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Campbell v. Wood
18 F.3d 662
9th Cir.
1994
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*1 (Nоrris, J., dissenting). analysis in legal tion.7 The of our at We several F.2d penalty opinions, in Mason. Mason v. so recent has been —to failed do (9th Cir.1993) put charitably faulty, and as a Vasquez, F.3d result — are, J., dissenting best, highly ques- from the order of ultimate (Pregerson, decisions (Noonan, court); J., Moreover, id. the en banc tionable. the errors are cumula- dissenting the order en bane upon from tive one as flawed case builds another. court). again, understandable, fail Tonight, given we once this All of be prior speed our time we break all records pace required at which have been to act. we doing However, so. while in my opinion, price far too high. This is not how law should made speed prevent we has with which act certainly not life case—and when human developing body ed us from coherent Perhaps someday is at stake. we will slow pause give do corpus habeas law. We give petitioners down and habeas the fair and rigorous posi intellectual examination adequate they are federal review to which deprived oppor are tions we take and Only acting entitled. then will we be like tunity thoughtful ex and reasoned Accordingly, law. court of I dissent. changes of that are views so essential judicial decisionmaking. proper It is the

subjecting analysis by of ideas careful frequently forges opinions

others that positive result creative advances Instead, area, corpus law. in the habeas we gaps jurispru up end with serious in our and, often, with dence decisions logically address flawed. None our cases CAMPBELL, question of Charles Rodman

es the critical what constitutes a Petitioner-Appellant, hearing “full and fair” state-court within the See, § meaning e.g., Rich 28 U.S.C. 2254. (9th Ricketts, mond v. 774 F.2d 961-62 WOOD,* Superintendent, Washing Tana Cir.1985). questions critical have been Other Penitentiary, Walla, ton State Walla similarly ignored. example, For how can a Washington; Gregoire,** Christine O. present “meaning petitioner next-fiiend ever Attorney General, Washington, State of incompetency ful evidence” of a defendant’s Respondents-Appellees. standing to a district court he lacks request examinations or to cross- medical No. 89-35210. place? examine witnesses the first United of Appeals, States Court short, emphasis I believe that because of our Ninth Circuit. substance, speed body our entire over standing badly law is next-friend underrea- Argued 1993. Submitted Jan. underdeveloped. soned Submission Withdrawn Jan. 1993. all, we make when Worst bad law we Submitted Nov. 1993. questions are forced to decide life or death them, opinions regarding and to issue all Decided Feb. 1994. example, opinion within hours. For our Court, Gomez v. States United District (9th 1992), Apr. 20,

WL 155238 was Cir. so publica- flawed that it was withdrawn * Officially, opinion Blodgett pur- Wood withdrawn moot. Tana is substituted for James Court, 43(c). See F.2d 463 in other ed under ly published. States v. United District Fed.R.App.P. Gomez suant to (9th 1992). However, opinions Cir. our ** petitioner Gregoire O. Christine is substituted for Kenneth in which the was execut cases subsequent 43(c). Eikenberry pursuant Fed.R.App.P. similar circumstances were O. See, Brewer, 1021; e.g., 989 F.2d at Mason, 5 F.3d at 1220.

664

I proce- begin with an overview of the

We Campbell’s background of dural and factual prior petitions his current and conviction and post-conviction relief.

A of three counts of

Campbell was convicted aggravated murder and sentenced death. Washington Supreme Court affirmed Campbell, v. and sentence. State conviction (1984). 691 P.2d 929 103 Wash.2d County Superior Court issued a Snohomish Campbell’s scheduling execu- death warrant March 1985. The tion for Supreme stayed the execution to allow Court Campbell petition the United States Su- certiorari. The preme for a writ of Court April on Supreme Court denied certiorari Washington, 471 2169, 85 L.Ed.2d 526 Campbell, pro per, Walla Charles Rodman May A death warrant issued second *6 Walla, Washington. 1985, July setting Campbell’s execution for Lobsenz, 25, Carney, Bradley, Campbell Smith moved the 1985. James E. stay. court Seattle, Washington, pe- Supreme for another The for the Court Spellman,

& personal as a restraint treated the motion titioner-appellant. 18, 1985, July denied the petition, and on Weisser, Attorney Gen- Assistant Paul D. petition stay motion for a and dismissed Jones, Attorney eral, Gen- Assistant John M. 22, 1985, July Campbell on the merits. On respon- eral, Washington, for the Olympia, petition in the United corpus filed habeas dents-appellees. Western Dis District Court for the States court Washington. The district trict of Campbell’s granted stay of the execution. claims, petition 61 40 made had not been ex determined district court Campbell amended in state court. hausted WALLACE, Judge, Before: Chief 21 claims to the petition his to limit his POOLE, BROWNING, TANG, D.W. court held claims. The district- exhausted REINHARDT, BEEZER, NELSON, 12, February evidentiary hearing, and on O’SCANNLAIN, THOMPSON, WIGGINS, 1986, petition. af the habeas We denied KLEINFELD, Judges. Circuit 6,1987. Campbell v. Kin firmed on October Cir.1987) (9th cheloe, (Camp F.2d 1453 BEEZER, Judge: Circuit I). rehearing petition for denied the bell We rehearing en banc. suggestion for and the Campbell was convicted Charles Rodman denied certiorari. Supreme The Court aggravated first- in 1982 of three counts of 948, Kincheloe, Campbell v. to death. We degree murder and sentenced (1988). 380, dis 102 L.Ed.2d 369 We S.Ct. Campbell’s bane the denial consider en 25, January stay оf execution solved the on petition. corpus We second federal habeas 1989. provide for the court and affirm the district February issued on pending A third death warrant stay of execution dissolution of the 15,1989, scheduling Campbell’s execution appeal. 30, Campbell appealed 8, March 1989. from Campbell banc on October 1992. v. Blod scheduling (9th Cir.1992). the order execution. The gett, 978 F.2d 1519 Washington Supreme Court on affirmed 1, 1993, May On we ordered a limited 35- 23, Campbell, March 1989. State v. day remand to the district court for an evi- 186, Campbell 770 P.2d 620 Wash.2d dentiary hearing on the issue of whether petition for a filed a second writ of habeas by hanging execution violates the corpus in the district court. The district prohibition Amendment of cruel and unusual evidentiary hearing court held an and then punishment. Campbell Blodgett, v. request petition stay for a denied on (9th Cir.1993) F.2d 984 (denying reconsidera 28, The district March 1989. court issued a order); tion of Blodgett remand see also v. probable Campbell ap- cause. certificate — U.S. -, Campbell, 1965, 29, 1989, 30, pealed March on on March (1993) (O’Connor, J.) L.Ed.2d 66 (denying 1989, granted stay of the execution we order). application to vacate remand pending appeal. days district court heard testimony three appeal pending, Campbell was While findings and entered and conclusions on June personal petition filed another restraint 1, Campbell attempted 1993. appeal Washington Supreme Court. The Wash- findings filing conclusions a notice ington Supreme petition Court denied the on appeal in the district court on June 21, 1991, rehearing March and denied on 23, 1993, 1993.' In July an order dated we May August grant- 1991. On we appeal stated that an from the limited re ed leave to file a third habeas mand error. Campbell Blodgett, was v. petition, appeal, any, and indicated that an (9th Cir.1993). Campbell F.2d 763 moved to from the district court’s decision on the third supplemental allow briefing. granted We petition pend- would be consolidated with the August motion Briefing 1993. ing appeal petition. Campbell on the second completed on October and we or (9th Cir.1991); Blodgett, v. 940 F.2d 549 see dered the case resubmitted for decision on (9th Campbell Blodgett, also 927 F.2d 444 November 1993. We now affirm. Cir.1991). Campbell filed his third habeas corpus petition in Sep- the district court on B tember district court dis- *7 petition missed the as successive and an 1974, In Campbell Charles assaulted and abuse of the writ on March 1992. sodomized in Renae Wicklund her residence Clearview, Washington. Campbell held a Campbell’s petition While third habeas was knife to one-year-old the throat of Wicklund’s court, pending before the district the Wash daughter Shannah, threatening to harm her ington Attorney petition General filed a for attack, Renae did not submit. After the mandamus in the Supreme United States Wicklund ran to the neighbor, house of her Court Supreme on October 1991. The Hendrickson,- Barbara help. Campbell writ, Court denied the but stated that was tried and convicted on the assault and plausible delay found no reason for the sodomy charges in 1976. Both Renae Wiek- resolving Campbell’s appeal. second In re — lund and Barbara Hendrickson testified at U.S. -, -, -, Blodgett, Campbell the trial. was pris- sentenced to a 674, 675, 677, 116 L.Ed.2d 669 The on term. In March Campbell was appeals therefore were not consolidated. We transferred a facility to work release in Ev- affirmed the district court’s denial of relief erett, Washington. Campbell’s on petition third on December Campbell Blodgett, 1992. v. 982 F.2d April Wicklund, On Renae Shan- superceded reh’g, on denial 997 F.2d 512 (then eight old), nah Wicklund years and (9th Cir.1993) III). (Campbell Barbara Hendrickson brutally were found panel opinion Campbell’s filed its on slain in the Wicklund residence. Wicklund 1,1992. petition April second Campbell v. had been sick and remained at home that (9th Cir.1992) Blodgett, 978 F.2d 1502 day. gone Hendrickson had to Wicklund’s II). (Campbell granted rehearing We en residence to assist her. fingerprint showed matching Camp The evidence at trial that Wick- kitchen bore Finally, had first victim. was lund been the She bell’s. another work-release resi had police naked on her bedroom floor. She place found dent directed to a on the Sno- her beaten with a blunt instrument on Campbell been homish River where he and had head, back, jaw upper chest. and Her evening April been on the 14. Investiga broken, were she had bracelet, nose been stran- tors and divers found a three ear cut her gled. She had a seven-inch across necklaces, rings, piece pottery, two and a neck, from which had bled to she death. object, all of brass linked were death, had vaginally After her she been as- Wicklund residence and the victims. See saulted with blunt instrument which left generally Campbell, State v. 691 P.2d at 933- vaginal cut in wall. one-inch her 936. daughter had also Wicklund’s been stran- jury Campbell convicted on November gled, and she had a seven-and-one-half-inch jury 1982. The aggravating found four upper across her neck. She had so cut lost (1) Campbell serving factors: was a term of sample much blood that a was difficult to imprisonment at the time he committed the obtain. murders, 10.95.020(2); (2) Wash.Rev.Code cut, Barbara Hendrickson also and Renae

Hendrickson’s throat had been Wicklund leaving against Campbell were former a seven-inch wound. She of a witnesses died hemorrhage. generally v. their were massive State murders related to the exercise of trial, Campbell, 691 P.2d at 933. their official duties at that Wash.Rev. (3) 10.95.020(6)(b); Campbell Code murdered Campbell charged was and tried on three Hendrickson Barbara and Shannah Wicklund aggravated degree first counts murder. protect identity, conceal his Wash.Rev. convictions, affirming 10.95.020(7); Campbell Code commit- Supreme Court noted the State’s case of, ted the murder course the fur- “overwhelmingly strong.” v. State of, flight or in therance the immediate Campbell, 691 933. P.2d at Several witness- burglary degree, crime the first they es testified that saw a man near the 10.95.020(9)(c). sepa- Wash.Rev.Code In a Wicklund residence on afternoon of proceeding, jury rate found insufficient Campbell murders identified at trial mitigating leniency, merit circumstances to they man had Two other seen. witnesses Campbell was sentenced death. State matching a car description described Campbell, 691 P.2d at 937. Campbell’s they car and testified that ob- parked ear in an served the inlet a wooded April area near the Wicklund residence on C Camp- Dirks Judith testified that presents following questions: April had morning bell visited hér on the *8 (1) Campbell’s absence at Whether drinking, that he had and he been that empanelling jury of the state court violated six-pack a at drank of beer her residence. rights; his constitutional Dirks later her noticed butcher knife was (2) Campbell received Whether ineffec-

missing. Campbell’s acquain- Another of respect tive assistance of to counsel tances, Kedziroski, Debbie that testified selection; presence jury of his waiver Campbell early visited her afternoon April Camp- 14. Kedziroski testified that (3) pen- Whether death proposed sexual and bell to have relations statute, 10.95, alty pro- Wash.Rev.Code but tugged her clothes did not hurt her. mandatory penalty death formula vides a provide appropriate to and fails reliable day Campbell Items seized from on the sentencing authority for standards to pair a earrings the murders included determine whether sentence death belonging a witness identified as to Renae imposed; should be earring Campbell’s An found in Wicklund. (4) by car was a business identified associate Whether the trial court’s instructions present unconstitutionally birthday given jury Renae’s as a limited the he had jury glass mitigation; to A found in the could Shannah. Wieklunds’ facts the consider (5) he had a con- judge Campbell has informed Campbell been denied Whether during jury right present to counsel' and ade- stitutional be assistance of effective absent, selection, he post- in his and if he were to the courts quate access lawyers select help not be able to his proceedings; would conviction jury. judge Campbell that warned (6) by court erred the district Whether jurors might approve not (cid:127) selected he of the stay Campbell’s motion for denying attorneys. judge advised his also providing an and ade- execution contact Campbell that he would have little hearing; quate evidentiary lawyers they Spokane. were in with his while (7) by hanging vio- Whether execution Amendment; and lates the repeatedly that he un- Campbell indicated quali- repercussions of his decision. Washington employs derstood the Whether war- He stated: personnel fied to execute

rant. I a lot of in Mr. Mestel confidence They Savage over there. going

and Mr. II trying pre- living. that for a I am do myself I pare my part in the trial and Campbell that a defendant contends togeth- trying get my to relax head am right capital case can never waive the Spokane I will be going er.... feel like jury. empanelling We presence at My a real time will be inconvenience.... could, Campbell disagree. We hold that prepare I limited and will not be able to did, right present during his to be waive things working right I am now. It is jury. empanelling of the my stay decision to here Snohomish County I accomplish so that can that. A judge The state trial considered the matter pub- to the inordinate amount of local Due day Campbell further the next and informed charges against licity generated by the presence empanel- that his waiver at the trial, Campbell pending and his would, effect, ling jury irrevoca- be jury be trial court ordered that the selected difficulty getting Campbell due to the ble Courthouse, Spokane County at the loca- Spokane Camp- changed he his mind. County 275 miles east the Snohomish tion pres- stated that he bell still wished waive selected, jury was Courthouse. Once ence. The court concluded that there was County transported to for the Snohomish “good Campbell’s request cause” honor 21,1982, Campbell's trial. October attor- On Campbell impor- because felt he had more Campbell ney told the court that wanted to things in preparing tant to do for trial. The jury presence his at the selection and waive honoring request stated court also County. to remain in Snohomish Counsel “justifiеd by difficulty expense Campbell “legitimate had stated that fears” security means that have to be treatment he would receive from as to the transport us him taken to afford and the Spokane, prisoners and other officers security during any jury the course of selec- stay Campbell preferred “to Snohom- [in foreign county.” in a tion County] and on the trial ish concentrate future.” following executed the written *9 right present waiver of his to be at the objected immediately, prosecutor ex- The empanelling jury: of the Campbell pressing the concern was game, Campbell’s pro- being that he has playing a and that The defendant advised right Spokane posed was to create an an absolute to travel to waiver a tactic issue n jury judge' present during the appeal. The then addressed be the selection of satisfy guilt penalty phases the Campbell personally to himself that to sit in doing.1 by not Campbell knew what he was this cause of action and mindful that transcript day. Appendix Refer to A for the this hearing hearing following and the conducted the

671 1486, (1985) attending jury proceedings curiam). selection he 84 L.Ed.2d (per 486 precluded challenging By pleading guilty will be forever from charge, to a an accused persons impaneled may those his counsel or right jury trial, waive the to a right contesting composition, knowingly, self-incrimination, its against right and the intelligently voluntarily waives his Alabama, Boykin confront witnesses. v. 395 right present 238, to be to allow him to remain 243, 1709, 1712, U.S. 89 S.Ct. 23 L.Ed.2d County in prep- Snohomish to continue his (1969); States, 274 McCarthy v. United 459, aration for trial. 466, 1166, 1171, U.S. 89 S.Ct. 22 L.Ed.2d (1969). orally agreed open further in court right to waive his to raise an ineffective Campbell argues right pres to be assistance of counsel claim connected with may ent not capital be waived in a case. right present. the waiver of the to be Al Campbell nineteenth-century relies on two though prosecution preferred to have this Supreme Court support decisions to aspect agreement writing, additional of the in proposition. Utah, Hopt In v. 110 U.S. judge trial the oral found waiver on (1884), 4 S.Ct. 28 L.Ed. 262 the Court Cf., the record in court was sufficient. Wash. power held that it was not within the of the R.Sup.Ct. CR 2A. accused or his statutory counsel to waive a requirement presence the trial. B States, 370, 372, 13 Lewis v. United 146 U.S. person charged felony A awith has a 136, 137, (1892), S.Ct. 36 L.Ed. 1011 right present every fundamental to be found, Court held that “aftér the indictment Allen, stage of trial. Illinois v. 397 U.S. nothing shall be done absence 337, 338, 1057, 1058, 90 S.Ct. 25 L.Ed.2d 353 prisoner.” (1970). right present This includes the to be These authorities do compel the result empanelling jury. at the voir dire and Campbell urges. States, In Diaz v. United States, 442, 455, Diaz v. United 223 U.S. 442, 455, 250, 254, 223 U.S. 32 S.Ct. 56 L.Ed. (1912). 250, 254, 56 L.Ed. 500 (1912), distinguished the Court between right presence derives from the Confron capital noncapital cases and cus- between tation Clause of the Sixth Amendment and defendants, todial and stating noncustodial the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth that the courts Fourteenth Amendments. United States v. regarded an accused who is in custo- 522, 526, Gagnon, 470 U.S. 105 S.Ct. dy charged capital and one who is with a curiam). (per 84 L.Ed.2d 486 incapable waiving as right; offense rights A defendant’s under one, presence because his or absence is waived, may provided Constitution such control, not within his own and the other voluntary, knowing, waiver is intelligent. because, being usually addition to Zerbst, 458, 464, Johnson v. 304 U.S. 58 S.Ct. custody, he is deemed to suffer the con- 1019, 1023,82 L.Ed. 1461 Character naturally apprehen- straint incident to an right presence ization of the as “funda penalty sion of the awful that would follow analysis. mental” adds little to the A defen conviction. dant rights waive such fundamental The Court held that a defendant who was silent, Arizona, right to be Miranda v. custody charged capital neither nor with a 436, 444, 1602, 1612, 384 U.S. 86 S.Ct. right pres- offense was free to waive the (1966); counsel, right L.Ed.2d 694 by voluntarily absenting ence himself. Id. Johnson, supra; California, Faretta v. analysis U.S. 95 S.Ct. expanded Snyder L.Ed.2d 562 This (1975); trial, Massachusetts, right present to be at the States,

Taylor 17, 19-20, 332, (1934), v. United capital 78 L.Ed. 674 case *10 194, 195-96, (1973); 94 S.Ct. 38 L.Ed.2d 174 privilege which the Court observed that the right present and the presence “may by be at a conference be lost consent or at judge juror, between the and a by Finally, United States times even in misconduct.” Illi Gagnon, 522, 529, 1482, Allen, 337, 342, v. 470 U.S. 105 S.Ct. nois v. 90 S.Ct.

672 (1970), disruptive by be cannot 25 L.Ed.2d 353 the Court waived behavior be [Hopt freely dicta in by petition broad and an affirmative waived made “[t]he

stated in a trial can never continue Lends judgment. ]that on informed The state based expressly been re- have correctly refusing defendant’s absence trial judge observed accepted stated that it jected.” The Court might'be Campbell’s request “an invitation to may right that a defendant lose the instead get ungovernable be back [to sent Sno- by consent present at trial or miscon- to be County].” A rational decision to homish 342-43, at 1060-61. Id. at duct. right waive the constitutional is entitled to weight imputed by as a same waiver' argues that Campbell further Bustamante disruptive Camp- conduct. We conclude that (9th Cir.1972), 269 dic- Eyman, v. 456 F.2d capable waiving right bell was be his right not waive to be tates that he could present jury. Bustamante, empanelling at the of the jury present at selection. attorney had waived pres- defendant’s tape recording of his when a was ence client C at

replayed jury. for Id. 271. We re- A relin waiver an “intentional versed, suggesting right both that could right quishment of a known waived, not, or abandonment right not be had Zerbst, privilege.” 304 fact, Johnson v. U.S. been waived: 1019, 1023, 464, 58 82 L.Ed. S.Ct. 1461 custody appellant capital Since was (1938). finding knowing and volun was not and his absence necessitat- offense tary question is a mixed of law behavior, waiver we disruptive ed hold that he not, fact we review de Terrovona not, which novo. v. right waive to* indeed could his did (9th Kincheloe, Cir.1988). F.2d 427 852 present courtroom at trial. Fur- be in the thermore, legal ultimate issue voluntariness is there is evidence that he question attempted right. requiring independent to waive this'- He federal even de Fulminante, voluntarily right have could not waived this termination. Arizona v. replayed, 1246, 1252, tape was because it before U.S. not even this appears that he was aware of L.Ed.2d 302 year replay until almost a later. Neither indulge every must We reasonable attempted that he is there evidence presumption against the loss constitu gained knowledge right after he waive present stage right tional tó be a critical at it. Allen, trial. at 90 S.Ct. at compelling.2 is not The dicta of Bustamante Still, difficulty concluding we have no 1061. right Had there been convinced that the ‍‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‍we voluntarily, that Campbell knowingly, and in waived, absolutely not be not we would could telligently right presence at waived any analysis of engaged in whether a jury. empanelling of the authority had More recent waiver occurred. today. holding supports our We held remaining Thé notion Snohomish Raines, (9th F.2d Brewer v. County jury empanelled while the was Cir.1982), knowing, that a defendant’s volun- Spokane County originated Campbell. with tary, intelligent absence from his trial attorneys Neither his own nor the Snohomish right acts as a waiver of confrontation. County Prosecuting Attorney sought to de- prive Campbell right of his to attend the limit principled There is no basis for Spokane. Campbell’s noncapital proceedings attor- offenses a defendant’s abili ney ty voluntarily, opposed Mark Mestel3 was to the deci- knowingly, intelligently sion, right Campbell Nor presence. opposing waive the do we find but believed right may already fragile logic proposition in the the issue would undermine an represented phrase 2. To the could was Mr. Mestel and extent that "indeed may interpreted holding not” as a Anthony Savage Savage trial. Mr. conflicts, today decision we en our note that an prior Campbell's execution of consulted existing banc court overrule Ninth Circuit right jury present to be waiver of the selection. Inc., Co., Skaggs precedent. See LeVick Cir.1983). (9th F.2d *11 relationship. open jury. Correctly professional anticipating Twice Campbell that court, Campbell discussed his decision to claim attorneys that his were ineffec- spoke directly He presence. allowing with the tive him to presence, waive waive his judge. Campbell signed prosecutor secured, court, his trial written in open Camp- being fully any that after informed his bell’s waiver of claim waiver that counsel was deprive opportunity him of allowing absence would an deficient in him pres- to his waive attorneys jury jury on to advise his selection mat- ence at selection.4 never We have ad- ters, ability impair to his communicate with dressed whether a defendant waive the attorneys, preclude chang- his him right to claim ineffective assistance of coun- travelling Spokane his mind and to after We that question sel. reserve for another jury began. day, selection There has never been Campbell’s because counsels’ assistance ineffective, any suggestion Campbell incompe- despite that was was not the waiver. to tent execute the waiver. The terms of the prevail To that the claim his unambiguous. waiver are written they counsel were ineffective because allowed Campbell presence jury to during waive

