Campbell v. StateCampbell v. State
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Threadgill, Scheb, Campbell
Joe Nathan Campbell appeals his convictions and sentences for delivery, possession, and trafficking in heroin. He argues that the imposition of separate convictions and sentences violates the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. We agree and reverse.
Campbell was charged with delivery of heroin, possession of heroin, and trafficking in heroin in violation of sections
The case stems from a 1984 incident in south St. Petersburg. A police detective observed Campbell take money from a confidential informant and give the informant a packet of what later proved to be heroin, which Campbell pulled from a brown paper bag. Another detective waiting nearby was alerted and moved in to arrest Campbell, confiscating the paper bag which contained sufficient amounts of heroin to sustain the trafficking charge.
The Florida Supreme Court has recently addressed the issue of multiple convictions and sentences for trafficking, sale and possession of illegal drugs. In Carawan v. State, 515 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1987), the court specifically receded from its decision in Rotenberry v. State, 468 So.2d 971 (Fla. 1985) on which the state relies. As here, the defendant in Rotenberry was convicted of trafficking, sale and possession of drugs arising from a single transaction. While acknowledging that possession of contraband is undoubtedly different than sale of contraband, the court held in Carawan that a defendant cannot be simultaneously convicted of sale and possession, in addition to trafficking, because trafficking necessarily encompasses either or both of the other evils. Therefore, in accord with Carawan, we set aside the convictions and sentences and remand for resentencing.
The written judgments and sentences reflect that court costs in the amount of $20.00 and $2.50 were assessed against Campbell. The record does not reflect that the judge imposed these costs at sentencing, nor that Campbell was given
We have considered Campbell‘s remaining argument that imposition of the $50,000 mandatory fine pursuant to
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
SCHEB, A.C.J., and CAMPBELL, J., concur.