Campos v. Tubi, Inc.Campos v. Tubi, Inc.
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- John J. Tharp Jr.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Sylvia Campos has brought an amended class action complaint against defendant Tubi, Inc. under the Video Privacy Protection Act (“VPPA”),
BACKGROUND
Tubi is an online platform for streaming movies and TV shows. Anyone can stream Tubi’s content for free because the site is supported by unskippable advertising breaks rather than subscription fees. Registering an account with Tubi, while not necessary to stream content, provides access to certain additional features such as the ability to create a watch list that can be revisited later.
In 2021, Campos registered for a Tubi account using Tubi’s mobile app for Android phones. The Tubi app’s account registration page is reproduced via screenshot below:
The page has a dark blue or black background, a small “Skip” button1 on the top right, and, near the top, promotional copy in large, white font: “Unlimited Movies, Shows and More”. Immediately below that, also in white font but smaller, there is a
Those components cover about the top five-sixths of the page. As for the bottom sixth, there is some blank space, followed by, in the center, some gray text that is smaller than any of the copy or buttons above and less vivid than the white font used above. It says, “Have an account?” To the right, there is slightly larger, seemingly bolded, white “Sign In” text, presumably a clickable element. Beneath that sign-in segment, finally, we reach a line of text in the same small font. It says, “[starting in gray] By registering, you agree to Tubi TV’s [alternates to white] Terms of Use [alternates to gray] and [alternates to white] Privacy Policy.” There is one final line at the bottom, in small white font, that says, “Do Not Sell My Info.”
The small white “Terms of Use” text is a hyperlink that redirects the user to Tubi’s TOU when clicked. The first page of the TOU document concludes with the following language in bold3:
IMPORTANT NOTICE REGARDING ARBITRATION: BY USING ANY TUBI SERVICES AND ACCEPTING THESE TERMS OF USE YOU ARE AGREEING (WITH LIMITED EXCEPTION) TO RESOLVE ANY DISPUTE BETWEEN YOU AND US THROUGH BINDING, INDIVIDUAL ARBITRATION RATHER THAN IN COURT. YOU AND TUBI WAIVE THE RIGHT TO BRING OR PARTICIPATE IN A CLASS ACTION IN CONNECTION WITH SUCH DISPUTES. PLEASE REVIEW CAREFULLY SECTION 10 TITLED “ARBITRATION AGREEMENT AND CLASS ACTION WAIVER” BELOW FOR DETAILS REGARDING ARBITRATION (INCLUDING THE PROCEDURE TO OPT OUT OF ARBITRATION).
Ex. 1 to Elliot Decl. at 1, ECF No. 13-1. Section 10 of the TOU provides the terms of the arbitration agreement and class action waiver. Id. at 21-26. Since the precise language of the arbitration clause and class action waiver are not subject to differing interpretations by the parties and do not otherwise bear on the outcome of any motion before the Court, it is unnecessary to detail them here.
The “Continue with Email” button redirects the user to a registration form, a screenshot of which is reproduced below:
Tubi’s vice president and deputy general counsel Matthew Elliot has submitted a declaration stating, in part, “an individual in Illinois who provided the name ‘Sylvia Cmpos’ [sic] registered an account with Tubi using Tubi’s Android app. Tubi believes that this account was created by Plaintiff, given Plaintiff’s allegations that she is an Illinois citizen and that she created a Tubi account in the past two years. As noted above, any person who creates a Tubi account—as Plaintiff says she did—must agree to the Tubi TOU.” Elliot Decl. ¶ 17. There is no evidence that Campos registered using that “Continue with Email” page, as opposed to using her google or Facebook accounts, though plaintiff’s response brief assumes that she did. Resp. at 6.
