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Cannon v. Mullin
383 F.3d 1152
10th Cir.
2004
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*1 unnecessary it is to ad- appeal that the because Appellant sub- agree with char- receivership ques- determines its the merits of the stance of a transaction dress to form. Okla. Stat. regard attorney’s without grant acter tion. The fees CIT (Article 12A, applies “to § tit. 9-102 is VACATED. form,

transaction, of its which is regardless part, in in AFFIRMED REVERSED interest,” security a in- intended to create proceedings for part, REMANDED contract”); Okla. cluding “title retention opinion. with this consistent 1-201(9) (1991) (“A 12A, person § Stat. tit. ... security ... as acquires goods a in the ordi- money buyer debt is not business”); tit. Okla. Stat. nary course (Article

12A, apply 2 “does not 2-102 although in the form

any transaction which pres-

of an unconditional contract to sell or only operate ent sale is intended CANNON, Monteil Jemaine transaction”); 12A, tit. security Okla. Stat. Petitioner-Appellant, (“Each provision § 9-202 of this Article title to collateral is in applies ... debtor”). or the party the secured MULLIN, Warden, Mike Oklahoma only stands Repurchase Agreement Penitentiary, Respondent- State separate independent se- alone as a Appellee. transaction, it but also reveals the cured entire deal. The true character of the No. 03-5008. financing transaction

transaction was Appeals, United States Court of outset, from the and the failure CIT to Tenth Circuit. security perfect its interest renders its inferior to proceeds claim in the Stillwa- Sept. lien. See Okla. Stat. prior perfected ter’s 12A, § tit. 9-312. retention of title to the purported

CIT’s

Subject until remitted Equipment Sabre Repurchase to the

payment pursuant change

Agreement does not result Ill, at Aplt.App.,

this case. See Vol. 626- devices

27. Retention of title are limited security of a effect to the reservation 12A, §

interest. Okla. tit. 2—401. Stat. 2-401(1) provides “[a]ny

Section re- by the

tention or reservation seller goods shipped or deliv- (property)

title buyer in effect to a

ered limited security of a interest.”

reservation the district court and

We REVERSE pro- is entitled to the

hold that Stillwater supe- due to its lien which is

ceeds blanket unperfected security

rior to interest. CIT’s district court on

We AFFIRM the cross- *5 (Jemaine Greubel, Tulsa, OK,

Stephen J. Cannon, briefs), him on Monteil Petitioner-Appellant. for Elmore, Attorney Bránt M. Assistant (W.A. General, Division Drew Criminal Edmondson, General, Attorney and David Brockman, General, Attorney Assistant M. Division, brief), on the Criminal Oklahoma OK, City, Responden1>-Appellee. for KELLY, HARTZ, Before O’BRIEN, Judges. Circuit HARTZ, Judge. Circuit Jemaine Monteil Cannon was convicted degree in Oklahoma state court of first murder and sentenced to death. After the Court of Criminal Appeals Oklahoma (OCCA) appeal denied his direct and his petition post-conviction se state for pro relief, timely applica- filed an tion relief under 28 U.S.C. *6 The United States District Court for the rejected Northern District of Oklahoma evidentiary request for an hearing and denied all relief. appeal

On Mr. Cannon raises numerous of trial claims of ineffective assistance counsel; of trial counsel mis- three claims conduct, which we recharacterize as addi- tional claims of assistance of ineffective counsel; and a claim of ineffective assis- counsel for failure tance appellate ineffective- pursue appeal the claims of jurisdiction ness of trial counsel. We § 2253 and 28 U.S.C. under 28 U.S.C.. except § 1291. affirm on all claims We regarding factual three. There are issues procedural respect bar with the merits and (1) allegations to Mr. Cannon’s notify failed to the court of trial counsel prosecution improper between contacts recesses, jurors during trial witnesses (2) him prevented trial counsel in his own defense at trial. testifying from therefore reverse and remand in was dead and to turn himself proceedings court for further Clark district also remand for police story. two claims. We and tell his side of the those Mr. Cannon’s claim further consideration convincing After to turn [Mr. Cannon] appellate coun- of ineffective assistance in, himself mother told [Mr. Cannon]’s sel. police Tulsa detective Tom Fultz [Mr. thereafter, Shortly location. Cannon]’s I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND telephoned [Mr. Cannon] Detective Because Mr. Cannon filed his habeas him Fultz and told that he killed Clark 24, 1996, petition April after the effective in self-defense. was ar- [Mr. Cannon] Antiterrorism and Effective date of the shortly rested after his conversation (AEDPA), Penalty Act of 1996 Death with Fultz and he was returned to Okla- Rogers our governs statute review. See Although homa. claimed [Mr. Cannon] Gibson, 173 F.3d 1282 n. he killed Clark self-defense and that Cir.1999). AEDPA factual deter- Under they fight, [Mr. had violent Cannon] pre- minations made state courts are did not have wounds or noticeable sumed to be correct. See 28 U.S.C. when he was arrested. abrasions 2254(e)(1). Thus, adopt we the OCCA’s (Okla. State, Cannon v. 961 P.2d recitation of facts. Crim.App.1998). Other facts will be set 3, 1995, February Cannon] On [Mr. necessary forth as to the discussion. girlfriend, to death his stabbed Sharon- II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY referred to as [also da Clark Sharonda at trial The contested issue White]. A jury the District Court of Tulsa stabbed Clark [Mr. Cannon] Oklahoma, County, convicted Mr. Cannon aforethought malice or in self-de- degree. jury of murder the first body police fense. Tulsa found Clark’s found aggravating four circumstances and apartment Jacque Pepper in her after recommended a sentence of death. The police contacted when she could not lo- him accordingly. trial court sentenced missing cate Clark who had been represented at trial attor- twenty-four over had been hours. Clark neys Conway Sid and Julie O’Connell from *7 in stabbed several times the neck A Tulsa Public Defender’s office. dif- also chest. She had incise wounds on attorney ferent from the Tulsa Public De- commonly her hands characterized as office, Barry Derryberry, repre- fender’s Elliott defensive wounds. Sheena testi- appeal sented Mr. on direct Cannon fied that [Mr. she saw Cannon] OCCA, which affirmed his conviction. See Clark around noon the third and that State, Cannon v. 961 P.2d 838. they having argu- she sensed an were pursued later post-convic- telephone ment. Elliott tried to Clark Although tion remedies the OCCA. her, later the afternoon to check on originally represented by the Okla- but told her that [Mr. Cannon] Clark Indigent (OIDS), homa System Defense an though was not there even Elliott could entity distinct from the Public Defender’s one, background. hear Clark No office, represent he later elected to him- Cannon], except [Mr. had contact with self, serving standby with OIDS coun- Clark after noon on the third. sel. He raised a number of claims of 4, 1995, February On [Mr. Cannon] sought ineffective assistance of counsel and money, bought borrowed a bus ticket Flint, evidentiary hearing. an The OCCA denied Michigan stay and went to relief Michigan, request an uncle. From and denied his for an eviden- [Mr. Cannon] telephoned his him tiary hearing. mother who told

