Campbell v. Superior Court

not stand. In accor- elude that is not entitled to relief this sentence should Sasak Ross, that his dance the sentence because he failed to demonstrate with Santobello by” promise remanded for plea “was induced the State’s should be vacated and ease provision plea agreement specific performance and that “but for” the he would not of the pled guilty. Majority Opinion judge, at 734- have before a new or the defendant should Clearly, application 735. standard to withdraw from given be stringent test more than that announced agreement. the breached improper. Santobello is

I conclude as a matter of law that would a material stipulation guilty plea for the and that the

inducement signifi-

plea upon stipulation rested to a record, including degree.

cant This the evi- hearing,

dence received at the Rule 32 does support any other conclusion. CAMPBELL, Petitioner, Joe David promise concur- State’s to recommend prison rent terms should be sentenced Sasak agreement prison was the sole affirmative Ari- SUPERIOR COURT of the State of regard- between the State and the defendant zona, In and For OF COUNTY ing sentencing. If the had made such MARICOPA, The Michael Honorable J. judge a recommendation so that the trial O’Melia, judge thereof, Respondent position been of the would have aware State’s Judge, prior sentencing, one cannot assume that influ- recommendation would not have Arizona, STATE of Real permit enced the outcome. The cases do not Party in Interest. Santobello, assumption. such an Ross, 498; 92 S.Ct. at 166 Ariz. at No. CA-SA 93-0280. If sentencing judge 804 P.2d at 118. had Arizona, Appeals Court of persuaded by been the State’s recommenda- 1, Department E. Division tion, might the defendant have received a prison long twenty- sentence half as Feb. 1994. year actually imposed. sentence As Corrected March 1994. As this court noted in Ross: 3,May Review Granted prosecutor A commits reversible error plea agreement

when he violates his Breaking promise

the defendant. plead guilty

induced the defendant to rath- jury

er than exercise his to a trial integ-

undercuts the essential fairness and

rity justice. system of our The defen- preju-

dant therefore need not show actual component

dice. It is an essential of fun- that,

damental fairness when a defendant particular agree- state enter into a

ment, comply prom- the state must with its

ises. (citations 804 P.2d at 117

omitted). preserve

To the essential fairness and plea bargaining sentencing

tegrity of the

components justice system, of our criminal (A.R.S.) 13-4033(B) (Supp.

Stat.Ann. 1993)—and years to 4.5 sentenced Campbell prison. post-con- filed notice of relief, pursuant Rules of viction to Arizona (Rule) 32, requested Criminal Procedure of counsel. Counsel was as- assistance signed July on 1993. On October Campbell’s counsel filed stating completed he had the trial court his record had found no review the present. In that no- meritorious claims tice, requested that the trial court thirty days grant Campbell more to file a se, petition pro should he so desire. The Campbell request. trial court denied this petitioned special then this court for action Romley, Maricopa County Richard M. jurisdiction relief. The court has over this Hazelton, County Atty. Deputy Arthur matter under article section 9 of the Ari- Phoenix, Atty., party in for real interest. the Rules of zona Constitution and under Trebesch, County Special Maricopa Dean Pub- Procedure Action. W. Matthew, Depu-

lic S. Defender Lawrence Defender, Phoenix, petitioner. ty Public ISSUE Camp- presented issue whether OPINION appeal, bell—who waived his VOSS, Presiding Judge. who, giving post-conviction after notice of relief, action, for and was counsel— asked special In this Joe David to an extension of the Rule 32 Campbell (Campbell) is entitled asks this court to re- filing pro permit of a deadline submission sponte the trial court’s denial of a sua verse appointed se when his counsel was request by Campbell’s attorney for additional urge any unable meritorious claims. pro peti- Campbell time to allow to file a se tion for The facts here relief. virtually Montgom- identical those DISCUSSION Court, Superior ery v. stated, this court has addressed this (App.1993), depart- in which another Thus, Montgomery. either issue we must ment this court held that defendants it, Montgomery, distinguish follow or chal- Campbell’s position are entitled to such ex- lenge case are it. Because facts disagree Because tensions. we with Mont- any indistinguishable way material from application. gomery decline its Montgomery, option those in the second

Dungan, (App. Ariz. only following unavailable. This leaves Comm., 1985); Ariz. Castillo v. Indus. departing from it. reach We (Previous (1974) App. contrary Montgomery there- a result highly decisions of this court are considered opinion primarily fore direct our at what we binding, persuasive and unless we are con- perceive to be its flaws. prior vinced that decision based clearly principles.). erroneous holding Montgom- disagree with the below, ery hybrid representa- it because authorizes expressed