ANALYSIS
Tubi seeks to enforce individual arbitration of Campos’s dispute. It contends that she manifested her assent to Tubi’s TOU, which included the mandatory arbitration clause and class action waiver, by registering for her account through the Tubi app. In the alternative—meaning that if the Court declines to compel arbitration—Tubi seeks dismissal of Campos’s amended class action complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to
I. Tubi’s Motion to Compel Arbitration
“Under the [Federal Arbitration Act], arbitration should be compelled if three elements are present: (1) an enforceable written agreement to arbitrate, (2) a dispute within the scope of the arbitration agreement, and (3) a refusal to arbitrate.” Scheurer v. Fromm Family Foods LLC, 863 F.3d 748, 752 (7th Cir. 2017). Campos does not dispute the second or third elements, only the first. She contends that she should be not “be required to submit to arbitration a[] dispute which [s]he has not agreed so to submit.” Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Watts Industries, Inc., 417 F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir. 2005). As the party seeking to compel arbitration, Tubi bears the burden of offering “sufficient evidence to allow a factfinder to conclude that the parties agreed to arbitrate.” Melvin v. Big Data Arts, LLC, 553 F. Supp. 3d 447, 450 (N.D. Ill. 2021) (citing Tinder v. Pinkerton Security, 305 F.3d 728, 735 (7th Cir. 2002). The parties agree that Illinois principles of contract formation govern this inquiry. See Faulkenberg v. CB Tax Franchise Systems, LP, 637 F.3d 801, 809 (7th Cir. 2011).
Since the parties do not dispute any other aspect of contract formation, enforceability, or interpretation, the resolution of this motion hinges solely on whether Campos agreed to be bound by Tubi’s TOU by creating her Tubi account. It is a basic tenet of contract law that “[i]n order for there to be a contract between parties, there must be a meeting of the minds or mutual assent as to the terms of the contract.” See Midland Hotel Corp. v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., 515 N.E.2d 61, 65 (Ill. 1987). In Illinois, “[w]hether mutual assent or an intent to accept exists is determined by an objective standard.” Arbogast v. Chicago Cubs Baseball Club, LLC, 2021 IL App (1st) 210526, ¶ 20. “Only the parties’ overt acts and the communications between them may be considered in determining whether and upon what terms they have entered into a contract.” Id.
In contesting the fact of her assent, Campos cannot rest on the mere fact that she did not actually notice the prompt
In applying basic contract principles to the not-so-basic world of online adhesion contracts, the Court must engage in the “fact-intensive inquiry” of whether “a reasonable person in [the plaintiff’s] shoes would have realized that [s]he was assenting to” the TOU when she followed the link to fill out a registration form.5 Sgouros, 817 F.3d at 1034-35. Courts in the Seventh Circuit have considered several non-dispositive factors in conducting this assessment, including:
(1) whether there is a clear prompt directing the purchaser to read the terms; (2) the size of the prompt; (3) use of a bold font or contrasting colors; (4) the visual clarity of the website’s layout; (5)
whether the user can see the link to the terms without having to scroll; and (6) the spatial proximity between the notice and the mechanism for manifesting assent, such as a purchase button.
Domer v. Menard, Inc., No. 22-CV-444-JDP, 2023 WL 4762593 at *3 (W.D. Wis. July 26, 2023).
In examining all the relevant circumstances, the Court finds that Tubi has not established that it reasonably communicated the existence of its TOU to Campos. The Prompt is in the smallest font on the screen, and it is very nearly at the bottom. The relevant text of the Prompt, “By registering, you agree to Tubi TV’s,” is in a gray font that contrasts poorly with the background. To be sure, a user does not seem to need to scroll to see it, a fact that favors Tubi’s position. But at the same time, even if a user does not need to scroll to see the Prompt, a reasonable user registering for a Tubi account would not be expected to read it. This is because the Prompt on the first screen is not spatially coupled with any mechanism for manifesting assent. Nothing on the screen indicates that clicking one of the “Continue with…” buttons manifests assent to the terms of use; to the contrary, the Prompt indicates that some other action—registering—is required to assent to the TOU. And there is nothing on the first screen of the app that tells one how to register.
“Normally, courts will find a sufficient spatial connection where a consumer has an opportunity to review the terms and conditions in the form of a hyperlink placed directly adjacent to the button by which the consumer manifests assent.” Wilson, 448 F. Supp. at 883. But that is not the case here—the Prompt and the manifest assent button (“Register”) are not even on the same screen. Moreover, the prominent and colorful “Continue with…” buttons would be of much more interest and relevance to a prospective Tubi user than would the small and obscure text at the bottom of the first screen. Having been invited to “Continue with” their exploration of the app, it is unlikely that Campos or others would have expected or noticed the “Terms of Use” prompt on the first screen advising that registration (which is otherwise unmentioned on the first screen) equals assent.