1159 16,1999, an have had a doubt respecting Mr. Cannon filed reasonable August On 694-95, relief under 28 U.S.C. application for guilt.” Id. at 104 S.Ct. 2052. “A District § 2254 with the United States a probability probability reasonable suf District of Okla- for the Northern Court ficient to undermine confidence in the out appli- district court denied the homa. The 694, 104 come.” Id. at S.Ct. 2052. 9, December 2002. Mr. Cannon cation on appealability a certificate of None of Mr. current obtained Cannon’s inef (COA) the district court on the inef- from fective-assistance claims was raised di trial- fective-assistance-of-counsel Oklahoma, appeal rect un OCCA. See 28 counsel-misconduct issues. U.S.C. jurisdictions, generally requires like most 2253(c). opening an brief and a He filed a criminal defendant to raise such claims court; standby coun- reply brief with appeal on direct or forfeit them. See addressing supplemental sel filed a brief 1086, 1089; State, §§ Okla. v. Stat. Walker oral only procedural appeared bar and (Okla.Cr.App.1997). 933 P.2d As argument on of Mr. Cannon. We behalf result, argues-that the State Mr. Can the issues authorized now address procedurally non’s claims are barred. COA. questions procedural bar When III. DISCUSSION however, problematic, are and the substan appeal All Mr. claims on disposed readily, tive claim can allegations of ineffective assis- amount may federal court exercise its discretion to of counsel. will address the tance reject a bypass procedural issues and appellate assistance of claim of ineffective claim on habeas the merits. See Romero concluding our discussion of counsel after 1107, 1111 Furlong, 215 F.3d Cir. assistance of trial the claims of ineffective 2000). All but two of Mr. Cannon’s claims counsel. clearly of ineffective trial counsel are with prevail To on a trial-counsel-ineffective merit, dispose out we of them with so will claim, satisfy ness defendant must regard procedural out We will bar. two-pronged test articulated the United claims; remaining then address the two Supreme in Strickland v. States Court determining that these claims have after Washington, U.S. S.Ct. merit, proceed to potential we will consider (1984). First, L.Ed.2d 674 he must they procedurally barred whether are performance show that counsel’s was defi op Cannon should have the Second, cient. Id. at 104 S.Ct. 2052. develop pertinent facts at portunity to per he must show counsel’s deficient evidentiary hearing. *8 To prejudiced formance his defense. Id. performance that counsel’s was defi show A. Meritless Claims cient, defendant must demonstrate an performance that counsel’s “fell below may AEDPA we Under objective of reasonableness.” id. standard for relief: grant application is, at 104 S.Ct. 2052 — that was adju- respect any to claim range competence demand “within the in court dicated on the merits State in attorneys ed of criminal cases.” Id. adjudication proceedings unless the (internal quotation 104 S.Ct. the claim— omitted). prejudice, To a de marks show (1) in a decision that was resulted there is a reason fendant “must show'that to, an unreasonable contrary or involved that, but for counsel’s un probability able of, errors, clearly established Feder- [jury] application ... professional law, by Supreme determined the OCCA’s determination on the merits al States; or of the United any Court in admitting opinion error Fultz’s (2) resolving in a decision that was was harmless. In Mr. resulted Cannon’s unreasonable determination based on an appeal, direct the OCCA wrote: light in of the evidence of the facts Even if we construed Fultz’ statement proceeding. in the court presented State improper opinion telling jury as an 2254(d). If, however, § 28 U.S.C. find, what to defense counsel attacked adjudicate state court did not a claim on Fultz on cross-examination because he merits, any court to state- defers produce any could not evidence of who determinations, court factual see 28 U.S.C. fight, started the who had the knife first 2254(e)(1) (“In § proceeding a instituted any or statements of the victim to dis- application for writ habeas prove [Mr. Cannon’s] self defense claim. corpus by person' custody pursuant attempts expose Defense counsel’s court, judgment of a a determi- State of Fultz’ the basis conclusion on cross- nation of a factual issue made a State examination cured error which could correct.”), presumed court shall be have resulted.” novo, and addresses issues of law de while reviewing findings Cannon, the district court’s 961 P.2d at 846.

fact clear error. See LaFevers v. Gib- adjudicated Because the OCCA neither son, Cir.1999). F.3d “contrary the claim a manner that was se, proceeds pro Because Mr. Cannon we to, of, ... an unreasonable application appellate liberally. construe his brief See clearly established Federal law” nor made Evans, Cummings v. 161 F.3d its decision “based on an unreasonable de- (10th Cir.1998). facts,” deny termination of the we must testimony 1. Detective’s 2254(d). relief. See 28 U.S.C. played

At prosecution trial the tape of a conversation between Mr. Can testimony 2. Doctor’s Fultz, non and Detective who had investi Mr. Cannon claims that his trial counsel gated tape the crime scene. On the was ineffective for failure to raise several victim, killing Cannon admitted but objections testimony by Hemphill, Dr. claimed that he had killed her self- who examined body. the victim’s He con- defense. tape played, After the (1) tends that Hemphill objec- Dr. offered Fultz, prosecutor asked Detective “Based testimony tionable on the element of intent on what telling you the defendant was by declaring that the cause of death was based upon you seeing what were from the (2) “homicide”; improperly testified that scene, opinions you what did form about certain wounds on the victim were “de- telling you?” what the defendant was Tr. (3) wounds”; fense improperly objected 764. Defense to this testified question that a as irrelevant. The court over necklace found at the scene could objection. ruled the Detective Fultz then have caused injuries; some of the victim’s answered, “I (4) did not believe lacked sufficient knowledge testify; *9 version of what had occurred.” Tr. 765. (5) should have been cross-examined regarding the time of death. Mr. Cannon

Mr. Cannon argues now that his trial also contends that counsel was ineffective attorney objecting was ineffective for not object failing prosecution’s for question the ground the on the that it called improper opinion for mischaracterization of Dr. testimony. Hemphill’s re- testi- ject this claim because we are mony during closing argument. bound recross-examination, defense at- On testimony a. “Homicide” asked, of homicide torney ‘Tour definition Dr. that complains Mr. Cannon The to cause harm?” includes intent testify that permitted Hemphill was Id. ‘Tes.” witness answered homicide. death was the victim’s of cause during occurred exchange following The of Cannon’s the basis Whatever Hemphill: Dr. examination direct testimony, he has about concerns you viewing prejudice. what any possibility on Q: And failed to based show opin- an viewed, you formulate the cause of description did Dr. Hemphill’s of death? manner ion as to the con- completely was as “homicide” death of the theories with Mr. Cannon’s A: Yes. sistent regarding no issue There .was case. opinion, what expert Q: your And victim. intent to harm the of death? the manner was acted in self- whether he only were issues Homicide. A: and, not, culpabili- if whether his defense Tr. at 881. manslaughter. See only ty attor- the defense cross-examination On (defining manslaughter § 711 Okla. Stat. questioning: line of up on this ney followed with- perpetrated “[w]hen as “homicide” uh, you said that you, Q: Hemphill, Dr. death, and in a heat to effect design out a have, that opinion formulated and unusual in a cruel passion, but homicide, right? this was a manner, dangerous by means’ of or A: Yes. under it committed weapon; unless is me define for you please Q: Would as constitute excusa- circumstances such homi- you' say you mean when what homicide” or justifiable “[w]hen or ble cide? unnecessarily either while re- perpetrated Examiner’s Medical Part of the A: Yes. killed to attempt by" person sisting an a case investigating responsibility crime, attempt after such commit a appro- as to the opinion an give is to failed”). theo- defense Neither shall have death into which the priate manner harm. intent to ry cause excludes is report Our classified. should be only an it. It’s without incomplete testimony “Defense-wound” b. Nobody ruling. not a opinion. It’s that his tri argues it, but anything based has to do Dr. it, objected homicide, means should al counsel way we use death, wounds testimony that opinion, Hemphill’s in our certain that the by the wounds.” was caused action were “defense death on the victim testimony that consti person and action First, another that the he asserts that’s to cause harm and intended Dr. because surprise,” tuted “unfair all it means. not so classi did expert report Hemphill’s added). Br. at 6. To Aplt. fy the wounds. (emphasis Id. 884-85 contending that extent that Mr. examination, prosecutor On re-direct have raised constitu should you anything that asked, is there “And testimony objection tional that cross examination thought about on ‘ he was warned ground clas- regarding your your changes opinion explain, advance, testimony does as homi- death victim’s] of [the sification contention how his perceive, nor do we harm?” to cause cide, being intended n is no proposition “[t]here “No, survives the answered, isn’t.” there The witness discovery in .right to constitutional general at 890. Id. *10 ” a criminal case.... v. Bur to this testimony as an opinion” “ultimate Weatherford sey, 429 U.S. S.Ct. 51 did not constitute ineffective assistance of (1977). L.Ed.2d 30 There also was no trial counsel. objection

meritorious state-law available to requires counsel. Oklahoma law testimony c. Necklace State, upon by defense, request expert reports “including disclose results Mr. Cannon contends that or physical mental examinations and of counsel was ineffective because she failed tests, scientific experiments, or compari object to Dr. Hemphill’s testimony that 2002(A)(1)(d). § sons.” Okla. Stat. some of the victim’s wounds could have require But does not everything it by been a necklace. caused which an expert testifies be contained argues that because the necklace nev was expert’s report. Fed.R.Civ.P. Cf. er custody taken into by police and 26(a)(2)(B) (requiring experts retained because Dr. Hemphill only photo saw prepare a report “containpng] complete a graphs necklace, his testimony was opinions statement of all expressed to be beyond scope of his personal therefor”); knowl the basis and reasons Fed. (at 16(a)(1)(G) edge. R.Crim.P. defendant’s re quest, government provide must Hemphill Dr. was asked to explain what summary

written of expert testimony to be injuries could have caused some to the trial). during used its case-in-chief In victim’s He neck. answered: particular, expert’s report need not contain all the expert’s ultimate conclu are a type These of blunt injury, by so See, State, sions. e.g., Pierce v. 786 P.2d definition, they’re by caused or blunt 1255, 1262-63 (Okla.Crim.App.1990). Mr. semi-sharp object being dragged across Cannon’s trial counsel was not ineffective the skin. As to what could have done failing object for to the testimony as this, fingernails could do this. There “unfair surprise.” scene, small necklace found at the Second, Mr. Cannon contends that Dr. I which was pictures shown told Hemphill’s reference to certain wounds as about, could have conceivably “defense wounds” improper ultimate- caused some of these. The necklace was opinion testimony. law, Under Oklahoma broken. If grabbed it, the assailant for “opinion testimony merely which tells a example, pulled or any- twisted init jury what result to reach is inadmissible.” [sic], way slipping around could have State, (Okla. Romano v. 909 P.2d caused some this. Crim.App.1995). “expert But witnesses suggest can jurors inference which Tr. at 874. ground see no proper application should draw from the of spe objection to this testimony. Mr. Cannon id., knowledge facts,” cialized dispute does not that a necklace had been “[tjestimony in the form of opinion an found at the scene the crime. does Nor inference otherwise is not admissible ob explain why depiction of the neck- jectionable because it embraces an ulti lace in photograph provided an inade- mate issue to by be decided the trier of quate foundation for Dr. Hemphill to infer fact.” 12 Here, § Okla. Stat. 2704. Dr. that it could have injury. caused the An Hemphill explained why he inferred that expert may express opinion certain based on likely wounds trying resulted from to ward off factual provided an attack. evidence Such testimony is others. See barred Romano. object Failure to Okla. Stat. *11 f.Closing argument body Knowledge of the victim’s d. counsel contends that Hemphill Mr. Cannon that Dr. argues

