Plaintiffs-Appellants F. Douglas Cannon, Allan Robert Cannon, and Margaret Louise Cannon (the “Cannons”) brought suit against the Defendants-Appellees claiming two violations of the Solid Waste Disposal Act and one violation of the Administrative Procedures Act. The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the jurisdiction-stripping provision at 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). We conclude that the district court properly aрplied § 9613(h) because the Cannons’ suit constitutes a challenge to the Government’s selected removal action, and therefore AFFIRM the dismissal.
*1330 I.
Jesse Fox Cannon owned over 1,416 acres of land in Tooele County, Utah. Cannon’s land was adjacent to the Army’s Dugway Proving Grounds. 1 In 1945, Cannon entered into a six-month lease with the United States War Department, which provided that, in return for one dollar, Cannon would permit the Government tо enter onto his land “in order to survey and carry out such other exploratory work as may be necessary in connection with the property; to erect buildings and any other type of improvement; and to perform construction work of any nature.” The Government agreed that, at the expiration of the lease, it would “leave the property of the owner in as good condition as it is on the date of the government’s entry.”
Government officials then entered onto Cannon’s land to conduct Project Sphinx, which was designed to test “means of battling Japanese forces entrenched in caves in the Pacific Islands.”
Cannon v. United States,
After completing its tests, “[t]he Army failed to keep its promise to clean up Cannon’s property.”
Cannon,
Over the years, Cannon’s son, Dr. J. Floyd Cannon, unsuccessfully requested that the Government clean up the property. Id. Beginning in the 1970s, the Government initiated efforts to study the contamination at the adjacent Dugway Proving Grounds, and included the Cannon property in some of these efforts. See id. at 1185-86. The Government, however, did not clean up the Cannon property at that time, and has yet to do so. Id. at 1188.
Frustrated by the slow progress in the Government’s clean up efforts, two of Dr. Cannon’s children, who then owned 75% of the Cannon property at issue here, sued the United States in 1998 under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). See id. Following a bench trial, the district court found that the Government had diminished the value of the Cannons’ land from $176.26 to $25 an acre, and awarded them $160,937 in damages. See id. at 1189. This court, however, reversed that judgment and held that the statute of limita *1331 tions barred the Cannons’ FTCA claims. See id. at 1184,1189-94.
In November 2005, the Cannons tried a different approach. Three of Dr. Cannon’s children who currently own the land at issue — F. Douglas Cannon, Allan Robert Cannon and Margaret Louise Cannon— sued the United States, the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, and the Secretary of Defense (collectively “the United States”), sеeking to use federal environmental protection laws to force the United States to clean up the Cannons’ property. To that end, the Cannons alleged two claims under the Solid Waste Disposal Act (“SWDA”). 2
The Cannons pursued their first SWDA claim under 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A), which permits “any person” to
commence a civil action on his own behalf—
(1)(A) against any person (including (a) the United States, and (b) any other governmental instrumentality or agency, to the extent permitted by the eleventh аmendment of the Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of any permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, or order which has become effective pursuant to this chapter....
42 U.S.C. § 6972(a). In support of this claim, the Cannons alleged that the United States was in violation of federal and Utah regulations applicable to generators of hazardous waste.
The Cannons asserted their second SWDA claim under 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B), which provides that “any person” can
commence a civil action on his own behalf
(B) against any person, including the United States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency, to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution, and including any past or present generator, past or present transporter, or past and present owner or operator of a treatment, storage, or disposal facility, who has contributеd or who is contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment,. ...
42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B). In support of this claim, the Cannons alleged that the United States has contributed to conditions on their property that endanger the Cannons, other individuals mining on the property, and members of the gеneral public who come onto the Cannons’ property. Those dangers include unexploded ordnance and poisonous chemical agents.
In addition to their two SWDA claims, the Cannons also asserted a claim under the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 706. That APA provision permits a court to “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(1).
The district court dismissed the Cannons’ claims, holding that 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) deprived federal courts of jurisdiction to consider those claims. Briefly stated here, § 9613(h) deprives federal courts of jurisdiction to consider “any challenges to removal or remedial action *1332 selected” under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”). In dismissing these claims, the district court concluded that the United States had already “selected” a “removal” action addrеssing the Cannons’ property through the United States’ preliminary efforts to investigate whether clean up efforts were needed. The Cannons appeal that decision.
