Roy Campbell, the appellant, was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County (Melbourne, J.) of conspiracy to violate the controlled dangerous substance laws, possession of cocaine with intent to distributе, possession of cocaine, and possession of paraphernalia. He was committed to the custody of the Division of Correction for ten years without the possibility of parole in accordance with Md.Ann.Code art. 27, § 286 (1957, 1987 & Supp.1990), 1 ten years concurrent for the conviction of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, and four years concurrent for the conviction of possession of paraphernalia. The court merged the possession of cocaine conviction into the conviction of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. On appeal, the appellant contends that:
*160 1. The trial court lacked jurisdiction to convict and sentence him of “conspiracy to violate the controlled dangerous substances laws”; and
2. The court erred in denying his motion to dismiss for violation of Rule 4-271.
The record before us shows that pursuant to a warrant, the appellant and others were arrested for drug transactions occurring at a house in Landover, Maryland. Drug activity had been observed from the house over a period of time.
During the execution of a search warrant on April 20, 1989, while 10 to 12 neighborhood рeople were present in the house, cocaine was seized in the basement, phencyclidine was discovered in a refrigerator in an upstairs bedroom, and drug paraphernalia was discovered throughout the house. Thereafter, investigations determined that drug activity, including curbside service, was recurring at the subject address. On May 31, another search warrant was executed. When this warrant was executed, there were 18 people inside the housе. Almost three grams of cocaine were discovered on a mirror in a co-defendant’s bedroom. Next to it were several $50 rocks of crack cocaine. Several other rocks of crack cocaine wеre found hidden behind paneling, on the basement floor, and on a bedroom floor. Upstairs, cocaine was found in another bedroom. Drug paraphernalia was found throughout the house.
I
Appellant first contends that the indictment charging him, in pertinent part, with conspiracy to “violate the controlled dangerous substances law of the State of Maryland,” failed to state a cognizable offense. He argues that, because it failed to specify the сrime which was the object of the conspiracy, the conspiracy charge failed to give him notice of the precise nature of the charge against him, and that the charge was not specific enough to allow him to determine the maximum penalty he would face if convicted.
*161
The appellant did not object to the charging document in the court below. As to his complaint that the indictment failed to give him notice, he has waived our review оf it. Md.Rule 4-252(a). However, the claim that an indictment fails to charge a crime is jurisdictional,
State v. Chaney,
Although the appellant concedes that in
Quaglione v. State,
The indictment in Quaglione alleged that the defendant and others
“unlawfully conspired together and with each other and with certain other persons * * * to violate the Narcotic Laws of the State of Maryland.”
Id.
at 578,
“conspired each with the other and with others ... to violate the controlled dangerous substances law of the State of Maryland____” [Emphasis added.]
The issue in
Quaglione
was the sufficiency of the conspiracy allegation. In a case primarily involving a statute of limitations issue,
McMorris v. State of Maryland,
The dissent in McMorris included a vigorous attack on the conspiracy language of that indictment. Judge O’Donnell, in dissent, specifically directed the majority to our holding in Quaglione, stating:
The only reported opinion, sustaining the validity of a count charging a conspiracy “to violate the narcotic law of the State of Maryland” is that by the Court of Special Appeals in Quaglione v. State,15 Md.App. 571 [292 A.2d 785 ] ... where that court found that the “rationale and holding in Hurwitz” supported a finding that such a count validly stated the object of the conspiracy. [Emphasis in McMorris.]
As I see it, these bare similarities are not enough to bring the charge in Quaglione ... within the ambit of the holdings in Hurwitz v. State.[ 2 ]
For these reasons, reaching the validity of count 2 in the indictment, I would hold, as “a matter of jurisdiction,” that it failed to charge an offense.
Lastly, I cannot agree with the view expressed by my brethren with the observation ... when they note ... that had the appellant made a demand for particulars ... and thereby have placed a limitation upon the scope of the proof, his failure to do sо, inferentially sustains the view that count 2 validly charged an offense.
Id.
at 83-88,
Even though the issue ... was not directly raised ... nor expressly spelled out within our writ of certiorari, I *163 believe that the failure of count 2 ... is properly within the ambit of our review.
Id.
at 91,
Our analysis of McMorris leаds us to conclude that the dissent’s assertion that the Court of Appeals had discretion to consider the jurisdictional issue raised by the alleged failure of the count to state a cause of action was correct. We then nоte that the majority in McMorris chose not to review that issue and that, because the dissent attacked our holding in Quaglione, the Court rejected the dissent’s invitation to overrule the Quaglione holding.