Mr. Cannon object to necessary failing for ineffective knowledge personal was the lacked prosecution dur case. On reeross-examina- statements made testify in the Dr. mischaracterizing asked argument counsel as closing trial ing tion brought to was forth Dr, testimony. this case As set Hemphill’s Hemphill, “When you Anything you know? on earlier, all did testified cuts you, Hemphill what Dr. that Dr. Tr. at 891. to?” testified wounds. haven’t were defensive victim’s hands “Well, I don’t Hemphill responded, cross-examination, Mr. attor On only I can recollection. independent be other ex that there could ney elicited had written investigator my you what tell they could be cuts—that for the planations the first body for I saw the by the time out that he claim with Mr. Cannon’s consistent ” that contends Mr. Cannon time.... Id. exami redirect On acted self-defense. Dr. that testimony demonstrates this asked: “[Defense] prosecution nation the knowl- personal sufficient lacked Hemphill possible causes you about asked [c]ounsel of the cause opinion of edge to form ques to her you After listened injuries. of testimo- quoted disagree. death. We answers, your thought about you tions knew Hemphill Dr. only to what ny related your within explanation best your it still body. It is examining the victim’s before it’s still con that experience, training Hemphill Dr. that from the record clear classify the sistent, opinion, to your examination a medical actually performed as defensive to her major hands wounds testimony. for his the basis provided that re Tr. The doctor 889-90. wounds?” classify would still that sponded death Time e. at 890. wounds.” Id. as “defensive wounds Dr. that argues Cannon recounted prosecutor During closing during period Hemphill’s estimate “[Finally I testimony. He stated: this inconsistent occurred was death which well, say, up to stand had redirect wit testimony prosecution with the coun- questions defense [the those all [did] mur away him from placed nesses who one iota? your opinion change asked] sel Apparently during period. scene der Id. at answered] No.” the doctor [And should his counsel contending that he is argue that seems to Mr. Cannon on this Hemphill Dr. have cross-examined doctor’s description mischaracterized not a But the time death point. Although agree we testimony. (Mr. did case critical issue testimony describe did not prosecutor defense) the cross- an alibi not have cause verbatim, description was success Hemphill Dr. examination objection. Decisions respects. other ful in several generally are a witness question how El- of Sheena 3. Cross-examination See counsel’s discretion. committed to liott F.2d Snyder, United States argues that Cir.1986) (“Counsel’s selection failing assistance ineffective rendered ‘strategic matter of is a questions adequate Elliott Sheena to cross-examine lati choice,’ broad to which has [s]he between inconsistencies ly. points He tude.”). failure hold counsel’s her testimony' and hearing preliminary her Hemphill regarding Dr. cross-examine agree that several testimony. We ineffective did not constitute time of death preliminary at the made she statements counsel. assistance of *12 hearing were inconsistent with important statements hardly evidence is inconsistent notably, made at trial. Most Ms. Elliott investigator’s with the belief in the preliminary hearing testified at the strength of the already evidence obtained. the last time she saw Ms. Clark alive was nothing There was inadequate about trial 2, 1995; on Thursday, February but at counsel’s failure to cross-examine on this trial she testified that this occurred on matter. Friday, February day 3—the of the homi- Collins, Adrian a friend of Mr. cide. Cannon’s, testified that he drove Mr. not, however, always It is the best trial station, Cannon to the bus and he identi strategy every to exploit inconsistency in pair bloody fied a sneakers found witness, the statements of a even a witness apartment victim’s belonging as to by opposing called counsel. To some ex- Mr. Cannon. Mr. Cannon asserts that tent, testimony Ms. Elliott’s was consistent trial counsel should have impeached Mr.

with Mr. Cannon’s defense and was re- using Collins his “extensive criminal rec ferred to favorably his counsel’s final ord.” But Mr. Cannon fails to provide argument. Mr. Cannon has not shown sufficient information about that criminal that defense strategy counsel’s with re- record to determine impeach spect cross-examining Ms. Elliott was so ment would have been possible under the unreasonable as to constitute ineffective applicable evidence, Oklahoma rule of assistance of counsel. §

Okla. Stat. 2609 (allowing impeachment impeach 4. prosecu- Failure to other use of criminal convictions in certain tion situations). witnesses and call a witness Furthermore, it appears that Mr. Collins testify did not anything argues Mr. Cannon that he received in- impeaching. worth effective assistance of counsel because his trial impeach counsel failed to three other Scott, Betty mother, Mr. Cannon’s prosecution Fultz, witnesses: Detective matters, testified on various including the Collins, Betty Adrian Scott. He also telephone call from her son in Michigan suggests that trial counsel should have after he had killed the victim. Mr. Can called the testify. victim’s mother to non asserts that trial counsel should have respect Fultz, to Detective With impeached her eliciting that she inwas Mr. Cannon contends that the officer’s possession of a phone. stolen cell We conduct belied his testimony that he disagree. gratuitous Such a attack on a did not believe Mr. Cannon when Mr. Can client’s mother is unlikely to helpful. be gave non his version of events in their argues also that “trial telephone conversation. On February counsel should have called Sharonda over a week after he spoke with Mr. Can mother, Clark’s Phyllis Lacy[,] testify as non on the telephone and examined the phone a recent call she received from scene, homicide requested Detective Fultz Sharonda in which Sharonda told her lab work to determine whether Mr. Can mother how happy she was in her relation non’s blood was found at the scene. Mr. ship with Mr. Aplt. Cannon.” Br. asserts that request demon observe, however, We strates that that such testimony Detective Fultz “solidly may grounded in opinion theory undermined his por as he that the trayed himself to victim February aggressor. Moreover, was the 7th.” ex Aplt. Br. at 14. The pecting contention is testify frivo a mother to favorably for An investigator’s lous. decision pursue admittedly defendant who killed her presented.” men, available was though strat- risky trial surely be daughter would Stat. 12 Okla. at 16. Under Id. egy. evi- 2404(a)(2), may offer an accused claim that reject trait of the pertinent character dence of failure ineffective because *13 victim. these witnesses or call to cross-examine suggests. he purposes for the Nevertheless, has failed Mr. Cannon testimony any helpful additional show evidence to introduce Failure he states: In affidavit available. an was assis- ineffective claim of his fifth For lived with Sharonda Cannon[ ] “Tamoura coun- only, “Trial tance, states Mr. Cannon Clark[,] husband, for Kelly her Clark reveal evidence or introduce failure to sel’s person- had time. Ms. Cannon period assis- ineffective evidence was existence violent Clark’s knowledge al Sharonda prosecu- murder capital tance of counsel her husband. This toward tendencies In the absence Br. at 15. Aplt. tion.” testimony of supported have brief claim, we explanation any further Pro to the same Se Agnes Clark effect.” it. reject must Relief, Post Conviction for Application added). (emphasis 1 at Exh. (call) necessary to consult 6. Failure reviewing Agnes It is therefore worth experts matter: testimony on the Clark’s trial contends ever Okay. victim] Q: [the Was she call consult or improperly failed you? with violent Stating that trial. at his experts to assist counsel was by trial only expert called A.: No. sentencing during testified who a doctor fights into get her Q: you Did ever see argues he dangerousness, future regarding aggressive? or be arguments or sought the have counsel should that “[t]rial Yes, A: once. neuropsychiatrist, blood- of a assistance that for us. Q: Okay. Describe expert, medical-examiner expert, spatter anyone Well, like angry she A. present order to expert in and self-defense know, and had else, angry, you Id. defense.” [his] it. that was argument, and to testi- called the defense doctor anger her draw you ever see Q: Did neuropsycholo- sentencing during fy anyone or to come blows her us, has Mr. nor apparent It is not gist. anyone because attack aggressively indicated, testimony helpful what Cannon anger? of her could, would, been elicited even have get mad. Well, seen her yes, A: I’ve suggests. he experts of the additional Yes, mad. get her say that I’ve seen cannot this record we On to en- failing for ineffective counsel was Q: At who? (Nor has Mr. experts. gage additional At husband. her A.: ordering an any basis provided Cannon any- it as you Q: Would characterize matter.) evidentiary hearing on the ordinary? thing out of the No. A: argue facts elicit and 7. Failure to to self-defense

