57 So. 554 | Miss. | 1911
delivered the opinion of the court.
Briefly stating this case, it is about as follows: In 1908, M. A. Candler recovered a judgment against King Cromwell for seventy-two dollars and twenty-three cents in a justice of the peace court. In November of that year, the judgment was enrolled in the office of the circuit clerk of Alcorn county, in compliance with sec
In the cases of Cayce v. Stovall, 50 Miss. 402, and Cooper v. Turnage, 52 Miss. 431, this court held that, while a judgment lien takes effect on • a growing crop only from the time it has an actual existence, the lien does not relate back to the rendition or enrollment of the judgment but a lien or mortgage on a growing crop relates back to the date of its creation, and takes effect from the date of the execution of the mortgage, thereby taking precedence of a judgment lien.
When a trust deed specifies that the mortgagee will furnish a specified sum, followed by the words “more
Let us see where the contention of counsel for appellant would lead us. A judgment creditor succeeds to-only such rights in the -judgment debtor’s property as the judgment debtor actually has. The judgment creditor merely succeeds the judgment debtor; that is, takes-his place and subjects the actual interest of the judgment debtor to his demand. The judgment creditor is-barred by all the equities which bar the judgment debtor, and can assert no demand that the judgment debtor is precluded from asserting. Harris v. Hazlehurst Oil Mill, 78 Miss. 603, 30 So. 273; Foute v. Fairman, 48 Miss. 536; Miss. Val. Co. v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 58 Miss. 846. It needs no argument to show that Cromwell could not defeat the lien of this mortgage after accepting advances under it of more than fifty dollars, and for the-same reason that he cannot do so his judgment creditor, who merely succeeds to his rights, is also precluded
A mortgage need not specify definitely the amount to be furnished. This has been frequently held. The mortgage might have merely specified that it was 'given to secure such future advances as might be agreed upon. In the case of Wilczinski v. Everman, 51 Miss. 841, this court has said: “A mortgage to secure future advances, which on its face gives information as to the extent and purpose of the contract, so that a purchaser or junior creditor may, by an inspection of the record, and by ordinary diligence and prudence, ascertain the extent of the incumbrance, will prevail over the supervening claim of such purchaser or creditor as to all advances made by the mortgagee within the terms, of such mortgage, whether made before or after the claim of such purchaser or creditor arose. It is not necessary for a mortgage for future advances to specify any particular or definite sum which it is to secure. It is not necessary for it to be so completely certain as to preclude the necessity of all extraneous inquiry. If it con-'
The Wilczinski case expressly holds that it is not necessary for a mortgage to specify any particular or definite sum which it is to secure. The meaning of the mortgage, when it says an open account furnished under it shall be fifty dollars, more or less, can become of
Affirmed.