For reasons we ac- any constitu- jurisdiction deny tion at the trial level without cept tional and because constitutes basis appeals. making by the court FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Campbell guilty damage— Montgomery, the court held that pled to criminal is unable to thereby waiving appeal, Ariz.Rev. tioner whose Rule 32 counsel right unequivocally. meritorious claims is “entitled to voke that State v. Rick find se____” man, present his claims (1986) Hanson, (citing 870 P.2d at 1183. The court reasoned (App.1983)). supplemental pro filing se was neces- sary protect a defendant’s constitutional Here, Montgomery, as in defendant made procedural right appel- of access to the and request proceed no to alone and neither permissible late court and because it did not rep- did defense counsel withdraw from case against hybrid representa- the rule violate Instead, finding after no meri- resentation. 86-87, tion. 178 Ariz. at 870 P.2d at 1182-83. raise, defense counsel mere- torious claims to justified only “pre- The court its actions as ly that their clients be allowed to file asked serving] the same access to the courts of- view, giving on their In our first the own. fered to a under the former ver- attorney and then his client the proce- of Rule 32 ... ... sion and Anders petition clearly “acting to constitutes dure____” 87, 178 Ariz. at 870 P.2d at 1183. alternately” present a in violation of to case convincing. We find none of these reasons Stone. case—and We unaware

Montgomery ap- cites none—which allows pointed unilaterally counsel to convert his or Hybrid Representation her status from counsel of record to “adviso- 2, ry simply by giving counsel” have held that article 24 of We Thus, Montgomery trial court. creates a give our state constitution “was intended to unique co-representation form of that has right represent an accused the to himself or by any never been sanctioned rule or statute counsel, right represented by to be but precedent and that is in the without decisions right presented not the to have his case ... of this court. by by acting both himself and alter- Stone, nately or same time.” State v. Indeed, consistently until we 304, 307, 558, 122 (App. 561 maintained that a defendant is bound 1979) added). (emphasis Clearly, an accused Alford, actions of his counsel. State v. right hybrid representation has no to at trial (App.1988); 754 P.2d 1376 State v. under either the federal or our state constitu- Scrivner, (App. tion. Id. at 594 P.2d at 562. Because 1982); Stanley, proceedings part are considered (App.1979).1 Alford, In for exam 32.3, original criminal action under Rule ple, we held that counsel’s refus right hold that a defendant has no to argue particular al to constituted a issues hybrid representation during post-conviction defendant, binding waiver that was on the proceedings. Campbell argues, howev- despite express the defendant’s to desire (with er, support Montgomery) from have those issues raised. 157 Ariz. at hybrid representation, this was not Barnes, but rath- (citing 754 P.2d at 1377 v. Jones permissible advisory er counsel situation. U.S. 103 S.Ct. 77 L.Ed.2d 987 disagree. recognize (1983)). While we that de- Stanley, inAnd we found the defen se, right proceed pro fendants have the complaint dant’s about his counsel’s “deter California, 422 appealable” Faretta v. U.S. 95 S.Ct. mination of what issues [were] (1975), they 45 L.Ed.2d must be without merit because such determina- distinguish attempt petitioners Montgomery Campbell 1. The dissenter’s these like to file to, unpersuasive. separate petitions. We see little difference cases It would be inconsistent hand, attorney directly stating uphold policy precluding between an that his on the one attorney arguing client has no meritorious claims and an defendants from issues which their attor- refusing suggested (even implying—by argue neys though issues deemed meritless the defen- inclusion), without vociferously promoted his client—that client’s claims are dant their only degree defendants, merit. The distinction is the grant time have same who attorney position which the views the client’s expressed neither a desire to se nor unmeritorious. any particular they articulated wish Therefore, raised, denying right supplemental in our file a Alford have Stanley separately appointed chance raise issues on se after their counsel declare strongly against permitting their own militates that no meritorious issues exist. find meritorious counsel is unable to judgment.” are “a of counsel’s tions matter issues, Similarly, permission on the defen is based at 1009. predicated on has held that dant’s the U.S. strategic Anders appeal by the counsel’s withdraw. See on bound lawyer California, U.S. of his and must decisions and actions (1967). attorney 18 L.Ed.2d 493 Neither that results “bear the risk error Campbell’s exists here. at procedural Coleman of these factors in a default.” withdraw, Camp torney Thompson, never asked S.Ct. waiving bell—by pleading guilty and L.Ed.2d appeal—was only to the limited entitled if a light must ask: of these cases we provided by Rule 32.2 post-conviction review counsel’s actions and decisions defendant’s however, analogy to Montgomery, An preclusion a direct can result ders, expand post- default, us the limited why deci- would have should such actions and procedures to defendants contrary in a conviction available sions create a result discretion- plead guilty procedure to include the ary have stated who Rule 32 review? we appeal. homogeniza strange accept on direct This previously, would be available “[i]t for yet procedural requirements di holdings of conclude tion of the cases] these [the discretionary Rule 32 re appeals is rect that the defendant entitled consider- views, merits, represents improper our petition, the in ation a Rule appellate rights for by attempt to de ... that have been raised reinstate could expressly them. Alford, 157 who have waived were not.” fendants counsel but melding procedures ignores also the at that is This Ariz. at 1378. Yet supreme that the courts in Mont- court’s statement precisely what the court has done proceedings,3 the should not think it is clear that had “Ander-ize” gomery. We proceedings “Rule attorneys Montgomery cho- and the fact that Campbell for or ... de designed in Rule not afford an automatic only raise one or two issues a sen Scrivner, at layed appeal.” the petition, permitted we not have would are and P.2d 1024. Anders and Rule 32 supplement petitions. such at defendants separate and distinct. Why not be should remain then should these defendants similarly no when their counsel find bound justified Montgomery The court also its The for the meritorious claims? answer by “petitioner commenting that decision Montgomery court that defendants was preserve the seeks to same access opportu- the position be afforded this should petitioner under the for courts offered to a nity to se because defendants 32____” mer Rule version supple- the Anders reviews have chance court, supreme The at 1183. how disagree. Again, ment. we ever, procedural 32 to make revised Rule petitione provided access may file a alterations the it is true that a defendant