relevant testimony “to Tr. at 710-11. Additional helped effect” would the same that “[e]vi Mr. Cannon states reject this ar- therefore Mr. Cannon. We ag violent and Clark’s of Sharonda dence gument. tendencies, towards particularly gressive also asserts that trial coun- 8. Failure to invoke the rule of se- questration

sel was ineffective for offering evi- dence bruises on the victim’s wrists Mr. Cannon claims that trial coun were consistent with grab- “[Mr. Cannon’s] sel was ineffective because she failed to bing possessed her wrist while she invoke the sequestration, rule of which knife in Aplt. her hand.” Br. at 16. This prevents witnesses from being in the evidence, argues, he would have been con- courtroom while other witnesses are testi This, fying. sistent with the being aggres- argues, victim’s “allowed pros ecution witnesses to sit sor and would have and listen to supported his claim each testify other specifically craft their record, however, self-defense. The reveals *14 testimony own to prejudice Aplt. [him].” no failure defense in counsel this re- Br. at 21. Yet Mr. Cannon fails to allege spect. Trial counsel vigorously cross-ex- which witnesses present were during other amined the medical examiner in an effort testimony, witnesses’ making impossible it get him to admit many to determine whether good there was victim’s wounds were consistent with Mr. (for cause for the present witnesses to be theory Cannon’s of self-defense. In par- example, principal agent case is often ticular, questioned trial counsel the medi- permitted to present be the counsel cal examiner about whether bruises on the trial, table to assist throughout the see 12 victim’s forearm were consistent with Mr. § Okla. Stat. 2615 (providing rule of se grabbing Cannon’s her forearm. During questration listing exceptions); Dyke closing argument said, “The exter- State, (Okla.Cr. 716 P.2d 697-98 nal circumstances that I see are a bruise App.1986) (construing statute to include here, right consistent with grabbing and agent case exception to rule of seques stopping Sharonda from attacking with a tration)), or prejudice could knife.” Tr. at 915. appears Counsel have resulted. support There is no for a exactly have done what Mr. Cannon claims claim of ineffective assistance on this she did not do. ground. Additionally, Mr. argues 9. manslaughter Presentation of de- that trial counsel should have offered evi fense dence of cuts hands, on Mr. Cannon’s Mr. Cannon claims that trial coun

which were consistent with defending him sel violated his rights constitutional by ar against self someone with a knife. But the guing a defense of manslaughter in addi officer who arrested Mr. Cannon in Michi tion to self-defense. Mr. Cannon asserts gan testified that he did not any inju see that he wished to argue only self-defense ries on Mr. Cannon’s hands anywhere at trial counsel, but “[t]rial repeated over on Mr. body at the time of ar objections by Cannon[,] presented and In rest. an attempt officer, to impeach argued a manslaughter against defense trial counsel elicited testimony will.” Aplt. Br. at 24. He lights contends that were dim inclusion of a during manslaughter the arrest and that defense undermined his the officer’s self-defense claim attention was focused else because the logically two are inconsistent. where. She also made point during disagree. closing argument. Mr. Cannon does not

indicate what more his trial counsel could In 27, 1999, his affidavit of January have done. Cannon stated: if 'danger, “even he great in that he was trial counsel arguments closing In or where theory of in such belief not warranted argued was

presented objections of acting over the manslaughter although self-defense slayer did Petitioner petitioner. Id free from blame.” not himself man- theory or wish desire refer Thus, courts and commentators some own on his presented slaughter be “imperfect” self- manslaughter as aware counsel was Trial behalf. is, the defendant although defense—that it. ignored Petitioner’s desire of self-de satisfy all the elements cannot theory that a desired only Petitioner he can fense, because culpable is less on his own argued of self-defense . See 2 the elements satisfy some of included also Trial counsel behalf. LaFave, L. Wayne R. Subst. Crim. jury instruc- it[s] manslaughter ed.2003). 10.4(i) (2d peti- objection of the tions over prejudiced Petitioner tioner. theories, counsel, by arguing Trial both counsel because this act find self-de- jury essentially asked peti- against it prosecution used so, not do fense, jury if the could but This closing arguments. tioner *15 did argument The manslaughter. find available have been option wouldn’t any fashion. guilt concede Mr. Cannon’s it presented hadn’t if trial counsel a offense argue to lesser-included Whether There objections. petitioner[’]s over by counsel after to decided a is matter guilty as not thing a is such See ABA with the defendant. consultation is no but there reason of self-defense 4-5.2 Justice Cmt. for Criminal Standards by reason guilty as not thing such of ed.1993) (8d (omitting statement at 202 manslaughter. edition that in 1980 second appearing manslaugh- theory of By arguing a 5. seek submission whether to client decides made an admission ter, trial counsel instruc- jury of lesser-included-offense to Trial behalf. petitioner’s guilt on tion). reject this claim ineffective authority to has no due counsel assistance. on guilt be- any make admission peti- without of the petitioner half pro Right proceed

tioner[’]s consent.... se to 10. Re- for Post Conviction Application Pro Se that claims trial Mr. Cannon lief, 1 at 6. Exh. proceed to right him the counsel denied complete a de is Although self-defense A defendant has appeal. direct pro se on murder, justifying first-degree to fense himself, represent right to a constitutional only a manslaughter is whereas acquittal, detrimental to would be doing if so even offense, theories are two lesser California, v. See Faretta his defense. inconsistent. On contradictory logically 2525, 834, 45 L.Ed.2d 95 S.Ct. U.S. “It complementary. contrary, they are (1975). asserts resulting passion general rule is proceed to his desire aware of was counsel to may be sufficient or terror fright from inform the to appeal but failed se pro on man murder from to a homicide reduce however, reveals, record judge. The closely may be killing and such slaughter regard in this counsel by trial any failure See in self-defense.” killing to akin He had any prejudice. him not cause did (Okla. State, P.2d Wood judge inform both opportunity may be A homicide Crim.App.1971). rep of his desire and appellate killing when manslaughter to be found appeal. on resent himself belief by the defendant’s motivated following exchange se, The pro occurred at sen- yet years almost elapsed two be- 26,1996: tencing on March tween the date he was sentenced and the you ready The Are Court: for sentenc- date his appeal argued before the ing, Mr. Cannon? OCCA. Mr. Cannon: Yes. Mr. Cannon also contends that he filed you

The Court: Do have anything say timely applications to proceed pro se on sentencing? before appeal direct but he was right denied the Mr Cannon: No. to do so because the court clerk mishan- Conway, The Court: Mrs. you do have dled applications. The record belies anything say before sentencing? this assertion. Whether the clerk mishan- No, Mrs..Conway: sir. dled his applications was of no conse- All right. Court: It will be the quence. Mr. Cannon’s letters judgment of the Court that the defen- OCCA clerk 5, 1998, were dated March dant be sentenced to die adminis- and March approximately one 1998— injection tration of intravenous I month after appeal his direct had been will set the time for sentencing, which heard at argument oral February 10, merely formality, day the 23rd Thus, applications to proceed May, midnight. pro se on direct appeal were too late for The public hereby defender’s office is any action by the OCCA. appointed represent the defendant Although Mr. Cannon asserts that he for purposes appeal. had previously sent a letter requesting to Cannon, you do funds proceed se, pro specifics offers no about *16 with which to your hire own attorney? letter, that such as when he sent it. Fur- Mr. Cannon: Not at the moment. thermore, other than an affidavit attached Well, you The Court: do rela- to reply court, brief to this the record anyone tives or plans that on hiring contains no reference to such a letter. your attorney? own Therefore, we can properly ignore this as- Mr. Cannon: I got haven’t to talk to sertion. yet. them The Court: You got haven’t to talk to B. Claims with Possible Merit yet. meantime, them inWell the I We now turn to two claims may that be will appoint the Public Defender’s Of- meritorious. Mr. Cannon claims that trial fice here in Tulsa to represent you. If counsel was failing ineffective for notify to you get money if your family can the court improper of contact between get money the and can hire another prosecution jurors witnesses and during it, attorney, so be but up until that recesses, trial and for usurping his deci-

