Tinder, Inc. owns and operates the smartphone-based dating application, Tinder. The original app began, and is still offered, as a free online dating service. It presents users with photos of potential dates. The user can swipe right to express approval, or swipe left to express disapproval. In March 2015, Tinder released a premium service called "Tinder Plus," which allows users to access additional features of the app for a monthly fee.
Plaintiff, Allan Candelore, commenced this action on behalf of himself and a putative class of California consumers who were over 30 years old when they subscribed to Tinder Plus. The complaint alleges that Tinder charges consumers who are age 30 and older $19.99 per month for Tinder Plus, while it charges consumers under the age of 30 only $9.99 or $14.99 per month for the Tinder Plus features.
But, as discussed below, the Unruh Act provides broad protection against arbitrary age-based price discrimination. No matter what Tinder's market research may have shown about the younger users' relative income and willingness to pay for the service, as a group, as compared to the older cohort, some individuals will not fit the mold. Some older consumers will be "more budget constrained" and less willing to pay than some in the younger group. We conclude the discriminatory pricing model, as alleged, violates the Unruh Act and the UCL to the extent it employs an arbitrary, class-based, generalization about older users' incomes as a basis for charging them more than younger users. Because nothing in the complaint suggests there is a strong public policy that justifies the alleged discriminatory pricing, the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer. Accordingly, we swipe left, and reverse.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This appeal followed a judgment of dismissal after the trial court sustained Tinder's demurrer without leave to amend. "The purpose of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of a complaint by raising questions of law." ( Sargoy v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992)
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In addition to the factual allegations set forth in the Introduction to this opinion, Candelore's complaint included the following excerpt from a news report on the website TakePart, offering Tinder's justification for its age-based pricing:
"The logic Tinder executives supplied for the age-related pricing? It benefits their bottom line. 'During our testing we've learned, not surprisingly, that younger users are just as excited about Tinder Plus, but are more budget constrained, and need a lower price to pull the trigger,' Tinder's vice president of corporate communications, Rosette Pambakian, told TakePart in an email. [¶] 'We've priced Tinder Plus based on a combination of factors, including what we've learned through our testing, and we've found that these price points were adopted very well by certain age demographics,' Pambakian wrote."
The trial court sustained Tinder's demurrer without leave to amend. With respect to the Unruh Act claim, the court ruled (1) there is "no basis in the published decisions for applying the Unruh Act to age-based pricing differentials"; (2) "Tinder's rationale that customers age 30 and younger have less capacity to pay for premium services" demonstrates "the differential is not 'arbitrary, invidious or unreasonable' within the meaning of the Act"; and (3) Tinder's alleged pricing furthers the " 'public policies' " of "(a) increased access to services for the general public and (b) profit maximization by the vendor, a legitimate goal in our capitalistic economy." As for the UCL claims, the court ruled (1) Candelore's failure to allege an Unruh Act violation defeats his " 'unlawful' " prong claim; and (2) the alleged business practice is not " 'unfair' " under the UCL because "it is entirely proper for Tinder to charge alternative prices in the pursuit of profit maximization" and "the rationale for this price distinction (quoted by plaintiff in the Complaint ...) is a sufficient business reason for doing so."
The trial court entered judgment for Tinder, from which Candelore appeals.
DISCUSSION
1. Overview of the Unruh Act
"Enacted in 1959, the Unruh Act secures equal access to public accommodations and prohibits discrimination by business establishments. Its predecessor, our state's first public accommodations statute, became law in 1897." ( Harris, supra,
The Unruh Act provides that "[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry,
Although its text identifies particular kinds of discrimination-such as sex, race, and national origin-this list is "illustrative, rather than restrictive," and the Unruh Act's proscription against arbitrary discrimination extends beyond these
Thus, while not all discrimination is prohibited (see Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 1160-1161,
The Act applies not merely in situations where businesses exclude individuals altogether, but also "where unequal treatment is the result of a
2. Tinder's Alleged Pricing Model Uses a Personal Characteristic to Discriminate Against Older Customers Based on a Generalization About Income
Candelore asserts Tinder's alleged pricing model violates the Unruh Act because it discriminates against customers who are age 30 and over by requiring them to pay more than twice as much as younger customers to access Tinder Plus. In response, Tinder maintains this allegation is insufficient to state a claim for arbitrary age discrimination, because its pricing model rationally treats "youth [as] a reasonable proxy for economic disadvantage." (Italics added.) By Tinder's account, it is "self-evident that people under 30 face financial challenges," and this "common knowledge provides a reasonable and non-arbitrary basis for Tinder to offer a discount to people under 30." The trial court likewise reasoned that Tinder's age-based pricing model was "not 'arbitrary, invidious or unreasonable' within the meaning of the Act" because the complaint admitted "Tinder's rationale" was based on market research showing "customers age 30 and younger have less capacity to pay for premium
Our Supreme Court's decision in Marina Point is controlling. There, the Supreme Court was asked to address whether, under the Unruh Act, an apartment complex owner could lawfully refuse to rent its apartments to a family solely because the family included a minor child. ( Marina Point, supra,
The Supreme Court concluded the landlord's blanket exclusion of families with minor children contravened "the individual nature of the
Having concluded the "potential misbehavior of children as a class [did] not justify [the landlord's] exclusionary practice," the Marina Point court turned to whether the policy might "nonetheless be sustained as reasonable on the ground that the presence of children basically does not accord with the nature of [the landlord's] business enterprise and of the facilities provided." ( Marina Point, supra,
Even crediting Tinder's stated rationale, its alleged discriminatory pricing model violates the principle articulated in Marina Point by operating on the "generalized prediction" that an individual over the age of 30 earns more and is less budget constrained than another individual under the age of 30.