D process, Campbell selection must demon (1) Campbell's The nature waiver of strate that counsel “made errors so seri right presence provides his that functioning another basis ous counsel was as the supporting guaranteed our conclusion. Criminal defen ‘counsel’ the defendant agreements Amendment,” to make dants entitled Sixth that “the defi n rights. performance prejudiced affect their constitutional Newton v. cient the defense.” 386, 393, Rumery, 668, 687, Washington, Strickland v. 466 U.S. (1987). 2052, 2064, 94 L.Ed.2d 405 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 674 proper attorney perfor for standard Campbell express entered an into “reasonably mance is that of effective assis agreement rights to his waive constitutional tance.” Id. The defendant must therefore exchange permission remain Sno representation show that he received County and homish attend to matters he objective below “fell an standard of reason important. deemed more The terms ableness.” Id. at at 2064. S.Ct. agreements written and oral made bar he his rights constitutional claim. The fundamental performance Our review counsel’s Campbell afforded highly the Constitution do not deferential. Id. 104 S.Ct. at “ consequences relieve him ‘from the оf his 2065. We will second-guess neither counsel’s Adamson, voluntary decisions, apply twenty-twenty choice.’” Ricketts v. nor the fabled 1, 8, hindsight. “A vision fair assessment (1987) (quoting attorney performance L.Ed.2d requires every Adamson Rick ef (9th Cir.1986) etts, (Brunet 722, 740 789 F.2d distorting fort be made to ef eliminate the ti, J., dissenting)). hindsight, fects reconstruct the circum conduct, challenged

stances counsel’s per to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s Ill spective at the time.” Id. Campbell claims that he received ineffec- tive assistance of trial Applying principles, counsel because his these we have lawyers permitted Campbell difficulty concluding Campbell waive did right present empanelling at the not receive ineffective of trial assistance morning judge Campbell, 4. On the of October the court con- asked addressed him Campbell’s accepted incompe- sidered and "willing waiver of his he was waive claim of right present jury tency to be while [a] selected. counsel as result of waiver?” Appendix prosecutor explained Campbell A. The was careful to limit his waiver to the process, agreed he believed jury the written waiver should contain a waive selection dealing specific only clause future claim of ineffec- ineffective assistance claim prosecutor requested tive right present. assistance. The waiver of his to be The court writing objections waive in “all future ruled that the waiver need not be reduced competency writing. to be raised as to of counsel.” *12 674 right limited the factors and circumstances the his he decided to waive when

counsel jury mitigation. jury empanelling. dis- could consider The. presence hearing a at which both court trict conducted attorneys, Mark Mestel Campbell’s trial A Campbell in- Savage, testified. Anthony Washington’s death Campbell claims jury days before se- several formed Mestel imposes mandatory death penalty statute that he did not want attend. began lection argues penalty formula. that the statute He waiving against him his Mestel counseled balancing an test that impermissible creates Campbell emphatic presence. was right of jury making individual- prevents the ftom issue, prior from Mestel knew .of the The ized determination sentence. unlikely Campbell was experience that provides.that the sentence shall be statute Camp- honored change mind. Mestel “beyond jury death finds a reasonable request, on his conclusion that based bell’s mitigating not doubt that there are sufficient professional could maintain a way he leniency.” to merit circumstances Wash.Rev. Campbell to refrain relationship was 10.95.060(4). Code Section 10.95.070 allows against Campbell’s personal advocating from authority “any sentencing consider County stay during in Snohomish decision to deciding question relevant factors”

jury selection. mitigating provides a non-exclusive list of court concluded counsel’s district leniency. merit factors that could not representation was ineffective. We capi motivated agree. Mestel’s decision Individualized determination preserving a harmoni- legitimate constitutionally required. concerns sentencing tal Carolina, Campbell. 280, relationship with working We ous North U.S. 96 Woodson nothing representation (1976); in Mestel’s see L.Ed.2d 944 Roberts v. S.Ct. objective Louisiana, stan- Campbell falls below an 428 U.S. 96 S.Ct. .that per- (1976). are also explained We dard reasonableness. L.Ed.2d 974 As the Court that, against argued Woodson, Mestel al- suaded had pres- right of lowing Campbell to waive the process significance that accords no [a] ence, resolving we be here whether relevant facets of character record Campbell’s counsel were ineffective circum- of the individual offender or the County letting stay in him Snohomish particular stances of the offense excludes events, prepare trial. That course of we for in fixing consideration ultimate believe, greater presented a far would have possibility com- punishment of death relationship undermining the between risk of passionate mitigating stemming or factors Campbell his counsel. To the extent from the humankind. diverse frailties of forced to choose between that Mestel was Woodson, at 2991. S.Ct. evils, profession- agree his choice was two we sentencing sche Under the individualized ally justified. ma, the Court has struck statutes that down mandatory of death provide sentence IV crime, upon particular of a even if conviction Washington’s Campbell claims death Shuman, defined, narrowly Sumner v. 10.95, statute, is un- penalty Wash.Rev.Code 66, 107 (1987), U.S. L.Ed.2d 56 arguments: He makes three constitutional. that limit the kinds of as well statutes First, argues statute Campbell that the cre- mitigating sentencing circumstances the au formula, mandatory death sentence ates Ohio, consider, thority may Lockett v. preventing determina- thereby individualized 57 L.Ed.2d 973 tion; second, argues he that the statute fails provide appropriate reliable standards argument authority Campbell’s that Wash. sentencing to determine for the mandatory death penalty; and Rev.Code 10.95 сreates impose whether to Supreme third, has no argues penalty trial formula merit. court’s requirement repeatedly has held jury unconstitutionally “[t]he Court instructions to the sentencing capital of individualized cases is provide cause it fails to the sentencing au- *13 by allowing jury thority satisfied the to consider all with appropriate an and reliable stan- mitigating Blystone relevant evidence.” v. dard for determining impose whether to the 299, 307, Pennsylvania, penalty. death The district court determined (1990) (footnote 1078, 1083, Campbell 108 L.Ed.2d 255 had raised this claim in his omitted) (rejecting challenge penalty petition to death first and that claim was barred. preclude statute that did not the sentencer Controlling weight may be ac considering any type mitigating evi prior corded to the denial of a petition for dence); Boyde California, 494 U.S. “(1) corpus habeas ground where the same 374-77, 1190, 1194-96, 108 110 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d presented in subsequent application was (1990) (rejecting challenge pen to death adversely determined applicant on the alty providing you statute that “[i]f conclude (2) prior application, prior determination aggravating that the outweigh circumstances merits, was on the justice the ends of circumstances, mitigating you shall im would not be reaching served the merits death”). pose a sentence of subsequent application.” Sanders v. opening issue, In his brief on this filed States, 1, 15, United 373 U.S. 83 S.Ct. 1989, Campbell relied on Adamson v. Rick 10 L.Ed.2d 148 Sanders sub etts, (9th Cir.1988), 865 F.2d 1042-43 9(b) stantially reflects Rule of the Rules Gov proposition for the that a statute with lan erning Corpus Proceedings. Habeas Rule guage similar to that of Wash.Rev.Code 10.95 9(b) provides, part, that “[a] second or case, In unconstitutional. we held petition may successive dismissed language impose ... “the court shall judge allege finds that' it fails to new or a sentence of death if the court finds one or grounds different prior relief and the aggravating more of the circumstances ... determination was on judge the merits.” A mitigating there are no circum may also single dismiss a successive claim sufficiently stances substantial to call for le particular petition. within a niency” unconstitutional because it created a legal ground presumption asserted here is of death and removed the sen corpus new. In his 1985 petition, habeas tencing judge’s discretion. Id. In Walton v. Campbell urged Arizona, that the 639, 651-52, statute was uncon stitutional adequately because it failed to (1990), 111 L.Ed.2d 511 this hold guide jury channel and ing discretion. He now overturned.5 The Court reiterated language “appropriate uses the that the reliable requirements Constitution’s are sat standard.” And he has shifted provision the focal allowing isfied the sentencer point argument: petition, of his in his first he mitigating consider factors. Id. relied on the instruction based on Wash.Rev. already We have held that Wash.Rev.Code 10.95.070, provides Code which a non-exclu 10.95 presumption leniency. creates a sive list of jury relevant factors for the I, 829 F.2d The statute mitigation; consider in now he relies on the does Campbell’s not interfere right jury instruction derived from Wash.Rev.Code an by limiting individualized sentence 10.95.060(4), requires jury to de sentencing discretion of authority. Be- cide whether “there are not sufficient miti jury cause the mitigat- free to consider gating leniency.” circumstances to merit factors, penalty the death statute is not a mandatory formula. analysis, “ground” the Sanders legal granting is “sufficient basis for

B Sanders, sought.” relief 373 U.S. at Campbell argues petitioner S.Ct. at 1077. A does not raise a penalty ground statute is unconstitutional by offering be- new different factual alle- plurality 5. Justice White wrote for a of four on does not state restricted Amendment issue; separately Justice Walton, 673-74, Scalia concurred challenge. 497 U.S. at judgment, stating position that the claim J., (Scalia, concurring). S.Ct. at 3068 that a unlawfully sentencer’s discretion has been arguments. jus- also failed to legal We are demonstrate “ends of gations or that, Campbell’s unpersuaded by argument tice” demand a redetermination. challenging he was petition, in his first statute, petition, in his second he is while V instruction; jury way, challenging the either Campbell’s We next address claims that he jury’s to- the directed under-

the claim is right has been denied to counsel and mean- obligations. standing of its during ingful access to courts collateral *14 argues Rupe, that State 108 Campbell v. proceedings.6 II), 734, (Rupe P.2d 210 Wash.2d 743 1061, 2834, denied, 486 U.S. 108 S.Ct. cert. Campbell he claims that received ineffec- (1988), change of 100 L.Ed.2d 934 effected a tive of counsel and assistance was denied justice” “ends of and that the would law meaningful courts access to the in both his by of issues be served a redetermination proceedings. habeas and federal He 10.95.070. We related Wash.Rev.Code argues attorneys given that his were not Rupe represent II does not disagree. adequate prepare properly time to for the Rather, change law. court intervening collateral attacks on his convictions. He also that, rejected defendant’s claim there “meaningful claims access” to the courts jury. Camp Nor has statute confused сounsel, requires only representation by not persuasive argu presented bell other adequate prepare. time to but The district justice” the “ends of ment to show that performance court held that counsel’s satis- a redetermination of his claim served fied standard enunciated Strickland v. penalty death statute is 668, Washington, 2052, 104 466 U.S. S.Ct. 80 unconstitutional. (1984), Campbell L.Ed.2d 674 and that had meaningful access to the courts. C argues Campbell jury in A unconstitutionally limited the facts structions Supreme recent Court Two decisions jury mitigation. consider could The directly dispose of address and all but instruction, challenged jury taken verbatim Campbell’s second meaningful element of ac 10.95.070,provides Wash.Rev.Code argument. Pennsylvania Finley, cess In v. factors, “any jury may consider relevant 551, 1990, 481 95 U.S. 107 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 539 including eight not limited to” but enumerat (1987),the held that there is consti Court no above, Campbell, ed chal factors. noted right tutional in state pro counsel habeas lenged in his petition. this instruction first 556-57, ceedings. Id. at 107 S.Ct. at 1994. now, however, argues raising He that he is Murray rule in Court reaffirmed this v. First, legal grounds. argues two new he Giarratano, 1, U.S. 10.95.070(2) jury allows the section consid (1989),holding L.Ed.2d 1 that Finley applies only er disturbance if it finds the mental capital cases, in both noncapital and and that “extreme”; to have been and sec influence meaningful to the courts access does not 10.95.070(6) ond, argues that section al he require appointment of counsel. Id. at jury impairment lows the to consider due to at 2271. S.Ct. or defect disease if it was “sub mental stantial.” Finley Because both and Giarratano were legal grounds. Campbell’s not new decided

These are after conviction became correctly Camp- concluded that final must consider district court we whether Lane, 288, 109 challenged Teague previously mitigat- bell had S.Ct. (1989), ing-faetors Campbell prevents appli instruction. cannot 103 L.Ed.2d 334 their ground narrowing Teague, cation to Campbell’s manufacture a new case. specific claim modifiers. also Court that new constitutional to two He has held rules (9th Cir.1992). substantially adopt opinion We of the three- F.2d 1515-1517 II, judge panel these issues. See procedure applied Finley criminal not be retro- 1994. The rule straight- stated is a actively application which direct had precedent; to cases for review forward it broke no completed prior creating ground. to the decision Finley applies retroactively been new at 1075 the new rule. Id. this case. (plurality opinion). If the rules announced in reach regard We the same conclusion with new,

Finley they are not and Giarratano There, to Giarratano. the Court reaffirmed apply to this case. Finley, holding applies capital that it to both

According Teague, noncapital Giarratano, cases. thorough S.Ct. at 2271. A review a case announces a new rule when it principles holdings in the Court’s ground imposes

breaks new a new obli- previous penalty cases led the Court to gation on the States or the Federal Gov- require conclude that “these cases the con put differently, To ernment. case Pennsylvania clusion that the rule of v. Fin announces new rule the result was ley apply differently should in capital by precedent existing dictated at the time *15 10, noncapital cases than in cases.” Id. at the defendant’s conviction final. became added). (emphasis 109 S.Ct. at 2770 It also 301, Teague, 489 U.S. at 109 S.Ct. at 1070 prisoners’ argument dismissed the that the omitted). (citations Finley, the Court right courts, meaningful access to the an right held that the to counsel does not extend Smith, 817, nounced in Bounds v. 430 U.S. 97 post-conviction procedures. Finley, to civil 1491, (1977), S.Ct. required L.Ed.2d 72 555-56, 107 481 U.S. at S.Ct. at 1993-94. In appointment Giarratano, of counsel. conclusion, reaching this the Court stated: 4, U.S. at 109 S.Ct. at 2767. The Court prisoners We have never held that have a explained prisoner’s proposed rule right constitutional to counsel when mount- misreading” on a “rest[ed] of Bounds. Id. upon collateral attacks their convic- We are convinced that Giarratano did not tions, today. and we decline to so hold juris announce a rule of constitutional new right ap- Our eases establish that the to prudence, applica but instead was a direct pointed appeal counsel extends to the first tion existing precedent. and clarification of further_ right, and no think We that since a defendant has no federal con- B right pursuing stitutional to counsel when discretionary appeal on direct review of Campbell’s ineffective assistance of conviction, fortiori, his he has no such Finley counsel claim fails under and Giarra right attacking when a conviction that has tano; Campbell right had no to counsel in his long upon since become final exhaustion of post-conviction proceedi federal and state process. appellate Giarratano, 10, ngs.7 at U.S. S.Ct. (citations 555, 2770; 555-56, 107 Id. at Finley, 107 S.Ct. at 1993 omit at 481 U.S. ted). language unambiguously This indicates at 1993-94. “Since had no constitutional [he] counsel, directly right deprived the Court’s decision follows to he could not be Indeed, prior holdings. from its the Court the effective assistаnce of counsel....” Torna, heavily 586, 587-88, opinion Wainwright relied on its v. Ross v. 455 U.S. Mof 2437, fitt, 1300, 1301, 417 U.S. 94 S.Ct. 41 L.Ed.2d 102 S.Ct. 71 L.Ed.2d 475 (1974), stating analysis Similarly, disposes Campbell’s Giarratano respondent’s meaningful ease “forecloses constitutional contention that access to the 556, 107 Finley, requires appointment claim.” S.Ct. at courts of counsel.8 did, fact, Campbell Washington Supreme 7. claims that the state's termination of 8. The Court appoint Campbell petitioned Evergreen Legal its counsel. Wash- contract with Services one ington Supreme appointment Court for of coun- original requires month before his execution date post- sel both times he decided to initiate state evidentiary hearing to determine whether the proceedings. appointed The court conviction deliberately right state interfered with the to petition, initially the first but counsel for state Campbell right counsel. Because had no when, appoint refused to counsel over three counsel, his claim is without merit. later, Campbell years decided to initiate a second challenge. Campbell's request state second 11-12, Washington Supreme Giarratano, petition. The Court 492 U.S. at 109 S.Ct. at reject appointed directed CampbeFs ineffective counsel and counsel We 2771-72. file, working days, five a memorandum within claim. assistance

demonstrating “that there exists this mat- previously litigated issues not which have ter C potential require sufficient merit further argument is that Campbell’s second court, necessary consideration this required to the courts meaningful access consideration, permit such the issuance of grant supreme court to counsel ade stay.” Campbell asserts that deadline pe post-conviction prepare his quate time meaningful him access to the courts. denied person his first state filed titions. July petition on al restraint Supreme held Court has Supreme peti his Court denied indigent must assure the defendant an “State days just seven July before tion on present his adequate opportunity to claims Campbell’s attor execution. his scheduled Smith, fairly.” Bounds peti habeas neys filed the first federal then 52 L.Ed.2d granted tion, federal court district omitted). Athough Campbell (quotation had July 1985. The stay of execution right meaningful under the counsel petition dismissed the because district court doctrine, counsel, appointed, once access his claims, and Camp unexhausted it contained represent to a was entitled fair chance attorneys petition filed an amended bell’s procedural history Given client. *16 only Despite including exhausted claims. case, Campbell's Washington Supreme claims, Campbell dismissal unexhausted obligation satisfied Court its constitutional in petition a state not file concurrent did personal under Bounds. In his second state raising claims. Camp his unexhausted court action, attorneys CampbeFs restraint raised denied, ultimately petition was federal beFs by the 40 unexhausted claims dismissed petition review this appellate conclud CampbeFs prior court. district Because I, Campbell F.2d in 829 1453 ed 1987. presented counsel had discovered and these Cir.1987). waited, (9th however, Campbell petition, in his claims first federal habeas in counsel order to until late 1988 seek Campbell’s new did not counsel in his claims a second raise unexhausted having to search the record for burden personal petition. restraint state Rather, errors. counsel were claimed afford days alleges already brief the issues Campbell that the Su- ed seven in grant presented CampbeFs petition. his counsel preme Court failed to ade- We sought for quate prepare Campbell times he also note that was aware three time to both years he collateral review. This is not the could raise the unexhausted state case. filing ample a strict deadline claims in state court. He had time in The court- set record, personal regard to his second state which to review the become familiar re- law, 1988, August sought In almost he petition.9 straint one with the and brief the issues year personal peti the district raise in his restraint after we affirmed court’s second I, relief, Campbell strategy if CampbeFs habeas see 829 tion. Even was to denial of 1453, Campbell petitioned Washing- agreed to see if wait this court F.2d unexhausted, him Supreme provide Campbell Court to with coun- claims were ton indeed pursuing adequate prepare, had to assist his unexhausted still time as sel him personal appellate process in a restraint review ended claims second state counsel, Campbell’s his one filed one month before scheduled terminated month before sched- execution, by accompanied amicus Washington Supreme was an re- uled execution. The Court by attorneys. Upon quest this second filed two appointed Washington immediately Appellate appointed request, court counsel. represent Campbell, and Defender Association to filing We therefore do ad- set no deadline. not peti- Campbell's personal 9. As to first restraint CampbeFs his counsel had dress claim that inad- tion, filing there was no strict deadline. Ever- personal equate prepare time to his first restraint represent green Legal agreed Services had petition. Campbell, their with the State but contract was knew, 27, light Campbell proceedings fact that on March and recommended yet prepared evidentiary that counsel be for that these claims had since hearing. court, petition application a reviewed stay were filed first March and the district had been defined his habeas issues evidentiary hearing. court conducted an did not petition, we hold that state court testimony district court Camp- heard from deny Campbell meaningful impos- access counsel, appellate bell’s state trial and as well five-working-day limit which to file three other witnesses. in support a written of these memorandum claims. Campbell argues evidentiary this hearing inadequate. agree. was We do

VI Although Campbell’s attorneys had limited prepare amount of hearing, time to for the Campbell that the court claims district de- they adequately developed the record con adequate evidentiary hearing nied him an on cerning whether received ineffec petition. the claims he asserts his second tive assistance of counsel. The district court He also claims that the district court erred any way ability not in Campbell’s did limit denying application stay. for a These present evidence on or all of his claims. lack claims merit. expedited procedures improper. Such are not corpus proceedings, In habeas an ev Estelle, 880, 895, Barefoot identiary required peti hearing is where the S.Ct. 77 L.Ed.2d 1090 allegations, proved, tioner’s would establish note, regard, Supreme We in this Sain, right to relief. Townsend v. upon hearing Court remarked as follows: 9 L.Ed.2d “The [district] court acted with commendable (1963); Reed, Pilon v. 799 F.2d Van dispatch, holding hearing issuing (9th Cir.1986). evidentiary An opinion denying stay written or other relief hearing required allegations is not days petition within after the second “conclusory wholly specif devoid — *17 Blodgett, U.S. -, -, filed.” In re Maxwell, 1056, ics.” Boehme v. 423 F.2d (1992) 674, 675, 112 S.Ct. 116 669 L.Ed.2d (9th Cir.1970). evidentiary 1058 Nor is an curiam). (per hearing required on issues can that be re prejudiced by Campbell Nor was the dis- by to solved reference the state court record. expedited hearing trict court’s schedule. (9th 1228, Risley, v. 730 F.2d 1233 Bashor holding today Campbell knowingly that Our Cir.), denied, 838, cert. U.S. 105 S.Ct. voluntarily right present waived his to be 137, (1984). 83 L.Ed.2d 77 empanelling jury the obviates the Campbell granted was an evidentia need for evidence on his further whether ry hearing by district court. The Wash absence affected the outcome of trial. ington Supreme Court issued its decision de op- an Campbell The district court extended nying Campbell’s personal petition restraint portunity develop to the factual record on stay motion for a of every required execution March other claim that an evidentia- 23, Campbell, 1989. State v. 112 Wash.2d ry hearing. (1989). 186, morning, 770 P.2d 620 The next Campbell alleges that also he was denied

the federal district court held a status confer present opportunity an evidence on the whether Campbell ence determine intend respect judicial hang- he issues raises with application to file an stay ed for a of execu ing. Campbell We need not address whether petition tion and a for a of writ habeas opportunity additional was entitled to ah corpus. The for execution scheduled present court evidence the district 30, March of March 1989. It clear from the record Campbell deny Counsel for district did him such advised the district court not they opportunity. pending file an application court would for a an decision this Our stay petition morning grant and a appeal habeas on the of a limited remand to the requested purpose conducting March 27. The district court court of district for the Campbell transported court a hearing provides be such us a fall record with See, Campbell controversy “implies existence of disputed present facts. to all

respect Cir.1993) (de- (9th possible parties or adverse whose contentions 992 F.2d 984 Blodgett, v. order). adjudication.” to the court for are submitted of remand nying reconsideration States, v. 219 U.S. Muskrat United Campbell also claims dis 250, (1911) 254, (quot- 31 S.Ct. 55 L.Ed. denying application erred trict court Comm’n, 241, ing F. Ry. In re Pacific stay execution. Where district of for a (C.C.Cal.1887)). justiciable controversy A execution, stay a hut has denied court definite, concrete, real, substantial; it is cause, probable a certificate issued specific subject to Aetna relief. Ins. Co. Life oppor “must then be afforded an petitioner Haworth, 240-41, 227, v. 300 U.S. 57 S.Ct. merits, the court tunity address (1937). 463-64, A 81 L.Ed. 617 contro- merits obligated to decide the appeals is justiciable hypothetical, versy is not it is 893-94, Barefoot, appeal.” abstract, academic, Id. at or moot. Camp at 3395. order to afford 103 S.Ct. If S.Ct. at 463. the relief available would be merits opportunity to address the bell the opinion advising the law “an what would be stay appeal, we issued an indefinite facts,” upon hypothetical the con- This pending appeal. id. is execution troversy justiciable. Id. at is not moot. sue is at 464. argues Campbell’s The State VII non-justiciable he claims because has the challenges constitutionality power to choose a form of execution that Washington pen- hanging under death controversy render moot. A case 10.95.180(1). statute, alty Wash.Rev.Code parties, “by is rendered moot an act of the punishment provides that “[t]he The statute subsequent law.” United States Alaska .by hang- either ... shall inflicted Co., S.S. or, by neck at the election 64 L.Ed. 808 Mootness is caused defendant, injection].” Campbell by [lethal act, potential of a apprehension an judicial questions respect to three raises accepted, logic act. If the were State’s prescribed in the entire universe of claims would be foreclosed statute: future, might, adopt in the because party by hanging execution violates Whether course of action that would moot the contro per Eighth Amendment because se the versy. punishment; unusual cruel and Campbell’s ability *18 The State’s focus on (2) the con- direction injection Whether misplaced. choose lethal In Dear hanged unless he elects lethal States, demned be 73, Wing Jung v. United 312 F.2d 75- punishment; injection (9th is cruel and unusual Cir.1962), rejected argument 76 we government may cloak unconstitu punishments tional in the mantle of “choice.” (3) direction con- Whether voluntary, permanent depar held that We hanged unless he elects lethal demned be ture from the as a United States condition of injection Campbell’s violates First Amend- suspending a either sentence was cruel and rights by compelling exercise him ment free punishment pro unusual or denial due in his participate ‍‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‍own execution avoid escape cess. The condition did not on review hanging. ground could the defendant choose argues claims are that these not The State punishment prison the constitutional reject justiciable. argument, We also, occasions, many term. We Campbell’s specific each of claims. address constitutionality probation considered conditions, well, although in those cases as A chosen to the defendant could have remain judicial power Terrig v. E.g., The exercise of incarcerated. States United Cir.1988) no, (9th (consid 371, F.2d limited to cases and controversies. 838 374 U.S. Const, Ill, concept ering probation § a case condition violated art. 2. The whether

681 barbaric, rights); punishments imposed by First Amendment Unit torturous defendant’s Consuelo-Gonzalez, Stuarts, Furman, 253-55, v. 521 F.2d see ed States 408 at U.S. (9th Cir.1975) 259, (considering J., (Douglas, whether 92 at concurring), 264 S.Ct. 2733-35 (such illegal probation punishments condition violated and to defendant’s as defrock- rights). ing) by Bench, imposed King’s Amendment Fourth see Antho- ny Grannucei, F. “Nor Cruel and Unusual injection, Campbell is able to choose lethal Original Punishments The Inflicted:” not done so. As the State but he has con (1969). Meaning, 839, 57 Cal.L.Rev. 858-60 argument, Campbell oral has ceded at consis way, Either “there is no doubt whatever that tently he maintained that will exercise borrowing language including and in See, power e.g., to choose. State v. Eighth Amendment, Founding our 623; Campbell, 770 P.2d at for Petition Re Fathers-intended to outlaw torture arid other hearing at 15. His refusal to exercise the Furman, punishments.” cruel 408 at U.S. injection option Camp of lethal ensures (Marshall, J., 92 S.Ct. at 2767 concur- by judi will bell's death warrant be fulfilled ring). presents cial hanging. This case therefore dispute parties real between adverse on a historically The Clause has interpret been “ ” definite set facts. We conclude that ed to ‘punishments forbid such of torture’ Campbell’s regarding claims execution disembowelment, beheading, quartering, justiciable. hanging are stake, burning at breaking at the Furman, 264-65, wheel. U.S. at 408 92 S.Ct.