time the Public Defender’s Office is sion testify whether to in his responsible own defense. representing you for The OCCA has never purposes appeal. of Cannon, Mr. addressed the merits of your what is either birth date? claim. Mr. Cannon did not raise the claims on appeal direct OCCA; Tr. at 1240-41. Mr. Cannon fails to ex- and when he raised in post-conviction them plain why he could not have informed the proceedings, the OCCA held judge of his them to proceed desire to be pro se dur- ing procedurally exchange the barred because regarding they who would had not represent him been appeal. Moreover, on raised on appeal. direct As we pro- Cannon alleged has not (1) that ceed to explain, however, he informed each claim appellate of counsel his desire to proceed has merit if Mr. Cannon’s allega- factual and the Mr. Salzman tact between by persua- supported to be out turn tions cor- further would and jurors trial are claims (2) the evidence; sive testimony that findings Petitioner’s roborate on depends barred procedurally im- the of on re- was aware make counsel trial must court the district nothing. did and procedural no (3) contacts proper if there is mand; and hearing only hearing is evidentiary entitled An bar, sup- ac- develop evidence discover necessary to further can means which may and failure-to-testify claim be- communications of porting tual content his im- hearing on jury and to such entitled Mr. Salzman tween by dis- begin claim. prejudice extent proper-contact determine claim, pro- then of each merits cussing the petitioner. of an propriety bar, finally cedural State also saw same witnesses 3.These to each respect hearing with evidentiary Simpkins communi- Awanna witness claim. during a jurors verbally with cate Simpkins Ms. recess, time at which claims 1.Merits that Petitioner a statement made juror contact Improper a. These witnesses her. raped had trial counsel testify that also counsel alleges contact improper of this the court of was aware to inform for failure ineffective wit- and the the witness prosecution between between contact improper a record recesses. during trial failed to make jurors jurors but nesses submit- or take the court January before the incident His affidavit post- of his im- part the OCCA determine measures ted other attack, states: mem- collateral conviction of the communication pact evidentiary action or An to take jury. failed 1. Trial bers concerning im- hearing present this necessary to request hearing is influences outside witnesses summon proper evidence aware became im- jury. Petitioner concerning prejudicial testify *17 wit- Salzman, of father State Larry these errors. of pact himself an Pam Salzman ness Re- Post Conviction for Application Se Pro witness, improp- had State endorsed by listed was 4. Mr. Salzman lief, 1 at Exh. during jurors trial with er contact witness, al- potential aas prosecution the good in believes Petitioner trial. the Simpkins testify. Ms. he did not though have following persons the faith that sentencing trial’s during the testified contact such knowledge that actual for “Request entitled pleading In a phase. was counsel occur, that trial did filed si- Investigator” of an Appointment con- improper of this aware made by his and referenced with multaneously steps proper to take tact, failed supplemented Plaintiff application, § 2254 prejudi- remedy court to alert Simpkins’ Ms. stating that the affidavit jury trial. upon influences cial guilt during the occurred accusation rape Sallis, Betty Can- Sallis, Lee Hamon Mullin, Bryan trial. See of the phase Cannon, and Wade non, Tamoura (en Cir.2003) (10th 1207, 1214 F.3d con- improper witnessed all Johnson part hearing justified banc) (evidentiary one Larry Salzman tact between application). in habeas allegations These jurors. trial or more Cannon’s allegations If the when present also witnesses were likely rendered true, are affidavit con- was advised counsel trial ineffective counsel, assistance of because of assume that the OMahoma court would the probability proof juror of such Supreme found Court authority to be contact would have entitled him relief persuasive, or, in any event, would have from the trial court. If trial counsel was presumed prejudice here from an inflam- in fact improper informed about juror com- matory allegation rape and the other munications and did nothing, such inaction alleged improper communications. appear to satisfy Strickland’s first Accordingly, if Mr. Cannon’s assertions prong. for As prejudice Strickland’s true, are he was likely prejudiced by his prong, in States, Remmer v. United counsel’s inaction. Whether Mr. Cannon 227, 229, U.S. 74 S.Ct. 98 L.Ed. 654 has a meritorious claim will depend, how- (1954), Supreme Court held: ever, on whether he is entitled to an evi- In a case, criminal any private com- dentiary hearing on this claim and whether munication, contact, or tampering direct- such a hearing persuasive elicits evidence ly or indirectly, juror awith during a supporting his assertions. trial about the matter pending before jury is, for reasons, obvious deemed Right b. testify presumptively prejudicial, if not made pursuance Cannon alleges known rules of the court counsel and the would not instructions and allow him to directions take stand in the court during trial, made defense, his own despite full unequivocal knowledge of parties. expression The pre- of the desire to do so. The sumption conclusive, is not but the bur- district court construed Mr. alle- den rests heavily upon the Government gations that he was right denied the establish, after notice to and hearing testify as an ineffective-assistance claim. defendant, that such contact with Other courts also treat such claims as inef- juror was harmless to the defendant. See, fective-assistance claims. e.g., United See Scull, United States v. 321 F.3d States v. Teague, (11th 953 F.2d (10th Cir.2003). 1280 n. 5 Although this Cir.1992) (en banc) (“the appropriate vehi- court has declined apply Remmer in a cle claims that the defendant’s right to § 2254 proceeding to determine whether testify was violated by defense is a jury contact prejudicial, see Crease v. claim of ineffective counsel”). assistance of McKune, 189 F.3d Cir. We agree that Mr. Cannon’s claim is best 1999), that the issue before us. The treated as an ineffective-assistance-of- question here is not whether we would find counsel claim and analyze it as such. that the contact was prejudicial but wheth Mr. Cannon’s affidavit to the OCCA *18 er the state court would have preju found in states part: relevant dice had trial counsel raised the issue. If 1. In more than pre-trial one confer- the state court had applied Remmer to the petitioner ence informed trial coun- facts alleged by Cannon, Mr. it very likely sel that the petitioner would have wished to found prejudice. Unfortunate testify on ly, petitioner’s there is no own definitive behalf. Oklahoma decision Trial counsel adopting or was against rejecting this deci- Remmer. The only sion. reference in reported Through the of Oklahoma course cases sever- to the Supreme al pre-trial Court decision is a case discussions dis concerning tinguishing, but not this criticizing, petitioner issue Remmer. would never re- See State, Silver v. 737 1221, P.2d lent change 1224 or his position and de- (Okla.Crim.App.1987). In this circum sire to testify on his own behalf. stance we believe the proper course is to Trial counsel also refused to relent

1171 has a defendant criminal A being of position the change own testify in his right to testify to constitutional desire petitioner’s against Arkansas, 483 v. begin- Rock At the trial. behalf own behalf. his on 2704, 97 49-52, L.Ed.2d 44, to reiterated 107 S.Ct. petitioner U.S. trial of ning testify testify on to to (1987). his desire The decision trial counsel 37 defendant; not it is behalf. own with the squarely his lies Barnes, 463 trial to v. request Jones decision. petitioner[’]s counsel’s Upon behalf, 3308, his own 77 L.Ed.2d testify on 103 S.Ct. to counsel U.S. enraged and inform became (1983). counsel should counsel trial Defense 987 finesse previous to right [her] abandoned the he has that the defendant aggressive to went technique and to decision whether that the testify and to responded and bulldog approach Teague, to him. See solely belongs testify assigned Hopper “Judge petitioner, also should Counsel 1533-34. F.2d at 953 I am and case represent tome strategic the defendant with discuss make I ship and of captain testify, to choosing whether implications this case concerning decisions all a recommendation make should testify, to going say you’re I au lacks Yet counsel id. See defendant. in already list is our witness besides from testi a defendant thority to prevent couldn’t you it so you are doing defense, even when in own fying his still Petitioner testify anyway.” See United strategy. is suicidal so testify. to his wish maintained & n. Janoe, F.2d States case it[ ]s rested the State 3. When Cir.1983). defense for the Judge called true, then is affidavit If Cannon’s side, Petitioner ]s it[ present to constitutional of the him deprived ready get to jacket his to fix started Such a own defense. testify right in.his testify stand witness take satisfy counsel would duty by counsel dereliction Trial behalf. his own of Strickland. petitioner[’]s prong of the first aware well purpose- In order to testify. towish above, Strickland’s As discussed petitioner’s and subvert sabotage ly is there prong-prejudice-is second established if behalf testify on his own right testimony probability fendant’s reasonable a de- for the de- Judge called when juror’smind a raised sprang quickly fense, trial counsel ing doubtconcern reasonable said the chair and out Strickland, at 694- guilt. U.S. cut the in order to rests defense proba-bility reasonable 2052.“A S.Ct. knowing the off[,] well full petitioner probability confidence mine under- sufficient inci- an[ ] afford couldn’t petitioner 694,104S.Ct. Id. at outcome.” Petition- jury. in front dent jury recognize had Sallis, 2052. Hamon grandparents, er’s recording account heard already Cannon, Tamoura Sallis; sister Lee Clark’sdeath Sharonda (note: State Betty Scott Mother telephone Fultz. Detective conversation Witness) Johnson Wade *19 friend physical light evidence In Petition- knowledge of prior all had testimony, jectedMr. re- jury behalf other his own testify on er’s wish skeptical be can knowledge account.We testify such would changed jury’s been have the court. view by to do so if called would testimony, by live hearing Re- Conviction for Post Application Pro Se particularly what light what lief, 1 at 5-6. Exh. could have been elicited cross-examina- footnote recites the harm to Mr. Cannon tion. that would have resulted from his testify- ing. The not, however, footnote does

