83 Fla. 501 | Fla. | 1922
Lead Opinion
This appeal brings to. this- court for review one question only, namely: The propriety of the ruling of the chancellor striking, upon motion of complainant, one paragraph of the joint and several answer of defendants Canal Lumber Company and Stockton, Smith and Brown to the amended bill of complaint. Prior to this ruling the court, in passing upon a demurrer to the bill, construed, it to be a bill for the foreclosure of .a vendor’s lien upon the property described and, so construing it, overruled the demurrer. The defendants named are the only ones contesting the suit. It is recited in the record that one other defendant answered, but his answer is not contained in the record. Decrees pro confesso for failure to appear or interpose any defense were entered against the other defendants. After the taking of testimony, reported by a special examiner, the court, upon consideration of the ease,. entered final decree of foreclosure of the lien in accordance with- the- prayer of the bill. From this decree an appeal was taken to this court.
The error assigned is the ruling of the court granting the motion-of complainant to strike a part of the third paragraph of the answer of defendants Canal Lumber Company and Stockton, Smith and Brown to the amended bill of complaint. .
The contract sued upon is one made on the 15th day of July, A. D. 1918, between Florida Naval Stores and Manufacturing Company, a corporation,- and J.' A. Reñtz
The provision of the contract sued on which is the basis of the controversy and npon which the decision turns, is that describing the property conveyed or to be conveyed by complainant to defendant Rentz upon his compliance with the terms and conditions of the contract. By this provision the complainant, “upon the comp] i anee by the said J. A. Rentz of all the terms, stipulations, conditions and agreements herein contained,” agrees to “sell and convey to the said J. A. Rentz (1) without warranty all of the stumpage coming within the terms of the aforesaid agreement of October 1, 1909, and the supplement thereto dated December 11, 1917, now available for logging and milling purposes subject, however, to all the terms and conditions of the said contract of January 30, 1917.”
The “aforesaid agreement of October 1, 1909” referred to is an agreement under which a predecessor in title of complainant acquired his interest in the property conveyed. The supplement dated December 11, 1917, is to this contract and, while it asserts that it is not to be construed as changing the original contract, ■ it does contain slight modifications.'of it. The contract “of January 30, 1917,” referred to, subject to the terms and conditions of which the contract sought by this suit to be enforced was made, seems to be the contract of January 30, 1918, under which complainant acquired title to the property. There is no contract in the record dated January 30, 1917. The date of the contract or conveyance of the property involved by which the immediate predecessor in title of complainant acquired it is not given in the record, but it must have been subsequent to the supplemental contract of December 11, 1917, for the reason that this contract was
The paragraph stricken from the answer, the ruling upon which is made the basis of the assignment of error, is as follows:
“And these defendants further say that for the consideration mentioned' the complainant in and by its'said agreement covenanted and agreed that the stumpage upon all of the lands included in said agreement, lying west of the East Coast Canal should be available for logging and milling purposes by October 1st, 1919that said stumpage was not so aavilable; that same was necessary for the' continued operation of said Canal Lumber Company; that said stumpage was not on said day or at any time" prior to the institution of this suit available for logging or milling purposes as in said contract agreed.”
The contention of the contesting defendants, appellants here, is that by its contract complainant conveyed to Rentz the “stumpage” described in the contract, subject to the terms and conditions of the several contracts referred to, in consideration for which Rentz agreed and promised to pay an-agreed consideration in fixed installments at stated periods; that certain terms and provisions of the contract required by complainant to be complied with, namely, the making available by complainant of the “stumpage” on all the land described in the contract west of the East Coast Canal by October 1, 1919, were not performed and therefore complainant is not in position to demand or enforce payment by these defendants, as successors ' of Rentz, of amounts alleged in the bill to be due by them under his contract of purchase.
“It is understood that I now, and hereby, deliver to you to cut about 13,000 acres of said land according to the list hereto attached, which list is information and does not alter original contract. (I will also deliver for the purpose of being cut the balance of the timber on the west side of the canal on October 1st, 1909), which will include all the timber on the west side of the canal not now delivered and if possible I will begin these deliveries in October, 1918.”
It is stated in the brief of appellee, and seems to be conceded, that the date “October 1, 1909” stated in this quoted paragraph, is error and should be October 1, 1919, and this must, in the very nature of things, be true since the date of the instrument is December 11, 1917, and the quoted paragraph, with respect to the date mentioned, clearly refers to a future event. By comparing the stricken paragraph of the answer with this paragraph of the contract, it will be easily recognized that the defense attempted to be set up is based upon this paragraph of the contract, defendants contending that Rentz acquired “all of the stump age” coming within the terms of the contract of October 1, 1909, and the supplement thereto, from which the foregoing paragraph is quoted. If the series of contracts considered as a whole are susceptible of this construction, then clearly there is some basis for defendants’ contention, and the order striking the quoted paragraph from the answer was error.