B (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Utah, 130, 135, Wilkerson v. 99 U.S. 25 L.Ed. Campbell claims execution (1878)). Supreme 345 rarely, has Court by hanging per violates se the however, particular addressed whether meth Amendment. We remanded this case to the ods employed country of execution in this are purpose district court the limited of hold unconstitutionally cruel. Judicial evidentiary hearing on this claim. directly was last addressed the Court in findings The factual of the district court will 1878, in specifi Wilkerson. Court there they clearly set aside errone cally. distinguished punish between various Bessemer, City ous. Anderson v. 470 U.S. hanging, of torture and ments traditional 564, 573, 105 1504, 1511, S.Ct. 84 L.Ed.2d 518 execution common law. Wilk method (1985). questions review mixed of fact We erson, 135-37; 99 U.S. at see also In re Spokane, novo. v. law de United States Kemmler, 136 U.S. S.Ct. (9th Cir.1990), cert. F.2d de (1890) — (upholding L.Ed. 519 electrocution as -, nied, S.Ct. execution); method ex Louisiana rel. (1991). questions L.Ed.2d 1053 We review Resweber, 459, 464, Francis 329 U.S. McConney, law de novo. United States v. (upholding 91 L.Ed. 422 (9th Cir.) 1195, 1201 (en banc), 728 F.2d cert. attempt second at electrocution first denied, after death); attempt failed to cause but see Glass L.Ed.2d 46 *19 Louisiana, 1080, 2159, v. 471 U.S. 105 S.Ct. (1985) (Brennan, J., 85 514 L.Ed.2d dissent (1) ing). Eighth prohibits Amendment “cruel punishments.” and language construing unusual Recent the decisions English Rights derives the Bill of of Amendment the focus on sentence whether 1689, ought which states that “excessive bail constitutes “one of ‘those modes or acts of required, not punishment to be nor im- excessive fines that had been considered cruel posed, punishments nor cruel and at time unusual unusual Bill of ” v. Georgia, Rights adopted,’ inflicted.” See Furman 408 v. Kentucky, U.S. was Stanford 238, 243-44, 2726, 2729, 361, 368, 2969, 2974, 92 33 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 492 U.S. 109 S.Ct. 106 (1972) J., (1989) (Douglas, concurring). 346 (quoting The L.Ed.2d 306 v. Ford Wain 399, 405, 2595, proscription punish- wright, cruel unusual 477 106 S.Ct. U.S. 2599, (1986)), ments has been attributed to reaction to 91 L.Ed.2d on 335 and whether 682 (Del.1987). 630, State, evolving contrary to Shields v. 534 A.2d 639 “the punishment states, progress Currently, two Mon decency that mark the standards Dulles, society,” tana, maturing Trop by hanging. v. 356 provide for execution

aof 590, 598, 86, 101, 10.95.180(1); 2 L.Ed.2d 630 78 S.Ct. Mont.Code Wash.Rev.Code U.S. (1987). (1958). dispute 46-21-103(3) no here execu Campbell § There is relies Ann. acceptable the Bill by hanging Coker, was when 584, 2861, tion 433 97 on U.S. S.Ct. Wilkerson, 99 adopted. See Rights Florida, was 782, 102 Enmund v. 458 U.S. S.Ct. at U.S. 133-34. 3368, (1982), proposi 1140 for the 73 L.Ed.2d n exacting tion that the number states when is whether question The more difficult dwindles, given punishment punish contemporary hanging comports with stan- drops constitutional floor. ment beneath the issue, addressing decency. dards officials, nor the state we note neither dictate the Coker and Enmund do not has Campbell, nor our own research revealed Campbell urges. result Those eases concern holding imposition single decision penalty to proportionality of the death by hanging penalty is cruel the death conviction,10 opposed crimes of as to the contemplation punishment within unusual criti method of execution. The distinction is Eighth Amendment. hand, proportionality cal. On the one review hanging whether To determine both of entails examination of actions unusual, unconstitutionally cruel and we look juries sentencing legislatures and of objective factors the maximum extent contemporary determine standards of decen 369, Stanford, U.S. at 109 492 possible. See, Oklahoma, cy. Thompson v. 487 U.S. Georgia, v. 433 (quoting 2974 Coker S.Ct. at 815, 821-22, 2687, 2691-92, 101 108 S.Ct. 2861, 2866, 584, 592, 53 L.Ed.2d 97 S.Ct. U.S. (1988); McCleskey, L.Ed.2d 702 481 U.S. opinion)). Among (plurality these 300, hand, other 107 S.Ct. at 1771. On the by society’s passed elect factors are statutes heavily methodology review focuses more Id., 370, 109 representatives. ed U.S. objective pain evidence of the involved in the McCleskey (citing Kemp, S.Ct. at 2975 See, e.g., challenged method. v. Loui Glass 279, 300, S.Ct. U.S. siana, 1084, 105 471 U.S. at S.Ct. at (1987)). presume that a We L.Ed.2d J., (Brennan, dissenting) (noting that “[f]irst democratically punishment selected among “objective and foremost” factors constitutionally legislature is valid. elected by which should evaluate the constitu courts Georgia, 428 Gregg v. challenged tionality punish of a method may 49 L.Ed.2d 859 “We “ ‘the ment” is whether method involves legislature require the to select the least not ” unnecessary pain.’ infliction of wanton long penalty possible penalty severe so (Citation omitted.))11 The number of states cruelly dispro inhumane or selected is using hanging public percep is evidence portionate to crime involved.” Id. at tion, light pain but on the actual sheds at 2926. may practice. not attend the heavily judicial on the We cannot conclude that relies trend years incompatible evolving among in recent to re with standards of de several states cency simply continue the place hanging other methods of execu because few states See, tion, injection. e.g., chiefly practice.12 De lethal penalty dispro grossly proportion must not be out of held that Coker (Citations omitted.)); rape. severity see portionate to 433 U.S. at crime." the crime of States, penalty also Weems v. United 373- 97 S.Ct. at 2866. Enmund held that *20 74, 544, 551-52, (1910). aiding disproportionate 54 793 to the crime of and 30 S.Ct. L.Ed. was resulting abetting robbery U.S. a in murder. 458 evolving 12. Another of cases addresses stan line 797, at at 102 S.Ct. 3376. decency prison dards context condi of the of 173, prisoners' Gregg, U.S. S.Ct. 2925 tions and medical needs. Estelle v. 428 at 96 at 11. Cf. Gamble, 97, 102-06, 285, (consideration of a of 429 U.S. 97 S.Ct. 290- of the excessiveness form 92, (1976) “First, (holding aspects: punish- that deliber punishment 50 L.Ed.2d 251 has two prisoners’ unnecessary ate medical needs ment not and wan- indifference must involve the Second, Ray, punishment); Hoptowit punishment v. pain. cruel and unusual ton infliction of

683 ¶ VI.G.3.a(3)(d). We do not consider to be The rope is boiled and then simply cruel and unusual because it causes elasticity. stretched to eliminate of most its death, pain or because there some rope Id. The is then coated with wax oil or with death. “Punishments are associated easily. so that it will slide Id. The Instruc- they lingering or cruel when death_” involve torture a provides diagram tion knotting rope a Kemmler, (Attachment In re B.) U.S. properly. Id. L.Ed. 10 S.Ct. Washington employs “long-drop” a method Constitution, implies As in the used “cruel” hanging, of in which the condemned is barbarous, “something inhuman and some dropped particular distance based on the thing than extinguishment more the mere of prisoner’s weight. provides The Instruction against cruelty life.” Id. “The which the determining a chart for the distance of the protects Constitution a convicted man is cru ¶ VI.G.3.a(2). drop. Field at Instruction elty punishment, of inherent the method purpose drop, The of the as set out in more necessary suffering in any not the involved below, detail ensure that forces to the extinguish employed method life humane are optimized rapid neck structures to cause Resweber, ly.” at unconsciousnеss and death. Campbell is entitled to an execution unnecessary “the free of and wanton The district court heard live and deposition pain.” Gregg infliction v. Georgia, of 428 testimony pathologists from several oth- and 153, 173, 2925, 49 U.S. 96 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d specific er knowledge hang- witnesses with of (1976) (plurality opinion). judicial ings, testimony and otherwise. The issues, focused on including several does argue punish- not that the causing mechanisms and unconsciousness ment disproportional of death is to the judicial hanging; death the effect of crimes of he which was convicted. Our focus factors, including length various is therefore on whether execu- the method of drop, elasticity of the rope, place- and the unnecessary tion involves the wanton and knot; ment risks death pain. infliction of We hold it does not. asphyxiation decapitation, opposed by injury vascular, spinal, death ner- (2) functions; and Westley vous execution by hanging ligature Death occurs when a Dodd, according Allan conducted encircling tightened by the neck is Washington protocol. weight body. Pathologists distinguish accidental, types hangings: between four testifying pathologists described vari- suicidal, homicidal, judicial. ac- Suicides by judicial ous death mechanisms involved in majority count hangings, for the vast but (1) hanging. These include: occlusion of the they generally employ do not meth- same (2) arteries, carotid occlusion the vertebral judicial ods as hanging. are used (3) arteries, veins, (4) jugular occlusion of the (5) Washington judicial hanging arrest, conducts ac- reflexive cardiac occlusion of the (6) cording transection, airway, tearing, trauma, to Field Instruction 410.500 WSP or (hereafter Instruction”), (7) cord, “Field spinal sepa- a detailed shock to the fracture or (8) methodology Army Regu- column, derived from U.S. spinal ration of the cervical inter- 633-15, (9) Military lation ruption process, No. Procedure for of the odontoid irre- (1959).' Washington Executions Under the damage. versible brainstem These various can, protocol, rope do, probably must be three- between mechanisms occur quarters concert; one-and-one-quarter thus, single “pathway” inches there is by judicial diameter. Field hanging. Instruction And as re- (9th Cir.1982) (holding ap 682 F.2d directly liberate indifference” standard deficiency plicable proportionality medical care in the either to to methodol See, Penitentiary ogy questions. State Chapman, reflected deliberate indiffer- Rhodes 346-47, prisoners, ence to serious medical needs of experts but (noting that standards of care set medical L.Ed.2d 59 conclusion described an ideal level care than a rather deliberate indifference a different rests on factual care). proportionality). constitutional minimum level of "de- determination from that of *21 England per- testifying a two. in pathologists the foot or Executioners of of one search indicates, legendary “hangman’s frac- the in the drop sisted with short nineteenth the long- the common routes to century, developed of less Irish ture” is one while the a and up death.13 drop employing drops unconsciousness of to seven- method Ryk Ra- generally teen feet. See James & that, gener- in The evidence demonstrates Nasmyth-Jones, The chel Cer- Occurrence vascular, of spinal, al, interruption of or nervous Hang- vical Judicial Fractures in Victims above by the mechanisms listed functions ing, Forensic Science Int’l 85-91 unconsciousness and death. rapid results (1992). 1880s, English the the the studied Reay example, Dr. Donald testified For drop, long merits the and relative short causes of the carotid arteries alone occlusion drop long more humane. and concluded a was to ten a within six loss consciousness Appointed to Report of the Committee Similarly, Dr. Ross Zumwalt tes- seconds.14 Inquire Capital into the Execution of Sen- upper the severe trauma to tified a (1886). tences cause an instantaneous loss spinal cord would very rapid and loss of life. of consciousness drop is critical to Appropriate distance hand, pathway sole in- the On the other conducting judicial in the hu- hanging most airway, conscious- is occlusion the volved way possible. drop mane If is too short may a minute. Dr. persist over ness weight the prisoner, relation (“Ryk”) testified that uncon- Deryk James likely result death is from mechanism solely asphyxiation due sciousness occlusion; is, airway condemned a minute and minute-and-a- take between long in asphyxiate. drop will If the is too half, longer than two minutes. but no from weight, death result relation predict Although way with a there extremes, decapitation. Between these two accuracy of the high degree of which various drop lengths highly likely are to cause death contribute unconscious- mechanisms will vascular, spinal, and some combination any given hanging, there ness mechanisms. ensures that the nervous This increasing the likelihood that methods of mat- condemned loses consciousness within a rapid com- will be and death unconsciousness rapidly ter thereaf- of a few seconds diеs among paratively painless. these is Chief pro- Washington ter. The Field Instruction length drop. of the appropriate drop lengths on vides based always involve did not Judicial weight rapid cause unconsciousness testified, Anglo- drop. As Dr. James death. century placed a in the eleventh Normans bringing A important factor second condemned, the neck of noose around painless about a swift and death is the selec- beam, rope over a slung the other end rope. tion and treatment of the Later, person up. execution- and hauled the three-quar- beam, rope uses of a diameter between to reach the and the ers used ladders one-and-one-quarter ters inches. up ladder and condemned would led presented evidence court indi- practice drop- it. district “turned off’ then ligature very cates that a slender is more ping distance did not the condemned some skin, century. eighteenth prone increasing late At to break the develop until the short, first, partial complete drop very decapitation. no more than chances of or Nasmyth-Jones, process, Ryk & The Oc- of the odontoid which is more 13. James Rachel ration Fractures in Victims Judi- likely injury. currence Cervical to cause cord Hanging, 54 Science Int'l cial Forensic generally “Hangman's fracture” refers Reay's findings Dr. are based research dislocation or fracture of the second to a cervical hold,” involving sleeper "carotid vertebra, separation of and third cervical by pressure blocked arteries are process. Id. Drs. James Nas- odontoid person positioned arm and forearm of behind myth-Jones the remains of cervical studied witness, subject. Boyd Another Dr. Ste- spines executed between 1882 of 34 criminals phens, testified that of the carotid ar- occlusion They Great Britain. found fractures and 1945 in probably of con- teries alone would cause loss cases, (19%) six four of which were crack-like sciousness within 15 to seconds. causing displacement perhaps little fractures sepa- injury, no cord and two of which involved *22 likely ligature is less to do so. cause of A thicker the Dodd’s death was massive treating importantly, by rope hemorrhaging occurring the More at the base of the elasticity, Washington protocol the reduce arteries, brain tears in the vertebral energy by guarantees the caused “energy kinetic and the wave was delivered to drop quickly will transferred to cord, namely, the be and spinal spinal the shock.” Dr. structures, neck rather Reay borne the than opinion stated his that Dodd became Finally, simply being rope. absorbed unconscious within a matter of seconds of treating rope dropped. the surface reduce being . easily allows rope

surface friction to slide tighten about the neck. Several witness- (3) applying pressure es testified that all the Campbell challenges several of the way important neck around the was an factor evidentiary district court’s rulings. Wé re causing rapid unconsciousness.15 view the district evidentiary rulings court’s A bearing third factor on whether uncon- for abuse of discretion. United States v. rapid painless sciousness and Catabran, (9th Cir.1988). 836 F.2d positioning Washing- is the of the knot. protocol specifies positioning ton the knot The district court-excluded several items of position ear. by Campbell below the left This subaural evidence offered to show that energy drop judicial hangings ensures that from the is trans- “bungled” been spinal past, resulting ferred to structures decapitation either or as- likely phyxiation. carotid and vertebral arteries will be by the Evidence excluded dis- (1) placing occluded. The evidence showed that trict court photos included several of the (submentally) the knot below the chin 1901 New Mexico execution of “Black Jack” energy Ketchum, spinal clearly also transfer showing structures. that Ketehum was (2) decapitated; newspaper two accounts of Washington judicial has conducted one Quinn execution Richard stat- hanging according to Field Instruction. ing Quinn “pleaded was asphyxiated January Washington On executed pitifully with up attendants to take him and Westley Allan Dodd. district court (3) spring drop again”; the former testi- testimony heard extensive related to the con- mony who, Duffy, late Clinton as war- duct of the execution and mechanisms Quentin California, den prison of San wit- contributing to Dodd’s death. At the State’s judicial hanging nessed a which resulted in request, Brady Dr. William witnessed Dodd’s asphyxiation; and a collection research pronounced execution and Dodd’s death. Dr. Jr., compiled by Espy, materials Watt detailr Brady testified dating from executions the 1600s. body dropped through [w]hen Mr. Dodd’s trap there simply signifi- door was no Federal Rule of'Evidence 401 defines rele- activity, twisting, cant there no turn- vant evidence as that‘which tends make ing, swinging. carefully I observed his of consequence existence a fact more chest and and I believe that abdomen probable or less than it would bе without the there was one minimal at inspiration, effort permits evidence. Rule 403 the exclusion in, that, breathing following within grounds preju- relevant evidence on the seconds, several there have been dice, issues, misleading qualities, confusion of small inspiratory second action. delay. Having found that Brady Dr. body specific judicial then watched Dodd’s for protocol hang- relies on ing, between 60 and He seconds-. then en- district court excluded evidence approach tered the execution reliably compared Washing- chamber could body pronounce Reay per- Dr. death. ton’s method. The district court excluded autopsy formed an hangings Dodd. He concluded evidence for which there was no example, pathologists Application 15. For pressure as several of sciousness. sufficient testified, pressure applied single ato carotid two or more arteries causes unconscious- artery, compensate the other arteries will for the ness. flow, person loss of and the will not lose con- *23 shifting as basis for the the records cannot serve weight prisoner, of the account of rope. showing that the drop, proof the width of the absent burden of length the of potential party on notice of the records’ was that, argues for some of Campbell — denied, litigation), cert. relevance offered, accounts he “bungled” execution the -, 1567, 118 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. could available or be was information certain Campbell on this basis to shift is not entitled instance, For the estimated. or deduced proof of to the state officials. the burden approxima permit rough photos Ketehum Second, could, did, Campbell present perhaps length drop the of tion of the tending offi to undermine the state evidence rope. Such evidence could the the width of by asphyxi that argument cials’ either Rule 401. admitted under arguably have been impossible decapitation ation or is all but not, however, abuse its court did The district Washington protocol. That Wash under the excluding the evidence under discretion only one un ington performed has execution court committed no The district Rule 403. protocol Campbell the state der its left its under our concluding that role error in exactly footing with officials on the same ju to determine whether order was remand respect proof of effective the method’s only performed it is hanging as dicial say Campbell was ness. cannot We punishment. unusual Washington is cruel and unfairly by the district court’s prejudiced required to court not consid The was district judicial of other refusal to admit evidence marginal relation hangings er evidence hangings. Washington pro according to the hanging persuaded that the were tocol. Even we argues the dis Campbell also admitted, have been we should evidence admitting Reay’s trict erred Dr. court prejudice The district no here. would find sleeper testimony related to the “carotid that, it considered even had court concluded sleeper involves hold.” The “carotid hold” evidence, findings its ultimate proffered by applying pressure the carotid arteries changed. have been would not lodging subject’s upper neck between the argues that he not be Campbell should person performing arm and forearm the proof so difficult burden saddled with occluded, airway is not be the hold. The of evi- paucity is extreme there because in the of the bent arm. The cause is crook by meeting established the criteria dence by oc sleeper causes unconsciousness hold He asserts that limita- district court. cluding Campbell ar the carotid arteries. by him imposed the district court leave tions testimony gues irrelevant because was one, execution, sample of the Dodd with a judicial the hold bears resemblance to prove his ease that with which hanging. argue, did The state officials not agree. unnecessarily painful. not We do however, sleeper hold is akin to First, argues that. to the extent judicial testimony hanging. demonstrat The destroyed spoliated or the State has long subject conscious ed how remains evidence, he misconstrues the record. when carotid are occluded. arteries failure, recently, to conduct au- until State’s its district court did not abuse discretion prisoners topsies judicially hanged is nei- admitting testimony purpose. for this spoliation nor the ther the destruction States, Campbell argues v. the district See Akiona United evidence.16 Cir.1991) (9th (destruction excluding any related court erred evidence F.2d regard, Campbell’s Bigelow Corp., on Motors 451 U.S. this reliance Inc., (1981), Pictures, accepting impre- 68 L.Ed.2d v. RKO Radio (1946), damages misplaced. proof partly due cise to the nature 90 L.Ed. 652 damages, obviously conspiracy of business an issue absent That case involved an antitrust n premised exception prevented plaintiffs showing is also on first-run films. case. The having damages possi- plaintiff evidence Although proof of established other no direct ble, rely wrongdoer. Bigelow pro- jury that the defendant is a Court held that could proof shifting damages where vides no basis for the burden of circumstantial evidence nature, scope prevented broadening sim- wrongs, by of admissible evidence their defendants' precise proof prove ply damages. explained because there is limited evidence As Co., petitioner's theory. Chrysler Payne Court in J. Truett Inc. injection. judicial hanging, lethal The remand We hold that execution conduct- Instruction, under which the district court conducts ed under the Field order evidentiary provided hearing unnecessary ed the does involve wanton and evidentiary hearing pain, was to limited infliction of and therefore does not vio- *24 hanging is cruel unusu- Eighth of whether late the Amendment. issue interpret- punishment. The district court al order it was precisely ed our remand as C response issue

intended. The we address judicial Campbell’s hang- claim is to whether Campbell claims that his First and Washington to ing according protocol the rights by Amendment are violated unnecessary inflic- involves the and wanton provision statutory that allows him to pain. tion of The relative merits of lethal by injection death lethal by elect rather than injection question. are irrelevant to this reject hanging. claims. We both these Campbell’s challenge First Amendment premised on the Free Exercise He Clause. religious contends his preclude that beliefs ju findings The district entered that participating any him from in his level own according to the dicial conducted execution, that infring- these beliefs are Washington Field Instruction is cruel not upon by 10.95.180, ed Wash.Rev.Code punishment. unusual The found court injection allows him to elect lethal avoid bringing mechanisms involved by judicial hanging. death judicial death in about unconsciousness and extremely rapidly, hanging occur that uncon infringement upon We see no Campbell’s likely sciousness to be or was immediate of religious free exercise beliefs. We seconds, of within a matter and that death agree Campbell providing that a statute rapidly would follow thereafter. The court for choice two execu between methods of by decapitation tion, found that risk of death one uncon constitutional'and other negligible, hanging according and that stitutional, place might impermissible an bur protocol lingering.death, does not involve den on the free of exercise the asserted mutilation, unnecessary or the and wanton Dep’t beliefs. See Frazee v. Illinois Em of no pain. infliction of We find error in these 829, 832, ploy. Security, 489 U.S. fully findings. supports The evidence L.Ed.2d This is findings fact. not, district court’s however, the situation here. charges First,

Campbell judicial hanging po- required Campbell is not to make unacceptable causing an risk participate ses death choice or to the selection of decapitation. asphyxiation employed either or re- be We the method to his execution. refuse, ject argument. Campbell absolutely to es- silent failed He remain participate that the risk of result more tablish either election. The statute slight.17 provides imposition than He has failed to penalty also demon- for presence slight by hanging, require strate that risk of and does not him decapitation asphyxiation Second, judicial or renders choose the method his execution. above, hanging unconstitutionally today cruel. reiter- judi- We as described we hold painless is not hanging, according ate entitled to a cial as conducted execution, purposeful protocol, but one free of is not ah unconstitu- Resweber, cruelty. tional method does of execution. statute compel Campbell compromise at 376. need con- The risk accident cannot and not one process right infringement eliminated the execution stitutional avoid the in order to survive constitutional review. another. testimony yield expert compels did not a reliable evidence that the has conclusion risk decapitation estimate of the risk of either through possible as been minimized much as asphyxiation. accept purposes We of this for adoption of the Field Instruction. However, case that a risk such does exist. reject Camp- therefore argues that statu the execution. We

Campbell also claim as moot. an for death lethal bell’s tory option provision pun cruel and unusual injection constitutes IX not, not, and do address need ishment. We injection is a constitutional lethal whether the clerk of this court shall issue When execution, Campbell has consis method case, stay in this of execution mandate option, and tently exercise refused force pending appeal be of further shall injection is uncon lethal does not claim and effect. heavy Campbell faces a burden stitutional. denial of affirm the district court’s We to show existence attempting of habe- Campbell’s petition second a writ to his execution cruel option related *25 entirety. corpus as in its Gregg, at unusual. See say thе State descends cannot at 2926. We AFFIRMED. allowing depths by the con

to inhuman We such an election. to exercise demned A APPENDIX may prisoners to who believe that benefits (October 21, 1982, AFTERNOON SESSION and option who choose to exercise p.m.) 4:20 injec they elect lethal that can feel relieved costs those outweigh the emotional to tion honor, is an- MR. Your there MESTEL: option of an the mere existence who find you I know if want to do other matter. don’t objectionable. not, but, or in an abun- this on record caution, probably should. dance of I think we VIII My presence client like to waive his would petition in Campbell claims his jury at remain in selection and Snohom- person employed there no Washington in is County. He a lot and ish is under of stress qualified by the who is to or retained State necessary and he not think is tension does it judicial hanging. part He relies in conduct a jury for him to He is attend the selection. in State v. on Dolliver’s statement Justice willing presence open to waive in court. his Frampton, 627 P.2d 95 Wash.2d fears, fears, legitimate as to the He has (1981), is uncontested that there are “[i]t he will receive from the custodial treatment hangers no State trained Spokane he officers and inmates prison Penitentiary, nor are the authorities prefer stay to here concentrate would any in the States.” aware of United trial and future. In- Washington’s adoption of Field preliminary. There COURT: This is THE employment of a struction renders addressing point myself to Mr. unnecessary. hanger” Field “trained Campbell’s obtaining if I won’t such waiver provides that Instruction I as prosecutor it so will from the allow hear appoint pro- Superintendent will [t]he you appro- proper to think it is whether briefing to those individuals as re- vide a priate. your I would hear comments pro- quired implement the Execution observations. required individual will be cess. No proper. know MR. ROCHE: I don’t if it is participate part execution writing, I I it think would have be done procedure. imagine, proper in a would considered ¶ Instruction Field VI.G.2.a. Instruction have penalty ease not to the defendant phases all provides for rehearsals of there. execution, springing of the door. up ... It to me Superintendent It sounds to me like seems Tana Wood testified many expressed interest prison that Mr. had conducted rehearsals officials here, throughout being this no matter officials’reli- trial the Dodd execution. The state just happening. It me perform ance Field what was strikes on the Instruction extremely point judicial very for em- ... odd hanging obviates the need stage of this says, at most critical ploying person perform trained to now he specific EXAMINATION BY THE COURT selection, ease, you jury going where are Q Campbell, your Mr. attorney has said going people to have 12 who are to decide you prefer to remain in Sno- dies, he whether he lives doesn’t want County selecting homish while we are it. input into jury Spokane County. Right Is that [sic]? As we have seen —I am concerned. We Yes, A it is. many games played by have seen so Q you fully you Are aware the fact that defendant, just game. I think another right present do jury to be while a tendency MR. MESTEL: The matter —no is selected? request, just objects. what I the State A I do. Q might I would assume it be a constitu- THE I’m COURT: not all much sur- right, correct, tional my memory and if Mestel, prised as to Ad- Mr. their reaction. rules, granted by unless leave is the court things you’ve mittedly, unique asked present stages the defendant must be at all surprise anyone. Any and come as a time proceedings, voluntarily unless he asking anything we are out of the ordi- *26 generally, absents himself along those nary change ... not do like and automat- We or— lines. ically change. resist right You have a to present do be while why, I see a number of if he reasons jury being a is selected. waiver, intelligent I makes an would not be- A I understand that. subject appellate lieve it be the could Q you stay if jury picked And here and a is regarded review. It shouldn’t be as revers- there, you over present won’t be to hear ible, I think. Expense shouldn’t and man- your questions attorney asks power would be consideration. jurors. may You questions hear those la- grant you I unique. this is It has not you may you ter opinion and be of the my That, happened experience in they before. in wished had questions. asked other itself, and of no present is reason for me to You not supply automati- will be to them cally say Again, questions. no. we’ve had bombshell. with you Do understand that? way. I myself Let’s do it this will address Yes, A do. I myself

to Campbell satisfy Mr. and he Q may jurors say, You look at might doing. you knows what I he want to jurors type aren’t the “Those I would writing, reduce it to fact that I have my lawyers pick have to if I wanted had necessarily done this doesn’t mean I will been there.” it. I allow But least will consider it over evening maybe and reflect on it and any right any You would waive to have give you I sometime tomorrow will ten min- input jury pro- in the whatsoever selection utes, anybody if can with up come consti- cess, you your than other what can tell something tutional prohibition or that would attorneys you ahead of time. Are aware

necessarily subject ap- cause it to be that? pellate review reversal. Yes, A I am. Q you willing to And are submit the issues only thing you I keep would ask in case, may guilt your in this well be many mind is frequently that the State tries your your or innocence and be life or ungovernable, people who are absentia death, you people who have no choice jury

if ungovernable, came and he was selecting part selecting with— that would conduct for be which he would be present they not were even while were proceedings. suppose removed from the I selected? might be considered an invitation to be ungovernable get A sent back. Yes. you. I argue