We further pointed out in
Haina v. State,
‘unlawfully conspired to violate the controlled dangerous substanсe laws of the State of Maryland’____follows the statutory form set out in Md.Code, Art. 27, § 40 and is sufficient without specifying the particular drug involved.[ 3 ] Scarlett v. State,201 Md. 310 [93 A.2d 753 ] ... (1953) and Quaglione v. State, 15 Md.App. [571,292 A.2d 785 ] ... (1972).
Id.
at 314,
Campbell directs our attention to
State v. Simpson,
We said in
Wooten-Bey v. State,
The Court of Appeals opined in
Winters v. State,
although the language of Count One stated the conspiracy, it did not properly allege the object of the conspiracy, thus, it is argued, the count was defective. Appellant contends that since the income tax laws can be violated in a variety of ways, the indictment should set out the particular means by which he and Osborn conspired ... to violate those laws.
Id.
at 234,
It is well settled in Maryland that so long as the object of the conspiracy is set forth in the indictment there is no necessity to also set forth the means by which the conspiracy was intended to be accomplished. See ... Quaglione v. State,15 Md.App. 571 ,292 A.2d 785 (1972) (conspiracy to violate the narcotic laws of the state held sufficient). All of these cases demonstrate a consistent holding on the issue dating back to State v. Buchanan, 5 *165 H & J 317 (1821)____ We see no need to depаrt from this well settled law.
Id.
at 234,
As we interpret the cases, objections to the use of short form indictments in narcotic cases have been primarily two fold: (1) that they do not identify the controlled dangerous substance involved in the offenses; аnd (2) that they do not identify the “act,”
i.e.,
possession, distribution, smuggling, etc. In the
McMorris
dissent, it was inferentially conceded that the identity of the “substance” was not required to be specified in the indictment when Judge O’Donnell stated, at 89,
If, for instance, count 2 had alleged a conspiracy ‘to sell narcotic drugs,’ then arguably the object of the conspiracy would have been set forth, and a bill of particulars might have been available to specify the type of narcotic drug involved. A bill of particulars, it seems, сould be used to ascertain the means by which it is contended that a conspiracy charged was to be carried out. [Citations omitted, emphasis in original.]
In Winters, supra, the Court of Appeals, referring to the tax offense alleged to have occurred, discussed the “means” in the sense of the act which constituted the conspiracy. There was no question of substance type, as there may be in a case of conspiracy to violate narcotic laws where the type of substance may well dictate the ultimate sentence. In Winters, the Court stated that it was sufficient to state the “object” of the conspiracy, i.e., “to violate the Maryland Income Tax Laws” and that “the means by which it was intended to bе accomplished need not be set forth.”
Even the dissenter in McMorris conceded that the narcotic substance need not be identified in the indictment. In Winters, the Court indicated that the specific activity need not be identified. Thus, we conclude that our holding in Quaglione rеmains the law and is determinative of this question. Therefore, we hold that neither the controlled dangerous substances, i.e., cocaine, heroin, etc., nor the *166 activity, i.e., possession, selling, distributing, etc., need be specified when the short form conspiracy indictment is utilized.
We thus conclude thаt appellant’s contention is without merit. 4
II
Appellant also contends that the court erred in denying his motion to dismiss for violation of Rule 4-271. He argues, “the trial judge applied the wrong standard in denying the motion because it did not appеar that the State’s purpose had been to deliberately circumvent the rule.”
When criminal charges are
nolle prossed,
ordinarily, the time period for commencing trial begins to run upon the refiling.
Curley v. State,
Here, the court, after listening to arguments from the appellant and the prosecutor regarding the refiling of nolle prossed charges, determined that the State was not “deliberately” trying to сircumvent the law. We perceive no error.
JUDGMENTS AFFIRMED; COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
Notes
. Neither the docket entries, nor the commitment record reflects the mandatory sentence. The sentencing transcript, page 8, does so reflect.
.
Hurwitz v. State,
. The McMorris dissent appearеd to indicate that its objections to the sufficiency of such language were not addressed to its failure to specify the particular drug involved but to the failure to specify the activity involved, i.e., sell, distribute, manufacture, possess, etc.
. To whatever extent there may havе been merit in the contention that the Hurwitz rule should not have been applied to narcotic conspiracy cases, the continual reliance on Quaglione and its use as authority in subsequent cases have, as we see it, established it as the settled law in narcotic conspiracy cases.