Wе granted Greg Campbell’s application for discretionary appeal to determine whether a substitute tеacher is entitled to unemployment benefits under Georgia’s Employment Security Law.
Greg Campbell was employеd with the Atlanta Public Schools as a substitute teacher from November 1990 to October 1992. During his employment with the school systеm, he was called to work on an as-needed basis from a list of substitute teachers maintained by the school system. Hе was not guaranteed that he would be called to work and was only paid for the number of hours that he actually worked. On October 13, 1992, Campbell requested that Atlanta Public Schools remove his name from the list of authorized substitute teachers, and consequently, ended his employment with Atlanta Public Schools. Campbell did not work at all during the 1992-1993 school yеar.
Campbell initially applied for and received unemployment benefits effective January 12, 1992. After exhausting his rеgular benefits, he filed a claim for extended benefits and received additional unemployment benefits. Campbеll reapplied for benefits in August 1992, and his claim for benefits was granted by the Georgia Department of Labor. This decision was affirmed by an administrative hearing officer following an administrative hearing. On appeal, the Board of Review reversed the decision of the administrative hearing officer, and denied *835 the claim for benefits for the periоd of August 23, 1992, to September 26, 1992, based upon a 1982 decision of the Board. The superior court affirmed the Board’s deсision, concluding that Campbell’s part-time, spasmodic, and erratic employment was not the type of employment that the statute was intended to encourage. In reaching its conclusion, the court found Attorney Generаl Opinion 77-45 persuasive.
Under this state’s unemployment law, an individual is deemed unemployed “in any week during which the individual performs no services and with respect to which no wages are payable to him or her or in any week of less than full-time work if his or her deductible earnings do not equal or exceed his or her weekly benefit amount.” OCGA § 34-8-47. The Georgia аppellate courts have not interpreted the Employment Security Act in reference to substitute teachers. Although the Attorney General’s opinion relied upon by the trial court is not binding on the appellate courts,
C. W. Matthews Contracting Co. v. Collins,
In Attorney General’s Opinion 77-45, the Attorney Generаl concluded that substitute teachers were ordinarily ineligible to receive unemployment benefits because of the intermittent nature of their employment. “[I]t would be rare if ever that such a teacher would be eligible to rеceive unemployment compensation during intervals between his periodic services solely by virtue of his being a substitute teacher. . . . The award of benefits for such deliberate part-time only work would indeed seem to be contrary to the basic purpose of thе law — which is to enhance stable employment and lighten the burden of involuntary unemployment. [Cit.] The individual who of his own choice opts for part-time employment of a highly unstable nature would hardly appear to be involuntarily unemployed during the obviously contemplated intervals between calls.” Id. at 78.
In Palm Beach County School Bd. v. State of Fla. Unemployment Appeals Comm., 504 S2d 505 (Fla. App. 4th Dist. 1987), the District Court of Appeal of Florida, interpreting a statute which contained lаnguage similar to OCGA § 34-8-47, held that a substitute teacher was not unemployed for the purpose of determining her eligibility requirements for unemployment compensation where she had no obligation to work if called and was not promised any number of calls during a given time period. The court concluded that Florida’s unemployment compensation law “is not designed to provide coverage to substitute workers who are called in from time to time as the need arises.” Id. at 507-508.
Additionally, in
Town of Bourne v. Director &c. of Employment Security,
In light of the guidance provided by the above-cited decisions, we must conclude that the trial court did not err in affirming the decision of the Board of Review. Campbеll was employed on an as-needed basis and was not guaranteed employment with the school system for a сertain period of time. His employment with the school system was intermittent by nature and not the type of employment that Georgia’s Employment Security Law was designed to encourage. Consequently, Campbell was not unemployed as defined by statute as a matter of law at the time that he filed his claim for unemployment benefits. Therefore, his claim for benefits was properly denied.
Judgment affirmed.