It may be admitted that the situation is complicated and confused somewhat by making each 'of the series of contracts subject to the terms and conditions of each preceding contract of the series, rendering difficult the ascertainment of the true design of the parties. The intent of the parties with respect to any feature of the contract must be determined from an examination of the whole of the contract, including in this instance all of the contracts, the terms and conditions of which are made a part of the contract under consideration. The interpretation should be of the whole instrument and not of disjointed parts of it. 6 R. C. L. p. 837; West Yellow Pine Co. v. Sinclair, (Opinion filed January 27, 1922), 83 Fla. 118, 90 South. Rep. 828; Dekle v. Valrico Sandstone Co., 74 Fla. 346, 77 South. Rep. 95; Ansley v. Graham, 73 Fla. 388, 74 South. Rep. 505; Ross v. Savage, 66 Fla. 106, 63 South. Rep. 148; L’Engle v. Overstreet, 61 Fla. 653, 55 South. Rep. 381; Brown v. Beckwith, 60 Fla. 310, 53 South. Rep. 542; Escambia Land, etc. Co. v. Ferry Pass, etc. Assn., 59 Fla.
From the series of' contracts involved, it appears generally that the parties were dealing with a manufacturing plant and a tract of land, the timber upon which was to be manufactured into lumber by the respective purchasers ; that this timber was not, at the time of the original contract nor at the time of any of the subsequent contracts of the series, all available for cutting and removal; that although the tract of land was dealt, with as a whole in the contracts, the -timber, which was the real subject of the contracts, became available -by sections or tracts in installments as it was released from turpentine privileges reserved by the original owner; that the cutting and removal of the timber sold was to proceed in an orderly way from section to section as released, the cutting upon a section to be continued after being commenced until all the timber of the dimensions conveyed thereon should be removed, and that payments under the contract were estimated and fixed at installments sufficient to pay for the timber before or as it was removed by the purchaser under the contract. From all of which it would seem that the several parties, as they entered into the several contracts, contemplated a manufacturing plant and the timber supply available thereto as a single enterprise, and that each of the transactions- was intended as a transfer from each party to his successor of the plant and the timber .described in the several contracts. Under this view the construction, placed by complainant upon the contract, is untenable. -It seems to us, in view of the various provisions of
This discussion results in the adoption generally of the interpretation of the contract contended for by appellants. Upon this construction of the contract, where the defense attempted to be set up in the stricken paragraph of the answer is sufficiently pleaded, defendants should not be deprived of an opportunity to offer proof in support of such defense. Pitts v. Powledge, 56 Ala. 147; Durment v. Tuttle, 50 Minn. 426, 52 N. W. Rep. 909; American Assn. v. Short, 97 Ky. 502, 30 S. W. Rep. 978. Whether the measure of defendants’ loss or damage is upon the basis of a total failure to deliver or make “available” the “balance of the timber” conveyed upon the west side of the canal, or upon the basis of a delay beyond the date stated for such delivery, is not clearly averred, but it can not be said that the matter pleaded, if proved, is wholly insufficient as a defense to the bill. Walker v. American Agricultural Chemical Co. (Opinion filed January 30, 1922), 83 Fla. 153, 90 South. Rep. 696; Southern Ferro Concrete Co. v. Federal Terra Cotta Co., 79 Fla. 376, 84 South. Rep. 171; Campbell v. A. L. Wilson Co., 74 Fla. 608, 77 South. Rep. 540; Oneida Land Co. v. Richard, 73 Fla. 884, 75 South. Rep. 412.
The decre appealed from is reversed.
Dissenting Opinion
Dissenting.
The Florida Naval Stores and Manufacturing Company, complainant below, brought its suit against the appellants upon a contract which it had entered into with J. A. Rentz on July 15, 1918.
The bill contained alternative prayers. It first prayed for a cancellation of the contract and that the defendants be required to yield possession of that which was the subject of the contract and that the complainant be relieved from any obligations under it; the other prayer which was inserted in the bill as an amendment upon leave of the court sought to have the contract declared to be a mortgage lien upon the properties which constituted the subject of the contract and that the mortgage be foreclosed and the properties sold to pay the amount of money found to be due.