THE I won’t COURT: you they if wanted understand right willing your to waive Q still You are you selecting jury, will have less con- over during the selection present you your attorneys tact with than jurors? process there in the you were also over A I am. jury selection. Roche, again, I have THE Mr. COURT: I that. MR. CAMPBELL: understand decision, any ques- are there but made a prefer still [sic] THE YOu COURT: put Campbell? Mr. you I feel should tions stay here? think of other I can’t ROCHE: MR. I do. MR. CAMPBELL: setting I think defense questions. still case. trap in this another you prepare THE If will some- COURT: writing, sign might as thing I it. You will I things That is one of THE COURT: that, Mestel, anyhow, I do Mr. and then well evening and I over the to think about want sign will that tomorrow sometime. opportunity to think give you an about will (October also. MORNING SESSION a.m.) 9:30 Honor, I an- Your MR. CAMPBELL: your questions again, and I would like to THE the State of swered COURT: Once why I this. my Campbell. want speak own reasons vs. record ... present of confidence I’ve lot should reflect Mr. court, Mestel, along attorney, with his Mark me. Fine with MR. MESTEL: Roche, Jim on behalf of the State. here I a lot of confi- CAMPBELL: MR. *27 primary hearing this purpose Savage going and Mr. in Mestel dence Mr. morning or Mr. is to determine whether not living. They that for a I am do over there. presence Campbell’s request his to waive my part myself for in the trying prepare to during jury granted. I’ve selection will be my trying get to relax and trial and I am question put I’d to to Mr. one additional like together. head thought had occurred because going I like to doing ... feel I am What evening. me to over real inconvenience. It’s Spokane will be a Campbell, question. other It is Mr. one long I will cut off from going to be a ride. be say your to difficult for me waiver spend day all in things here. I will over right appear during jury to selection is an court, My going through that kind of stuff. it irrevocable waiver. I don’t know whether I will not be to will limited and able time be appellate or not. I don’t know how an working right I now. prepare things am on but, event, that, might treat if court stay my here Snohomish It is decision to Monday get there and we start on we over County accomplish I that. so that can mind, jury you change your and selection something THE You mentioned COURT: matter, purely practical it would be diffi- a they thought of. While are I had not cult, arrange you if to impossible, not to have they selecting jury, you a Spokane are brought through rest over to sit your off from attor- be cut somewhat that, I mat- process. practical think as a So day neys. with them all You be wouldn’t ter, waiver, probably if I it approve this long night. I don’t know how them at see you wouldn’t be irrevocable allowed week, may it jury may It be a selection be. your change mind. may You longer, or it be shorter. be you appreciate Do that? your attor- limited contact with would have Yeah, neys during period of time. MR. CAMPBELL: I do. you willing to I what THE Are still MR. understand COURT: CAMPBELL: about, knowing you talking your right appear, I if you’re saying. What I am waive mind, your nothing change probably I need to want opportunity wouldn’t have it? preparing myself atmosphere. could be done about in a relaxed indicated, things has he he feels are more important do in preparing for trial his I am. MR. CAMPBELL: through jury than selection. He has .sit Honor, practical MR. ROCHE: Your one good justified I cause. believe it is by the things consideration. One of the first expense difficulty security means always in trial is Court does introduce that would to be have taken afford us to parties jury they ask if and counsel and transport security him and during getwe people. know of these How will jury course of a foreign county. selection in by that? I accept will Mr. Campbell’s waiver of his way THE do in COURT: The same we right to appear any jury selection. every introduce, instance: we do so While we MR. you, your CAMPBELL: Thank Hon- they present. are We off because also read or. present, list are of witness names who Honor, MR. Your ROCHE: we don’t think practice I suppose we’d follow the same just the written waiver Mr. Mestel handed I respect with to an absent defendant. have me is sufficient this case. We would ask— personally presided never over a trial where I issue can think of going that’s I defendant was tried in absentia. counsel, be raised is ineffective assistance they heard have occurred in Snohomish although I can see—since Court 3.4 Rule time, County. point inquiry At that clearly present states the defendant shall be jurors: you must be made “Do know times, including at ail impanelling the defendant name and identification?” jury, absolutely which I think is essential suppose procedure. I we follow the same casе, penalty certainly— but will he that, problem MR. ROCHE: Savage after Mr. Mestel Mr. leave the conceivable, although extremely unlikely, case, trial, be at will the end juror potential might there could be a who attorneys scouring will be new the record to face, Campbell by know Mr. but not Savage see Mr. Mestel and Mr. are incom- name. gives petent. This them a classic issue to presume photo- THE I there COURT: bring up appeal for ineffective assistance available, graphs fairly recent. counsel, among things. other *28 Yes, MR. ROCHE: Your Honor. In addi- Campbell personally We’d ask Mr. waive tion, reformatory Mr. inwas writing objections all future to be as raised years for six and since 1976 has been never competency happened of It’s al- counsel. I east of the would think it mountains. ready. things, The for then defense asked highly unlikely people Spokane personally it, assigned going happen error it’s acquainted Certainly, would be with him. again. something knowing. we’d be interested Honor, thought MR. Your I MESTEL: THE might appropriate It be COURT: fairly comprehensive. pre- this He is juror, each individual ask them to observe a challenging anything cluded from about the photograph see. it, jury I selection. will have him write on you want. always I would assume we run that risk respect respect

with to witnesses and with Campbell, you THE COURT: Mr. did person A defendants. be could selected Mr. hear Roche’s remarks? jury say: sit on a “I do not know Mr. Yes, I MR. CAMPBELL: did. trial, Campbell,” someplace during THE you COURT: Do what understand say, suddenly they it occurs did know him saying? ishe years changed ten ago, they but he’s so much forgotten. Yes, I happen have had that with I MR. CAMPBELL: do. witnesses, not defendants. if, THE suggesting He is COURT: time,

I problem, you represented by realize it is a but I think a later other trial, good during think insurmountable and I there counsel —even the course of the or, you Campbell’s request. appeal, might cause to honor Mr. As on have new counsel 692 respect your non-

THE COURT: With jury process. appearance at the selection asserting your behalf that might incompe- Savage were Mr. Mr. Mestel Yeah, I it. will waive MR. CAMPBELL: you to such a waiver. allowing execute tent init ROCHE: I’d still rather see MR. any claim of incom- willing to waive you Are writing. [sic] result counsel petency of waiver? I think that’s neces- THE COURT: don’t sary. Specifically, waiv- for

MR. CAMPBELL: er? REINHARDT, Judge, whom Circuit Yes, specifically for waiver.

THE COURT: BROWNING, TANG, and Judges Circuit join, concurring Nothing past jury se- D.W. NELSON MR. CAMPBELL: that; dissenting: right? anything like lection Table of Contents 692 Overview. 695 Decency . Evolving Standards I. 695 Legal Standards. A. 695 Principles. General 1. 696 Specific Factors. 2. Society Rejected 697 Objective Hanging. Evidence That Has B. The Dignity. 700 Inconsistency Hanging with Human The C. . 703 Majority’s Evisceration Amendment. D. The (1) Any Majority’s Approach... 703 The Rational Basis Absence of (2) Disregard 706 Majority’s Deliberate Precedent. Majority’s 708 Consequences The Pernicious Rule. Summary 708 . E. Unnecessary 708 and Wanton Pain. II. Legal Standards. A. Analysis. B. Regarding Compelling 1. The Evidence the Existence Pain. 2. Lack Probativeness Protocol. Regarding The District Court’s Perverse to Consider Evidence Refusal Alternative Methods Execution. III. Conclusion. A. Appendix Appendix B. *29 ago, Overview century in than ten not but more Hill, They in then 1885. come from David B. executing mode present “The of criminals Hill the of New York. Governor Governor has to us from the hanging come down capital punishment, not seek to did abolish questioned it ages, dark well be only employ have the a less medieval present day the science of the whether taking for the of human life.1 means provide taking for the life cannot means of are condemned to die in a less such as century ago, enlightened individu- Over a manner.” barbarous pun- supported capital those als—even who hanging might expect words one from ishment —became concerned that These are hanging longer practice was incom- believes that was a “barbarous” someone who decency patible then-contemporary of comports the standards of of with standards with time, of Century. they decency. our standards the 20th Yet were writ- Since that late York, Kemmler, 436, 444, message governor dated of New 1. In re S.Ct. U.S. (1890) 1885). (quoting January 34 L.Ed. 519 the annual America, decency significantly. re- in the judi- have evolved With United States of hanging cial is constitutional.2 judicial hanging, they of spect concept exponentially. Because new have evolved There are three main faults in majority the execution, of such as and less brutal methods First, opinion. majority drastically the cur- injection, developed, lethal have been scope meaning tails the of the Cruel and of regarding has mounted the risks evidence Unusual Punishments Clause the United pain hanging, and mutilation in all inherent My colleagues States Constitution. hold that legislatures, both in but two state the Ninth savage barbaric and punishment forms of Circuit, rejected hanging as a prohibited by method not Eighth Amendment, the except carrying penalty. Inexplicably, cases which the use of such out results in techniques the needless infliction of ignores develop- majority all of these pain. today, applied Until we have the Su- accept- hanging ments and concludes that (as premе Court’s traditional standard we society in present-day American able —sim- do) are bound to and have struck down meth- because, view, ply majority’s hanging punishment either they ods were con- “unnecessary pain.” not cause I think does trary society’s evolving standards de- indisputable it the continued use cency if they pain. unnecessary inflicted society’s hanging incompatible with evolv- exception,3 Supreme has, With one Court Moreover, al- decency. standards expressly applied or implicitly, both elements though question, need not I we reach the every of this standard cruel and unusual equally think it clear that inflicts punishment case has decided in recent unnecessary pain, physical both and emotion- However, years, today’s majori- as have we. al, Accordingly, on those condemned to die. ty, determined to holding avoid the that fol- part majority I dissent VII-B inexorably lows from the contempo- fact that opinion, majority in which the reaches the rary society overwhelmingly rejected has that, in Anno Domini hanging, remarkable conclusion apply refuses the established part majority “grounds" I also VIII of dissent from considered the same relief. Be- (1) opinion, which concludes that "trained han- cause banc en court chooses to address however, ger" unnecessary. agree, (2) I with sponte, panel sua issue did not reach analysis majority opinion, claim, in the rest of the panel the merits of the errone- First, exceptions. two I existed, do reach the issue ously procedural found bar I part majority opinion. addressed in VII-C of the panel would remand this issue to the for resolu- I "a Because conclude this case involves note, record, tion on the merits. I for the execution, choice between two methods one Campbell's far claim seems from frivolous-—the [assumed be] un- constitutional the other challenges appear instructions he similar to constitutional," ante at need I not reach Supreme Stringer those the Court invalidated in question more difficult a statute re- whether - Black, -, v. quiring a defendant to choose between two con- L.Ed.2d 367 stitutional means of execution would violate the First or Amendments. occasion, Albers, Whitley 3. On one 1078, 1084, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 Second, part majori- I dissent from IV-B the (1986), Supreme Court stated that ty’s opinion. part, majority In that decides "unnecessary pain” applies and ‍‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‍wanton standard argued an issue that was briefed neither nor challenges brought by prisoners after incarcer court, although Campbell en before the banc *30 However, ation. the Court has announced a sought supplemental point, to file brief the on contrary prison rule in cases before decided both request his was denied. Part IV-B holds - McMillian, and after Albers. See Hudson v. Campbell raising vague- is that barred from his U.S. -, -, 995, 1001, 112 S.Ct. 117 L.Ed.2d challenge sentencing procedures ness set (1992); Gamble, 10.95.060(4) Estelle v. 102- § forth in Wash.Rev.Code because 50 L.Ed.2d 251 petition. he had raised that issue in However, earlier (both prison stating punishment cases that a will previous a review of the briefs indi- violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishments cates that did not raise in this claim Instead, unnecessary pain Clause either if or prior petition. challenge it inflicts if it he raised a evolving completely statutory provision, is inconsistent with our of to a standards different Hereafter, decency). § I will not the Wash.Rev.Code These two mention 10.95.070. chal- lenges separate statutory Washing- Whitley to elements aberrant and short-lived each of statement capital sentencing procedure practice. be time ton's cannot I reiterate the otherwise uniform hang- nearly all the risks inherent it removes consider whether process, In the test. necessary considering pun- without wheth- savage and barbaric are judicial to barriers methods of execution —such as of cases that lies the er alternative in the class ishments injection Be- those risks. of lethal Eighth Amendment —method the core of —obviate hold, prevented Campbell majority cause the district court To as the cases. punishment introducing any punishment from evidence that would does, methods of review that we comparative they permitted have to make a inflict unnec- only determine whether to any inquiry, to it erred as a matter of law. that do not look essary pain, and we particular to whether determine other factors Finally, majority improperly the concludes acceptable to our are punishment forms of clearly err that the district coúrt did not only society, ignore not all is to civilized Washington it found that the state when very roots of judicial precedents but also the protocol virtually all hanging has eliminated majori- Under the Eighth Amendment. the decapitation. Tellingly, pain risk of the “rule,” most in- ty’s even the unprecedented analysis majority merely reiterates without savagery mutilation and of humane forms portion testimony the harmful to the of least they long so inflict permissible, be context, however, its conclusion. Read the necessary.4 than pain more clearly testimony as а whole showed that Second, majority upholds although majority hangings in. death is the district the the relatively painless, finding hanging involves no un- each time an individual is that court’s hanged significant is a risk of necessary pain, though even the district there slow, decapitation lingering, absolutely determining or of a and pain- had no basis court pain Washing- It also hanging inherent in ful death. showed the risks whether protocol necessary or not. It undeniable that ton state which district —on majority rely heavily at least risk court and the so every hanging involves some —con- slow, solely painful, 12-page typed prison will die a sists set prisoner regulations, pages Campbell offered evidence less than three of which death. tortuous injection anything have shown that lethal do with mechanics of would have substantially hanging. parts The pain less risk of than the actual crucial of this entails protocol simply copied were without hanging. The district court refused does from because it that it medical advice consultation a 1959 admit evidence believed military manual never the risks that inhere execution had should consider though hanging, in an inherent in other been used actual even hanging, and not those officials had procedures. one of the ultimate issues state no idea Yet procedure in the court —and the issue on how the set forth manual before the district exclusively developed. expert testimony majority had been which focuses —was any unnecessary protocol hanging entails made clear that' this fact not was whether impossible very procedures pain. logically hanging It different risk of sure, majority saying: “Campbell argue pun- does obfuscates its actions To be referring approvingly to the standards that disproportional ishment death is the crimes precedent applicable Eighth make established he convicted. Our focus is there- However, even most cur- cases. Amendment sory fore whether the involves method execution "analysis” reading of its reveals that unnecessary pain. and wanton infliction of flatly apply majority all relevant fac- refuses We hold that it does not." Id. There is no unnecessary pain. majority’s than tors other further mention of of the other in six sen- ratio decidendi contained entire opinion. The next Amendment factors First, majority opinion. its con- tences in pages page dealing section with the overwhelming num- that the fact that cludes exclusively issue are devoted the sub- legislatures rejected hanging is ber ject unnecessary pain. Part VII-B then con- consequence light it “sheds no of little because judicial hang- "We cludes as follows: hold that *31 may may pain that or not attend on the actual ing, Washington as conducted under the Field opinion practice.” 682. The then Ante at Instruction, does not involve the wanton and "Campbell entitled an execution states that is pain, unnecessary does infliction and therefore unnecessary free of 'the and wanton inflic- " Eighth (citation omitted). not violate the Amendment." Ante at pain.' 683 tion Ante at legal analysis majority completes by 687. then its

695 (1910). pain, lingering had caused severe 793 which Framers understood that deaths, past, society’s evolve, our and mutilation and that mores would and that likely occur some methods widely these results would continue to which had once been employed unacceptable would become in a number cases under the to soci- ety, just findings as the torturous procedures. pun- The district court’s and barbaric clearly ishments of the contrary are Stuarts had unaccep- erroneous. become by table the Framers’ own time. See id. at decision, today’s a result the Ninth As 372, They 30 S.Ct. 551. therefore framed among Circuit stands alone the federal courts prohibition a on punish- cruel and unusual a approving savage practice and barbaric dynamic “progressive, ments which and universally rejected in the of our rest nation. not fastened to the obsolete but that, majority than More does incalcula- acquire public meaning opinion as becomes damage Eighth ble Amendment. enlightened justice.” a humane Id. at Surely, this decision cannot be allowed to 378, 30 S.Ct. 553. stand. Second, expanded the Court has coverage beyond prohibition amendment’s its Decency Evolving I. Standards of on punishment, barbarous methods of to en Legal A. Standards compass protections guarantee such aas penalties proportionate will be to the offenses Principles 1. General see, they imposed, e.g., are Coker v. punishment The issue of what methods of 584, Georgia, 2861, 433 U.S. 97 S.Ct. 53 are unconstitutional is one that lies at the (1977), safeguard 982 against L.Ed.2d and a Eighth heart Amendment. That confinement, inhumane conditions includ medical, specifically designed to pro- amendment was See, ing inadequate e.g., care. Hell — punishment forms of hibit were “cruel ing McKinney, -, v. 113 U.S. S.Ct. purpose and unusual.” Its was to bar the 2475, 125 (1993); L.Ed.2d 22 v. Estelle Gam imposition savage punish- and barbaric ble, 97, 285, 429 U.S. 97 S.Ct. 50 L.Ed.2d 251 ments convicted felons and to ensure that Despite developments, these the fun punitive actions taken the state con- purpose Eighth were damental Amendment a sistent with the standards of civilized soci- changed: question has not we face to Thus, ety. adoption, at the time of its day particular punish method of —whether Eighth punish- Amendment barred such ment is uncivilized and barbaric —involves alive, embowelling beheading, as ments prohibition the core Eighth embodied dissection; quartering; public burning Amendment. Wilkerson, alive. See 99 U.S. at Trop, punish theAs Court made clear in Eighth ratified, incompatible Since Amendment was ment that evolving with our expanded ways. its decency reach has been two standards of violates the Cruel and First, Supreme recognized addition, has Court Unusual Punishments Clause. protections Eighth punishment Amend violates if it the Clause in unnecessary ment “[t]he are “not static” Amend “the volves wanton infliction 153, meaning pain.” Gregg ment must draw its from the evolv Georgia, v. decency prog 2909, 2925, standards of that mark the S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 859 Dulles, (1976) maturing society.” Trop Stewart, Powell, Stevens, (opinion ress of v. 86, 101, JJ.). “[Pjunishments ‘incompatible U.S. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d with the (1958) (plurality opinion). evolving decency The Court standards of that mark the recognized early maturing society1 as 1910 that the progress ‘involving] Cruel of a prohibi unnecessary Unusual Punishments Clause’s and wanton infliction of are pain’ ‘repugnant tions not limited those methods of Amend — punishment McMillian, that were considered cruel or ment.’” Hudson v. U.S. -, -, at the Bill of Rights unusual time the 112 S.Ct. 117 L.Ed.2d States, added) adopted. (emphasis v. (quoting Weems United 217 156 Estelle 349, 372-73, Gamble, 102-03, U.S. 54 L.Ed.

696 (1976)). recognized derly to more fundamental start with the 290, 251 We L.Ed.2d 50 I, Accordingly, part I question. in discuss Eighth aspects to the Amend of these both incompatibility hanging’s general more with Haygood Younger, 769 inquiry in v. ment II, evolving decency, part in Cir.1985). standards (9th 1350, analysis 1354 F.2d (while unnecessary point) I to reach the is applied, cases has been in these set forth hanging involves the un- consider whether every Eighth in implicitly, expressly pain. necessary and infliction of wanton years. case in recent Amendment juris- contemporary in As is often case Specific Factors 2. analysis two-part prudence, the Su- punishment determining whether a is In Hudson, and that preme Court reiterated evolving incompatible with our standards of Haygood, is somewhat artifi- followed we decency, a court look a number case, any Eighth Amendment our cial. however, primarily, “we factors. First and always pun- inquiry whether ultimate objective pub indicia that reflect the look to evolving standards ishment is consistent given Gregg, a sanction.” lic attitude toward 173, See, Gregg, 428 at decency. e.g., U.S. 173, (opinion U.S. at 96 S.Ct. at 2925 428 Stewart, Powell, (opinion 2925 96 S.Ct. at JJ.). Stewart, Stevens, Powell, The most JJ.). unnecessary Stevens, infliction of objective of the important evidence consists way pain merely punish- a one adopted by society’s repre statutes elected However, can these standards. ment violate Kentucky, v. sentatives. See 492 Stanford unnecessary pain infliction of is the because 2969, 361, 367-70, 109 2974-75, 106 U.S. S.Ct. readily most measurable common and most (1989). legislatures L.Ed.2d 306 Where state inconsistency evolving with our example of “degree a have reached sufficient national decency, frequently the eases standards punish rejecting particular a consensus” separate a form of violation.-5 it as treat ment, 370-71, 2975-76, punish id. at at Thus, punishment that a if court decides inquiry may is unconstitutional and our ment ordinarily unnecessarily painful, it hold will Although Supreme end. neither the Court Eighth Amendment that a violation of explicit just ever made nor court has go on to and will not consider has occurred sufficient, of a consensus is it is how much punishment is otherwise incon- whether the point legislative clear that at some the state decency. standards of Simi- sistent with our compelling trend will become so that we can punish- larly, the court concludes sure, ignore it. To be “it is for us rejected by society-as savage has ment been ultimately judge” Eighth whether barbaric, necessary for it will not be it to prohibits given punishment. Amendment a unnecessary pain. Florida, 782, consider it inflicts 797, whether v. 458 U.S. 102 Enmund is, however, prescribed no our There order S.Ct. L.Ed.2d inquiry. analysis. However, reject can start with either punishment We once a been has Here, unacceptable by sufficiently large case because the involves “core” as ed issue, legislatures, long we Eighth it seems more or- number of state can Amendment developed question Eighth specialized Courts also various ultimate all Amendment have Amendment, government cases—whether the action is consis under the such doctrines "evolving decency." ap standard that tent with our standards of the "deliberate indifference” Gamble, 102-03, 290; cases, Gamble, prison plies 429 U.S. at 97 S.Ct. at see U.S. some 3375; 104, 291, Enmund, 794, proportionality at 97 S.Ct. at stan S.Ct. 367, 383-84, Maryland, govern inquiries appropriate dards into the Mills v. 486 U.S. , crime, particular punishment to S.Ct. 100 L.Ed.2d 384 ness of a see 1870 Florida, decency ("Evolving standards societal have Enmund v. (1982), high imposed correspondingly requirement 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 rule capital sentencing procedures reliably reliability on the determination that death is the must case.”); appropriate penalty particular Hoptowit in a those who receive the death sen differentiate not, (9th Cir.1982) Stringer Ray, 682 tence Black, - U.S. -, -, who do see v. F.2d from those pris (holding that the determination of whether 1135-41, (1992). They "unnecessary caused and wanton" 117 L.Ed.2d 367 conditions however, recognized, pain general public specialized bound "what the that all of these decent”). merely specific applications would consider doctrines