Nevertheless, ad- the recorded account was dress hardly whether his testimony seamless. The would have recording contains been long periods helpful on the manslaughter of silence (perhaps issue; from edit ing nor tape) and the does it state 22-page that absence of transcript prejudice contains 64 from not “inaudibles.” Such interrup testifying is an alternative in the tions impact ground narrative per could its for the court’s ruling. noteWe suasiveness. are cognizant also appellate the state’s brief makes no power of a appeal. face-to-face Most im reference to the footnote. In the circum- portantly, however, Mr. Cannon’s testimo stances, we prudent think it that our re- ny particular relevance to the mand for further consideration include this presented claim by his trial attorney that issue as well as issue.) the jury-contact his acts only constituted' manslaughter. objective Even when appears evidence Procedural bar to preclude a claim, self-defense the jury “On review, habeas this court does might still harbor a reasonable doubt not address issues that been have default whether-Mr. actually believed that ed in state court on an independent and he inwas danger, see State, v.Wood 486 adequate procedural state ground, unless P.2d (homi (Okla.Crim.App.1971) the petitioner can demonstrate cause and may cide be found to be manslaughter prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of killing where was motivated defendant’s justice.” English v. Cody, 146 F.3d “belie[f] inwas great danger, even (10th Cir.1998). procedural A ground if he was not in such warranted belief or is “independent” if it is state, based where the slayer although acting self- federal, rather than law. See id. at 1259 & defense was not himself blame”), free from n. 2. That is indisputably here, the case or was by passion, aroused see Cipriano where the OCCA refused to hear Mr. Can State, 32 P.3d 874 (Okla.Crim.App. non’s ineffective-assistance claims because 2001) (listing elements of heat-of-passion they had not been raised on direct appeal, manslaughter). Mr. Cannon’s testimony, as required by Oklahoma law. and his demeanor testifying, while could special significance to the For a jury on state rule of procedural de matter.' fault to be “adequate,” several conditions must be satisfied. with, To begin it “must

We conclude that the issue of prejudice be applied evenhandedly in the major vast is of sufficient doubt that it should not be ity of cases.” Id. at 1259. That is not an resolved in the first instance this court. issue on appeal. In addition, however, remand, On resolution of the merits of the rule is not “adequate” to (which, claim bar a claim of course, would not be nec- ineffective assistance of essary if the trial counsel: claim barred) is procedurally require will unless procedures district the state court to resolve comply with factual disputes imperatives regarding set whether Mr. forth in Kimmelman Cannon’s attorney actually Morrison, prevented [v. him 477 U.S. 106 S.Ct. from and, so, testifying if 2574, (1986) whether Mr. (1) L.Ed.2d 305 ]: allow- Cannon suffered requisite prejudice. ing petitioner an opportunity to consult (Although the question very close, we do with separate counsel on appeal in order not treat footnote 10 in the district court’s objective obtain an assessment of trial opinion as dispositive point. on this performance (2) counsel’s providing *20 firm ap- lawyers private from same law direct [on

a mechanism procedural adequate- can whereby a are often treated as one for conflict-of- peal] petitioner of claims the factual basis ly develop See Restatement purposes. interest (Third) of ineffectiveness. Governing Lawyers of the Law d(iv) (2000) (“Restatement”) § 123 & cmt. We now ad- 146 F.3d at 1263. English, (discussing imputation among of conflicts test, beginning with two-part dress noting lawyers affiliated and that “separate” be that counsel requirement imputed screening on conflicts and appeal. on “rules available public-defender organization ... a apply to “Separate” counsel a. firm in they private practice do to a law forth, set Mr. Can previously As situation”); Martinez v. Sulli- a similar by at trial attor represented non two was (10th Cir.1989) (as- van, 881 F.2d of neys from the Tulsa Public Defender’s suming partners that two should be law appeal represented He on direct fice. for attorney considered as one conflict-of- by attorney from the same office. another purposes). appellate an at- interest When argues attorneys who two torney argues of ineffective assistance trial Defender’s office work the same Public counsel, attor- arguing he is that the trial counsel “separate” cannot be considered ney—who may an office down the have English. He fur meaning within the reasonably competent a at- hall—“was not had alleges appellate ther that his counsel Strickland, torney,” 466 U.S. at arguing a of not ineffective assis policy (internal omit- quotation S.Ct. 2052 marks in cases tried tance of trial counsel ted), representation and that trial counsel’s Defender’s office. Public it not within “the was so bad allegations raise serious attor- range competence demanded of English. requirement under concerns (internal neys quo- in criminal cases.” Id. appellate trial and counsel differ de omitted). Arguing tation marks ineffective First, a from two considerations. rives colleague’s assistance to a respect with defendant, layman, will on own as performance saying that the perform- is “ordinarily recognize coun be unable inferior, only was not but unreason- ance pro and to evaluate counsel’s sel’s errors able. are indeed bold statements to These Kimmelman, performance.” fessional Presenting make about a co-worker. an Second, at U.S. S.Ct. may ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim lawyer who renders ineffective assistance reputation the trial damage well likely will hesitant raise his be for attorney which both trial office inadequacies appeal, or even own trial appellate counsel work. any inadequacies. inform client view, and appellate In our whether trial may still That second consideration attorneys from the same “office” should be lawyers handle the tri- force when distinct “separate” counsel will turn deemed appeal professional- two are al and but the public A specific circumstances. statewide ly rep- If a aligned. criminal defendant local of- independent office defender’s appellate trial and resented fices, appellate perhaps even distinct office, from the counsel’s appellate same office, not raise the same concerns performance assessment of trial counsel’s counsel work in appellate as when trial and objective. An may completely than less § 123 & adjacent rooms. Restatement understandable, although inappropriate, Cf. (for purposes, cmt. e conflict-of-interest collegiality appel- regard may restrain may be lawyers space share office who arguing from identifying late counsel conflicted). The culture note that considered trial-attorney error. We two *21 1174

office can also make substantial 351, differ- (1989) N.M. 785 P.2d (Hartz, 269 history ence. A of raising J., ineffective-as- concurring) (“Perhaps a practical sistance claims allay could concerns. every matter predicated reversal on plain error is a consequence particular Of of ineffective importance assis here is the alle- counsel.”); tance of gation that appellate Gitelman, Morton counsel had a policy claiming Plain Error Rule ineffective assistance Plainly Arkansas — public defenders at Time Change, trial. Although 53 Ark. L.Rev. presented (2000) has no 217 n. sworn (“abrogating affidavit the [plain asserting the policy, the record is strongly error] doctrine in the criminal area may be suggestive. On direct appeal from Mr. even more compelling [than in civil cases] conviction, appellate counsel since error that deprives a defendant raised including six claims of of due process can issues— more properly plain error. State, See Cannon v. 961 P.2d remedied a claim of ineffective assis 846, 848, 849, at 850, 854. Under Oklahoma counsel”); tance of 25 Ohio Jur.3d Crim. law, plain errors are “errors which counsel (2003) (“The § Law 59 of preju standard failed preserve through objection required dice to be satisfied to establish which, upon but appellate review, are clear ineffective assistance of trial counsel for from the record and affect substantial object failure to at trial is far more solici rights.” State, Valdez 900 P.2d tous rights defendant’s than the plain n. 6 (Okla.Crim.App.1995). Yet appellate error standard applicable to conduct not counsel failed assert that trial counsel complained of, and it possible is raise had been ineffective in not objecting to any ineffective assistance claim when the plain of these allegedly plain errors. error precludes standard a direct chal Especially light of what stake lenge to conduct.”); such Wayne R. La a death-penalty case, given appellate Fave, Israel, H. Jerold & Nancy J. King, counsel’s willingness (24) to raise many so 11.10(d) Criminal Procedure & n. 143 other alleged errors, we it striking find (2d (“courts ed. & Supp.2004) have appellate argued never noted that prejudice element of Strick trial coúnsel had been ineffective for not may land be more readily satisfied than objecting to a “clear” error that “affect[ed] the ... [comparable] component of the rights.” substantial Often, Id. even ordi plain cases). error standard”; citing narily, one would expect a claim of ineffec On the us, record before we tive assistance to accompany a claim of to conclude that Mr. Cannon’s trial and plain error. See Rhodes, State v. appellate counsel were “separate” (Minn.2003) N.W.2d 839 n. 7 (noting within the meaning of the in English. word similarities between plain error and inef On remand, however, the district court fective assistance and analyzing alleged er may grant the State an evidentiary hear- rors under ineffective-assistance frame ing that could establish otherwise. work); Hansen, State v. 1062, 1067 61 P.3d (Utah 2002) (‘When n. 2 a party fails to b. Claim resolved trial record preserve an issue for appeal, we will nev ertheless review the issue if Besides requiring the appealing “separate” counsel for party can plain demonstrate trial and appeal, error or ex English also states that ceptional circumstances. The party may procedural Oklahoma’s bar to ineffective- also assert ineffective assistance of counsel assistance adequate claims is only if either in failing preserve (internal (1) the issue.” the claim could have been resolved citations omitted)); State v. Crislip, 109 based on (2) the trial alone, record there