While supreme us appeal if his rs.4 It seems to odd that the supplemental brief on direct changing judg- ground agree him” for known to 2. While we dissent's contention sentence, supporting has to access to a Rule 32 a with "evidence ... that ment or court, agree supreme 32.5(a) (1987) do we that allegations Rule [attached].” Ellis, holding in Wilson Rule). court's (Old petitioners under the burden on This (Oct. 5, 1993), a creates by prior the fact alleviated somewhat appellants type of dual afforded to Anders access they "at time after that were allowed by Montgomery. described entry judgment Old Rule and sentence." 32.4(a). filing, After defendants were Ellis, response 3. In Wilson the court—in given thirty days to amend who were re- comment that decision would dissent's petitions. original Rule 32.- their Old clients’ quire Rule 32 cases— an Anders review all 5(b). commanding, we nor do stated: "we are not [petitions Anders-type want ... reviews in Rule face Under the current post-conviction relief]." filing, required only but are strict time limits for a form to file may appointed, be if then Rule 32.4. Counsel re- prior defendant was 4. Under the Rule “every requested, and either counsel quired included to file that By holding power there inherent implement a new rule that court should choose to court, beyond ... “preserve go is] ... that which by interpretation, [to if can cluded the door [the rules] as that which existed un- within [result]” the same judge adopt opened to each Montgomery wide der the old rule. To follow practice then most consistent which seems nullify changes made to Rule 32. would concept of what constitutes with his own Thus, agree do not "with justice. administration of This the due judge a trial abuses his discretion completely nullifies the Rules of Criminal denying counsel for additional system prac- Procedure as a consistent time to his client to file a se allow power repeatedly has been de- tice. Such petition. supreme If the court wishes to nied____ require 32 to for or such amend Rule allow reasoning in We think that United extensions, court, clearly may do so. This Peltz, D.C., States v. 18 F.R.D. however, attempts power exceeds its when it up why points further the courts of to alter the Rules decision. go beyond scope this state should not [the rules]: Making Rule Power power This court has neither to create “If ... the law is to be amended developed Montgomery rule like the one beyond present provisions ... the compliance nor to it from the trial exact with upon something reform should rest more Only Supreme courts. the Arizona Court subtlety. solid than semantic The sub- “has the Power to make rules relative to all ject important prosecutors, is defen- procedural any matters in court.” Anderson community large.... and the at dants Pickrell, 1335, 589, 590, 115 Ariz. 566 P.2d “It well to is remember that we (1977) (internal quotation 1336 marks omit- dealing subject peculiarly with a that is ted). power may supplemented, “This not be Supreme rule-making within the Court’s superseded by or annulled court____” an inferior rule-changing power. Should the added). (emphasis Id. Because Supreme appropriate Court deem it this, type of we have eschewed the of rule question Supreme consider the ... the making Montgomery, especially found in Court has available the traditional supreme promul- where the court “has not rules]____ [altering method gated any authorizing procedure rules [in technique superior a [S]uch of reform question]” and where the rule cited “does not approach, to the case-to-case decisional any procedure include reference to [the uncertainty with its concomitant Court, Superior Hedlund v. 171 voked].” conflicts, individualizing facts, and in- 566, 567, (App.1992), Ariz. 832 P.2d 220 poli- assumptions articulated basic vacated, Sheldon, Hedlund v. Ariz. cy.” (1992) (overruling holding 840 P.2d 1008 Court, Polley Superior 134- based). upon opinion which our (1956) (Struekmey- 268-69 302 P.2d Although explicitly not Rule 32 does forbid dissenting) omitted) er, J., (empha- -"'rttions hybrid representation type endorsed added) (quoted approval by sis with Moore v. any Montgomery, neither does it “include State, Ariz. 467 P.2d procedure. reference” to this Under these (1970)). approach circumstances we believe the better Furthermore, attempt promulgate “[t]o for this court is to leave alteration or hastily necessary . . ... rules without the expansion supreme rather than court study and deliberation to make them effec- anything read into the rule. tive, might produce satisfactory a less than Blazak, support approach. reasons this result.” State v. Sound 84, 86 In our Mont- supreme our court has noted: significant changes given sixty days fully complying petition. Clearly, to file a these are to Rule procedure. Rule 32.4-.5. provide gomery produced a state’s such a announc- Court held that refusal result bright ing previous indigent new rule that counsel to defendants in discretion- a blurs concerning hybrid representation ary the Due Process appeals line did offend ability rely Equal calls into the court’s or Clauses of the Constitu- Protection being the actions of counsel as those tion. 417 U.S. S.Ct. 2437. And rule an- Wolff, party represented. If recognized prisoner’s the Court (and good idea “subject nounced a to restric- of access tions____” be) may through it be pursued well should 418 U.S. 94 S.Ct. 2974- process Supreme the amendment outlined Ross hold that states are Wolff Court Rule 28. obligation provide under no counsel for discretionary prison disciplinary or reviews may Although this amend- circumvent proceedings, proceedings do and that such procedure when faced with conflict ment panoply procedural pro- not merit the full rights and the between rule constitutional appeals. on direct Yet tections available defendants, Birmingham, Montgomery cites these cases as authority (1964), reh’g, proposition for the that when state volun- (1964), we cannot provide indigents tarily opts to counsel to For exam- simply rewrite decision. discretionary post-conviction proceed- Superior in Hart v. ple, Court we had to ings, give such failure add- compliance a recent choose between with ed se—after as- ruling or adherence U.S. signed nothing argue— counsel has found the rules. We stated: inadequate access to the tribunal. amounts change the rules allow the [to] We cannot disagree proposition and do not [v. Boddie suggested by type of notice Indeed, Ross supports it. believe Connecticut, Wolff of Ross holdings actually mili- (1971)] being adequate. L.Ed.2d 113 Wolff of against procedures tate the invocation only thing. can do next best by Montgomery. such as the one created Supreme Court is af- Until the Arizona consider forded the to post-conviction relief and Access to review pass problem us on the matter before procedures right. is not a constitutional appropriate, obliged it we are to deems 722, Thompson, v. Coleman 501 111 U.S. complete petitioner access to the afford the 2546, (1991); see also 115 L.Ed.2d 640 S.Ct. conformity legal required in with the Scrivner, 54, 1024; at 132 Ariz. at 643 P.2d Boddie ruling. Drozd, 330, P.2d 569 272 184, 186, 433, Ariz.App. 16 492 P.2d 435 Thus, logic if (App.1977). dictates that no (1971). Thus, rules unless we follow the provide obligation to constitutional exists existing higher an applying rule would violate access, comports with the rules access that principles. the facts of constitutional Under per governing proceedings such is force ade- Montgomery, however, no such this case and 32, is quate. Under Rule this access limited constitutional conflict exists. sixty-day during either period or his is assigned counsel ex- defendant Right Constitutional Access of adequate petition. pected file Rule to an Montgomery, In the court reasoned that Entitling right with a to 32.4. right giving proceed pro se defendants the se, finds no after necessary “every litigant an was ensure claims, goes beyond the re- meritorious both present his claims ‘adequate opportunity scope quirements process of and the of due ” 87, fairly,’ Montgomery, 870 Rule 32. Moffitt, (quoting Ross v. 417 P.2d at 1183 Montgomery also cites article section 24 2437, 2447, 41 L.Ed.2d support (1974)), its prisoners of the Arizona Constitution required 341 because in holding. no this source Id. support We find “right have a of access the courts.” McDonnell, Montgomery’s holding. Article (citing 418 U.S. Wolff 2974-75, appeal, guarantees 935 24 defendants the 94 41 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. Ross, however, defendant, as here and Mont- (1974)). in a the U.S. but when

