35 Wis. 103 | Wis. | 1874
The able and ingenious counsel for the defendant did not seriously contend that ch. 184, Laws of 1869, so far as it attempted to authorize a proceeding in rem against a vessel for the enforcement of a maritime contract, could be sustained as a valid enactment. The decisions of the supreme court of the United States are too clear and emphatic upon that question to allow any discussion, unless their binding authority is denied — a position' not assumed in the argument. See The Moses Taylor, 4 Wallace, 411; Hine v. Trevor, id., 555; The Belfast, 7 id., 624; The Bagle, 8 id., 15. Also see decisions in the state courts in the following cases: In re Steamboat Josephine, 39 N. Y., 19; Brookman v. Hamill, 43 id., 554; Vose v. Cockroft, 44 id., 415; The Steamboat General Buell v. Long, 18 Ohio St., 521; Thorsen
This being the case, the further question arises, Did the warrant thus issued in a cause over which that court had no jurisdiction, afford any protection to the officer for acts done in its execution ? The counsel for the defendaht contends that it would protect the officer, and that, if fair and regular on its face, he had no right and it was not his duty to inquire whether the court which issued it had jurisdiction of the cause. Where the subject matter of the suit is within the jurisdiction of the court, yet jurisdiction in the particular case is wanting, there is
But it is said that this rule imposed upon the officer in the present case the duty of determining, in advance of any decision of the courts of this state, the validity of an act of the legislature. How can it be expected, it is asked, that a mere ministerial officer could decide such a question, and thus find out that his process was void for want of jurisdiction in the court which issued it? The maxim ignoraniia juris non excusat ignorance of the law, which every man is presumed to know, does not afford excuse * — ■ in its application to human affairs} frequently operates harshly; and yet it is manifest that if ignorance of the law were a ground of exemption, the administration of justice would be arrested, and society could not exist. For in every case ignorance of the law would be alleged. And consequently the answer must be given in this case, that the . ignorance of the officer is of the law, and the rule is almost without an exception, that this does not excuse. It may devolve upon the officer a vast responsibility in some cases, to say that he must notice at his peril that an act of the legislature attempting to confer jurisdiction upon the courts is unconstitutional. But if the officer does not wish to assume all the hazard which such a rule of law imposes on him, he must require a bond of indemnity from the party for whom he is acting. It is further said that it was the duty of the officer to obey the mandate of the warrant and seize the identical steamboat which he did attach, and that he had no alternative but to obey. If the act which the writ commanded him to do was a trespass, he was not required to perform it, Nor would he be liable in that case to the plaintiff for refusing to execute a process void for want of jurisdiction.
We have examined the authorities cited on the brief of counsel for the defendant, but we find nothing in them inconsistent with the views above expressed.
By the Court.-The order of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings according to law.