Tubi attempts to distinguish Wilson, 448 F. Supp. 873, by noting that the webpage in that case was cluttered and included multiple irrelevant, intervening buttons and information, and that is supposedly not the case here. While it is true that Tubi’s page is less cluttered than the one in Wilson, Tubi’s registration page suffers from a more significant discontinuity: the placement of the Prompt advising of the consequence of registering on an entirely different screen. That discontinuity is compounded by the fact that the registration button, on the second screen, says nothing at all about registration constituting assent to the TOU. While the second screen explains what some of the registration information is used for (“We use this information to confirm that you’re meeting the age requirement set out in our Terms of Use and to personalize your experience. Questions? Let us know at support@tubi.tv”), nowhere does it advise that by registering, a customer assents to Tubi’s Terms of Use.6
Tubi has submitted an exhibit reproducing screenshots of webpages from multiple cases where Courts have upheld the validity of web agreements that are similar in
Another shortcoming with Tubi’s page is that the hyperlink to its TOU is not reasonably visually conspicuous. “Where the terms are not displayed but must be brought up by using a hyperlink, courts . . . have looked for a clear prompt directing the user to read them.” Sgouros, 817 F.3d at 1035. “Courts have found links to terms and conditions insufficiently conspicuous where the ‘characteristics of the hyperlink raise concerns as to whether a reasonable user’ would recognize the text as a hyperlink.” Wilson, 448 F. Supp. at 885 (quoting Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., 893 F.3d 53, 63 (1st Cir. 2018)). Here, as in Wilson:
The hyperlinks that [Campos] would have encountered appear in white text, which does provide some contrast with the surrounding gray text. At the same time, other non-hyperlink text on the Sign In screen appears in white. Using a different color for the hyperlink from the surrounding text, by itself, is not sufficient to render the hyperlink reasonably conspicuous. Indeed, coloring can be for aesthetic purposes. Courts have required more than mere coloring to indicate the existence of a hyperlink to a contract. There must be some other distinguishing characteristic to inform consumers that there was in fact a hyperlink that should be clicked and that a contract should be reviewed, such as words to that effect, underlining, bolding, capitalization, italicization, or large font.
Id. (cleaned up) (citing Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 63 (“While not all hyperlinks need to have the same characteristics, they are commonly blue and underlined.” (internal quotation marks omitted))). On the following page with the actual registration form, unlike the initial page containing the “Continue with…” buttons, Tubi underlines its hyperlinks and make them more conspicuous. But it does not, and cannot, argue that the prompt on that page (“We use this information to confirm that you’re meeting the age requirement set out in our Terms of Use and to personalize your experience. Questions? Let us know at support@tubi.tv”) was the relevant prompt to give Campos notice that her registration would constitute assent.
The cases and screenshots in Tubi’s Exhibit 1 each involve more conspicuously displayed hyperlinks than Tubi’s TOU hyperlink on the initial registration page at issue here. See Meyer v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 868 F.3d 66, 81-82 (2d Cir. 2017) (capitalized, underlined, and blue with no other similarly formatted non-hyperlink text on the screen); Bold Limited v. Rocket Resume, Inc., No. 22-cv-01045, 2023 WL 4157626, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 2023) (same); Regan v. Pinger, Inc., No 20-CV-02221, 2021 WL 706465, at *1–2 (N.D. Cal. 2021) (hyperlinks in highly contrasting bright green on pages where all other green font text causes an action); Ball v. Skillz, Inc., No. 2:20-cv-00888, 2020 WL 6685514, at *1 (D. Nev. Nov. 12, 2020) (hyperlink underlined and directly beneath the assent mechanism with minimal other text on the screen); Anderson v. Amazon.com, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 3d 1265, 1269 (M.D. Tenn. 2020) (hyperlinks noted through contrasting color and underlined); Selden v. Airbnb, Inc., No. 16-cv-00933, 2016 WL 6476934, at *9 (D.D.C. Nov. 1, 2016) (hyperlinks noted through contrasting color and other similarly formatted text on the page also performs action once clicked). Here, once again quite like in Wilson, “the Court finds the gray disclosure text surrounding the hyperlinks not reasonably conspicuous because there is insufficient contrast between the gray text and the black background.” 448 F. Supp. 3d at 886 (citing Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 64 (finding the notification text to be inconspicuous where it “was displayed in dark gray small-sized non-bolded font against a black background.”)).