697 society’s say philosophy, religion, logic, that it is with our history, er consistent and in an decency, regardless of our effort to obtain a full understanding what standards n nature society. of such clear judges view would be the absence civilized While may See, e.g., Georgia, v. not substitute their legislative judgment action. Coker own for 584, 593-96, 2861, 2866-68, legislature, that of the they are particularly 433 U.S. 97 S.Ct. well-equipped, by training, (plurality opinion) 982 virtue of 53 L.Ed.2d edu- cation, experience, and the (striking Georgia’s penalty characteristics down death for brought bench, which woman, apply them the largely rape of an adult because techniques these the type of issue Georgia only imposed before was the state that Moreover, by tenure, us. virtue of life adult, feder- rape for penalty death an and one of judges al so political pres- do free of only imposed three states that the death sures or other extraneous considerations. penalty rape); Ford Wain cf. 399, 408-10, 416-18, wright, 477 U.S. 106 Objective B. The Society Evidence That 2595, 2601-02, 2605-06, 335 91 L.Ed.2d Rejected Hanging Has (1986) (relying on fact that “no State By objective measure, hanging in has permits the Union the execution of the rejected by present-day been society. holding Eighth This sane” that the Amendment country experienced has far more than a prohibits executing a state from an insane “trend” toward abolition. Abolition is almost prisoner provide the state must an fact, complete. everywhere In complete, it is hearing sanity). adequate on the issue of but in the northwestern corridor of the Ninth legislatures Where the have failed to reach Circuit. Before the turn of century, general agreement punish kind of that a hanging “nearly was the universal form of however, repudiated, be ment should we v. Frampton, execution.” State 95 Wash.2d circumstances, inquire In must further. such 469, 922, Indeed, 627 P.2d 934 48 Supreme clear, “legis as the Court has made hang persons states used convicted of judgments lative cannot determina alone capital century, however, offenses.6 In this tive Amendment standards since hanging virtually every- has been abandoned safeguard that Amendment was intended where, sought gruesome as states have less legislative individuals pow from abuse of and torturous methods of execution. See 19, Gregg, er.” at U.S. at n. 96 S.Ct. Georgia, Furman v. 296-97 & Stewart, Powell,.Ste (opinion 2925 n. 19 n. 2755-56 & n. JJ.). vens, In the absence of clear (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) L.Ed.2d 346 legislative unequivocal repudiation pun of a that, (stating eight as of states still ishment, objective must we look other employed hanging, remaining while the objec public indicia of attitudes and to other penalty suppos- states had switched “the Among tive factors. latter whether edly more humane methods” electrocution punishment involves mutilation or dis gas); Frampton, and lethal at 934 P.2d memberment, historically it whether asso that, 1981, only (stating jurisdic- as of four repression tyranny, ciated with or English-speaking tions in the world em- may fairly whether be characterized as Montana, ployed hanging: Washington, Dela- short, dehumanizing degrading. Africa). ware, we South Since punishment ask “comports must whether the away hanging. states have turned Ful- concept dignity with the basic of human at ly hanging 39 states abandoned in favor of another, the core of the Amendment.” Id. assertedly more humane method question execution, S.Ct. at 2929. We answer this additional seven abolished by reviewing pertinent judicial penalty all of the the death a time when by employing they decisions but also employed.7 the tools of was the method Even the they Appendix 6. Two states—Alaska and Hawaii—have not em- tion which did B also so. ployed any capital punishment form of since legislative judicial includes statements as their admission to the Union. well as other material which makes clear hanging precisely they states abandoned because Appendix year B sets forth each legisla- it to considered be inhumane. hanging, states abandoned and the *34 (1988), protocol Supreme held that the Army the the Court whose United States —on Eighth prohibited form executions for that Amendment heavily relies —abandoned so 1986, years the mili- crimes committed children under 16 as did other punishment in of services; year age. though 15-year-olds eli the last of Even were tary that same and penalty in the gible Circuit eliminat- for the death 19 death the Ninth two states outside injec- age, had penalty lethal states which no minimum practice and substituted ed the states, therefore, only plurality society rejected had the found that present, two tion. At Montana, penalty young for such children. the Ninth the death Washington and both plurality Circuit, hanging a form execu- The looked the 18 states which as of retain decision, age today’s adopted requirements the had minimum for of tion. As a result prac- penalty, the that finds the death and relied on fact this abominable Ninth Circuit still required have at all 18 the defendant to been tice constitutional.8 years the the least 16 old at time of offense. upheld has ever a mode of federal case No 826-29, (plu See id. at 108 S.Ct. at 2694-96 widely reject has as punishment which been concurrence, rality opinion). In her Justice Indeed, Supreme hanging. has ed as recognized 15-year-olds that could O’Connor society rejected that has Court has concluded eligible penalty for be the death 19 states. objective evi punishments where even 850, (O’Connor, id. at at 2707 See compelling it is far less than dence has been J., concurring judgment). in the Nonethe Florida, In Enmund v. here. less, application she concluded of that (1982), for 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 S.Ct. 15-year-olds penalty death violated it held that was unconsti example, Court Amendment, Eighth two- because “almost penalty vi impose the death for tutional to legislatures definitely thirds of the state have felony reaching In this con murder. carious 15-year-old that ex concluded no should be clusion, for opinion the Court Justice White’s execution,” posed no threat heavily “only the fact about a relied on “affirmatively unequivocally state had jurisdictions ever American third of a practice.” endorsed such Id. at permit participat who somehow a defendant S.Ct. at 2706. a robbery where murder occurred ed in a 792, 102 at die.” Id. at S.Ct. be sentenced to Thompson, hanging Under Enmund eight particular, only states autho 3374. In is, fortiori, a unconstitutional. The evidence penalty solely participat for rized the death society rejected hanging has form a felony person in a in which a was killed. punishment compelling than is far more 789-93, at at generally id. S.Ct. Supreme the evidence the found suffi- Court this other Largely because of 3372-74. compel finding a cient to of unconstitutionali- “[sjociety’s rejection of the death evidence ty in those In Enmund and cases. both penalty accomplice liability felony mur for Thompson, society concluded Court ders,” id. S.Ct. rejected punishment though had a even Supreme imposition Court concluded rejected by significantly had been fewer penalty circumstances death such rejected hanging. have states than Enmund Eighth would violate the Amendment. practice still authorized involved which was states, Oklahoma, eight Thompson Thompson 487 in involved Similarly, in practice which was still in nineteen.9 L.Ed.2d lawful majority ingenuously person challenge states who 8. that “neither refused conviction officials, Campbell, 699) nor our punishment; the state nor own page see has been infra holding single research has revealed decision hanged country lawfully in this in over three penalty by hanging imposition decades, surprising to it would be find cases punishment con- within the cruel unusual ruling question hanging’s constitution- templation of Ante at Amendment.” Thus, ality. the absence of cases does not detract for this be to all The reason must obvious 682. except Campbell’s simply argument rather, it — to see those who do not wish it. Because hanging one more indication that is inconsistent legislatures all the state outside decency. evolving with our standards of hang- themselves eliminated and Montana have judicial ing, pro- has for there been little need upheld Stanford, penalty In the Court the death hanging nouncements that is unconstitutional. Coker, Indeed, (with 17-year-olds. exception Distinguishing one 16- and since one cases, firing squad. Although practices in those all contrast some of these meth- states, closely geographical- situated questioned but two ods themselves as inhu- ly, rejected hanging. Contrary to mane, the states have all considered of them characterization, merely majority’s is not to be more than hanging. humane Oliver years among several states recent “trend Holmes, Wendell then the Chief Justice of replace with other methods Supreme Court, the Massachusetts Judicial *35 added). (emphasis at 682 execution.” Ante expressed the view of all of the states which Instead, virtually there has been a unani- hanging had moved from to electrocution rejection by formerly of mous the states this explained change when he de- “was universally accepted Be- mode of execution. reaching for proposed vised the end as swift- ginning with of New York’s abandonment ly painlessly and possible.” as In re Storti (other 1888, every in hanging state than 549, 210, 178 (1901); Mass. N.E. see Montana) Washington and which has re- Carolina, Malloy 180, also v. South penalty sought death tained the has some 185, 35 S.Ct. 59 L.Ed. 905 other, less barbaric mode execution. (“Influenced by the results in New York early Many part did in states so eleven adopted other States have the same Century, in many 20th more did so the 1980s mode inflicting capital eases; death in 1940s, so in and still more did recent and, known, as commonly is this result is the is, short, years. greater This in a far “de- consequent of well-grounded belief that gree than of national consensus” the Su- painful electrocution is less hu- more preme previously thought “has suffi- Court years later, mane than hanging.”). Forty particular punishment cient to label a cruel finally when the state of Louisiana aban- Stanford, 371-72, and unusual.” 492 U.S. at hanging electrocution, doned in favor it 109 S.Ct. 2975-76.10 explained recognized that “electrocution is as a more painful humane and less manner It is not the sheer number of states carrying means of penalty out death than practice that have abolished that dictates by Jones, hanging.” State ex rel. Pierre hanging the conclusion that unconstitution- is (1942). 200 La. 9 So.2d See also legisla- al. It also fact that the state 1,14 §§ eh. (changing Tex.Gen.Laws by in tures have the main been motivated hanging from referring electrocution and Eighth core Amendment concerns. The hanging antiquated “fact” that “is hanging states that have abandoned in favor supplanted many has been states clearly other methods of execution did so system more modem and humane of electro- they agreed because with Governor Hill’s cution.”). replaced Like the states that that characterization of method as a “barba- electrocution, hanging with that states punishment rous” mode of “from which came gas moved hanging chamber ages” place the dark and had no in the “sought provide inflicting method policies society. Hanging of a civilized has penalty most humane manner legis- been considered so that inhumane Jon, known to modern science.” State v. Gee latures have all found other available meth- ods 46 Nev. preferable. of execution to be P. The States same, course, rejected hanging have is true for the favor electrocu- states tion, gas, injection, injection lethal lethal and even the chose lethal alternative. Enmund, Ford, conviction, opposed Court relied on the fact as to the method of execu- majority (footnote omitted). permit capital that "a of the states that tion.” at 682 ma- Ante punishment jority it authorize for crimes committed at has it backwards. The actions of the state Id., age legislatures 16 or above." they are most relevant when have dictated, here, at 2976. Eighth been as fundamental text, explain As Amendment concerns. I in the many rejected hanging unexplained non-sequiturs, precisely of its the states have be- one majority they decrees that are cause it to Coker Enmund found barbaric inapposite punishment "[t]hose because cases concern the inhumane core Amend- —a proportionality penalty the death the crimes ment concern. Constitution, consensus binds jurisdictions which Under two

Even in the books, has all us.12 on the it been hanging remains years. practice recent abolished but us, necessary it not In the case before single person asserted who Since objec- go primary further than our test —the rights law has been Eighth Amendment objec- public tive This evidence attitudes. country. only per fully hanged in this overwhelming tive so evidence is con- judicially hanged during has who been son simply not free to trols our decision. We Dodd, Westley Allan whom period disregard nearly universal determination year he re last after Washington executed legislatures hanging is no of our state fact, rights. This those fused to assert longer compatible with our standards de- well, strong provides evidence legisla- cency. people and Because the society’s with our longer compatible judg- have made tures of this nation their *36 See, decency. e.g., Thompson, of standards ment, consistently clearly and re- have and 2696-98; 831-33, at id at 487 U.S. jected hanging the of a form of execu- use as (O’Connor, J., 852-63, 108 at 2708-09 at S.Ct. tion, our is an No further task end. (both rarity with concurring) noting that the However, judicial inquiry required. is the imposed is indicates that punishment

which a that, factor, here, plain every singly fact is unusual). Indeed, the with it is cruel and collectively, and necessitates a determination Africa11 a exception of South few small hanging that cruel and unusual constitutes states, there has not been another Caribbean punishment. helpful It is therefore to exam- English-speak judicial hanging the entire ine of some the other relevant factors. facts, light In of these ing world since 1966. willingness to so sav majority’s endorse Inconsistency Hanging C. The Hu- with of practice age a as constitutional and barbaric Dignity man incomprehensible. simply is It every is not fact that almost rejected hanging pun- of the has as a form of legislatures 46 states state (and hanging possibly compels of the ishment that the conclusion that have abandoned it) adopted hanging comport evolving have considered fails with our two which never judicial hang- decency. that standards of It is also the fact that the facts and determined taking judicial practice hanging is ing is inhumane manner of life. of demonstra- so, bly incompatible doing they responded respect core concern with the for human dignity that of Amendment —that the state is mark a civilized nation. of capital punish- savage and meth- some of us that employ barbaric While doubt majority of this en ment of kind is consistent with punishment. ods of contem- values, substituting porary religious its social and even court has business those banc clearly-expressed persuaded stаte-sponsored of of judgment for the view us who are that nearly every legislature in the nation. executions are constitutional must conclude state newer, enlightened government, process challenged a more as unconstitutional is 11. aWith judicial hanging may in fact even this bastion fall. constitutional. Such determination Keller, duty Parties Endorse South Bill would not relieve us of our to examine the African Cf. Constitution Times, All, Granting Rights to New York question with utmost care and ensure that the p. Al. Nov. rights persons fully protected. involved are However, legislatures where here the Thus, wrong simply majority when it is particular their view that a demonstrated form judicial conclude that "[w]e states that cannot punishment society, unacceptable is our role is evolving hanging incompatible with standards circumstance, one. In such a far different decency simply few states continue because appropriate question not be for us to would every nearly practice.” Ante 682. Where judgment, legislative and we should not seek punishment, abandoned a method of has 696-97; ways undoing supra pages it. See cf. they they precisely have done so because Morgan, n. Katzenbach inhumane, we cannot but found it abhorrent and 16 L.Ed.2d 828 n. punishment is inconsistent conclude that powers (holding Congress can use its under decency. with our standards to en- Section of the Fourteenth Amendment Amendment, protections of that but hance emphasize I that we are not faced with protections). large legislatures those not to dilute determination number savage hanging body, is a and barbaric meth- head off of spurts while blood terminating uncontrollably, We od of human life. are con- but of hanging’s one de- judicial hanging ugly vestige grading vinced that is an incidents. earlier, when less civilized times science Hanging is associated lynching, with yet developed medically-appropriate

had not justice, ugly, nasty, frontier and with our human bringing methods of life an end. best-forgotten history swinging of bodies crude, rough, Hanging pro- is a and wanton from the public trees or places. exhibited cedure, purpose apart of which is tear many Americans, judicial To hangings call needlessly spine. It is violent intru- forth the images brutal justice of Southern sive, deliberately degrading and dehumaniz- song immortalized in a hauntingly sung by ing. beyond grievous It causes fear others, Holiday.14 many Billie To they are a consequences death itself and the attendant symbol rough jus- instant Western humiliating disgusting. often tice —of asking questions first and us, later.15 all hangings Yet to are a cases, In a number of one of these conse- earlier, time, remnant of an harder a time quences decapitation. Every single expert in meting punishment when out we were far evidentiary hearing witness at —both less dignity concerned with human and de- by Campbell those and those called called cency. In the two states of the Ninth Circuit point state —admitted at one another *37 exists, hanging where still it out stands decapitations that some will occur under the starkly as a barbaric anachronism. Indeed, protocol.13 Camp- presented testimony reject bell unrefuted that punishment the We barbaric forms of as Washington protocol actually merely will increase and cruel unusual not of because the they the it decapitation, requires pain risk of because but pride inflict also because we rope that being the be treated to eliminate all on a society. ourselves civilized We elasticity, thereby assuring greatest the capital punishment necessary that look on as a possible any longer amount of force will be Few transferred evil. view it as cause for prisoner’s the neck. The risk that the celebration or an occasion for civic festivities drop great rip public gatherings.16 force of the will so as to or impose capital the We A, Appendix pp. strange 13. See at 717-22. Be- Here is a infra dissent, length the cause of I crop. of have set And bitter Fruit, Strange forth detailed the discussion of the evidence ad- by Lewis Allan. evidentiary hearing appendix duced at the in an style justice 15. This Western of is in the reflected A). (Appendix I refer to that evidence in the Hang Airport, title of the book Davis, the 'Em at Ed body necessary, main of this dissent when how- City the former Chief of Police of of the ever. Angeles. Los 14. Southern trees Hanging historically has been associated with strange Bear a fruit spectacle public of executions. Charles Dick- Blood on the leaves ens, Times, ain letter to the London described at And blood the root mayhem hanging at a he attended in 1849: swingin' Black bodies In upon midnight, the Southern breeze When I scene at came Strange fruit the shrillness of the cries and howls ... made poplar on, my night From the trees. blood run cold. As the went screeching laughing Pastoral scene yelling strong and and gallant melodies, Of parodies negro South chorus of of awith bulging eyes Manning' [one substitution of ‘Mrs. of the con- 'Susanna'; And prisoners] the twisted mouth demned ruffians and magnolia vagabonds every Scent ground kind flocked to the every variety Sweet and fresh with of offensive and foul lan- guage. Fightings, faintings, whistling, Then the sudden smell imita- burning Punch, jokes, Of flesh. brutal tions tumultuous dem- Here a fruit delight swooning onstrations of indecent when pluck dragged For the crows to women were out of the with crowd disordered, gather gave For the rain to their a dresses new zest wind For the to suck entertainment. For the sun to rot Letter December in Letters Charles (1903), Teeters, drop quoted Negley For the tree to Dickens K. short, that only ma- In the Constitution commands a we do because when punishment impose penalty the death as civilized we legislators have conclud- jority of citizens possible. a I rec- and non-brutal manner as combatting necessary means of ed that it is di- ognize “oxymoronie” quality of this this is crime. While punishing violent or of rective; nevertheless, I do not believe that place nor to debate time neither the open to It individu- debate. all theory, we be able should dubious stake, is at it is nation’s dignity al’s minimum, unite, proposition society’s as well. To the that we and extent carried state-sponsored executions must be brutal, degrading, vio- eliminate the can painful, the least least cruel out execution, aspects of an and substitute lent uncivilized, possible. It manner is difficult developed approved method scientifically anyone advocating imagine fact to —or terminating through appropriate life medi- course. permitting any other Constitution — neutral, procedures in a medical environ- cal ment, obligated by we are the Constitution fact, requires the Constitution developed has do so. If medical science person it executes to die state allow the relatively painless- terminating method of life possible. Gregg, as dignity much as comparative dig- ly peacefully, and with (opinion 96 S.Ct. at nity, requires that we em- Constitution JJ.). Powell, Stevens, Stewart, Although in- savage, than ploy procedure rather from the infliction dignity stem needless antiquated ugly, methods of earlier relatively pain, also arise from the it can days times. The old and West- Southern savagery, degradation, painless infliction end, justice finally ern must come necessarily Cruelty brutality. does not Washington and the states of Montana Indignities can pain. involve be inflicted And elsewhere.17 even this court will some- example, person has died. For even after a recognize day have that barbaric and sav- *38 Eighth little the there be doubt can our age practices permitted are not under public exhibiting of prohibits the Amendment system of law. stringing up the yardarms, and on carcasses medically I will the of a discuss issue more Likewise, it public squares. in of bodies appropriate in- method of execution—lethal by corpses dragging caissons of prohibits the jection part connection with II of —in state-spon- after a through public streets the prop- opinion, fully which sets forth more the execution, displaying of the bodies sored may not more osition that the states use a occupants homes of their former outside the if a ;painful ‘painful method of execution less lived, they in neighborhoods which or in the Here, only I em- method is available. need warning co-conspirators. as a allies that, phasize notwithstanding the district prohibits draw- finally, the Constitution And improper permit court’s the intro- refusal ing only before quartering not but after injection, regarding duction of evidence lethal fully out. the has been carried death sentence injection person of the administration an to a Utah, 136-36, See Wilkerson v. by placed has been sedated and on a bed who (1879). post-mortem these All L.Ed. 345 person medically trained in a envi- a medical person’s body are forms of treatment of a obviously ronment far less barbaric necessarily violate the abhorrent and would uncivilized, degrading, far less inhumane and Clause, al- Punishments Cruel and Unusual prisoner up a than forced march of obviously, them cause though, hangman none of could gallows steps where the untrained spoiled in person. hope drop will any pain the executed waits be sight-seers, peddlers Hang were and medicine men would scenes the Neck Such day. this side of the Atlantic as well: common on on the town before the descend fatal single brought spec- Perhaps event more Teeters, supra, at 39. years, public hanging. than tators in those present; People camped for to be some drove miles only than 17. While Montana state other vicinity days. The in for several permit hanging, at least Montana large camp people brought fol- concourse of actually say that it has can in its defense Entertainers, every large gathering. lowers to hanged anyone years. for 50 vendors, evangelists, pick-pockets, promoters, voiding support only by astonishing wholly the defecation and that result of its unprec- and violent from the state’s crude effort edented decision to of bar use traditional forcefully Eighth life terminate human at the end Amendment concepts in cases involv- rope. punishment,18 of a of legal forms nor even a

argument remotely based on a analogоus justifica- ease.19 There is simply no rational Majority’s D. The Evisceration of majority opinion tion or elsewhere for Eighth Amendment abandoning the traditional standards favor majority deliberately disregards all pain an exclusively. examination of Nor barbarism, questions of savagely, and cruel- majority purport does the any to offer rea- ty, apply and refuses to the traditional fac- explanation why exception soned to the tors which courts our determine whether governing rules Eighth Amendment cases contemporary decency standards of should carved involving be out for cases does been violated. It so on the basis its punishment exception methods of —an unexplained unreasoned and conclusion that drastically power would curtail the addressing challenge constitution- respect federal courts to the most fun- ality punishment,” “method we must Eighth damental of Amendment concerns consider whether that method unneces- preclude considering would us from sarily pain. inflicts Without even a colorable punishment whether modes of administered analysis, majori- attempt at constitutional by the states meet the minimum standards ty rejects employed every the standard society. fact, a civilized were we to limit Eighth years. By Amendment ease recent our review such solely pain cases pronouncement, majority its ex cathedra question, powerless federal courts only longstanding Eighth eviscerates not stop implementation number but Amendment doctrine Amend- punishments, long uncivilized barbaric so ment itself. they pain did not inflict more than necessary penological to meet some asserted interest. Any The Absence Rational Basis Approach Majority’s majority’s entire discussion the con- Contrary stitutionality precedent, majority to all per- rests *39 law, legislatures premise, ungrounded deems it irrelevant that the state verse prior that uniformly hang- Eighth have almost concluded that the imposes only Amendment one ing longer pun- requirement appropriate respect is form of with to a method of disregards ishment. It all of the punishment factors execution or other form of —that (other unnecessary pain) pain than unnecessarily. Despite that courts it not inflict two traditionally years legal history considered when determin- hundred of unbroken particular punishment contrary, majority simply whether is con- the the refuses evolving any sistent with our standards of decen- consider of other the relevant factors. cy. The majority single supra distinguishes cannot cite a case in See note 4. It Coker and pages punishment. 18. As I demonstrate 705-06 n. the & "excessiveness” of a form of infra Yet, majority’s very page passage the reliance on dis Justice Brennan's on the same as the the cites, sent from ana, denial of certiorari Glass v. Louisi majority Greggplurality the made clear that 2159, 2162, only part any Eighth one of “excessiveness” is (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting Thus, L.Ed.2d 514 analysis. pain Amendment excessive certiorari), wholly from denial of is erroneous as disproportion are the exclusive consider- disingenuous. well as Eighth analysis. plu- ations in Amendment The rality required notes both that courts are to "look objective public indicia that reflect the attitude majority attempt support 19. The does limi- its sanction,” given Gregg, toward a U.S. at Eighth tation on the of use the traditional Stewart, Powell, (opinion containing S.Ct. at 2925 of Amendment standard with a footnote Stevens, JJ.), penalty Gregg Georgia, pas- "[a] that must also citation to but the “cf." man,’ dignity sage quoted tion, Gregg, quota- accord 'the of the with which is like the Brennan entirely Eighth Gregg concept underlying is taken out ‘basic the of context. The Amend- ” (citation omitted). passage determining sets forth considerations for ment.' Id. punishment very the core tra- methods of lies at applied eases which the Enmund —two Cruel and Unusual Punishments the punishments and struck down ditional test any part Eighth If Clause. Amendment widely rejected by the they had been because subject Supreme Court’s central law is “[tjhose legislatures cases —because “evolving decency” test and en- standards pen- proportionality of the concern the affords, it protections it titled to essential conviction, opposed to alty to the crimes of clearly challenges part governs that which (foot- at 682 Ante the method execution.” majority’s The punishment.” “methods omitted). majority only offers two note The its point on tells us much about silence purported of its distinc- support sentences it opinion and the method arrived appear in does not distinction which tion —a wholly at fallacious ultimate conclusion. its Enmund, Coker, other case—notwith- consequences simply anywhere no rational basis revolutionary There standing the sentences, opinion paradoxical exception in the for the In those two which would follow. majority apparent from creates. This is pronounces, without majority simply majority’s on distortion of the authorities whatsoever, “proportionality that explanation rely purports which it and the inсonsisten- actions entails examination review cy appropriate between its discussion sentencing legislatures and of both of state legal ultimately it em- standard and test juries contemporary to determine standards apparent ploys. equally It is from the fact decency,” “methodology fo- while review majority barely mentions the stan- objective heavily on evidence of more cuses on, finally adopting it in the dard settles challenged in the method.” pain involved Moreover, indirect of manners. before most Ante unnecessary applying pain rule distinction created considered, The factitious factor that must be directly original majority contradictory conflicts with majority two sets forth other of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments It intent rules and disavows either of them. never rules, Anthony simply explains ignores As Granucci demonstrated two then Clause. groundbreaking study, that clause them. government fear arose out analysis majority The introduces its impose and other barbarous tortures de “[t]o the non-controversial statement persons punishment convicted forms termine whether is unconstitutional Congress acts.20 and the states criminal unusual, ly objective cruel and we look to adopted with the Amendment possible.” factors to the maximum extent understanding pro it “was directed at 682. It then cites the established Ante hibiting punishment.” methods of certain Stanford, sug recently rule set forth most Granucci, “Nor Anthony F. Cruel and Un gesting that rule. apply it intends to “ Original usual Punishments rule that: ‘[F]irst’ Inflicted:” states Stanford *40 (1969); 889, Meaning, 57 841-42 Cal.L.Rev. among ‘objective that the the indicia reflect Dutton, F.Supp. v. 609 see Groseclose also public a given attitude toward sanction’ are (M.D.Tenn.1985) (“It 1432, 1440 evident society’s passed by represen elected statutes Eighth in prohibitions 370, 109 that the Amend the Stanford, tatives.” 492 U.S. at S.Ct. primarily from the concern for ment evolved (quoting McCleskey Kemp, at v. 481 2975 the individuals would be manner which U.S. S.Ct. death.”) added). (1987)) added).21 short, (emphasis Ap In

put (emphasis L.Ed.2d 262 earlier, parently understanding prohibition of inhumane that the as the noted Stanford (2d expressed Adoption Among that at the Federal Constitution 111 those who concern the of 1881). meeting Virginia delegates ed. the of at which the of Constitution was considered ratification the Henry George Mason. See previous page, were Patrick court 21. On the the Stanford Granucci, infra, were "conceptions decency” at 841. Similar concerns of of made clear that the expressed society as at the Massachusetts Convention a whole” are deter- "modern American as Elliot, delegations. inquiry. by Eighth See other See J. of the Amendment well as minative id., U.S. 109 S.Ct. at 2974-75. Conventions on at The Debates the Several State face, would, By its dictate the conclusion 85 L.Ed.2d 514 lifting rule on one unconstitutional, majority the sentence out of context ignoring the rest by omitting cru next “restates” the rule the majority opinion, of the the totally distorts para quotation first word of the when it cial position. Glass, Justice Brennan’s Justice implements It phrases the then statement.22 (with joining) Brennan Justice Marshall ar- announcing by rule a its “restated” gued Supreme Stanford Court should have category analysis and a new method new granted capital certiorari consider a defen- determining Eighth Amendment viola Eighth challenge dant’s Amendment to elec- majority declares that in cases tions. trocution as a method of execution. On the involving category “methodology review” —a page immediately following the one sentence analysis majority pur by invented cites, majority Justice Brennan makes poses of this case23—we must more “focus[ ] clear that: heavily objective pain on evidence .Eighth protection Amendment’s challenged involved method.” dignity “the of man” beyond pro- extends However, misrepresentation even the hibiting unnecessary pain infliction of hastily conceived rule for Stanford extinguishing when Civilized stan- life. majori- “methodology cannot review” do dards, require for example, a minimization result, ty’s majority work for it. a As of physical during violence execution irre- quickly prior approaches all of its abandons spective pain that such violence actually by applying resolves the case might on the condemned. Similar- inflict that is more standard even inconsistent ly, dignity basic notions of human com- ulti- Eighth majority Amendment law. The mand that the state minimize “mutilation” mately proceeds to case decide the as its prison- and “distortion” of the condemned newly rule not created were that “methodolo- body. principles er’s explain These heavily” objec- gy review” focuses “more on prohibition Amendment’s of such pain, tive evidence of but it focuses practices drawing quarter- barbaric as Thus, exclusively unnecessary pain.24 on de- ing. spite purported Stanford, its reliance on majority actually directly applies a rule that (citations Id. at 105 S.Ct. at 2162-63 contradicts well the long as line Stanford omitted) added) (emphasis Trap, (quoting Supreme precedent upon Court which (plurality U.S. 597-98 case relies. opinion)). Gregg As in its use of аnd Stan- ford, majority again, by lifting once making any argument In lieu of in support out omitting sentence of contéxt or crucial proposition “méthodology of its ultimate sentence, part of on relies a case for a unnecessary pain, review” focuses directly proposition contradicted majority single legal opinion— cites a page within a it cites. sentence remarkably, it is a dissent from denial 703; is, supra page my note 19. This certiorari written Justice Brennan Louisiana, view, way Glass which courts should Court, majority Supreme "Among 22. The states: these in an action to factors review the Arkan passed society’s representa- grant ap statutes elected sas Health Services Commission's *41 (citing Stanford, proval at nursing tives." 682 Ante 492 U.S. at for construction of a new 70-bed 370, (citing County. McCleskey, Beverly Enterprises- 109 at S.Ct. 2975 481 home in Drew See 300, 1771)). Arkansas, at 107 at U.S. S.Ct. Inc. v. Arkansas Health Services Comm’n, 221, 363, 308 Ark. 824 S.W.2d 371 recognized 23. other No court has ever “method- Eighth ology separate category review” as a of Indeed, (“We analysis. today judicial hang- Amendment until this 24.. See at 687 hold that ante appeared judicial opinion ing, term has never in a under as conducted the Field Instruction, discussing ap- that Amendment—it did not even does not involve the wanton and pear majority unnecessary pain, in the Justice Brennan dissent the of does infliction therefore Amendment.”); quotes. page only Eighth 705. The court ever violate the see also infra any supra to use the term in context was the 4. Arkansas note 706 Stevens, Powell, Stewart, (opinion 2925 of that determine fundamen- decisions