We recognize, however, that past cases have embraced the notion that age may serve as a reasonable proxy for income in upholding age-based discounts against Unruh Act claims. (See, e.g., Starkman v. Mann Theatres Corp. (1991)
Our decision to break with Koire 's dictum is bolstered by the fact that discounts for children and seniors are independently justified by compelling "social policy considerations as evidenced by legislative enactments ." ( Koire, supra,
Although past cases have followed the Koire dictum in citing generalized assumptions about income disparity as grounds to uphold age-based price discounts, in most of those cases the discounts were independently
The only outlier is Javorsky , where the court approved a luxury health club's age-based discount for 18- to 29-year-olds, despite scant indication of a legislative policy favoring differential treatment for this age group. ( Javorsky, supra,
The danger of using age as a proxy for income to justify age-discriminatory pricing becomes more apparent when one acknowledges that such pricing operates not merely as a "discount" for the favored age group, but effectively as a surcharge on the disfavored one. (See Koire, supra,
Consistent with Marina Point , we conclude Tinder's alleged discriminatory pricing model cannot be justified by a generalization about the relative incomes and budget limitations of the two implicated age groups. We turn now to whether the public policies cited by the trial court compelled the finding that Tinder's alleged discrimination was justified, as a matter of law.
3. The Complaint's Allegations Do Not Compel the Finding that Public Policy Justifies Tinder's Age-based Classification
In sustaining the demurrer, the trial court concluded Tinder's alleged age-based pricing model was justified by " 'public policies' " that promote "(a) increased access to services for the general public and (b) profit maximization by the vendor, a legitimate goal in our capitalistic economy." Similar justifications were rejected by the Supreme Court in Koire when advanced by the bar owner in defense of its Ladies' Nights discounts. Further, while our Supreme Court recognized in Harris that vendors may pursue legitimate business interests by making economic distinctions among customers, it held such distinctions were permissible because they employed criteria that could conceivably be met by any customer, regardless of the customer's personal characteristics. ( Harris, supra,
In Koire , the Supreme Court rejected the argument that increasing patronage
As for profit maximization, we have no quarrel with the trial court's conclusion that it can be an acceptable business objective and can be advanced by price discrimination. As anyone who has attended an auction can attest, individuals may and often do value goods and services differently. Some are willing and able to pay a higher price than others for the same product. And, as any student of elementary microeconomics knows, sellers of goods and services could (at least theoretically) maximize profits if they could engage in price discrimination by charging higher prices to those consumers willing to pay them, and lower prices to the rest. For example, a seller might offer several versions of its product, with different features, trim, branding, etc., each at a different price, in an effort to increase overall profits. Or a seller might seek to attract bargain hunters by offering temporary price reductions during a sale or other promotion. But the quest for profit maximization can never serve as an excuse for prohibited discrimination among potential customers.
"In Marina Point , this court held that the fact that a business enterprise was ' "proceed[ing] from a motive of rational self-interest" ' did not justify discrimination. [Citation.] This court noted that 'an entrepreneur may pursue many discriminatory practices "from a motive of rational self-interest," e.g., economic gain, which would unquestionably violate the Unruh Act. For example, an entrepreneur may find it economically advantageous to exclude all homosexuals, or alternatively all nonhomosexuals, from his restaurant or hotel, but such a "rational" economic motive would not, of course, validate the practice.' [Citation.] It would be no less a violation of the Act for an entrepreneur to charge all homosexuals, or all nonhomosexuals, reduced rates in his or her restaurant or hotel in order to encourage one group's patronage and, thereby, increase profits. The same reasoning is applicable here, where reduced rates were offered to women and not men."