II.
The district court dismissed this action at the summary-judgment stage of this litigation. This court, therefore, will review the district court’s decision
de novo. See New Mexico v. Gen. Elec. Co.,
A.
“Congress enacted CERCLA to provide a mechanism for the prompt and efficient cleanup of hazardous waste sites.”
United States v. City and County of Denver,
No Federal court shall have jurisdiction under Federal law other than under section 1332 of Title 28 (relating to diversity of citizenship jurisdiction) or under State law which is applicable or relevant and appropriate under section 9621 of this title (relating to cleanup standards) to review any challenges to rеmoval or remedial action selected under section 960j of this title, or to review any order issued under 9606(a) of this title, in any action except [if certain listed exceptions apply]....
42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (emphasis added).
“In enacting this jurisdictional bar, Congress intended to prevent time-consuming litigation which might interfere with CERCLA’s overall goal of effecting the prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites.”
City and County of Denver,
This case implicates § 9613(h) because the Cannons asserted claims under federal law — RCRA and the APA. The parties concede that none of § 9613(h)’s exceptions apply. Further, the parties agree that this case involves agency action taken under 42 U.S.C. § 9604, rather than 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a). 3 Therefore, we must resolve two questions to determine whether § 9613(h)’s jurisdictional bar applies to this case: (i) whether the United States has “selected” a “removal or remedial action” under 42 U.S.C. § 9604; and, if so, (ii) whether the Cannons’ claims present a *1333 “challenge” to that removal or remedial action.
B.
Our analysis of whether the United States selected a removal or remediаl action “begin[s] and end[s] with the language of [§ 9613(h)
Gen. Elec.,
In the instant case, the Government’s authority to begin removal actions depends оn 42 U.S.C. § 9604, which enables the Government to respond to releases, or the substantial threat of a release, of hazardous substances into the environment. Section 9604(a)(1) authorizes the President to take removal or other remedial action which the President “deems necessary to protect the public health or welfare or the environment.” 4 Section 9604(b)(1) provides that,
[wjhenever the President is authorized to act pursuant to subsection (a) ... he may undertake such investigations, monitoring, surveys, testing and other information gathering as he may deem necessary or appropriate to identify the existence and extent of the release or threat thereof, the source and nature of the hazardous substances, pollutants or contaminants involved, and the extent of danger to the public health or welfare or to the environment. In addition, the President may undertake such planning, legal, fiscal, economic, engineering, architectural, and other studies or investigations as he may deem necessary or appropriate to plan and direct response actions, to recover the costs thereof, and to enforce the provisions of this chapter.
42 U.S.C. § 9604(b)(1) (emphasis added).
In turn, CERCLA defines removal actions as:
The terms “remove” or “removal” mean[ ] the cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances from the environment, such actions as may be necessary taken in the event of the threat of release of hazardous substances into the environment, such actions as may be necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat of release of hazardous substances, the disposal of removed material, or the taking of such other actions as may be necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare or to the environment, which may otherwise result from a release or threat of release. The term includes, in addition, without being limited to, security fencing or other measures to limit access, provision of alternative water *1334 supplies, temporary evacuation and housing of threatened individuals not otherwise provided for, action taken under section 9604(b) of this title, and any emergency assistance which may be provided under the Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act [42 U.S.C. § 5121 et seq.].
42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). On the other hand, CERCLA defines
[t]he terms “remedy” or “remedial action” [to] mean[] those actions consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of or in addition to removal actions in the event of a releаse or threatened release of a hazardous substance into the environment, to prevent or minimize the release of hazardous substances so that they do not migrate to cause substantial danger to present or future public health or welfare or the environment. ...
Id, § 9601(24).
The statutory definition of a removal action dictates that a removal action is ongoing and thus, that § 9613(h)’s jurisdiction strip applies, even if the Government has only begun to “monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat of release of hazardous substances.”