1175 barred, ishe procedurally not claims are an appeal of direct the time at existed A find- to relief. necessarily entitled specific not to remand procedure adequate only that means supplemen- bar procedural no ing court district to the claims F.3d at the court. English, before properly record. are the his claims tation that En- court ruled are the claims The district that prove still 1263-64. He must to respect Mr. with satisfied whether glish was consider We now meritorious. Spe- claims. ineffective-counsel evidentiary Cannon’s to an is entitled Mr. Cannon that the Mr. to claim respect cifically with allega- his the truth hearing to establish testify, the to right the was denied Cannon tions. be resolved claim “can that the court said The trial alone. record the trial upon hearing Evidentiary testi- did not Petitioner that reveals record in 1996 re of AEDPA The enactment ] issue[ ... [The] behalf[.] own fy on his to authority of federal courts the stricted appeal direct raised have been could habeas cases. hearings in evidentiary grant R. fact-finding[.]” doc. additional without standard, a habeas pre-AEDPA the Under omitted). (citation We have at evidentiary to an was entitled petitioner view. different (1) “the facts court if hearing federal ato communication An out-of-courtroom in the state developed adequately not were ordinarily not reflected be juror would not court, long [was] as that failure so any discussion Nor would record. trial the Medina petitioner,” attributable attorney Mr. Cannon between (10th Cir. Barnes, 363, 369-70 71 F.3d only reflects The record testifying. about (2) if true and 1995), allegations, “his It testify. states did Cannon that Mr. existing factual by the not contravened decision that made who the nothing about relief.” him habeas record, to would entitle Additionally, testify. he would 1207, 1214 Mullin, 335 F.3d Bryan v. did not ask judge state trial banc) (internal Cir.2003) (en quotation Certainly, testify. to he wished omitted). marks of direct knew at time But the these claims. he had appeal pro- It the standard. changed AEDPA the issues not have resolved could OCCA vides: alone. trial record on the based develop has failed applicant If the court claims claim State of a Accordingly, Mr. Cannon’s basis factual unless not hold barred court shall procedurally not be proceedings, could time of at the unless place had in claim hearing on the evidentiary Oklahoma supplementa allowing procedure appeal a that— applicant shows See, e.g., English, the record. tion of (A) relies on— claim procedural rely on To 1264-65. F.3d at law, (i)- of constitutional rule new on remand bar, establish must the State cases on collat- retroactive made time of law that Oklahoma Court, Supreme by the eral review have allowed appeal would direct unavailable; or previously that was record supplement him to (ii) that could predicate a factual that counsel his claims support evidence discovered previously been not have the court inform failed improperly due dili- the exercise .through juror influence outside gence; and testify. right denied (B) the claim underlying the facts court de- course, if the even district Of establish sufficient to on remand termines clear convincing mum, evidence that but seek an evidentiary hearing in state error, for constitutional no reasonable court in the prescribed manner by state factfinder would have found appli- *23 437, law.” 529 U.S. at 120 S.Ct. 1479 guilty cant of the underlying offense. added). (emphasis AEDPA speaks of fail- 2254(e)(2). § 28 U.S.C. ure “to develop the factual basis of a claim.” An evidentiary hearing is not the “Under the opening clause only means to accomplish that § task. 2254(e)(2),a We failure to develop the factu have not had prior occasion in our al opinions basis of a claim is not established unless to address whether applicant is a lack an diligence, there or has dem- some great fault, er onstrated a attributable to prisoner diligence the lack in the pursuing or a prisoner’s counsel.” claim failing Williams v. Taylor, to utilize a means other 420, 432, 529 U.S. 120 1479, S.Ct. a 146 than hearing develop the facts. (2000). If L.Ed.2d the prisoner did But a sister circuit has. In Dowthitt to develop “fail[ ] the factual basis of Johnson, (5th 230 F.3d Cir.2000), [his] claim in court, 2254(e)(2) § State the Fifth Circuit held that sometimes dili- not applicable federal habeas court gence requires pertinent obtaining affida- should proceed to analyze whether evi- a[n vits. The court wrote: dentiary] hearing is appropriate or re argues Dowthitt that he exercised due quired under pre-AEDPA standards.” diligence because he requested (internal eviden- Bryan, 335 at 1214 F.3d citations tiary hearings in omitted). proceed- state habeas quotation marks ings, and requests those were denied. agree We with the district court that Thus, he asserts that his failure to de- has satisfied the AEDPA velop his habeas claims are excused un- requirements 2254(e)(2)(A) § forth in set 2254(e)(2). der We do not agree. (B). To determine pre-AEDPA Mere requests for evidentiary hearings standards apply, we must review whether suffice; will not petitioner must be diligent in trying to devel- diligent in pursuing the op factual develop- the factual in record state court. ment of his claim. As the state habeas The Supreme Court stated in found, court Dowthitt did not present Williams that “[d]iligence ... depends affidavits from family members and did upon whether prisoner made a reason not show that they “could not be ob- able in attempt, light of the information at tained an absent order for discovery or a time, to investigate pursue claims hearing.” response, In Dowthitt now in state court.” 529 U.S. at 120 S.Ct. argues that “proffers” of what would 1479. In prior cases which the issue presented at a hearing constituted raised, we have said that requesting diligence. due We do not find argu- an evidentiary hearing was sufficient to ment persuasive. Given that-the family See, constitute diligence. e.g., Boyd v. members were willing to testify Ward, (10th F.3d 925 & n. 10 hearing, Dowthitt could have Cir.1999); easily ob- Miller v. Champion, 161 F.3d tained their A Cir.1998). affidavits. reasonable But we have person never place stated a Dowthitt’s categorical would have at rule that re questing an least done evidentiary as much. hearing in argu- Dowthitt’s state court ipso facto satisfies ments that diligence lack of funding prevented re quirement. Indeed, Supreme development of his Court claims are also with- said Williams, “Diligence will require in out merit. Obtaining from affidavits the usual case that prisoner, at a mini- family members is not prohibitive. cost testify Right to b. not rebutted has Thus, Dowthitt regard. in this finding habeas state affidavit, in which deci usurped his alleges trial counsel Id. first testify, provides sion whether view. Fifth Circuit’s share on his own of events based account hand re- not be should court district federal who only people knowledge. The personal hearing evidentiary to conduct quired allegations the truth Mr. know has for relief applicant a claim when counsel. and his trial are Mr. Cannon *24 would that evidence presented not hearing evidentiary an requested Cannon true. if claim were readily available see cannot in state court. We this issue Mr. whether to address proceed nowWe pursue to done could have more he what dili- necessary established Cannon Hence, sat he record. of the development gence. Under requirement. .diligence isfies an evi- entitled to he law is pre-AEDPA contact of the merits hearing regarding a. Juror dentiary the issue. improp regarding allegations The with sum, and remand we reverse in Mr. Cannon’s In contained juror contact