199 KLEINSCHMIDT, Judge, dissenting: plea guilty gomery, has entered of and the complied require- court has with the trial majority that a defendant who holds 17.2, ments of Rule defendant’s relief, and post-conviction files appeal is and he is left with more waived attorney can no issue find meritorious whose limited avenue supplemental to file a argue, is not entitled 13-4033(B) Wilson, § (Supp.1993); A.R.S. pro per support memorandum 123-24, 746-47; 859 P.2d at id. 176 at majority that to allow tion. The concludes 124-25, (Martone, J., at at 859 P.2d 747-48 raise on his behalf own dissenting). hybrid representation, endorse Thus, Rule 32 defines the access opinion Montgomery, 178 court’s pleads guilty, insofar as of a defendant who impermissible at P.2d at was an 870 process.5 those limits do offend due judicial making. I reaffirm exercise in is correct in its While court I my Montgomery, and ad- concurrence “designed to ac assertion that majority specific arguments dress the jus commodate the unusual situation where makes. yet awry,” tice ran its Mont course went gomery, Ariz. at P.2d at Stone, Hybrid representation, according to McFord, (quoting at undesir- Ariz. at (App.1982)), pro “Rule 32 interruptions able can cause because ceedings designed afford ... are not an have proceedings. Commentators Scrivner, delayed appeal.” automatic hybrid representation detracts noted that Ariz. at 1024. Nor does court- dignity from the and decorum the destroy principle “Rule 32 the basic of finali room, insisting can result a defendant McFord, ty proceedings.” in criminal prerogatives of counsel surrender substantial Ariz. at 644 P.2d at 287. attorney, the office of and can be used as A Rule creates choice. either/or guise un- presentation for a defendant’s may proceed pro defendant se or Wayne R. sworn statements. LaFave assignment counsel. hold a To Israel, Procedure, Jerold H. Criminal Vol. to his of these choice alternatives consis- 11.5, § pp. through all What prohibition hybrid rep- tent with Arizona’s hybrid represen- of this boils down is that resentation; ability it mirrors a defendant’s tation is undesirable it makes it diffi- because counsel, right to to at trial exercise either his orderly cult run an to efficient its the right with concomitant waiver of objection ap- But not proceeding. this does self-representation, right or self-repre- his to ply longer petitioner when counsel for a nois sentation, knowing with its waiver of the actively in Peti- involved the case. While the right to counsel. attorney may tioner’s still be counsel of rec- Rule 32 the court had Under trial discre- ord, activity every practical purpose for his grant showing upon tion to an extension in ended he filed that the case when 32.4(c). say good cause. Rule We cannot argue. he to found no meritorious issue deny- in the trial court abused its discretion cases, ing majority, citing in that a nothing language the motion when the The asserts Constitution, party Arizona the acts of his of Rule the or is bound the counsel by Montgomery requires ex- that the to his own cases cited to allow Petitioner file attorneys for find the tension defendants whose memorandum violates that rule. None of worthy mentions, however, majority no claims of review. cases the deal with counsel asserts that the situation where reasons, foregoing deny For all the arguable there are no issues all. Under adopts, petitioner majority the rule the McGREGOR, J., mat- would be denied access to the court no concurs. written, process by despite fail- to in- Rule violates due 5. note that the court’s efforts decision, ability ing provide with the voke a rationale for its constitutional Montgomery explicitly se. nowhere does hold that 2, § might precisely in the ter how mistaken counsel be It was because art. expressly open belief that the case lacks merit. The fear that this court left the ave- might in escape that meritorious cases thus re nue of review PCR lieu example, appeal dress is no means fanciful. For the rules direct when amended during respect involving in argument Montgomery, oral able to cases admissions Montgomery pointed probation for in counsel out that violations. represented in two cases he had other 123, 859 at 746. Id. at defendants, granted courts had relief to the access, right having The defendant on he his clients issues that had not raised unilaterally counsel cannot shut the court- he in lacking because considered them merit. Supreme house door. Court observed McDaniel, See Anders, pro- in “the .court—not counsel—... (1980); O’Dell, ceeds ... whether the is whol- decide case (1972).6 ly frivolous.” S.Ct. at 386 U.S. California, In Anders v. 386 U.S. (1967), 1396, 1400, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 majority’s avoiding The reason for second squarely recognized application has of Anders—that counsel when counsel for a defendant finds his case not in this touched on withdrawn case—was wholly to be frivolous the defendant himself my earlier discussion. Whether there has any points must be allowed to raise that he not, been a formal counsel who withdrawal majority says chooses. The that this facet of are no certifies there meritorious apply