See Razore v. Tulalip Tribes of Washington,
In the instant case, the Government’s removal actions are therefore sufficient to trigger § 9613(h). The Government has already undertaken several steps toward determining how it will address the contamination present on the Cannons’ property. First, the Government has cоmpleted a preliminary assessment of the property. As part of this preliminary assessment, the Government conducted an “Archive Search Report” that compiled historical records, interviews, and site surveys to determine the exact nature of the military testing conducted on the Cannons’ property. Based on the Archive Report, the Government then prepared and issued a “Draft Formerly Used Defense Site Engineering Evaluation/Cost Analysis Report.” This draft report indicated that the Cannons’ property was in fact highly contaminated.
5
Cannon,
Contrary to this conclusion, the Cannons assert that the Government’s conduct up to this point does not trigger § 9613(h)
*1335
because the Government has not officially selected a removal or remedial action pursuant to the applicable regulations. The Cannons specifically contend that the Government has not selected a removal action until it has complied with the full panoply of the applicable regulations, which require the Government to conduct a site inspection, issue an engineering evaluation and cost assessment report, take public comments, and finally make a decision about the removal action based on the administrative record.
See
40 C.F.R. § 300.415. We find this argument to be unpersuasive because it unduly restricts the plain language of § 9613(h). That section is a “blunt withdrawal” of the jurisdiction of federal courts, which applies once the Government has begun its removal action.
See Potter,
C.
Section 9613(h) applies only to
“challenges
to removal or remedial action.” 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (emphasis added). A lawsuit challenges a removal action if it “calls into question [that removal] plan.”
Gen. Elec.,
Turning to the instant case, there is no doubt that the Cannons’ suit constitutes a challenge. The Cannons requested injunc-tive relief ordering the remediation of their property. Such relief would undoubtedly interfere with the Government’s ongoing rеmoval efforts.
See Alabama v. EPA
The Cannons attempt to avoid the broad standard for what constitutes a challenge by arguing that the cases applying that standard are inapposite because the Government has not yet selected a removal action. This argument merely rehashes the Cannons’ earlier contention that a removal action begins only after the Government has selected it pursuant to the regulatory provisions at 40 C.F.R. § 300.415. Accordingly, the argument suffers a similar fate. As we noted above, the broad statutory language indicates that Congress intended to strip federal jurisdiction from any challenge that would interfere with an ongoing removal or remediation process.
See, e.g., Potter,
III.
The Cannons’ suit sought to hasten the Government’s cleanup efforts through in-junctive relief. We are sympathetic to the Cannons’ frustration with the long delays; however, their suit falls within the broad ambit of § 9613(h). Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s decision to dismiss the case. In addition, we DENY the Government’s motion to take judicial notice of the final inspection plan.
Notes
. The Cannon property is located within the “Yellow Jacket Mines area,” which is immediately adjacent to the Proving Grounds.
. The SWDA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-81, amended the Resources Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (''RCRA”).
See United States v. Colorado, 990
F.2d 1565, 1568 (10th Cir.1993). The parties often refer to these claims as RCRA claims. Both of the Cannons’ RCRA claims, asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a), are referred to as RCRA citizen suits.
See Colorado,
. These two provisions of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604 and 9606, "authorize the President and his designees to initiate cleanup operations.”
Pollack v. United States Dep’t of Defense,
. Although the President has delegated most of his authority under CERCLA to the EPA, he has delegated his CERCLA authority over Department of Defense sites instead to the Secretary of Defense (''Secretary”).
See Colorado,
. The Government never finalized this draft report due tо several concerns, including funding limitations. The failure to finalize this report, however, did not stall the Government’s administrative process because the report was merely a collateral step.
. The Government moved for us to take judicial notice of the final site inspection plan. This document is not necessary for the resolution of this appeal, and accordingly, we DENY the Government's motion.
. We reсognize that this conclusion splits with the Seventh Circuit's holding in
Frey v. EPA,
. In their reply brief, the Cannons assert that neither Boarhead nor Razore support the conclusion that a removal action commenced once the Government began monitoring, assessing, and evaluating the Cannons' property. The Cannons attempt to distinguish both cases by noting that those cases involved property that the EPA had previously listed on the National Priorities List ("NPL”). That fact, they assert, implicitly demonstrates that the EPA had completed all of the necessary regulatory steps to select a removal action.
In spite of the Cannons' argument, neither Boarhead nor Razore rely on (or even mention during the analysis) the placement of the properties on the NPL. Thus, we find the Cannons’ attempts to distinguish the reasoning from these two cases unpersuasive.