In their briefs, the parties dispute the relevance of this Court’s reasoning in Anand, 2019 WL 2716213, a prior opinion where the Court found a defendant’s webpage insufficiently designed to give adequate notice of terms of use. Tubi is correct that the webpage at issue in that case suffered from a fatal defect that is not particularly relevant here:
The problem for the defendants is not that the notice regarding mandatory arbitration and the terms and conditions hyperlink were insufficiently conspicuous (though that point is arguable), but rather that there was nothing that told the user that she would manifest her assent to those terms and conditions by clicking “Continue.”
Anand, 2019 WL 2716213 at *4. Here, unlike in Anand, there is an appropriate description of the act that would manifest assent to the terms and conditions. That’s not the problem. Here, the problem is that the warning is divorced from the act of assent, making it unlikely that a prospective user like Campos would receive the warning before performing the act of consent.
As a final matter, Tubi argues that reasonable mobile app users should already expect that they will be subject to terms of use. It quotes dicta from a District of D.C. opinion for the proposition that:
The act of contracting for consumer services online is now commonplace in the American economy. Any reasonably-active adult consumer will almost certainly appreciate that by signing up for a particular service, he or she is accepting the terms and conditions of the provider. Notifications to that effect—be they check boxes or hyperlinks—abound.
Reply at 5 (quoting Selden, 2016 WL 6476934, at *5). Even if the Court were to adopt that general logic—unlikely given the dissonance between that view and Illinois law as it stands—it would not mandate a different outcome here. According to the pleadings, Tubi does not require users to register for an account to watch its content, registration only provides a handful of modest features that are unavailable to unregistered users, and registration is free. There is no indication that Tubi, like various other ad-supported video streaming platforms, allows registered users to comment on its content, generate their own content (e.g., upload their own videos), or otherwise interact with other users—functions that may suggest that account usage may be tied to certain terms and conditions given their hazards. Therefore, Tubi’s site is meaningfully different
For the foregoing reasons, Tubi’s motion to compel arbitration is denied.
II. Tubi’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
As an alternative to compelling arbitration, Tubi moves to dismiss Campos’s complaint for failure to state a claim. To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Kaminski v. Elite Staffing, Inc., 23 F.4th 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting
In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts the well-pleaded factual allegations in a plaintiff’s complaint as true and “draw[s] all reasonable inferences in his favor.” Id. But legal conclusions, such as threadbare recitals of a cause of action, “are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 566 U.S. at 679. The Court may also consider documents extrinsic to the complaint as long as the complaint refers to them, they are central to the plaintiff’s claim, and a party attaches them to a pleading or motion to dismiss. Hackman v. Dickerson Realtors, Inc., 520 F. Supp. 2d 954, 963-64 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
Generally speaking, the VPPA prohibits video tape service providers from knowingly disclosing a consumer’s personal identifiable information—which “includes information which identifies a person as having requested or obtained specific video materials or services from a video tape service provider,”
A. Campos’s Allegations.
The overarching theory of the complaint is simple. Tubi does not generate revenue from subscriptions or rentals or purchasing fees. Rather, Tubi’s “revenue is derived solely from selling advertising space on” its videos. Am. Compl. ¶ 5. To make the most of that model, Campos alleges, Tubi capitalizes on a broad swath of data it
The complaint supports this theory through a variety of factual allegations, some of which are supported by documentary evidence. First, with respect to data collection, Campos alleges that Tubi collects data about its users, including the VPPA-relevant PII data, through multiple avenues. It is already clear that Tubi actually collects certain data from users (i.e., name, age, gender, email) during its account registration process. See supra Background. In addition, Campos alleges that Tubi uses a “sophisticated tracking technology” to collect that PII while users engage with Tubi’s site or app, including their viewing history. ¶ 6. The complaint cites Tubi’s own Privacy Policy, which states that Tubi “may collect” the relevant information—users’ identities and other personal characteristics (e.g., birthdays, email addresses, genders, locations), the video material’s identity, and the connection between them—during the registration process and over the course of the user’s engagement with Tubi’s site. ¶ 24. Beyond that, Campos’s complaint further alleges that Tubi has partnered with TransUnion, a credit reporting agency, to accumulate even more personal data about its users for, as a cited press release implies, the purpose of further targeting ads to users. ¶ 31. These facts provide ample grounds to infer that Tubi collects users’ data, including individual-level viewing history and other PII, for the purposes of targeting them with ads.