The subject of the contract was the logging and milling privileges of timber of certain classes located on certain lands which were in October, 1909, owned by John H. Pitt, in the counties of St. Johns and Duval. On October 1st, 1909, Pitt sold to Morgan Y. Gress. On December ,11th, 1917, J. EL Pitt wrote a ,letter to Morgan Y. Gress acknowledging receipt of fifteen thousand dollars to be applied on the contract of October 1st, 1909. That letter contained the following paragraph: “It is understood that in the future the timber cut from the lands referred to in said contract is to be measured in the manner provided in that contract,- and that you are to pay me on account of the sums due and to become due by virtue "of that contract at the rate of $3.00 per thousand as the timber is cut, until the total amounts due and to become due by virtue of said contract are paid, payments to be
“It is understood that I now, and hereby, deliver to you to cut about 13,000 acres of said land according to the list hereto attached, which list is information and'does not alter original contract. I will also deliver for the purpose of being cut the balance of the timber on the west side of the canal on October 1st, 1909, which will include all the timber on the west side of the canal not now delivered and if possible I will begin these deliveries in October, 1918.” Thereafter Gress assigned all his right, title and interest in the contract to the Morgan Lumber Company which on January 30th, 1918, assigned all its right, title and interest in said contract to the complainant.
On the 15th of July, 1918, the complainant entered into an agreement with J. A. Rentz. That agreement is the basis of this litigation. Rentz afterwards conveyed to J. N. C. Stockton, W. P. Smith and B. B. Brown all his interest, right and title to the properties that he acquired under the contract with the Florida Naval Stores and Manufacturing Co., and Stockton and his associates transferred their rights to the Canal Lumber Company.
When the conditions which, under that contract, Rentz was required to perform were ignored or disregarded the complainant brought its suit as ’ above stated. The bill alleges in paragraph three that under the agreement made with .Rentz he agreed to pay $35,725.00 for the properties; that of that sum $20,851.10 had been paid, but that a note due August 5th, 1915, for $1,500.00, and one for the same amount 'due September 5th, 1919, and one for a like amount due October 5th, 1919, and another for a like
The defendants answered and in the third paragraph of their answer they averred that the “complainant in and by its said agreement covenanted and agreed that the stumpage upon all of the lands included in the said agreement lying west of the East Coast Canal should be available for logging and milling purposes by October 1st, 1919; that said stumpage was not so available, that same was necessary for the continued operation of said Canal Lumber Company; that said stumpage was not on said day or at any time prior to the institution of the suit available for logging or milling purposes as in said contract agreed.” The above averment was upon motion stricken from the third paragraph of the answer. Whether it was rightfully stricken constitutes the question. presented on this appeal. There was a decree for the complainant from which the defendants appealed.
There is no such language or clause bearing such interpretation contained in the agreement between the complainant and J. A. Rentz which as stated was dated July 15th, 1918, and it is only upon the conditions named in that agreement that the defendants can rely for an excuse for the non-performance of the promises made by J. A. Rentz. Unless they rely upon some other agreement existing between them and the complainant and there is no claim of that nature in the answer.
The majority opinion applies one rule for the construction of contracts and overlooks another which is of first importance. That rule is: The intention of the parties must be gathered from the language of the instrument. It is not within the function of the judiciary to look outside of the instrument to get at the intention of the par • ties and then carry out that intention regardless of whether the instrument contains language sufficient to express it. The language must be sufficient when looked
If a written contract is ambiguous or obscure in its terms so that the intention of the parties cannot be understood from the language used, parol evidence of the facts and circumstances in the light of which the parties acted and. wrote is admissible not for the purpose of changing the terms of the.written instrument but to elucidate the words used in the contract. Scmitt v. Bethea, 78 Fla. 304, 82 South. Rep. 817.
Even so, but who is to say that the complainant purchased more than that which was then available? The contract between Morgan Lumber Company and the complainant expressly limited the stumpage sold to all that “coming within the terms of the aforesaid agreement of October 1, 1909, and the supplement thereto now available for logging and milling purposes.” Is the complainant to be given more than it purchased to support the argument that Mr. Rentz and his assigns were entitled to more than he purchased? But suppose that the complainant only purchased the stumpage which was available on the 30th day of January, 1918, and did not purchase that which would hot be available until October 1st, 1919, surely that is no concern of the associates of Mr. Rentz, who by their insistanee that .the words “now available” mean, that stumpage which would be available twenty months thereafter, injected into the contract the. only question as to its purpose. All that the vendee, Rentz,
The subject matter of the contract between the complainant and Rentz embraced more property than the right tp stumpage which the complainant acquired from the Morgan Lumber Company, it included a large amount of personal property epid leases, the former transferred without warranty, and the latter, the personal property and leases, with warranty.
The majority opinion concedes that at no time from the making of the original contract to the one between complainant and Rentz.was all the timber available for “cutting and removal.” But it must be conceded that at least on December 11th, 1917, some of the timber was then ‘‘available for logging and milling purposes” and so far as this record discloses that which was not to be available until October 1st, 1919, was merely the timber on the west side of the canal which had not already been delivered.