Anders does not in the case us before longer for grounds relief no controls the case. right self-representation because Indeed, although say Anders does that coun- which Anders mandates “based on the argue sel who can no issue to should find on right predicated defendant’s withdraw, aas matter of custom withdrawal request counsel’s to withdraw.” The Peti- in An- required has never been Arizona right tioner this case has as much allowing a prerequisite ders cases as a post- access to the court for his file his own memorandum. in Anders conviction relief as the defendant right appeal. for his had to access While Finally hybrid repre- on sentation, that can be considered on majority argues that our su- might court, Ellis, much tion be preme that the Wilson said can narrower than those that be considered pro- should “Ander-ize” courts appeal, the court to ceedings. majority reads broad- Wilson ly petitioner ought consider those issues is same both mean not be cases. The has a under the allowed to a memorandum se when claim, bring argue. can Arizona Constitution to find no issue What rule, majority “Contrary claim within the ambit of the said in was that Wilson dissent, supreme attention of the court. Our court to the intimations of the we are want, recently point commanding, made this clear Wilson nor do we trial courts Ellis, (1993), Awders-type reviews in conduct PCRs.” reading held files a P.2d at 747. A which that a defendant who majority opinion tion for relief is entitled to both the and the dissent proceedings, suggests referring even what was to as of the relevant the court transcript “Anders-type was review for specifying the nature of his claim review” without simply I not read error.v The court noted that article fundamental error. do say petitioner may that not file a provides 24 of the Arizona Constitution Wilson attorney as- pro per an accused in all cases memorandum when his has the the case merit. and said: serts is without representation, explains Kemper hybrid H. Arthur which how 6. See also letter of James August Hazelton filed with the dated brought the court issues were attention of Montgomery. court in Both McDaniel and O’Dell by the themselves. appealed were State v. foreclosed before Stone