arrive at JJ.). rights.25 way punishment can tal constitutional in which a One by inflicting is contravene these standards analysis for majority’s is remarkable certainly not only single, pain unnecessarily. nar- Yet that is If as well. other reasons pain” ap- “unnecessary of test way. completely painless infliction row the Even a challenges Eighth Amendment to plies to disre- punishment still evidence utter “ majority must the be punishment, of methods man,’ dignity ‘the of which is the gard for rule, truly discovering this for it sagacious in concept underlying Eighth Amend- ‘basic the ” than centu- court in the more two is the first (quoting Trop, 356 at ment.’ Id U.S. sug- Rights Bill to have the of ever ries of 597). example, guillotine the 78 S.Ct. at For fact, upon which premise gested it. painless execu- comparatively is a method of holding is is so novel majority’s founded painless if it the most tion. Yet even were suggested extraordinary it was not even method, today faced the issue court with Rather, simply created the state. that, certainly the state hold whatever hope I this purposes of this case —and 1789, beheading is inconsistent law majority. It has no only26 by the case — decency, both with our current standards Eighth jurispru- place in our Amendment every rejected has that form because state dence. savagery is a execution and because there bodily and the out- the extreme mutilation Majority’s Deliberate simply Disregard pouring Precedent of blood that inconsistent Similarly, dignity.27 with human all of majority’s representations, Contrary to the postmortem punishments involving mutila- analy- Eighth Amendment the touchstone of part tion would be held discussed I-C is, doubt, beyond any types cases sis all Amendment, violation of the punishment conforms to our soci- whether a though they cause inflic- decency. even would not contemporary ety’s standards See, pain. Gregg, at tion of e.g., 428 U.S. at suggests. any part majority majority to far context than the consider different 25.Were essentially than Brennan’s Glass dissent other followed the method Justice Justice Brennan context, out of it would be analysis part it takes sentence I set forth in I-A of this that, supporting compelled to admit rather than He first looked to the actions of dissent. approach, unprecedented Justice its Brennan's legislatures re and noted that their decisions requires judicial hanging be analysis that held garding challenged are entitled method is, analysis Justice Brennan's unconstitutional. great states had not deference. Because the question, totally inconsistent with the without electrocution, reject how reached consensus ignore majority's attempt all of factors that ever, legislative concluded that decisions he these hanging is demonstrate that inconsistent determinative, that courts could not be dignity. As Jus civilized standards human assessing must factors in the consti look other understood, and stated in the tice Brennan well tutionality unnec of the method. He considered majority selectively quotes, very dissent among pain indignity essary to be foremost governs Eighth overriding principle that Amend id., 1083-85, 471 at 105 those factors. See U.S. analysis the Cruel and Unusual ment S.Ct. at 2161-63. 'expansive "has an and vital Punishments Clause character,’ meaning 'draw[s] its example penalty opinion of a 26. For an prog evolving decency that mark the standards of good only, v. United for one case see Gomez Id., maturing society.'" ress 471 U.S. at Court, 155238, No. 92- District 1992 WL States Weems, (quoting 217 2161 105 S.Ct. at (9th Apr. U.S.App.Lexis Cir. 551; Trop, U.S. at withdrawn, 19, 1992), vacated as moot and (plurality opinion)) (empha 78 S.Ct. at 598 1992), (9th modifying, WL F.2d 463 Cir. added). hardly surprising It Justice sis (9th Apr. U.S.App. Cir. Lexis dissent from оf certiorari Brennan’s denial 22, 1992). ap directly majority's Glass contradicts least, proach At not be case. should majority's surprising anyone professed who ever Justice I has read note under punishment. compelled capital Brennan on the issue we would be to reach rationale Nevertheless, diffi- contrary I find it majority's conclusion. The best that can be said about the *42 cult believe that even the members use dissent Glass of the sentence from the in is test, willing majority, if forced to the would be that Justice the statement Brennan did make so, however, quoted logical consequences by of their actions. majority. the in a follow the He did

707 earlier, explained except majori injeetion for As the Eighth violates the Amendment be- “[tjhere general ty, uniformly required agreement courts have that a that le- cause injection present thal is at punishment the most unnecessary pain neither inflict humane type of execution prefera- available and is far “evolving nor otherwise violate of standards ble to the sometimes barbaric means em- decency” and not sought to limit the ployed in past” “[mjany states have Eighth by seeking force of the Amendment now abandoned other of forms in execution off category to seal of from full cases its injection”). favor of lethal protections.28 Specifically, every contempo rary give federal case to extended discussion courts have ways looked all of constitutionality of a method execu of punishment in which a can violate our stan- engaged evolving tion has in the entire stan decency dards of in involving non-capi- cases decency inquiry. said, dards of None has as tal well as’capital punishment. methods of majority, does the that “is defendant A example Eighth classic is the Circuit’s only entitled an execution free of ‘the strap decision that the use of the to discipline ” unnecessary pain.’ and wanton infliction prison inmates is unconstitutional. Jackson (citation omitted). 683 Gray (8th Ante at In v. Bishop, 571, Cir.1968). v. 404 F.2d 580 (5th Lucas, Cir.1983) Jackson, 710 F.2d 1068 In beyond the court looked curiam), (per unnecessary pain the Fifth narrow issue of Circuit relied on the and con- that strap cluded the use of “principles ... is inconsis- by Supreme articulated tent contemporary with Gamble, standards of decen- Court in Estelle v. U.S. [429 cy, both because degrading “[i]t is to the (1976)],” 102-0397 50 L.Ed.2d 251 punisher punished and to the alike” and be- deciding challenge gas in chamber. “[pjublic opinion cause obviously adverse.” were, course, principles Those the “con reaching conclusion, In the latter the court temporary decency standards as manifest on the only relied fact that two states still Gamble, legislation.” ined modem See permitted use the strap. The Jackson U.S. at 103-04 & n. n. S.Ct. at 290-91 & engaged proper court in the constitutional (holding denial of medical care to analysis, for strap whatever the value of the prisoners pun constitutes cruel and unusual (and prison discipline-might I am cer- states). listing ishment and statutes from insignificant), tain that it would not be Gray quoted extensively court from punishment place method out in late Eighth Gamble’s formulation of the Amend Century society, society 20th American test, applied ment “evolving standards of respect that demands dignity. human decency” in determining that execution gas lethal was constitutional.29 See Hill also By failing analysis to apply employed Lockhart, v. F.Supp. 1394 in punish- Jackson and all other method (E.D.Ark.1992) (rejecting cases, claim that lethal concluding ment instead that the Eighth 28. places holding Even outside the core of exposure Amend- lie to environ protections, evolving we ment’s have found the prison mental tobacco smoke in can violate the decency standards of challenge issue A determinative. Amendment), Eighth Helling nom. v. sub aff'd impose to the decision to the death - -, McKinney, usually penalty raises issues we consider (1993); Hoptowit, L.Ed.2d 22 F.2d reliability proportionali- under the rubrics of (concluding prison's medical care See, Enmund, ty. e.g., Stringer, supra; supra. system violated the Amendment if it Similarly, involving challenges in cases to ac- created conditions which exceeded "what prison gener- tions undertaken we authorities decent"); general public supra would consider ally focus on "deliberate indifference” or unnec- note 5. See, Hudson, essary pain. supra. e.g., all contexts, however, these the courts have under- express I no view on the results the Fifth inquiry always stood the ultimate was Gray, inquiry especially light Circuit's government comported whether action significant among abandoning trend states evolving decency. McKinney standards of Anderson, gas injection. (9th Cir.1991) chamber favor of lethal I 924 F.2d 1508-09 decided, states, (relying Gray on the note that since the number of fact that 45 the federal government, mandating by gas and numerous states execution has cities counties dwindled smoking restricting pub- had enacted statutes ten to three. *43 particular Summary meth- E. rejecting a of states number consequence of little is punishment od of sum, justification for simply is no there pain light on actual majority’s inquiry “sheds no the it the failure to conduct because society’s “evolving into standards whether may practice,” attend not the may that or prohibition decency” hanging. The prohibit 682, majority flouts fundamental the ante at and against barbaric uncivilized methods principles. In method- Eighth Amendment Eighth punishment heart of the lies the other, may cases, all we of-punishment above require us Amendment. The to deter- cases analysis “unnec- to the narrow not limit our particular punishment com- mine whether a majority’s hold- essary question. The pain” standards, they re- ports with societal Pun- the Cruel Unusual ing eviscerates legislative to to quire us to look actions precisely the and does so Clause ishments majority cannot question. answer this designed its it to have area in which was sug- point single holding case even —or greatest force. Finally, were ma- gesting the —otherwise. jority precedent and consider follow evolving hanging violates our stan- whether Consequences The Pernicious decency, con- dards of it would be bound to Majority’s Rule the it a form of execution that has clude that is rejected contrary as unequivocally been damage done to the Constitution standards, that contemporary the reason opinion Until majority’s the is incalculable. rejection practice for its is that this atavistic decision, universally it understood simply provide respect human fails to the for punishment his- central methods —the society dignity that civilized demands. Eighth Amendment— toric concern Wholly apart question from the unneces- absolute, against unwav- the were measured sary pain, Eighth well-established Amend- Now, society. ering of civilized values by ju- principles ment dictate that execution in the Circuit. ‍‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‍longer is no case Ninth held dicial be to constitute cruel today, say with assurance that Until we could Notwithstanding punishment. unusual would we counte- actions, will, under no circumstances majority’s fortunately, re- nation, nance, great everywhere anywhere- in our use main the in this land but in law the Ninth Circuit. punishments flogging, such as barbaric de- whipping, application electrical Unnecessary and II. Wanton Pain parts. ma- private Under the vices to one’s majority Even if the were correct longer jority’s such opinion, we analysis is Amendment limited to states, in the nine Western where assurance question unnecessary pain, its conclusion presumably judicial concern the sole judicial hanging is constitutional would pain the amount of pragmatic one—whether wrong. Hanging totally still be involves a necessary greater than to accom- inflicted necessary high pain, risk far than is more purpose. plish penological drop kill a inmate. If condemned short, death, may strangle prisoner too standard, majority’s any meth- Under However, process. painful a slow and long one which has punishment od of —even hangman also concerned that must be constitutional, be so put been to rest —would is, drop long, prisoner if it too be long pain inflicts is deemed reason- decapitated. As one scholar has ably necessary. we af- Given the deference explained risks involved: legislatures prison ford adminis- to state “long in the drop” advent of the Before the respect questions to such trators —and by hanging century, death late nineteenth given majority’s recognize refusal process painful a slow and was often pain under the most obvi- existence of even strangulation. dropped When the victim is clearly today’s ous decision height from a his vertebrae sufficient circumstances — crushed; uncivilized spinal invites a return the brutal and un- cord dislocated and fol- ways is immediate past. consciousness of our

7Q9 If drop a short time later. the is too lows examine alternative methods execution however, long, decapitation Al- they occurs. and consider might whether avoid the though hanging something pain has become risks of that in hanging. inhere is This times, in may especially an art modern and well be true light fact the that 89 painless properly performed, legislatures evidence have determined that alter- hangings bungled painful abounds: inadvertent native methods are less and more decapitation dropped hanging, when victims are too humane than and that one strangulation they dropped long; Washington when than state other still has a stat- Strangula- permits too short to break their necks. ute on its books that a such form of excep- punishment. tion be the rule rather than Yet the the district court refused supposedly any tion. Unconsciousness is .in- to consider evidence which demonstrated injection is stantaneous even when the neck not that lethal pain avoids risk of the broken, entirely but it is not that hanging. certain associated with Had the district conscious, If job is true. the properly this victim is court done its compared by strangulation extremely hanging death must be with other methods of available exe- cution, painful. it would have been bound to conclude hangings unnecessary some involve Gardner, Indigni- R. Martin Executions and pain, hangings significant and all a involve Eighth ties —An Amendment Assessment of Then, unnecessary pain. risk of assuming Punishment, Inflicting Capital Methods of majority would have still been will- (1978) (emphasis 89 Ohio St.LJ. ing to advance its novel Eighth view of the added). Amendment, it would nevertheless have been slow, painful risk of a The stran- compelled, view, even under that to hold that gulation asphyxiation has existed all hanging is unconstitutional. hanging throughout history. Although cases “long drop” frequency

the reduces the Legal A. Standards deaths, painful such a every risk remains in prisoner hanging through Supreme the will die The Court has clear made that— slow, process. regardless torturous The any evidence devel- bearing other' factors oped that, hearing consistency at made clear even punishment’s with our standards though majority hangings will result in decency punishment will violate the —a “ death, rapid, relatively painless Eighth is a there Amendment if ‘involv[es] the un significant risk given hanging necessary will pain,’” wanton infliction of — Hudson, pain.30 at -, result severe and excessive at 1001 omitted). (citation also Washing- evidence made clear that the Several cases clari hanging protocol ton state virtually meaning identi- fied Amendment’s respects “unnecessary cal in all relevant hanging pain” wanton infliction of procedures slow, painful demonstrate, which have caused standard. As these decisions asphyxiations past.31 in the key Faced inquiry the.type with this us cases before evidence, the necessary.32 duty pain district court was under a is whether If a chart, erroneously procedures drop While district court excluded two occurs in the but important probative drop Washington evidence even roughly offered chart in was regarding practical hang- drop lengths effects of the same as the British chart—the ing, enough Washington there was more than evidence before shorter were than the British lengths weights, longer court to eliminate doubt that lower at the the. painful higher weights. Transcript involves risk of death. torturous at 143. Appendix See A. prisoner challenges 32. Where individual con example, Royal 31. For purport penalty British Committee in duct does to be the strong crime, imposed asphyxiation, formally 1886 found evidence for the an additional deaths, painful inquiry and thus slow and had occurred into the officials’ state of mind is neces hangings sary pain in seven out of the 27 it studied. Tran- to determine whether wanton. Seiter, 294, -, script hanging procedure 102-03. v. Wilson 501 U.S. (1991); comparable procedure L.Ed.2d Jordan Gardner, employed period. (9th Cir.1993) (en during in Great Britain 986 F.2d banc). Where, however, Transcript major prisoner at 106. The difference between can show pain Supreme in Louisiana ex more than an avail- Court stated inflicts punishment Resweber, 459, 67 alternative, rel. Francis v. punishment will violate able *45 (1947) 374, (plurality opin- 91 L.Ed. S.Ct. Punishments Clause. Unusual the Cruel and ion), cruelty against which “The the Constitu- McCleskey, in Court stated Supreme As the cruelty protects is in- tion a convicted man unconstitutionally might be “any punishment punishment, not the herent in method of justifi- penological without if inflicted severe suffering necessary any involved in method 301, at at 107 S.Ct. 1772. cation.” U.S. extinguish humanely.” life employed to Id. punish- methods of two alternative Where added).33 464, (emphasis at at 67 S.Ct. penological goals, same but ment serve the considering a method of execu- In whether greater pain, markedly risk of a one involves Amendment, Eighth then, a tion violates the justification using penological for there is may only pain look court not at Indeed, the of painful method. use the more method, challenged suffering caused nothing painful “is more the more method impossible it for is to determine whether imposition purposeless and needless than the pain by one method is amount of caused Coker, suffering.” at pain and of necessary looking other without at whether 592, (plurality opinion). at 2866 pain. methods cause less A court must con- among sider whether the method is the least penalty, In of the death these the ease light presently cruel in alterna- of available a mode of execution principles require that in tives. As Justice Powell stated his dis- practical In carry pain. risk of the minimal senting opinion opinion in Furman —an addition, unnecessarily it must not “involve adopted by the in which was later Court Kemmler, lingering a death.” torture or any Gregg approve court would meth- “[N]o— Supreme at 10 S.Ct. 933. The U.S. at implementation of of death sentence od upheld penalty has the death because Court in unnecessary cruelty light found to involve goals has that death serves the it concluded presently alternatives.” available Furman retribution, and incapacitation, deterrence. Georgia, 408 U.S. 92 S.Ct. 183-86, Gregg, 428 U.S. at 96 S.Ct. at J., (Powell, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 dis- However, (plurality opinion). it has 2929-31 senting).34 suggested the state inflict never that necessary than to cause death. pain more cruel, unnecessarily In order a meth- it us contrary, To has told pain od of not inflict more execution need extent method execution creates more necessary every employed. time it is than life, necessary extinguish suffering than is example, painful For a method that leads gratuitous in infliction of suf- strangulation “results in one of five is un- out cases fering,” at necessarily id. at if there cruel alternative comparable As hence violates the Amendment. method that causes a amount of punishment formally particular which has been mutilation are a foreseeable unnecessary execution, imposed pain, proscribes for his crime causes method Resweber adopted needlessly state has necessarily fact method these risks are in- unless punishment through ordinary painful method taking volved in method of life. See id. at legislative judicial processes or satisfies the wan- 464, 67 S.Ct. at 376. requirement. tonness 34. And as Justice Brennan stated his dissent- majority support 33. cites Resweber its opinion upon opinion in Glass—an which the only Campbell is entitled to an statement that purports rely heavily en banc court for its purposeful cruelly.” Ante at execution "free firmly pro- within the conclusion—"it ‘historic However, does not 687. Resweber stand adjudication' cess of constitutional for courts to opposite. proposition quite at all— consider, through 'discriminating evaluation' case, Supreme was Court held that it evidence, particular all whether a available prisoner to execute a in the cruel and unusual carrying penalty is means of out the death 'bar- attempt electric chair after first electrocution light currently unnecessary baric' and avail- kill The Court held that failed to him. unforesee- Glass, able alternatives.” 471 U.S. at make an execution cruel able accidents could not J., (Brennan, unusual, dissenting S.Ct. at 2162 from denial but it also made clear that unneces- Furman, certiorari) sary (quoting pain carrying penalty of 430, out the here, J., Where, (Powell, dissenting)). pain S.Ct. at 2824 unconstitutional. risks

7H Washington judicial There are pain hanging one out of 25 cases. First, protocol for this conclusion. when and the reasons State Peni- two tentiary pain protocol involves a risk of that is staffs execution of that punishment virtually possibility has eliminated all greater than the risk involved in alternative unnecessary and wanton pain. infliction of punishments, there will be a number of cases punishment actually pain inflicts have been When we that could avoided. Judicial does not involve 23.. punishment whether a form of examine torture, death, mutilation, lingering *46 unusual, limited to cruel we are not unnecessary and wanton pain. infliction of probable punish- looking at the effect of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of at us; Law particular on the ment case before fre- findings clearly contrary 6. These were look, well, quently we as effect on hearing both to the evidence at adduced Second, general. punishment cases (cid:127) hearing and to the law. The evidence at the higher causing phys- involves a which risk of that hanging left no doubt of entails a risk higher pain necessarily will de- ical cause a slow, painful strangulation. has This risk gree psychological pain actual in all cases. of hanging protocols existed under all used always A condemned inmate will feel some fanciful, throughout history, simply and it is fear, anxiety degree anticipation, of as he worse, or to conclude that Washington execution, but, awaits he knows he protocol, substantially as which the same lingér dying, may pain intense he is before procedures, these will eliminate this risk. ever-increasing subject “to a fate of fear and Indeed, the evidence made clear that Trop, 356 distress.” U.S. at S.Ct. at Washington hanging protocol state will Thus, (plurality opinion). if a 598-99 state slow, little if on the risk of painful effect defendants, adopt to execute it must chooses Thus, death. an examination of the record a method of execution that minimizes permits before the court district no alterna- any person put risk that who is to death will tive to a reversal district court’s con- unnecessary Otherwise, pain.35 suffer trary ground on findings of clear error. Eighth have violated will Amend- Moreover, indisputable faced with the fact ment.36 hanging Washington —even —involves death, painful some risk of the district Analysis B. required court was determine whether court, necessary. risk was Yet the district Following hearing evidentiary we or- erroneously excluding portion addition of remand, in our dered limited the District testimony by Campbell offered regarding issued findings Court written fact and hanging, the actual effects also refused criti- conclusions law. The district court’s consider which would evidence have shown findings cal were as follows: injection substantially that lethal entails few- Washington judicial hanging The 8. er risks does that form of than execution. protocol Washington and the information, Peni- State Without this the district court tentiary protocol staff’s execution of that absolutely had no basis for concluding that virtually has eliminated possibility all of a hanging in creates no unneces- lingering Thus, or sary tortured death. pain. risk of the district court’s proposi- say 35. there were If doubt about this This is not one method tion, is resolved Justice Brennan’s dissent satisfy Eighth execution will Amendment Glass, denial from of certiorаri in which the any given point in time. There well majority purports. setting rely as forth the roughly several methods execution which are “methodology standards for sent In his review”. dis- Eighth equivalent perspec- Amendment (which I assume is now the law of the however, Where, tive. a method of execution circuit), Justice that "[Tlhe Brennan stated presents substantially greater risks than alterna- that, requires Amendment much as methods, tive it is unconstitutional. humanly possible, a chosen method execution violence, unnecessary pain, the risk of minimize Glass, and mutilation.” 471 U.S. at at 2163. variety had See ante at 683-84. no basis fact mechanisms. findings and conclusions any given hanging, one or more —but not or law.37 necessarily pathways all —of these will lead clearly nature of the district erroneous biological to death. Because individual exemplified factual determinations court’s differences, however, impossible it is to de- finding: present- following “Petitioner by the pathway before an execution which termine judicial hanging that a carried ed no evidence prisoner. will be the one that kills the Tran- Army's States execu- under the United out 105-06; Indeed, it script at 351-53. is often decapita- in a regulation resulted tion ever impossible an execution to determine death, torture, tion, the unneces- lingering after pathway actually prisoner. killed Findings pain.” sary infliction and wanton Transcript at 102-03. ludi- finding 2. This and Conclusions presented no evi- crous. course Of difficulty determining pathway hanging carried out under the dence that actually complicates that will lead decapita- regulations resulted in a Army’s the issue whether leads to torture *47 Army never the has carried tion —because death, lingering or a because some the regulations. hanging a under these See out judicial hangings in pathways death cause quote portion I Espy Deposition 29. this quick- unconsciousness and death much more simply decision to illus- the district court’s may ly than others. While the issue be way judge the the district went about trate that complicated, there can be no doubt the obligations performing his constitutional in clearly determining district court erred critically proceeding. important this always hanging virtually that result in would opin- that the district court’s end result was “immediate or near immediate” unconscious- legal series of factual and ion contains a Findings of ness or death. Fact and Conclu- clearly contrary that are both to conclusions particular, In sions of Law at 4. the district particularly the law. It is the record and to appears hanging court concluded that in- in a ease regrettable that this occurred ordinarily would result occlusion the the volving imposition death sentence. arteries, leading carotid to unconsciousness Findings within 6 12 seconds. See of Fact Compelling Regarding 1. The Evidence just and Conclusions of Law at 6. This is Pain Existence of wrong. Although plain occlusion arterial every absolutely question that There is pathway likely to lead which most hanging prisoner a risk that the will involves hang- in a near-immediate unconsciousness strangle immediately, but will not die instead ing, presented the evidence at the evidentia- asphyxiate process, death. This which ry hearing made clear that it is also the minutes, extremely may pain- take several single unlikely pathway most to occur under only prisoner experience ful. Not does the Washington protocol.38 victim, strangulation pain by any felt but dangling he does so while at the end of a developed The medical evidence at the evi- rope, after a trauma has been inflicted severe dentiary hearing is too detailed to discuss in spine. Although a on his neck and such slow However, body this opinion. full only painful will occur in a com- death the record shows that is a fair there chance cases, every percentage of paratively small through death not occur will rela- significant single hanging involves a risk that tively quick painless pathway of arterial it occur. will occlusion, slow, through but instead a tortu- involving presented hearing pathway asphyxiation. rous In- The evidence deed, majority rightly pathway inheres made this clear. As risk of such notes, A, through every Appendix hanging hanging. p. can cause death infra A, fully why dangling rope, experiences Appendix end of a 37. In I more demonstrate as he contrary findings clearly the district were court's effects of severe trauma. The district court to the record. should have considered whether means of unnecessary render even execution could event, twelve must six to seconds seem pain. amount of prisoner exceedingly long to a time conscious Moreover, minutes). knowledge lasting 722-24. the mere deal thirteen Although this painful is sufficient in death itself evidence direct evidence relat- psycho- inmate hanging cause the condemned severe to the risk that will cause a reasons, also, death, logical pain. lingering For these the court excluded it because practice judicial hanging every violates the did not know detail of the procedures Amеndment. used in hangings. Camp- these least, very however, bell did know at the surprising, This conclusion is not because bungléd hangings these occurred after the every jurisdiction that has ever used long drop (designed to minimize the risk of as a method of has execution understood strangulation) slow universally had become painful the risk of and torturous death exists. employed. The district unquestionably court pris- Even states other which have executed refusing abused its discretion in to admit this by hanging century oners in this have em- highly probative evidence.' ployed procedures contemplate did, however, The district court as does the might actually quite take some time. majority, rely heavily on its conclusions re- Duffy, As Clinton the former warden at San garding what happened during hang- the one Quentin, procedures: once described these ing that has occurred in this nation prisoner dangling remains from the past three decades. Aside from the fact that rope end of the for from 8 to 14 (if minutes painless hanging one pain- fact was doctor, up

