmuch as it came into
as an ex-
at,
cured the ills it was
pression
aimed when
of the will
people through
properly applied, it has
sal-
enactment,
had the
legislative
if
is to be
there
utary effect of minimizing them.
important
such substantial and
change in
process,
law it should be
that same
It has
effect for over 40
years.2
by judicial pronouncement.3
salutary purposes justifying
Originally
Chap. 52,
enacted
S.L.U.1935.
forth
Justice Worthen
Jensen
Mower,
683;
Stanton,
4 Utah 2d
P.2d
3. See statement Stanton v.
30 Utah
Allred,
2d
see also Andrus
Utah
2d
and authorities
there-
