47 Mass. App. Ct. 360 | Mass. App. Ct. | 1999
The principal issue in this case is whether the Maine “Good Samaritan” statute
We summarize the pertinent facts, which do not appear to be in dispute. While in northern Maine, on the evening of January 16, 1994, at about 10:00 p.m., the plaintiff’s husband, John Campbell, the defendant Robert Schwartz, and Pat Haddigan decided to return on their individually-driven snowmobiles from the Medawisla camp, where they had been visiting friends, to the Kokadjo camp, where they were staying. The distance between the two camps was at least eight miles.
In depositions presented to the motion judge, Candeloro expressed the opinion that he did not consider Schwartz’s and Gender’s original decision to search for Campbell a rescue mission but a “cautious mission.” He saw no need, when Schwartz and Gemler departed, to mount a search party or call for emergency aid, because from what Schwartz had told him, Campbell was not that far out from the camp, and Schwartz was capable of finding Campbell because of his familiarity with the trails. However, Candeloro further testified that knowing now that Campbell’s snowmobile was inoperative when he was found changed his opinion about the nature of the mission. He also testified that he would not, in twenty degrees below zero weather, send just one snowmobile out to look for someone but would send two out in case one broke down. Warden Roger Guay, who investigated the accident for the local police, testified in his deposition that when Schwartz and Gemler set out to look for Campbell, he did not consider that Campbell’s absence at that time presented a life-threatening situation. It was not uncommon for a snowmobile operator to get lost for an hour or so, and the seriousness of the situation depended on the preparedness of the operator for this eventuality. In Warden Guay’s opinion, when one is stranded alone in cold weather, with an inoperable snowmobile, and is legally intoxicated, those circumstances would create a potentially life-threatening situation. Guay also was of the opinion that, for purposes of safety, a search party should consist of two separate snowmobiles and operators.
The plaintiff does not controvert these facts but argues instead that the determination of the legal significance of these facts was a question of fact and not of law. She further argues that the deposition testimony of Candeloro opining that Schwartz’s and Gemler’s decision to look for Campbell was simply investigatory, and Guay’s testimony that he did not consider a life-threatening situation to exist when a snowmobile operator is missing for an hour in very cold weather, would support a finding that Schwartz and Gemler were not engaged in a rescue mission. The plaintiff’s argument overlooks two material points. First, summary judgment is appropriate when the material facts are not in dispute and as matter of law their legal significance
We now address whether those facts demonstrated that the defendants were engaged in rescue assistance at the time of the accident. The plaintiff argues that in order for the defendants to have engaged in rescue assistance, Campbell had to be in imminent peril or danger, and such was not the case when Schwartz and Gemler found him. The word “rescue” is not defined in the statute. Nor has the statute been subject to interpretation by the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. Nevertheless, applying the usual maxims of statutory construction, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine has held that in the absence of a legislative definition, “the plain meaning of the term controls.” State v. York, 704 A.2d 324, 326 (Me. 1997). Also, the meaning ascribed to the term must be “consistent with the overall statutory context and must be construed in light of the subject matter, the purpose of the statute and the consequences of a particular interpretation.” Reagan v. Racal Mort., Inc., 715 A.2d 925, 927-928 (Me. 1998), quoting from Madison v. Norridgewock, 544 A.2d 317, 319 (Me. 1998).
“Rescue” as used in ordinary parlance means “to free from . . . danger.” Webster’s Third New Inti. Dictionary 1930 (1993). Danger is defined as “the state of being exposed to harm.” Id. at 573. Applying these definitions, the judge properly held that where one’s whereabouts is unknown in rural Maine, late at night, in temperatures registering twenty degrees below
In sum, we conclude that the motion judge properly determined that Gemler and Schwartz, as matter of law, were engaged in rescue assistance when they went looking for Campbell. A search for an intoxicated person who is missing in rural Maine, late at night, with temperatures registering twenty degrees below zero, certainly constitutes a rescue mission. See Barnes v. Geiger, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 365, 371 (1983). Although the judge did not specifically address the duration of the rescue mission, we conclude that the rescue did not end when Schwartz and Gemler found Campbell on the trail with an inoperable
Judgments affirmed.
Maine Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 164 (West 1980), provides in pertinent part as follows: “Notwithstanding any inconsistent provisions of any public or private and special law, any person who voluntarily, without the expectation of monetary or other compensation from the person aided or treated, renders first aid, emergency treatment or rescue assistance to a person who is unconscious, ill, injured or in need of rescue assistance, shall not be liable for damages for injuries alleged to have been sustained by such person nor for damages for the death of such person alleged to have occurred by reason of an act or omission in the rendering of such first aid, emergency treatment or
The parties do not dispute that the substantive law of the State of Maine is determinative of the defendants’ liability to the plaintiff.
By Schwartz’s estimate, the distance between the two camps was fifteen to twenty miles, and by Fred Candeloro’s estimate, the distance was eight miles.
From the record, it is unclear where the trading post store was in relation to the Kokadjo camp.
Schwartz recollected that he had traveled one-half mile before realizing Campbell had fallen off the snowmobile. The police report indicated that the distance was approximately 600 feet.