How large a portion of the original acreage does not appear’, whether great or small, valuable or not, 'there is no information in the paragraph of the answer which was stricken. But the majority opinion thus points out that when the Morgan Company sold to the complainant and when the latter sold to Rentz there were two classes .of lands upon which the timber could be used for “logging and-milling purposes” and those two classes were: First, that land upon which the timber was “now available” and
The letter of Mr. Pitt dated December 11th, 1917, which is the supplement referred to in the contracts between the Morgan Lumber Company and the complainant and between the latter and J. A. Rentz, itself makes the distinction between the two classes of lands, because it clearly states that the balcmce of the timber on the west side of the canal, will not be delivered, that is to say, will not be available for logging and milling purposes, until October 1st, 1919. The cases cited in the majority opinion in support of the major principle upon which the opinion rests, which is: that in construing a contract it is not “enough to look to an isolated phrase or paragraph of the contract in an effort to determine-its true meaning,” support the rule but with a qualification which the opinion ignores. That qualification is stated in the fourth headnote in.the case of Ross v. Savage et al., 66 Fla. 106, to be: That the first point in construing a contract is to ascertain what was the meaning and understanding of the parties, as shown by the language used applied to the subject matter.
When the language used in any paragraph or phrase is ambiguous or contradictory of the meaning of the words used in other portions of the instrument, then and not until then, does there arise any necessity for construction. WTien it does arise the rule announced in the majority opinion applies and the cases cited so hold.
When at a given date certain timber that may be uijed for logging and milling purposes is classified by parties
There is another reason why the clause in paragraph three of the answer was properly stricken. The contract between complainant and J. A. Rentz under which the defendants claim any rights to the property described therein which they are enjoying is an executory agreement upon the complainant’s part, under which it is obligated to convey the properties only upon compliance by defendants with all the terms, stipulations, conditions and agreements therein contained. Until they pay what they agreed to pay they are entitled to no conveyance or transfer of any of the properties. The stricken part of the answer amounts to an averment that complainant breached the agreement nearly two months after the complainant’s right to cancel it had accrued under its terms. A payment of $1,500 was due August 5th, 1919, and another for a like amount was due September 5th, 1919: Neither was paid and under the terms of the agreement the complainant’s action accrued upon the defendant’s failure to meet the1 first payment, yet as a defense to that suit the defend
Even under the contention of appellants the delivery of the timber west of the canal was not a condition precedent imposed upon the complainant beLow before it could claim the performance of the agreement on Rentz’ part to be performed. The payment by him or his assigns of the price he agreed to pay for the properties was a condition precedent imposed by the terms of the agreement upon him before he could enjoy the possession and use of the properties except as the same was qualifiedly bestowed upon him at the time the agreement was made in July, 1918. In that agreement the covenant of the Florida Naval Stores & Manufacturing Company to convey the properties and the covenant of J. A. Rentz to pay were independent covenants. The payment by Rentz of the, purchase price of the properties was a condition precedent to the vendor’s covenant to convey. See Loud v. Pomona Land & Water Co., 153 U. S. 564, 38 Law Ed. 822; Southern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Allen, 112 Cal. 461, 44 Pac. Rep. 798.
The views expressed in the majority opinion seem to be, influenced by the supposed inconvenience and hardship, which the complainant’s construction of the contract might, entail. As, for instance, it might find that its own title, to the stumpage, which under the terms of the “supplement,” to the agreement of October, 1909, would not be available until October 1919, might fail; that such a construction' would hinder and impede the operation of defendants’ mill and inconvenience them in the manufacture of lumber, so the majority opinion strikes out the' word “now” in the contract and inserts the word “yet” so that the contract might read that complainant would
In this case there is no ambiguity in the language of the contract. The language of the contract is: “ That the manufacturing Company upon the compliance by the said J. A. Rentz of all the terms, stipulations, conditions and agreements herein contained, will sell and convey to the sáid J. A. Rentz (1) without warranty all the stumpage, ’ ’ etc.
Language could hardly be more explicit to indicate the intention of the parties to be that Rentz should first pay the purchase price before he could demand a conveyance. Even according to the construction placed upon the contract by the majority opinion, the purpose of Mr. Rentz, as shown by the language of the instrument, was to rely upon his remedy for any failure on complainant’s part to make the stumpage west of the canal available on October 1st, 1919. And he could not plead such failure as a bar to complainant’s right of action which had accrued nearly two months before.
The covenants in the contract should be interpreted as of the date of the execution of the instrument. “They are pot of a shifting character independent at one time and dependent at.another.”
There was no averment of any injury to the defendant by reason of the non-availability of the stumpage west of the canal on October 1st, 1919, nor was there any averment of its value.
I am; therefore, of the opinion that the decree of the Chancellor should be affirmed.