146 Iowa 526 | Iowa | 1909
Prior to the date of the contract' hereinafter mentioned, 'proceedings under the drainage statute
Belying upon this statute, the construction company petitioned the board of supervisors for a relevy of the cost of the ditch in question upon the lands of the district,
In said trial counsel for the construction company appeared with the county attorney to defend and uphold the tax, and, after the entry of said judgment holding the same invalid, said counsel, in the interest of their client, undertook to prosecute an appeal therefrom to this court; but, service of notice of such appeal not being sufficient to confer jurisdiction to review the action of the trial court, the appeal was dismissed. Yockey v. Woodbury, 130 Iowa, 412. Thereafter plaintiff began the present action against Woodbury County, alleging the excavation of the ditch under the contract made with the county auditor and the issuance to it by the auditor of warrants for the contract price of the work, which warrants were presented to the county treasurer, who re-, fused to pay the same because there was no money in the
In attempting to determine the status of Woodbury County in the proceedings in the district court, it is to be remembered that neither the board of supervisors nor the county auditor is the county. The county as a quasi corporation can act only through its officers, but it is not liable for or bound by their acts, save as they have authority to bind it. On the other hand the officers may have duties and be subject to liabilities in their official capacity which in no way affect or involve the corporation. . . For various purposes in connection with elections, taxes, and other matters, the board of supervisors constitutes a special tribunal authorized to exercise a limited jurisdiction in determining controversies submitted to it. In so
The foregoing extended quotation from the opinion, leading, as it logically does, to the conclusion expressed in the final sentence which we have italicized,. would seem to be decisive of this appeal. The county as -such has no more interest in the establishment of a ditch constructed for the benefit of a fraction of its territory than it has in the establishment of an independent school district or in the paving or sewering' of a city within its borders. A township or city may vote a tax in aid of a railroad, and it becomes the duty of the board of -supervisors to levy it and of the treasurer -to collect and pay it over; hut we think that no one would contend that‘the neglect or failure of these officers to perform the duties thus required of them would make the county liable for the tax. The same may be said of most taxes and assessments levied and collected on account of local improvements. In such cases
IY. Considerable attention is given in argument to the inquiry whether the power of the proper officers to levy the tax has been exhausted by a single abortive or unsuccessful attempt. In our judgment this appeal does not present that question for our decision. The statute (chapters 67 and 68, Laws 30th General Assembly) seems to have been enacted expressly to meet .such emergencies, but how far, if at all, the rights thereby conferred have heen exhausted or may yet be available against the proper parties we hazard no. opinion. The single question here presented is that of the alleged liability of the county, and upon this we find against the appellant.
We find no error in the judgment of the district court, and it is therefore affirmed.