er was he claims that to respect affidavit Mr. hearsay. The all are affidavit counsel when of assistance effective of denied knowledge first-hand no references of (1) notify the court failed counsel and witnesses between contact improper (2) prevented and juror contact improper family members It states jurors. Mr. trial. Whether testifying at from him knowl have actual Cannon friends Mr. either ultimately prevail on will Cannon events, underlying edge as such matters depend on claim will an knowledge at testify to they would proeedurally are claims whether has hearing. Yet evidentiary support barred, his evidence whether any of these affidavits not included ishe and whether persuasive, is the claims diligent A or friends. family members hearing to devel- evidentiary to an entitled much, absent have done would person the dis- leave to We further evidence. op doing from him preventing impediment an effi- court most district cretion so. proceeding. method cient impedi- was an not there Whether below. however, litigated ment, was Appel- Alleged Ineffectiveness C. explicit not make an did court The district Counsel late dili- Mr. Cannon’s regarding finding of fact ap- asserts that Cannon Finally, Mr. the dis- remand therefore gence. failing to for counsel ineffective pellate Can- question court trict raises he now the claims appeal pursue develop trying diligent non was counsel. of trial ineffectiveness regarding claim. juror-contact underlying his facts hardly inef- course, appellate Of evidence may take further court meritless pursue failure to fective hearing on discretion, conduct may, in its Hannigan, Hawkins claims, see deter- court If the district matter. Cir.1999); we so F.3d diligent, mines that pursue failure only the need address hearing evidentiary granted should be that we claims (if ineffective-trial-counsel two claim juror-contact of his merits on the merit. may have already said barred). proeedurally it is not respect With to those two trial-counsel completely princi- inconsistent these claims, however, we are remanding to the ples court remands for an evidentiary —the district court for further proceedings that hearing on claims that were presented may the ineffeetive-appellate-counsel moot court, federal district or not pre- claims if the district' court resolves the sented supported adequately. (either trial-counsel claims on the merits I. to Testify Failure denying they relief because do not have do). merit or granting relief they because (on I reject merits) the inef- Therefore, we remand the corresponding claim fectiveness upon based two ineffective-appellate-counsel claims for failure testify. As the district court further by the consideration district court. held, Mr. Cannon cannot show prejudice. Mr. Cannon’s theory of self defense was IV. CONCLUSION presented to the jury upon based his own We AFFIRM the district judg- court’s (the account recording) and a hearsay ac- *25 ment in all respects except that we RE- by count his mother. Tr. 669-81. As MAND to that court the issues whether by noted the court, district (1) Mr. Cannon is entitled to relief because (a) Although the Court finds attorney this issue is failed to inform the procedurally barred, court juror (b) of improper a review contact or the de- rec- nied right testify him the ord in reveals that his own Petitioner would not defense, (2) because his benefitted, counsel on di- have indeed would have been rect appeal pursue failed to these two seriously harmed, by testifying on his claims of ineffectiveness of trial counsel. own testified, behalf. Had he prose- the The issues before the district court will be cution could have emphasized the defi- procedural bar, diligence Mr. Cannon’s in in ciencies Petitioner’s “self defense” pursuing the development factual of his story. Cross examination would most juror-contact court, claim in state the mer- likely exposed have the facts that Peti- its of Mr. contentions, Cannon’s and tioner prison was a escapee at the time any of Mr. violation Cannon’s con- murder, of the that he was previously rights stitutional was harmless. Resolu- of a convicted violent crime against a tion of some may others, issues moot so we girlfriend, former that he only suffered leave to the district court’s discretion the injuries, minor if any, during the inci- manner in which to proceed. question dent in while the victim suf- multiple, fered wounds, fatal stab and KELLY, Jr., PAUL Circuit Judge, victim only tall, 5'5" concurring part and dissenting part. pounds while Petitioner is 6' over tall. I concur in the opinion, court’s R. Doc. 81 at 21 exceptions. three n. recently Cannon noted that: never explained how his testimony District courts would have are entitled to some lati- differed from tude with the regard presented account evidentiary hear- the ings, jury and and the how it higher standard is than would have countered the notice pleading. District courts are items by not mentioned the district court. Mr. required to hold evidentiary hearings in Cannon does not argue that his testimony collateral attacks without a firm idea of was necessary for a manslaughter de- what testimony will encompass and fense—to the contrary, Mr. argues how it will support a movant’s claim.. that trial counsel was ineffective pre- for United Cervini, States v. senting F.3d a manslaughter against defense (10th Cir.2004). Remanding this case is Mr. Cannon’s will. See Ct. Op. at 24-26. insistence, would Mr. Cannon’s which undo inqui- prejudice court remands This in which he urged retrial (1) tape surely quality ry because Br. at 22 See persua- Aplt. its Pro testify. affected Se may might have transcript (2) (“Mr. cognizant to note siveness, the court is like court Cannon would (3) Mr. appeal, firmly a face-to-face a claim of asserts power that Mr. Cannon pertinent testimony (“There would be defense.”), finding Cannon’s can be self Mr. Cannon manslaughter defense but of self-defense guilty not reason (4) court’s want, the district not does thing as not absolutely no such there likely harm of concerning discussion manslaughter.”). by reason of guilty (a) not address testifying does Mr. Cannon hardly required to court was The district (b) defense, not does manslaughter testimony address whether preju- that the absence explicitly state manslaugh- on the helpful have been would alternative testifying is an from not dice disavowal given Mr. Cannon’s ter defense (c) refer- is not holding, ground its and his understandable of that defense None brief. appellate by the state’s enced (both on it at the district rely failure persuasive. are of these reasons court) presenting and this court no us First, given has simply the court reading of the only reasonable claim. The by Mr. likely to be adduced facts that were conclusion that district court’s already testimony that were indeed benefitted would have recording and jury given before testi- harmed his own been *26 The mother. testimony of hearsay the preju- not that Cannon was mony is Mr. recording and that statement court’s not iden- the district court did That diced. persuasive not have been transcript may holding anas alternative tify its discussion re- of the quality of the technical because is so obvi- it hardly surprising because is more It is far speculation. cording pure is pro- reciting that the claim was ous—after rejected Mr. Cannon’s jury likely that the barred, court then the district cedurally injuries severe the victim’s given defenses record it had reviewed explained that injury to Mr. serious the lack and is a its were—this and what conclusions enough to note not It is Cannon. in the alternative. holding merits-based without appeal of a face-to-face power brief appellate the state’s fact that The in the appeal context that placing alter- court’s the district rely not does cross-exami- searching and troubling facts state moment —the holding is of no native followed Mr. Cannon’s that nation would arguments that Mr. Cannon’s argues inquiry testimony. prejudice The direct claims are that these appeal are new rec- the whole upon must be made based are Regardless, we barred. procedurally simply ord, presented been and what has opinion the district court’s bound review probability a reasonable not establish does regardless judgment, supporting the have would in this case the outcome that rely upon it. parties different. been of Mr. possible benefit Relying upon the Improper Juror Contact II. manslaughter de- testimony to a Cannon’s claim the ineffectiveness Insofar as does, im- completely fense, is the court as contact, I juror improper upon based posi- has taken proper. barred. reject procedurally it does not proceedings tion these fairly presented claim either The The fact manslaughter defense. want or not devel- OCCA entirety to the in its not ineffec- hold that counsel was that we or the the OCCA before adequately oped cannot such a presenting defense tive 1180

federal district court. The district court that would entitle petitioner to relief. summarily rejected this upon claim based Where the record has not been developed, Mr. provide failure to supporting the burden is on the petitioner to demon- facts, argument authority. Doc. 81 at (1) strate that he was not at fault for failing to develop the state court record or (2) meets the conditions of 28 U.S.C.

Mr. Cannon’s affidavit to the OCCA al 2254(e)(2); if met, this burden is not leges “improper contact” Larry between district court should not hold evidentia- Salzman, who did not testify, and one or — ry hearing. Jackson, See Holland v. jurors” more “trial sentencing -, 2736, U.S. 124 S.Ct. phase witness Awanna Simpkins told the (2004). L.Ed.2d 683 jurors at a Because recess Mr. Cannon had has explained raped how her. he satisfies “improper contact” these conditions, ground I nothing but a would not conclusion remand the dili- devoid specifics who, where, gence issue about district when and court. what. As to the ground, second Simp- Ms. C. Remmer Presumption kins did testify indeed “He [Mr. Cannon] me,” raped in the sentencing phase. Finally, Only the Remmer presumption the in his petition federal suggests did Cannon court that the OCCA would apply claim that Simpkins raped “he me” juror improper claim contact is a comment guilt came in the phase. Thus, rule of federal procedure, criminal not fed Mr. Cannon did not present fairly eral law, constitutional and this court has (with claim focus on guilt its phase) to declined to it in apply the habeas context. court; the state it is unexhausted pro Vigil Zavaras, 298 F.3d 941 n. 6 cedurally defaulted. See Picard v. Con Cir.2002); McKune, Crease v. nor, 270, 276, U.S. 92 S.Ct. (10th Cir.1999). F.3d Although (1971) (“[W]e L.Ed.2d 438 required rejected the OCCA the improper juror *27 prisoner state present the state courts contact claim on the procedural basis of with the urges same claim he' upon the bar and we are analyzing the merits for courts.”). federal Mr. Cannon has not time, the first Mr. Cannon should not be shown cause prejudice or a fundamen aided a presumption that is a matter of tal justice miscarriage of that would excuse federal procedure. criminal Though the this default. Carrier, See Murray v. 477 OCCA once cited Remmer and then distin 478, 485, 495, U.S. 2639, 106 S.Ct. it, guished State, Silver v. 737 P.2d (1986). L.Ed.2d 397 1224 (Okla.Crim.App.1987), that hardly Moreover, suggests that having named five OCCA would adopt witnesses such contacts, categorical I improper agree given rule our this treatment of it court that should context provid have habeas and its dilution or ed abrogation affidavits to the post-convic OCCA in the federal context. See tion. Certainly by Scull, United time States v. he filed his 321 F.3d (10th federal petition, they Cir.2003) (“We n. 5 should have been note that provided if expected circuit evidentiary and others questioned ap hearing. Federal courts required propriate are not breadth of presump Remmer’s (even to hold hearings if a petitioner tion of prejudice rule, postulating the stan diligent) without some why idea of dard should significantly narrowed, petitioner would be entitled replaced to relief. Cer altogether.”), denied, cert. vini, 379 F.3d 994. This means a de U.S. 124 S.Ct. 157 L.Ed.2d 116 scription (even contested) the facts if (2003); Sylvester, United States v. Cir.1998) (concluding 923, 933-34 F.3d sur- Remmer has not presumption

vived). Petitioner-Appellant, SERRANO,

Jerry Warden, WILLIAMS,

Joseph

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 02-2268. Appeals, Court States

United

Tenth Circuit. 14, 2004.

Sept.

Case Details

Case Name: Cannon v. Mullin
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date Published: Sep 13, 2004
Citation: 383 F.3d 1152
Docket Number: 03-5008
Court Abbreviation: 10th Cir.
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