before the who less) has climbed prove absolutely nothing about small ladder and listens his heart beat hanging produces whether significant num- *48 stethoscope, pronounces with a him painful ber of example, pain- deaths —for one dead.... ful death out four or five—reliance on the Westley hanging’ Alan Dodd constitutes sim- legal witnesses are dismissed after ply Campbell’s rights one further violation of having signed the usual witness forms. to a fair proceeding. The state controlled all However, body of the condemned is relating the information to Dodd’s execu- hanging gallows left below the for an addi- by limiting tion access to the execution to tional 15 to 20 minutes. This is to assure people choosing allowing only of its its in charge ample those time has expert own to autopsy conduct an on him. elapsed cutting rope before in order to upon remedy manipu- Called the state’s make certain of death. information, lation of the district court re- Gardner, supra, (quoting at 121 Duf- Campbell’s Clinton fused motion to have Dodd’s - fy). Despite evidentiary hanging the fact that videotaped. Although the district hearing jury, was not conducted before a taping court concluded that such —which district court excluded under Federal Rule of develop would have enabled any providing Evidence 403 right evidence exam- far fairer record —would violate Dodd’s slow, ples painful strangulations privacy, objec- which had any Dodd had never raised past in hangings (including occurred only one or- tion to it. It was the state that did.39 aware, judge permitted 39. At the same time the district which I am the courts have held that right privacy, the state to raise persons right Dodd's he to be executed in the future have a refused to allow next friend to raise videotape another’s execution in order to de- rights, including important Dodd’s the most con- velop evidence of the effects of that method. See right right stitutional Gomez, of all—the not to be execut- MHP, Fierro v. No. C-92-1482 1992 WL unlawfully. judge's ed The district (N.D.Cal. conduct in 1992) April (granting mo- refusing anyone to allow but Dodd himself to videotape tion to tion); Harris's execu- Robert Alton rights doing assert his when so would hinder his Judge Videotaping see also U.S. OKs execution, allowing while the state to assert those Execution, Times, Angeles Los December rights impediments Camp- in order to remove 1993, p. (reporting A21 that a federal District execution, exceedingly bell’s difficult to har- Judge Maryland videotaping ordered the of the monize. Thanos, gas execution lethal of John Frederick waves, monitoring judges as well as the Other district of his brain who have been faced with nearly constitutionality gas entirely identical because "the chamber situations taken an approach judge question' different from that of the district is a ‘serious that should be decided on evidence'.”). possible this case. In the other similar cases of 'the best completely circumstances, ipse These dixit statements simply no there is Under the before the will all of the evidence inconsistent concluding that the state- for rational basis court, The official-sound- district however. pro- of the Dodd evidence generated (which majority in- Field Instruction hanging will not any indication vides methodology derived us is a “detailed forms pp. unnecessary pain. 723- cause infra 633-15,” Army Regulation No. from U.S. 683) hardly some set of scientific ante at suggest hanging will I not mean do pos- magically eliminates all equations which death, or painful always a slow and cause strangulation. It is sibility decapitation or most of the results will occur that these even operating 12-page typed set of simply a Campbell’s expert witnesses Even time. during prison officials to follow guidelines for rapid uncon- hanging will lead to agreed that It contains no scientific refer- an execution. majority of cases. and death sciousness fact, ences, and, very it forth little of sets See, (testimony of Transcript at 154-55 e.g., taking for human life. procedures actual James). However, before the evidence Dr. Instead, as the with such issues dеals supported overwhelmingly court the district housing an inmate sentenced to location the risk of conclusion that the common sense death, present at an that can be the staff every slow, asphyxiation exists painful execution, privileges, telephone visitation and testimony at Only by ignoring the hanging. relations, moving procedures for media hearing district evidentiary could the cell, holding execution the inmate to the contrary conclusion. court have reached control, final meal. and the crowd hearing presented at The evidence the Wash- 2. The Lack Probativeness of protocol parts of the that the crucial showed ington Protocol military uncritically copied from a 1959 were which had never been used manual execution also the district court The evidence before abandoned. state and has since been judicial made clear expert single medical did not consult (otherwise as the hanging protocol known protocol, and it did not even developing the *49 Instruction) virtually no effect Field will have methodology the attempt what to discover risk, indistinguishable in it is on this because creating military employed its had proce- hanging respects from the all relevant addition, the state did not procedures. strangulation painful to dures which have led developments in foren- account of recent take majority past. Reading the deaths in the com- show that the more pathology sic that opinion, might get the idea one judicial hanging pathways death mon Washington protocol consists of detailed experts had what medical are different from varying rope series of instructions for A, infra, pp. thought Appendix in 1959. See a vari- drop depending on width and distance 724-25. might decapitation ety of factors which make hearing at the also showed The evidence likely particular prisoner in a more or less spe- could not detect prison that authorities according medical and scientific to the latest posed by physical strangulation risks majority the dis- cial knowledge. Both the and prisoners, nor characteristics of individual argue protocol has elimi- trict court protocol to they effectively alter the virtually decapitation. all See could nated risk of (“[T]he is be- differences. This compels account for these at n. evidence ante only relatively un- employs prison decapitation cause [of the conclusion that the risk task of physician’s assistants much trained asphyxiation] has been minimized as or pris- inspection conducting a medical through adoption of the Field possible physical charac- the crucial Instruction.”); oner and because Findings of Fact and Conclu- (“The strangulation risks of- judi- which affect Washington teristics sions of Law at 2-3 by highly even cannot be detected ten hanging protocol cial and the The evidence personnel. medical of that trained Penitentiary staffs execution State clearly protocol would showed that virtually possibili- all protocol has eliminated risk of slow stran- virtually no on the ty decapitation.”). effect majority’s Campbell great on this gulation. deposition reliance offered a deal of testimony relating injection. constituted clear error. to lethal document This testimony was unrefuted —made —which injection poses substantially clear that lethal District Court’s 3. The Perverse Refusal painful lingering less risk of a and death than Regarding Evidence Alterna- Consider hanging.41 does Both Longstreth Dr. Methods tive Execution Graney injection Dr. signifi- noted lethal hang- Faced with the undeniable fact cantly prisoner decreases the risk that in- ing involves a risk that the condemned pain, drug sequence will feel because the death, painful mate will die a slow and injection begins lethal with a sedative which required court district to consider always guarantees almost immediate loss necessary. whether this risk was Because Graney 62-63; Deposition consciousness. at impossible a determination such without Longstreth Deposition at 63-65. As noted considering whether of execu- other m'ethods above, many hang- there are cases which risk, significantly tion avoid lessen this ing cause does not immediate loss con- required court was district to consider sciousness, although it does cause immediate merits of of exe- relative alternative methods spinal damage paralysis. cord In these Yet it refused to cution. consider evi- cases, hanging injection is like a lethal with- relating dence method of execution sedative, out the and it lingering causes “a hanging. Transcript than other See 290- Kemmler, death.” particular, 91. In the court refused allow prolonged at 933. Because the risk of suffer- present any testimony Campbell live by employing can be eliminated the lethal showing injection present that lethal does not injection technique, unnecessary it is to sub- decapitation risks of painful ject prisoners to that risk. For that reason does, hanging it refused сonsider alone, hanging is unconstitutional. deposition testimony on this issue which Campbell hanging unnecessary submitted. Because the district The fact that causes showing prevented pain court graphically a number occasions is injection lethal execution involves less current illustrated standards of medical pain by hanging, precluded execution Longstreth than research. As both Dr. and Dr. testified, showing pain' Graney him from university associated or scientific hanging unnecessary journal the termi- allow experiment in which of human by hanging. nation life. Justice Powell would animals euthanized were Be- surely surprised have been district pain at the cause creates a risk of Furman, rulings. paralysis, reliably court’s 408 U.S. at does not lead to imme- *50 430, (Powell, J., unconsciousness, dissenting) satisfy 92 S.Ct. at 2824 diate it would not (“[NJo approve any court would method contemporary standards of research ethics. implementation Instead, of the death found agencies sentence universities and other do- unnecessary cruelty light killing involve that research involves the of ani- alternatives.”). presently require available He would mals that a sedative be administered by first, even injection. have been more the ma- astonished the animal lethal cursory jority’s unexplained Longstreth Deposition Graney endorse- at 63-65. De- of them.40 position ment at 64-65.42 40.Indeed, expect ap- say one injection poses different far 41. This is not that lethal no proach purports majority from an pain, injection en banc that risks of or that lethal is necessari- Heckler, adopt ly Chaney Justice Brennan's "method- standards for constitutional. Glass, 1084, (D.C.Cir.1983) ology (noting review.” See 471 U.S. at F.2d 1177-78 evi- (urging 'discriminating suggesting injection poses at 2162 S.Ct. "a evalua- dence that lethal its evidence, particu- pain), grounds, of all own rev'd tion' available risks of on other whether S.Ct. carrying penalty U.S. 84 L.Ed.2d 714 lar means out the is unnecessary light currently 'barbaric' alternatives") omitted) (citation (em- exception available phasis 42. The one occurs where the sedative added); id. at at 2168 105 S.Ct. would interfere with the research to be done case, (engaging analysis by comparing in such an elec- after the animal’s death. In such a gas injection). trocution to lethal killed lethal animal will be some other means that majority’s wholly unsup- medical researchers are refusal to so hold is practices of

These portable. “objective exactly kind of evidence of the majority

pain on which the states involved” III. Conclusion rely. They Ante at 682. show we should clearly hanging greater involves a quite mutilative, violent, Hanging is barbaric death, necessary pain than to cause risk of is procedure resoundingly reject- that has been injection such as lethal because alternatives society. Indeed, American our ed modern causing that result without these can achieve society began rejecting it over a hundred However, court years the district refused ago. risks. Even from the risks of aside death, decapitation lingering, painful of this information. See Tran- consider “ hanging simply court inconsistent ‘the script 290-91. The thus had no at ’man, dignity concept which is the ‘basic finding hang- or for its in fact law basis underlying Amendment.’” unnecessary pain. no risk of ing presents Gregg, at at 96 S.Ct. majority concludes that district JJ.) Stewart, Powell, Stevens, (opinion of refusing to did not err in consider court (quoting Trop, 356 at at U.S. injection. relating to lethal evidence 597). shows abso- The state states, majority correctly, hearing lutely respect dignity no human when question involved of wheth- this case stretching person by seeks kill a his neck hanging rope er was unconstitutional. But there spine of a that his will be the end so expla- yet exactly goal torn simply plausible apart; can be rational judicial assertion, hanging. participant majority’s One veteran for the next nation typical way: hanging described a injection relative merits of lethal are “[t]he Ante question.” to this at 687.43 trap dangles irrelevant springs When the he at the pain rope. involved times The risk alternative end of the There are when has not obviously extremely neck been broken and the of execution is means prisoner strangles eyes pop to death. His the question essential —to relevant —indeed head, tongue of his almost out swells unnecessary hanging creates an whether mouth, protrudes from his his neck impossible pain. simply It is con- risk of broken, rope many and the times hanging sider whether risks involved in large portions and flesh takes of skin necessary considering without whether the side of the face that the noose on. inflicting other methods death avoid these urinates, defecates, He he droppings showing injection By pres- that lethal risks. on, floor fall to the while witnesses look substantially pain hang- ents risk of than less almost all one or and at executions more ing, Campbell in- has shown helped faint or have to be out of the wit- necessary suffering than volves more “the room. ness employed involved in method to extin- Gardner, supra, (quoting at 121 Warden Resweber, guish humanely.” life Duffy). Clinton at 376. The district court un- questionably is, as a matter of doubt, errеd law Hanging slightest without the *51 evidence, refusing layman’s to consider this and the “cruel and unusual” —in terms and pain, guillotine. pain they minimizes such as the See Gra- native methods of and the execution ney Deposition at 65. cause. event, any any dispute In about the intended majority opinion nothing 43. The does more than scope Camp- of the remand is irrelevant. order confuse the issue when it claims dis- "[t]he bell under a is entitled the Amendment to interpreted precise- court remand trict our order light hanging, determination whether ly at 687. as it was intended.” Ante For one alternatives, unnecessarily pain. inflicts Wheth- thing, interpret the district court did not our misreading er court the district erred in our remand order as least some of us it. intended preventing or we Certainly, remand order erred in there been no would have reason for engaging any district court from in the constitutional- of us to assume that determination of ly inquiry, hanging unnecessary pain Campbell not had whether could mandated has a fair inflicts adjudication be conducted without consideration of alter- or full his constitutional claim. compelled answer have no will sense. No other doubt we be the constitutional —if enlight- today day perform claim to be an then some is consistent with our our —to duty In and civilized nation. Anno Domini under the Constitution: will ened We be required every Washington state and most oth- to inform and when almost Montana rejected savage the state not take the of a nations have such a and life er citizens, by citizen so cruel and unusual a killing its means. barbaric method of question, despite Without and good say hang- decision of court could conscience my colleagues, hanging violates the “evolving Constitu- ing comports our standards of I tion. dissent. decency.” that in It is inconceivable to me proud country,

one corner of our vast and a Appendix Developed A—The Facts at the single judicial willing circuit is to violate its Evidentiary Hearing permit un- obligations constitutional presented clearly The evidence on remand long practice outmoded conscionable and hanging significant showed that creates a exist. decapitation risk both of asphyxi- and of slow ation. The evidence also showed that public a time when fear of crime hanging protocol is essen- high, may violence is it be understandable tially reducing useless in these risks. The judges that some will on occasion close their findings protocol district court’s has Constitution, eyes to the dictates of the virtually eliminated all decapitation risk of employ whatever form of rationalization or lingering completely contrary death are self-deception will lead them the result presented hearing to the evidence at the Here, however, they expedient. there deem clearly thus erroneous. majority’s for the is not even such excuse n actions. The issue before us is not whether Decapitation A. The Risk of executed, only but will notes, majority theAs the earliest methods by put will be to death. method which he drop. involved little or no Thus, majority’s disregard all decision to English drop used this so-called short meth- precedent simply Supreme relevant Court exclusively Century, until od the mid-19th Still, inexplicable. democracy proved has re- developed involving when the Irish a method grown has silient and our Constitution By longer drop. a much the end of 19th stronger passed, notwithstanding as time has Century, the British had abandoned the temporary setbacks at the hands of courts entirely. drop They short instead method objectives. by political motivated on occasion employed procedure involving drop , grown stronger part It has because the according weight length which varied judiciary proved on whole has to be prisoner. The executioner would de- courageous, independent, fair minded. length drop by looking up termine usually The courts have corrected their own prisoner’s weight setting on table and they long sins and errors before became drop length weight. indicated for that ease, others, In this as in irremediable. very Washington employs a similar method ultimately emerge un- Constitution will hanging, drop length/weight and its table scathed. It is this court that will be quite by British similar to the one used majority today. what the does diminished Century, although the late 19th there after Transcript at are some differences. See decision, today’s Until we reverse our cir- drop reputation cuit The British abandoned the short be- will have blotch its painful I slow be a constant embarrassment to us all. cause often led will long long drop prob- had some hope that before we will be able to suffocation. The own, energy comprehend lems of its however. While the what has for some time been *52 by apparent dropping prisoner of the civilized created several feet to most of rest not, causing quick in Supreme world. If will un- was much more effective a Court death, in doubtedly required explain meaning it was also much more effective be us, Despite decapitating prisoner. the de- of the Amendment either risks, event, that capitation I the British concluded this case or some other. negligi- long drop was a more humane form evidence that there was more than a by decapitation Washington’s ble risk of drop. the short As stated under hanging than judicial hanging protocol.” Findings of Fact Royal Committee: However, of Law at Conclusions 6-7. desirous, however, recording areWe solid, presented highly in fact cred- respect “decapitations,” opinion our significant decapi- ible evidence a risk of culprit if the condition of the is such Washington’s protocol. tation under exists suggest as to the risk on the one hand of Campbell’s expert witnesses had studied the or, other, decapitation, on the of death judicial hanging, past mechanics of as well as i.e., pain needlessly pro- strangulation, hangings decapitation, they which led to longed, saying we' have no hesitation fully persuasively explained why hang- decapitation the risk of should be Washington protocol— under the —even pain, incurred. It involves no for the cul- prisoners’ created risk heads would be unconscious; prit already whereas the simply cut off. The state’s witnesses testi- has, public fear of we have censure conclusory fied terms that . stated, already on several led to occasions present would not such a risk. unnecessary prolongation of his suffer- they absolutely Yet had for basis these ings. they were not familiar with the conclusions— protocol, literature, the medical or historical Report Appointed of the to In- Committee examples hangings decapita- which caused quire Capital into the Execution Sentences brought tion. Once this information was (1886). Although Royal xiii Committee experts, they the attention of the state’s uni- long drop understood that a created a risk of formly decapitation admitted that the risk of decapitation, it decided that this risk was greater they thought. than had earlier taking worth where the alternative —a It present was the state which failed to credi- drop short an increased risk of —created evidence, Campbell. ble The district slow, painful strangulation.44 findings contrary clearly court’s were Washington employs long drop, Because erroneous. surprise decapi it comes as no that a risk of James, Deryk registrar Dr. senior in fo- Washington hanging tation exists under the pathology rensic at the Wales Institute of Indeed, procedure. every single expert who Medicine, “very Forensic testified that it is evidentiary hearing testified at the acknowl likely” Washington hanging protocol that the edged point at one or another that some produce decapi- will one or more instances of prisoners hanged Washington who are implemented regularly tation if it is over the See, decapitated. e.g., Transcript at twenty years. next ten or Transcript at 120. 43, 101-02, (testimony Campbell’s 120-21 James, groundbreaking Dr. who conducted (testi James); Deryk witness Dr. id. at 273 study judicial of the mechanisms of death mony Zumwalt); of State’s Dr. witness Ross hanging,45 reached this conclusion com- (testimony id. at 332 of State’s witness Dr. paring Washington protocol with those Reay); (testimony Donald id. at hanging protocols decapita- which have led to Boyd Stephens); State’s witness Dr. id. at past: tion in the 477-78, 480, 490-91, (testimony Camp drops previ- [I]f one looks that have Tencer). bell’s witness Dr. Allen ously decapitation weights caused and the Despite involved, testimony, people district court the thickness of the Campbell “presented if, found rope, example, people no credible then for those notes, majority correctly, Royal strangulation, long drop risking decapi- 44. The tion Committee "studied the relative merits of the hardly tation can be considered "humane.” long drop, long drop short and and concluded a majority was more humane.” Ante 684. The Ryk Nasmyth-Jones, 45. See James & Rachel Royal fails to mention that reached this conclusion because it felt that Committee Cervical Occurrence Fractures in Victims decap- Hanging, Judicial 54 Forensic Science Int’l strangulation. itation was better than Under to- majority study cites this ante at day's decency, standards of where methods exist 684 n. 13. killing prisoners decapita- without risk of *53 now, hanged guarantee hanged then were much else there to that were the neck stay together. just I using given, the table think one of them will It’s musculature. longer drop, given have been would really trying you’re I’m walking What — slightly have been a shorter other would very having fine line here between drop, I think both of those would be at but enough energy enough pull and force to high decapitation. risk of things apart, energy but not too much or catastrophic, too much force to create a Transcript at 121. quote, injury, which would be the neck— F. elaborated on Dr. Dr. Allen Tencer actually coming the head off. The reason conclusions. Dr. Tencer is Director James’s spine is the is itself the structure that Laboratory of the Biomechanics at Harbor- by greater absorbs far the amount of the Hospital, professor as a in the view as wеll energy. University Washington’s Departments Q. protocol And is the set forth Orthopedic Surgery Engi- and Mechanical manual, Washington weight neering Bioengineering. and its Center length drop, sufficient to assure that specializes in of the He the biomechanics you’ve just spoken fine balance that of? spine spinal generally trauma. See A. No. studying Transcript at 458-62. After Transcript at 490-91. Washington hanging protocol,46 details of the possibility Dr. Tencer concluded that a By testimony contrast with the detailed decapitation Transcript remained. at 477. Tencer, quite Doctors James and which was Indeed, explained, Washington proto- he evidently good study based on a deal of actually possibility col enhanced the of de- knowledge concerning judicial hanging and capitation by rope requiring the to be treated death, processes by it causes elasticity.47 explained to remove its As he on testimony experts simply the state’s direct examination: example, not For Dr. Zum- credible. Ross walt, the chief medical examiner for the state Q. rope And what is the effect if the is Mexico, decapitation of New testified that

treated, be, as it is recommended to as set “absolutely impossible,” was not Washington protocol, forth in the happen But I don’t see how could elasticity possible end that as much length drop, based on that the noose rope? from the removed policy diameter as described and used Well, happens your system, A. what system. state criminal stiffer, rope energy if the more Transcript Dr. Zumwalt did at 236-37. Yet higher spine. force is delivered to the explain drop length it was about what Q. any impact Does that have on the that led him to this conclu- noose diameter decapitation likelihood that a would occur sion. judicial hanging? in a Indeed, quite the cross-examination made Yes, you’re trying A. because when clear that Dr. Zumwalt had no basis whatso- cross, injury apparently being achieve the ever for his conclusions. On Dr. Zum- is, here, regarding pull spine achieved walt that his conclusion stated it, judicial hanging apart, you very decapitations as soon as do there isn’t rareness of Indeed, familiarity egregious example, Dr. harm. take the most Dr. Tencer evidenced his To protocol fluency Washington's refer- Reay testimony “particularly Donald —whose ring specific throughout elements of it (see Findings court of Fact aided” the district testimony explaining how these elements 5-6) and Conclusions of Law at that he —testified See, e.g., factored in to his ultimate conclusions. had not reviewed the table the state used to Transcript at 481-82. Dr. Tencer’s evident un- lengths drop and that he had not done determine derstanding Washing- of the ins and outs of the correlating drop length body research into protocol compares favorably striking- ton ly —and weight. Transcript at 311-12. testimony experts. of the state’s —with They rarely specific if ever referred to the details rope to reduce the risk of slow 47. The is treated protocol, simply and instead made conclu- soiy strangulation. statements that See ante at 685. not cause *54 experience thought. Transcript at 271- sources: Ms he had earlier on two was based 73.49 autopsies on automobile accident performing decapitated, and the had been

victims who Reay, King testimony of Dr. Donald consideration of what forces “calculation examiner, County’s any- chief medical judicial hanging.” in a I would occur think conclusory. thing even more baseless Transcript at 267. Yet Dr. Zumwalt admit- unlikely Reay Dr. testified that it was experience with automobile acci- ted that his protocol state execution actually gave ability him to victims dent decapitation: lead to would much force is sufficient to determine how Doctor, Q. directing your attention produce decapitation.48 Dr. Zumwalt also again Respondent’s ExMbit No. once attempt had made no admitted that he protocol. If the which is the execution investigate any of the facts or medical litera- provisions policy of that are followed rela- regarding decapitations noose, cetera, wMch had oc- weaving ture again tive et appropriate drop length is deter- hangings. Transcript and the previous curred in mined, you likely' how do think it is that a colleague informed Dr. at 270-73. When decapitation will occur? decapitation Zumwalt that a had occurred during hanging of Black Ketchum in Jack likely, decapitation A. I don’t think Mexico, home state of New he neck, Dr. Zumwalt’s certainly. Doing examining the — slightest today already, make effort to and I did this twice it’s a did not even structure, body very quite resilient acquaint himself with the facts of that case. resilient. When, hearing, Campbell’s counsel at the photographs Dr. Zumwalt several showed Q. you deny though, But don’t sir— decapitation first time Dr. the Ketchum me, Doctor, decapitations excuse some —the judicial hang- Zumwalt had seen them —Dr. Zumwalt al- have occurred as a result ings? opmion decápitation earlier tеred his hanging. Noting inherent in that Ket- risks happened. I A. It could have think drop chum’s involved similar you could fashion a circumstance where it