To be sure, collecting data like information about the user’s identity, location, viewing device, and content viewing history does not itself violate the VPPA. Nor is aggregating or anonymizing it and sharing with third parties. Rather, Campos must have alleged sufficient factual material that makes it plausible that Tubi disclosed the combination of viewing history and individual-identifying data to third parties. With respect to pleading this fact, the complaint alleges that Tubi disclosed the relevant combination of information to third-party advertising companies. In support of that allegation, it again cites to Tubi’s Privacy Policy. The Policy states that Tubi “may” share the information that it collects about its users with third parties such as business partners, advertising technology companies, and advertisers. ¶ 26. The version of the Privacy Policy that Tubi attached to its motion to dismiss goes beyond the conjectural “may” language to affirm that Tubi discloses the relevant categories of information to others in connection with advertising and marketing purposes.7 This language can be found in the sections providing notice in compliance with the California Consumer Privacy Act and several other states’ consumer protection laws. Ex. B at pp. 9-19, ECF No. 13-2.8 Campos also alleges that Tubi partnered with TransUnion to improve its advertisers’ abilities to target individual
B. Sufficiency of the Complaint.
Throughout its briefing, Tubi seeks to hold Campos to an excessively high pleading standard and unduly ignores Campos’s factual allegations. It argues that:
Far from presenting any analysis of Tubi’s website and platform—such as by forensically tracking the purported VPPA PII that allegedly traveled from Tubi’s platform to its advertisers—Plaintiff does not identify how Tubi allegedly transmits VPPA PII to third parties; the specific types of data points that Tubi allegedly transmits; the specific third parties to whom Tubi allegedly transmits the VPPA PII; or whether Tubi allegedly transmits the VPPA PII in a form that would reveal the “connection” between “the consumer’s identity” and “the video material’s identity.”
Memo. at 16 (quoting In re Hulu Priv. Litig., 86 F. Supp. 3d at 1095). The VPPA claim at issue is not subject to
“
Contrast Campos’s complaint with what would be a “barebones,” merely cause-of-action-reciting VPPA complaint: “Tubi collects and shares information which identifies me as having requested or obtained specific video materials or services from Tubi without my or other users’ consent.” Tubi would have no notice of the claim against it, and allowing the case to proceed to discovery would not be appropriate in such a situation. What kind of information did Tubi collect and share, and with whom? Did Tubi share people’s names and watch histories with curious journalists looking to find out what kinds of content certain users watched? Did Tubi sell email addresses and movie history to data brokers/aggregators who would then go on to reorganize and sell that data to content creators like movie studios? The possibilities are endless, and that is why that sort of complaint would not be permitted to
Despite Campos’s low bar at the pleading stage, Tubi takes issue with several of her allegations and her characterizations of the documentary evidence to which her complaint refers. And Tubi is right that, contrary to Campos’s suggestion, none of the documents “make clear” that Tubi discloses users’ PII to third parties in a non-VPPA-compliant manner—meaning in a manner that would permit the third party to learn an individual’s identity and their viewing history. Tubi’s arguments about the Audience Insights report, for instance, are well taken. The portions of the Audience Insights report to which Campos cites are benign and entirely consistent with Tubi disclosing anonymized and/or aggregated data, which the VPPA does not prohibit. Campos does not respond to this point in her opposition brief, and the Court is disinclined to give any weight to that document at this juncture.
But, as discussed below, Campos does not need to have found an admission of liability by Tubi in each of its documents to survive the motion to dismiss. Nor do each of Campos’s factual allegations need to be proven by the documents they reference; as long as those documents do not directly controvert her allegations, thereby showing that she pleaded herself out of court, she is entitled to have the Court draw all reasonable inferences from their contents in her favor. See Massey v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 464 F.3d 642, 650 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[A]s a general concept, a party need not plead much to survive a motion to dismiss: a party need not plead specific facts, legal theories, nor anticipate any defenses. The dangers almost always come from pleading too much—not too little. Thus, a party may plead itself out of court by either including factual allegations that establish an impenetrable defense to its claims or by attaching exhibits that establish the same.” (internal citations omitted)); see also Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1086 (7th Cir. 2008) (“A plaintiff pleads himself out of court when it would be necessary to contradict the complaint in order to prevail on the merits. If the plaintiff voluntarily provides unnecessary facts in her complaint, the defendant may use those facts to demonstrate that she is not entitled to relief.” (cleaned up)). Here, none of the documents directly contradict her claims, and some, e.g., the Privacy Policy, provide fertile grounds for drawing the reasonable inferences that Campos needs to make her claim plausible.