( Koire, supra,
Recognizing that a business's interest in maximizing profits is insufficient to justify discrimination based on an individual's personal characteristics does not preclude a business like Tinder from employing rational economic distinctions to broaden its user base and increase profitability. (See Harris, supra,
As alleged, Tinder's pricing model discriminates against users age 30 and over, and the complaint's allegations do not compel the finding that this discrimination is justified by a strong public policy in favor of such
4. The Complaint States a Claim for Violation of the UCL
The UCL prohibits, and provides civil remedies for, "unfair competition," which includes "any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice." ( Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200.) Its purpose " 'is to protect both consumers and competitors by promoting fair competition in commercial markets for goods and services.' [Citations.] In service of that purpose, the Legislature framed the UCL's substantive provisions in ' "broad sweeping language" ' [citations] and provided 'courts with broad equitable powers to remedy violations' [citation]." ( Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court (2011)
The UCL's "unlawful" prong "borrows violations of other laws ... and makes those unlawful practices actionable under the UCL." ( Lazar, supra,
Further, in view of our conclusion that Tinder's alleged discriminatory pricing model violates the public policy embodied in the Unruh Act, the UCL's "unfair" prong provides an independent basis for relief on the facts alleged. The standard for finding an "unfair" practice in a consumer action is " 'intentionally broad, thus allowing courts maximum discretion to prohibit new schemes to defraud. [Citation.] The test of whether a business practice is unfair "involves an examination of [that practice's] impact on its alleged victim, balanced against the reasons, justifications and motives of the alleged wrongdoer. In brief, the court must weigh the utility of the defendant's conduct against the gravity of the harm to the alleged victim .... [Citations.]" ... [A]n "unfair" business practice occurs when that practice "offends an established public policy or when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers." [Citation.]' " (
As discussed, the Unruh Act protects "all persons" from status-based discriminatory business practices that operate to deprive innocent individuals of "full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever." ( § 51, subd. (b) ; Marina Point, supra,
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. Candelore is entitled to his costs.
We concur:
EDMON, P.J.
LAVIN, J.
Notes
Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
There is some inconsistency in the record about whether the $19.99 monthly charge applies to individuals "over 30 years of age" versus "age 30 and older." For purposes of our decision, the distinction makes no difference.
Statutory references are to the Civil Code, unless otherwise stated.
The Marina Point court also found the contemplated adults-only apartment complex was distinguishable from businesses such as bars and adult book stores, which could likewise "be defended by reference to ... statutorily sanctioned restriction[s] on the activities of children." (Marina Point, supra,
Candelore rightly points out that the complaint alleges only that Tinder has publicly stated the budget constraints of its younger users were one among " 'a combination of factors' " that led it to adopt the chosen price points for " 'certain age demographics.' " We agree with his contention that the allegation concerning Tinder's public statement does not preclude him from amending his complaint should discovery reveal other factors that influenced Tinder's pricing decision.
The Pizarro court also observed that providing "discounted theater admissions to 'baby-boomers' to attend a musical about that generation does not perpetuate any irrational stereotypes," thus, recognizing that the price discounts were not based on " 'some arbitrary, class-based generalization' " about the age group, but rather on the fact that the musical was about the baby-boomer generation. (Pizarro, supra,
The trial court understandably relied upon these cases in concluding Candelore could not state a claim because there was "no basis in the published decisions for applying the Unruh Act to age-based pricing differentials." That conclusion, while consistent with these appellate authorities, failed to recognize that the cases were fundamentally different than this one because, in each, the differential treatment at issue was consonant with recognized public policies reflected in legislative enactments.
While concluding a supporting statutory enactment was unnecessary to uphold the discriminatory policy, the Javorsky court noted that "the law is not entirely bereft of indications that persons under 30-including students and those just beginning their careers-might feel economic pressures worthy of attention and assistance as a public policy matter." (Javorsky, supra,
The Javorsky court also remarked that the plaintiff's argument, if accepted, "would obliterate all age-based discounts-including those upheld in Starkman and Pizarro -since all age groups include persons with higher incomes and persons with lower incomes." (Javorsky, supra,
Tinder filed a request asking this court to take judicial notice of (1) several charts published by the United States Census Bureau regarding " 'Selected Characteristics of People 15 Years Old and Over by Total Money Income,' " and (2) a declaration offered by the defendant's expert in Javorsky , purporting to analyze census data regarding the financial resources of different age demographics in California. Because we conclude group data about income by age demographic is insufficient to justify the alleged discrimination, we deny Tinder's request for judicial notice. (See People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000)