length rope width to that the Wash- might happen. You could choose the vic- ington protocol, Dr. Zumwalt admitted that stature; physical tim’s the structure would ' greater decapitation risk of than there was a make a difference. you ability your experience Q. Q. [where 48. And in those cases automobile So have no passengers decapitated] you pro- are do to calibrate the amount of force sufficient case, ability decapitation average you? to calculate the amount of force that was duce do actually successfully right, used amount of That’s I force A. do not. —the added). decapitation? Transcript (emphasis that caused the at 268-69 No, impossible, A. that would be because not admissions, Despite these Dr. Zumwalt re- you talking speeds about the and mass baseless, turned on redirect to his earlier conclu- head, body you’re talking but about sory opmion: how much force is directed over how much sur- neck, body, applied [T]he face area when the actual force strikes the amount of force edge sharp relatively protocol, whether it was a blunt based on that is not sufficient to edge. decapitation, large cause and I think there is a. know, you you margin Q. don’t all that So since can of error there between the amount of is, necessary quick painless say cases, whatever amount force was in those force to cause a amount, decapitation? produce it was sufficient to death and the of force that would be necessary decapitation. Yes. to cause And that I A. people following stay you, protocol Q. And don’t see the who aren’t think within decapitated go margin. in automobile accidents who live, you? Transcript opinion simply not do 296. This No, generally light A. we don’t see the survivors of credible in Dr. Zumwalt’s earlier testimo- ny accidents. that he did know how much force was automobile not you anything Q. say decapitation So can’t about sufficient to cause and that he had produce prior hangings studied which had resulted in amount force that is sufficient decapitation, you? decapitation can to determine what factors led decapitation. A. No. *55 any drop Doctor, lengths, A. I have not done drop lengths that are Q. anything of that sort. Respondent’s Exhibit provided for seven, corresponding it relates to a page as Zumwalt, then, Transcript at 311.50 Like Dr. you executing body weight, do believe that Reay absolutely Dr. had no basis for his weights dropping of those person Washington hanging conclusion that the state lengths likely to corresponding them the protocol decapita- would not create a risk of decapitation? result seriously tion. had not reviewed the He No, drops I think those would A. don’t protocol, any and he had not consulted of the decapitation. produce judicial hanging any literature on or done subject.51 his own research on the Reay gave no Transcript at 322-23. Dr. explanation. further Boyd Stephens, Dr. Francisco San examiner, medical had at least reviewed responses, might expect that one Given judicial some of the medical literature on Washington actually he had reviewed testimony hanging, but his was also the most protocol perhaps done some research or equivocal experts. of all of the state’s On drop effects of different regarding the examination, thought direct he stated that he weights. lengths people of different Yet decapitation very unlikely “a would be necessary perform of this he did Washington protocol.52 It event” under preparation: cross-examination, however, became clear on Reay, you op- Stephens’s opinion on a Q. Doctor have had an that Dr. was based coming today misunderstanding of the of the portunity prior to to Court details Wash- lengths ington protocol. coming to his conclusion drop that correlate review weights page regarding Washington set forth on seven the risks under protocol, Stephens had relied on what he exhibit? Dr. thought protocol provid- fact that the was the They I A. have been available me. drop length in the based on ed for variations have not studied them. prisoner. differences of the On anatomical cross-examination, Q. Have You have not studied them. admitted that he had he Stephens you any type Finally, of research into Dr. conducted been mistaken.53 length forthrightly acknowledged data on correlating body weight drop judicial judicial hanging are so limited that all of his hangings? Well, exchange of variables that occurred later: A. there are a number 50. A similar hanging, many in a of which can be re- occur Reay, you Q. conducted Doctor potentially There will viewed and controlled. judicial hangings? into the field of research perceived always are not be some variables that No, absolutely A. not. looking at the or not controlled. I think that in papers you Q. Have reviewed the research protocol that the likelihood of as written now writings judicial hangings related to or other extremely unlikely. decapitation small supplied you by attorneys which were it's I don’t that one could state that think parties for either of the in this case? impossible, guidelines as set but I believe material, have had the A. I have not had—I very unlikely event. forth would make this a spent any but I haven’t time with it. Transcript 421. Transcript at 332. you 53.Q. Were mistaken? Zumwalt, Reay 51. Like Dr. Dr. also had not seen decapitation photographs of Ketchum’s be- proto- is included in other A. I think so. That hearing. Campbell’s When counsel fore the cols, you’re right, that it is not in but I believe photographs hearing, him these at the showed Washington directives. decapita- Reay Dr. altered his view of the risks of pro- Transcript Even at 426. tion, stating possible that "I think it’s on the variations, provided the testi- tocol had for such photographs." Transcript at 332. basis of these persuasively mony of Drs. James and Tencer why impossible per- explained for medical it is Q.Doctor, properly all question, you take account of last Do have an sonnel to detect 52. idiosyncracies prisoner’s opinion degree anatomical within a reasonable of medical of a decapitation. certainty likely decapitation the risk of thus to avoid how infra Washington's protocol? p. 725. occur under good past un- hangings entailed a measure of other evidence of the results of conclusions circumstances, Transcript at 448-49. Under these the dis- certainty. exists. refusing trict court abused discretion in its improperly court also excluded The district photographs. admit the photographs of the execution of Black Jack whole, testimony Taken as a admitted Ketehum, hanged in New Mexico in who was hearing at the made clear that en- n photographs clearly These showed *56 significant decapitation, tails risk of even as decapitated. had been that Ketehum practiced Washington. pho- The Ketehum photographs these un- district court excluded tographs would have made this fact even Rule Evidence which der Federal more clear. The state’s baseless and conclu- court to exclude relevant evidence if allows a sory testimony contrary simply not did substantially probative value is out- “its any weight deserve in the District Court’s by danger prejudice, weighed of unfair decision. issues, misleading confusion of the or jury, by delay, of undue or considerations Slow, B. The Risk Death Painful time, presentation or needless waste of “hanging The district court concluded that cumulative evidence.” Becausé did Washington procedure under the would re- width, drop length, rope not the exact know arteries, sult occlusion of the carotid caus- forth, hanging, used in the Ketehum and so seconds, unconsciousness within 6 to court concluded that the district rele- causing quick painless and thereafter photographs substantially vance Findings death.” of Fact and Conclusions of by outweighed countervailing considerations. However, ig- Law at 6. the district court persuasive nored the and unrefuted testimo- However, Campbell great provide did ny Washington protocol that the would not - procedures deal of information about cause sufficient arterial occlusion to lead to hanging. Ketehum used While this nearly immediate unconsciousness all specific not information was as as the Wash- testimony cases. This made clear that a risk Instruction, ington Field it did indicate that remains, asphyxiation and that death procedures hanging used in the Ketehum through pathway involving asphyxiation quite Washing- to those were similar used might take several minutes. today. example, Campbell For ton was able testimony The district court heard placement discern the knot in the Ket- .to unconsciousness would occur within to .six execution, provide general chum as well as to hanging twelve seconds caused a com- parameters rope drop for the width arteries,54 plete occlusion the carotid length, general as as a well estimate of Ket- figure to experi- six twelve second came from weight. Transcript chum’s expert Reay ments the state’s Dr. conducted using This information would have allowed the sleeper- so-called “carotid hold.” compare procedures court to sleeper were The carotid hold is a form of choke- employed by in the Ketehum execution with personnel hold used law enforcement employed Washington. suspects. places those that are Be- subdue The officer the indi- forearm, cause of the similarities between these two vidual’s neck between the arm and procedures, photographs facing away would have with the elbow from the sus- although dispositive pect’s applies pressure been face. The officer relevant — —evi- hanging protocol that a like that airway dencе both carotid arteries but leaves the adopted in state entailed a risk procedure designed unobstructed. This decapitation. Aside from the state’s own rapidly. occlude both carotid arteries Tran- Dodd, Westley autopsy practically script Reay Alan exper- 300-01. Dr. conducted brain, vertebrae, supply they 54. Four arteries blood to the teries are surrounded (one arteries, two neck) arteries carotid on each side of the much harder to occlude than the carotid especially high point and the two vertebral arteries. At least at the on the neck where (blocked) Thus, hanging two of these arteries must be occluded the noose sits. Id. for a to lead occlusion, in order to render an individual unconscious. to unconsciousness arterial it must Transcript generally at 111-14. Because the vertebral an- block off both carotid arteries. Id. majority sleeper hold on sev- The district court also the carotid iments heavily rely much too agents all the results West- agents FBI found eral ley autopsy, they Alan Dodd’s construe within to ten seconds unconscious six became showing quickly painless- that he died occlud- carotid arteries were the time their ly.56 misplaced, This reliance several Transcript at 301. ed. First, Campbell’s experts as both reasons. district court to have concluded For the experts explained, impos- and the state’s it is within hanging causes unconsciousness generalize single hanging sible seconds, necessarily to ten must six predict hanging the results of what a future Washing- under concluded simply many possible will be. There are too rapid, reliably lead to protocol ton death, pathways many variables too carotid arteries. complete occlusion both pathway pathways that determine what However, according testimo- case, the unrefuted particular will occur in a to use one *57 See, James, judi- Washington ny Dr. the state all predictor case as a for future cases. e.g., Transcript (testimony the at hanging protocol does not maximize 450-51 cial Thus, expert, Stephens). Dr. the state’s that such will occur. possibility occlusion Westley quickly Alan Dodd even was killed placed for to be protocol calls the knot The painlessly, anything guaran- this is but neck, snugly the left ear. high on the under Campbell pris- other tee that Charles knot bulk placement, of this the As a result lingering will not suffer a death. oner drop trans- energy from the will be of the right prisoner’s the of the ferred to side Second, put bluntly, it re- to the evidence right certainly the will neck. While carotid manip- garding the Dodd execution has been occluded, likely far the left it is less It ulated the state. is a well-understood Transcript at 111-14. The carotid will be. opinions expert in American law that fact only one insufficient to occlusion of carotid is always conflict and the interests often serve unconsciousness, however, rapid be- cause to parties who seek introduce them the other carotid and the two vertebral cause ordinarily court. We understand compensate. Transcript at 112- arteries will readily each truth is most uncovered when 13. to its party equal has access the evidence and interpret expert own witness examine testimony makes clear that the Wash jury can facts. The court or the relevant hanging protocol ington judicial cannot reli expert opinions against one weigh then rapid ably be counted on cause occlusion which is more credi- another and determine Transcript carotid arteries. at of both ble. 37; 111-14; Graney Deposition Deposition likely, Longstreth 16.55 As Here, however, completely con- state injury cause a protocol spinal could relating to the trolled all of the information yet prisoner him con paralyzes the leaves execution, past as well as executions. Dodd case, prisoner In such a scious. Dodd execu- The state limited access to the minutes asphyxiation, up after to two die choosing al- people of its own tion to suffering. Longstreth Deposi of conscious expert conduct only one own—to lowed —its clearly thus tion at 51. district court surprisingly, Dodd. Not autopsy on determining hanging under the quickly erred that Dodd expert testified died addition, judge in Washington protocol rapid un painlessly. would lead the district Campbell develop- virtually prevented all cases. case consciousness and Indeed, among Actually, apparently was some conflict arterial did not 56. there occlusion Westley autopsy or death in Alan experts meaning cause unconsciousness on the state’s photograph's case. The of Dodd follow- Dodd's ing performed autopsy, findings. Reay, Dr. who furrowing pronounced the execution show Transcript quickly. at 307. Dodd died stated that neck, right side of his little redness on on the but Zumwalt, could not however testified that he Dr. side, the left script where knot was located. Tran- certainty that Dodd say medical with reasonable Longstreth Dodd at 114. Dr. testifiеd that immediately unconscious. had been rendered disruption experienced flow to the of blood Transcript at 288. Longstreth Deposition brain. at 68. ing any independent Washington of his own evidence Hanging C. The Protocol relating refusing to the Dodd execution explained body I opinion, As of this request videotape hanging Dodd’s so clearly relying district court erred in that a fair record could be made. Dodd did (also Washington hanging protocol state Campbell’s request only object to Instruction) — called the Field to conclude that Blodgett, did. See state hangings Washington subject will not be (9th Cir.1993). Had the F.2d 1356 strangulation decapitation risks that expert Campbell’s to conduct an au- allowed hangings throughout history. have afflicted granted topsy had the district court 12-page typed The Field Instruction is a —or Campbell’s videotape hang- motion to Dodd’s largely document that is devoted to adminis- relations, pre- district court would have been trative details such as media crowd —the control, fuller, and the last meal. analysis Less than two sented with a fairer of what pages and a half of the Field Instruction set hanging actually of that results were. procedure forth the actual for con- manipulation of The state’s evidence re- demned pages, only inmates. Of these three garding hangings beyond extends the Dodd anything instructions had to do with the risk execution. Between was a decapitation: the chart which determined misdemeanor in the state of prisoner’s drop length,57 the instruction anyone publish the details of execu- which set forth the width and treatment of *58 § tion. See Wash.Rev.Code 9.68.020. rope, former and the instruction which stated addition, prior execution, to the Dodd placed knot would be behind the autopsy hanged of a inmate had ever been prisoner’s left ear. All of these instruc- Thus, Washington only very in done state. a including drop chart —came from tions — a regarding small universe of evidence existed military prepared execution manual hanging, large part the results of due to Transcript 1959. (testimony at 175 suppression Wood). the state’s of information. The Tana only problem district court exacerbated the Superintendent drafting Wood oversaw the by paucity by caused of evidence exclud- Transcript of the Field Instruction. at 160. ing hangings various evidence of two testified, As she simply the state lifted the slow, painful resulted deaths —one ordeal portions protocol crucial directly of its out of taking Although Campbell thirteen minutes. military the 1959 execution manual. The proce- did not know all of the details of the any state did not look to other information employed hangings, dures in these he did regarding procedure, nor did it do they long drop know occurred after the regarding prior research executions in Thus, universally employed. had become the Washington, nor did it seek advice from hangings evidence of these was relevant and professionals. just medical copied pro- It highly probative linger- to show that a risk of military adopted cedures the had in 1959. ing adoption death remained even after of Superintendent that, explained Wood al- long drop. practically Because this was though military she had no idea how the risks, evidence available these prepared execution manual was even —or court the district abused its discretion in military whether the hanged any- had ever refusing to admit it. body according procedures to the in the man- chart, According drop length solely to this 160 6'4" prisoner's weight. function of the The chart 165 6'2" provides following drop lengths: for the 170 6'0" 175 5'11" (Pounds) WEIGHT DROP DISTANCE 180 5'9" 120 8T' 185 5'7" 125 7'10" 190 5'6" 130 7'7" 195 5'5" 135 7'4" 5'4" 7'1" 5'2" 6'9" 6'7" 5T' 6'6" 220 and over 5'0” not) (it preceding manual the weeks an execution. See relied on the ual had —she military.” Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Tran- Law at it came from the “[b]ecause (“The judicial Washington hanging pro- 2-3 script at 178. practiced frequently during cedures are military proce- fact that Leaving aside the prior to a weeks scheduled execution hardly accuracy their known for dures are Penitentiary.”). staff of the State aside, humanity, leaving the fact that virtually nothing these rehearsals have Yet no idea how or Wood has Superintendent reducing decapitation. the risk to do with put military personnel who even whether the itself, Like the Field Instruction the re- sought manual to min- together the execution primarily hearsals are tailored to the institu- ought decapitation, the state imize the risk goals aiding'a government agency tional wary blindly particularly to have been administering complex procedure, rather pro- military manual’s adopting the execution goals reducing than the medical the risk of was, hanging. manual after cedures for Thus, prisoner. prior mutilation of the all, adopted drop prepared in and it prison Dodd execution officials rehearsed the quite to the one em- chart that was similar positioning of the witnesses law enforce- Century. 19th ployed in Britain the late during personnel Using ment the execution. great have learned a deal Yet scientists stand-in, they long determined how it tоok judicial hanging about the biomechanics prisoner for the to walk from the cell to the groundbreak- 1959. Until Dr. James’s since They practiced opening death chamber. also study, expert wisdom the conventional curtains, closing making as well as hanging usually caused death held that relevantly, sure the doors were locked. Most Thus, those breaking prisoner’s neck. hood, they practiced putting leg on the re- hanging procedures sought to cre- designing straints, noose, they conducted at neck, in enough force to break the order ate practice hanging using bag a sand least one strangulation. by slow Dr. to avoid death *59 place person. Transcript in of a at 162-66. however, proved, James’s research signifi- None of these acts of rehearsal could breaking very a common of the neck is not cantly decapitation, risk of howev- reduce the judicial hanging. pathway to death See er, they prison because could not tell the Transcript (testimony of state’s at 446-47 anything officials about the ease with whieh Thus, Boyd Stephens). Dr. someone witness particular prisoner’s head would come today might designing hanging procedure off. energy to the to transfer less kinetic seek rely court also seemed to The district decapita- risk of neck and hence decrease the Superintendent finding of the “[t]he its Washington proce- Because the tion. Penitentiary authority has State adopted military were from a manual dures judicial hanging protocol in to alter the ac- could not account of which have taken experts cordance with the advice medical research, developments in these medical physical or to accommodate unusual hardly risk of can be said to minimize the person to be medical abnormalities of the light presently decapitation available hanged.” Findings of Fact and Conclusions Camus, alternatives. Albert Cf Reflections doubly flawed. of Law at 3.58 This reliance is (“The truth is that in an on the Guillotine First, Superintendent it is not clear that the age age atomic we kill as we did actually authority has the the district science, steelyards taught ... has us which Superintendent had. court concluded she killing, much about could at least teach us too drop length herself stated that Wood decently.”). kill chart, always that the follow the would rely heavily Washington protocol provide did not for ad- The district court seemed to health, age, muscu- justments due to the prison on the fact that staff conducts Transcript hanging procedure prisoner. condition of the rehearsals of the lar various doctors; dinarily Although consult in these matters are not the district court does not acknowl- Transcript they physician’s at 189 edge point, are assistants. it is notable that "medical Wood). Superintendent (testimony experts” will or- of Tana with whom the However, decapitation. As all of the witnesses also stated that she risk she at 183-86. case, in this there is a tradeoff ability from the understood depart thought that decapitation and increased risk of between “implicit position [her] drop chart was asphyxiation. Yet the dis- decreased risk of Transcript at 190. authority.” majority and the here let the state trict court have the Superintendent does if the Even by relying ways on the state’s have it both vary drop length depending authority rope holding of the treatment specific characteristics of a individual on the 684-85, while stat- rapid, will be see ante persuasive court heard prisoner, the district minimizes the risk protocol also evidence that the state and unrefuted decapitation. those characteristics unable to detect sum, majority the reliance the likely. Super- decapitation more made place on the Field Instruction district court that, prior testified intendent Wood per- misplaced. district court heard The execution, per- physician’s assistant would pro- evidence that the suasive and unrefuted focusing on the “inspection” a medical form decapita- risk of tocol will not decrease the weight, Tran- height, and veins. prisoner’s fact, tion —in it will increase this risk. Dr. testified— 186. Yet as Tencer script at findings factual to the con- district court’s him on this contradicted no witness trary clearly erroneous. three variables more than these point —far an individual is like- whether determine Rejection Hanging Appendix B—The decapitated. Other crucial factors ly to be the United States vertebrae, prisoner’s the size include hanging as following states abandoned content of his density, the mineral his bone following on the dates: a method of execution bones, loading. lifestyle, and the rate of Many of factors Transcript at 482-87. these No. Alabama —1923. See 1923 Ala.Acts comprehensive in a could not be detected electrocution). hanging (changing from physician, highly trained examination has not had the death Alaska —Alaska cursory “inspection” in a much less penalty since statehood. Superin- assistant.59 Even physician’s therefore, vary рrotocol, can tendent Const, Ariz. art. Arizona —1933. See measurably the likeli- decrease fact does 1933) (changing (approved § 22 October decapitation.60 hood of gas). to lethal *60 above, Finally, noted the district court as See 1913 Ark. Acts No. Arkansas —1913. state’s consider the fact that failed to electrocution). (changing hanging from 55 rope all to remove elastici- treatment proudly the state 1937 ch. ty procedure which See Cal.Stat. California —1937. —a 172, hanging arguing protocol (changing § 1 from to lethal that its pointed to actually gas). rapid increased the lead to a death — prison- provided testimony particular characteristics of individual James also unrefuted 59. Dr. great expe- er, presented hearing states that "it takes that the literature rience in inches difference at the made the evidence drop," adjusting a few quite procedure one clear that this like the drop length in the can make an play Quare in Brendan Behan’s described Transcript at in the results. enormous difference Fellow: execution, Washington Before the Dodd 156-57. experience any executioner with hangman] gets quare did not have an fellow's [The Now, hanging. the state has an executioner weight the doctor so as he’ll know what from experience of the Dodd whose entire consists him, drop give but he likes to have a look at inexperienced hanging. individual Such an is, well, him to see what build he how thick as hardly upon to make the kinds of be relied could is, says judge he can his neck and so on. He necessary adjustments would be to avert fine decapitation eye. gave If he him too much better with the physician’s assis- if the state's —even breaking way strangle him instead of one he'd prisoner's physiological could discover tant neck, way pull he'd and too much the other varying protocol. that warranted conditions head off his shoulders. clean Fellow, Behan, Quare Act II Brendan Washington protocol allows

60. To the extent the drop length to fit the variation 727 Maine —1887. 1887 Me.Laws eh. 1933 Colo.Sess.Laws See 133 See Colorado —1933. (abolishing penalty 61, (changing hanging § from to lethal the death at a time when 1 ch. hanging the state retained as the method of gas). execution). 1935 Conn.Pub. See Connecticut —1935. Maryland hanging See 1955 Md.Laws ch. (changing from

Acts ch. 266 —1955. electrocution). (changing hanging gas). 625 from to lethal 281, Massachusetts —1898. See 1898 Mass.Aets See 65 Del.Laws ch. Delaware —1986. (changing § (1986) hanging ch. 6 from to elec- (changing hanging § from to lethal 1 Storti, trocution); also In re see 178 Mass. injection)'. C.J.) (Holmes, 60 N.E. 210 Florida —1923. See 1923 Fla.Laws ch. (stating change hanging from (changing hanging from to electrocu- purpose electrocution was “devised for the tion). reaching proposed swiftly the end as Georgia See 1924 Ga.Laws painlessly possible”). —1924. electrocution). (changing hanging § 1 from Michigan See 1963 Mich.Pub.Acts —1963. has not had the death Hawaii —Hawaii (abolishing penalty No. 119 the death at a penalty since statehood. hanging time when the state retained as the execution). method of 1978 Id.Laws ch. 70 Idaho —1978. See injection). (changing hanging from to lethal Minnesota —1911. See 1911 Minn.Laws (abolishing penalty ch. 387 the death at a § 1927 Ill.Laws 400 Illinois —1927. See hanging time when the state retained as the electrocution). (changing hanging from execution); Moos, method of see also Grant 1913 Ind.Acts ch. 315 Indiana —1913. See Newspaper Hanging Details Made it electrocution). (changing hanging to from Last, Tribune, Minneapolis State’s Star 26, 1992, p. (stating Iowa —1965. See 1965 Iowa Acts ch. March 19A that “the Williams, (abolishing penalty gruesome, the death at a time slow death” of William 14jé employed hanging hanged as a meth- in 1906 and took min- when the state who was execution). die, six-year “began movement in od of utes Legislature the Minnesota to abolish the Although hanging has not Kansas —1977. penalty, finally which succeeded formally been abolished as a method of exe- 1911”). cution, longer there is no offense for capital Mississippi 1940 Miss.Laws punishment is authorized See —1940. (changing hanging from to electrocu- that state. ch. tion). Kentucky Ky.Aets ch. —1938. hanging § 221- (changing from to elec- Missouri —1937. See 1937 Mo.Laws trocution). (changing gas); to lethal *61 Brown, 53, 112 v. 342 Mo. 568 State S.W.2d Louisiana —1940. See 1940 La.Aets No. (1938) curiam). (per electrocution). (changing hanging 14 to from Jones, hanging ex rel. Pierre v. 200 La. retains as a See also State Montana —Montana (1942) 808, 42, execution, (noting hanged it has not 9 So.2d 43 the method of but justified change grounds anyone Philip 1943 execution of on the since the Coleman, recognized an African-American man “electrocution is as a more “Slim” hu- painful killing of a white wom- mane and less manner or means of who confessed to the carrying penalty by hang- Although of its out the death than an. not noted the size Prejean, Walking: population, ing”); Helen Dead Man African-American Montana next Eyewitness Penalty sought hang an when in 1976 it An Account the Death to individual (1993) (“Louisiana penalty Dewey imposed in the the death Cole- United States 18 African-American, man, again fol- hang used to its criminals until the state another killing legislature lowing in 1940 that electrocution a confession to the of white decided efficient.”). This court reversed as to the death would be more humane and woman. 728 McCormick, Pennsylvania F.2d

penalty in Coleman 874 See 1913 Pa.Laws —1913. Cir.1989). (9th (changing hanging 1280 No. 528 from to electrocu- tion). 1913 ch. Nebraska —1913. See Neb.Laws Rhode Island —1973. See 1973 R.I.Pub. electrocution). (changing hanging 32 from to (changing hanging Laws ch. 280 from to le- 1921 387 Nevada —1921. See Nev.Stat. gas). thal (changing hanging gas); from to lethal see South Carolina —1912. 1912 See S.C.Acts Jon, 418, also v. Gee 46 Nev. 211 P. State 402, § (changing hanging No. from to elec- (stating legislature trocution). “sought provide inflicting a method of South Dakota —1939. See 1939 S.D.Laws penalty the most humane manner science”). (changing § ch. hanging from modern elec- known to trocution). Hampshire New See N.H.Rev. —1986. Tennessee —1913. See 1913 Tenn.Pub. (added 1986) title ch. 630:5 Stat.Ann. (first session) Acts. ch. 36 (chang- executive (changing hanging injection). from to lethal electrocution). hanging from Jersey New See 1906 N.J.Laws —1906. Texas—1923. See 1923 Tex.Gen.Laws ch. (changing hanging electrocution); from 51, 1; (“The § § see also id. fact that our Tomasi, see also State v. 75 N.J.L. 69 A. present putting method of to death con- (1908) (“Instead hanging by 217-18 by hanging demned convicts the condemned neck, legislature provided [the has] now in the judgment counties where the of death speedily that death shall be caused as frequently great is obtained creates distur- possible by application the direct of electrici- county, bance in the and the further fact that ty body of the convict. On its face the system antiquated sup- and has been imports lawmaking statute an effort planted many states the more modern body mitigate pain suffering system and humane of electrocution create convict.”). emergency imperative public and an ne- cessity_”). New Mexico—1929. See 1929 N.M.Laws (changing hanging ch. 69 from to electrocu- Utah —1983. See 1983 Utah Laws ch.

tion). §§ (changing from an election between shooting hanging to an election between New York —1988. See 1888 N.Y.Laws ch. shooting injection). and lethal (changing hanging electrocution); from Kemmler, supra see also note 1. Vermont —1913. See 1912 Vt.Laws No. 97, § (changing hanging from to electrocu- North Carolina —1909. 1909 tion). (changing hang- ch. 443 N-C.Sess.Laws from Virginia See 1908 Va.Acts electrocution). ch. 398 ing to —1908. electrocution). (changing hanging from Dakota —1973. North See 1973 N.D.Laws Washington Washington employs still — (abolishing capital punishment ch. 116 at a hanging as a method of execution. employed hanging time when the state as a execution). method Virginia West See 1949W.Va.Acts —1949. (changing hanging ch. 37 from to electrocu- 159-60, Ohio—1896. See 1896 Ohio Laws tion). (changing Bill No. 216 Senate *62 Wisconsin —1853. See 1853 Wis.Laws ch. electrocution). 103 (abolishing penalty the death at a time Oklahoma —1913. See 1913 Okla.Sess. employed hanging when the state still as the 113, § (changing hanging Laws ch. from execution). method of electrocution). Wyoming Wyo.Sess. See 1935 —1935. 22, Oregon § (changing hanging See 1937 Or.Laws ch. Laws ch. from —1937. (changing § hanging gas). gas). from lethal lethal addition, Military gave up the U.S. ORDER hanging in 1986. as method execution appears It to the court that filing since the 190-55, § Army Reg. 6-2 Con See opinion case, following mo- gress abandoned as the federal by tions have been parties: filed executing method of civilians convicted of crimes in 1937. Andres v. federal Unit (1) stay execution, Motion to vacate or States, 745 n. ed alternative, in the motion for immediate is- (1948)(“ ‘Many n. 92 L.Ed. 1055 States (filed suance of the by mandate 2/14/94 ... more use[d] humane methods of execu Wood, al.); et electrocution, gas.... tion such as or [Therefore,] appeared] for desirable (2) stay Alternative motion for of mandate change Federal Government likewise its (filed pending petition for certiorari 2/14/94 respect_’”) (quoting H.R.Rep. law in this by Campbell); 1) Sess., Cong., (ellipsis No. 75th 1st (3) expedited rehearing Motion for and re- Andres). alterations in newed stay motion to vacate of execution (filed Wood, by al.); et 2/23/94

POOLE, Judge, dissenting: Circuit by hanging I believe that death inflicts suggestion Motion to strike for rehear- intolerably punishment, cruel and unusual by the full pro court and to strike se crime; however heinous the that it is unac- (filed petition rehearing Wood, for by 2/23/94 ceptable today as would be the rack and al.). et screw; and therefore is violation of the appears It further petition that a for re- Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the hearing suggestion rehearing by for Constitution the United States. full court was filed on behalf of I therefore dissent. February Campbell’s pro supplemental petition

se brief on for rehear- ing was received on the same date. Having papers considered the filed parties, appropriate it is that the court first Wood, al., reply receive a Camp- et petition rehearing bell’s for full court en CAMPBELL, Charles Rodman suggestion banc before of the above Petitioner-Appellant, itemized motions are addressed the court. Therefore, now, it is WOOD, Superintendent, Washington Tana ORDERED submission of each of the Penitentiary, Walla, State Walla Wash above pending itemized motions is deferred ington; Gregoire, Attorney Christine O. grant deny decision whether the court will General, Washington, Respon State pending motion for reconsideration with dents-Appellees. suggestion rehearing by the full court. No. 89-35210. Appeals, United States Court of

Ninth Circuit. March WALLACE, Before: ‍‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‍Judge, Chief BROWNING, TANG, POOLE, D.W.

NELSON, REINHARDT, BEEZER, WIGGINS, THOMPSON, O’SCANNLAIN, *63 KLEINFELD, Judges. Circuit

Case Details

Case Name: Campbell v. Wood
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date Published: Feb 8, 1994
Citation: 18 F.3d 662
Docket Number: 89-35210
Court Abbreviation: 9th Cir.
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