With respect to the Privacy Policy, Tubi argues that it does not bear out Campos’s claim about disclosure because (1) it uses permissive language (i.e., only says that Tubi “may” share certain categories of information) and (2) nowhere does the Privacy Policy state that it may or may not—let alone will or will not—share the relevant data combination: information about an individual’s identity in conjunction with their viewing history. But Tubi’s argument about the Privacy Policy is misplaced. Tubi cites a case for the proposition that “allegations about what defendant ‘might’ do were impermissibly conclusory.” Memo. at 12 (citing U.S. ex rel. Fowler v. Caremark RX, Inc., No. Civ.A.03 C 8714, 2006 WL 3469537, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 30, 2006)). But there is a critical difference between that case and this one: here, Campos isn’t alleging that Tubi might disclose users’ VPPA PII; rather, she firmly alleges that Tubi does disclose users’ VPPA PII, and she bases that in part on Tubi’s own warnings that it may choose to do so and, as
And although the Privacy Policy does not explicitly say that it shares the relevant VPPA-PII combination with third parties, it does state that it discloses both categories of information, and it states that “We and our advertising partners use certain personal information to deliver online advertisements to you on your devices tailored to your interests. This may be considered ‘Selling or Sharing’ under California law and ‘Targeted Advertising’ under Virginia and other state privacy laws.” That Tubi knowingly disclosed the relevant combination of information to its advertising partners, in contravention of the VPPA, is a plausible inference based on the Privacy Policy, in tandem with the other facts that Campos has alleged and that the Court must take as true..
Tubi cites a few cases where courts declined to find plausible privacy claims based on subjunctive language in defendants’ privacy policies. See Nashel v. New York Times Co., No. 2:22-CV-10633, 2022 WL 6775657 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 11, 2022); Gamez v. VF Corp., No. CV 18-6246, 2018 WL 6333560, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2018). These can be distinguished by the simple fact that Tubi’s Policy not only includes suspicious “may” language but actually later affirms that Tubi disclosed various categories of information to third parties.9 See, e.g., Gottsleben v. Informa Media, Inc., No. 1:22-CV-866, 2023 WL 4397226 at *5 (W.D. Mich. July 7, 2023) (finding a claim about improper disclosure of customer subscription information viable because, inter alia, the Gottsleben defendant’s privacy policy, unlike in Nashel, “indicated that it was disclosing customer information to third parties,” and drawing reasonable inference from the privacy policy’s indication of disclosure of “customer information” that “information about its customers’ subscriptions” was also disclosed.). The present case can also be distinguished on the basis that Campos’s complaint is not reliant solely on the Privacy Policy’s language.
In short, Campos does not need a “smoking gun” in her complaint. The relevant pieces of circumstantial evidence, such as Tubi’s own words saying that it might engage in various aspects of the accused conduct, in conjunction with the other factual allegations about Tubi’s practices, its emphasis on hyper-specific ad targeting, and business model—some supported by suggestive documentary evidence—are sufficient to support the plausibility of Campos’s claim. Cf. In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d 622, 628-29 (7th Cir. 2010) (“We need not decide whether the circumstantial evidence that we have summarized is sufficient to compel an inference of conspiracy; the case is just at the complaint stage and the test for whether to dismiss a case at that stage turns on the complaint’s ‘plausibility.’” (emphasis in original)). After taking those factual allegations as true and drawing reasonable inferences based on those allegations and the documentary evidence in Campos’s favor, the Court has no trouble finding that Campos’s complaint generates “a nonnegligible probability that the claim is valid.” Id.
* * *
For the foregoing reasons, defendant Tubi’s motions to compel arbitration and to dismiss are both denied.
Dated: February 8, 2024
John J. Tharp, Jr.
United States District Judge