201-211 Montgom- I to the whether turn rule

ery impermissible the exercise was majority it to have been.

making the believes relating to possible

It that when the rules amended, nobody

post-conviction relief were if coun-

really happen what would considered there no meritorious

sel avowed that possible It is for review. also

issue that in simply the rule assumed

drafters of procedure the well established

such a case In apply. Anders would

mandated

event, rule suggest that to whatever extent I cases, just as

making in these it is is involved making

much an exercise ap-

majority say that a cannot pro per it is for us to

proach the court he can.

have said aside, Ellis settles

Speculation Wilson v. has a question. Since the Petitioner re- the Arizona under Constitution relating apply rules we should pre-

post-conviction relief manner

serves access courts. See

Birmingham, 95 remedy The time tested of the fash- United States way to in Anders v. is the

ioned California preserve grant that access. I would requests.

relief the Petitioner

JV-130549, Petitioner, of Ari COURT of SUPERIOR zona, OF and For COUNTY MARICOPA, The Robert Bu Honorable Judge, doff, judge thereof, Respondent Arizona, Real STATE Party in Interest.

No. 1 94-0028. CA-SA Arizona, Appeals E. Department Division March

Case Details

Case Name: Campbell v. Superior Court

Court Name: Court of Appeals of Arizona

Date Published: May 3, 1994

Citation: 871 P.2d 740

Docket Number: 1 CA-SA 93-0280

Court Abbreviation: Ariz. Ct. App.