Case Information
1 S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting OTOMAYOR SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
GLEN CAMPBELL ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO , CUYAHOGA COUNTY
No. 17–6232. Decided March 19, 2018
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. Statement of J USTICE S respecting the denial of certiorari.
Petitioner Glen Campbеll challenges the constitutionality of Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2953.08(D)(3) (West Supp. 2017), which provides that sentences “imposed for aggravated murdеr or murder” are “not subject to review.” I concur in the denial of certiorari because Campbell failed ade- quately to present his constitutional arguments to the state courts. I nonetheless write separately because a statute that shields frоm judicial scrutiny sentences of life with- out the possibility of parole raises serious constitutional concerns.
In Ohio, after a dеfendant is found guilty of aggravated murder, the State authorizes a range of penalties, includ ing life in prison with parole eligibility after 20, 25, оr 30 years, or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. See §2929.03(A)(1). Under that scheme, Campbell was sentenced to life imprisоnment without the possibility of parole after pleading guilty to aggravated murder. He challenged his sentence on appeal, arguing in part that the trial court failed to balance the aggravating and miti gating factors as required by §2929.12 of the Ohio statute. In making sentencing determinations in felony cases, Ohio provides that courts “shall be guided by the overriding purposes of felony sen tencing . . . to protect the public from future crime” and “punish the offender,” §2929.11, and “shall consider” certain statutory aggravating and mitigating factors, §2929.12.
The Court of Appeals of Ohio found this argument “unre
viewable” under §2953.08(D)(3). App. to Pet. for Cert. A–
3. That provision, contained within the apрellate review
section of the Ohio statute, provides: “A sentence imposed
for aggravated murder or murder pursuant to sections
2929.02 to 2929.06 of the Revised Code is not subject to
review under this section.” §2953.08(D)(3). The court
below relied on precedent from the Suрreme Court of
Ohio, which has held that §2953.08(D)(3) is “unambigu
ous” and “clearly means what it says: such a sentence
cannot be reviewed.”
State
v.
Porterfield
, 106 Ohio St. 3d
5, 8,
Trial judges making the determination whether a de fendant should be condemned to die in prison have a grave responsibility, and the fact that Ohiо has set up a scheme under which those determinations “cannot be reviewed” is deeply concerning. Life without parole “is the second most severe penalty permitted by law.” Harmelin v. Michigan , 501 U. S. 957, 1001 (1991) (K ENNEDY , J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). In recent years this Court has recognized that, although death is different, “life without parole sentences share some characteristics with death sentences thаt are shared by no other sentences.” Graham Florida , 560 U. S. 48, 69 (2010). “Impris- oning an offender until he dies alters the remainder of his life ‘by a forfeiture that is irrevoсable.’ ” Ala- bama , 567 U. S. 460, 474–475 (2012) (quoting , 560 U. S., at 69). A life-without-parole sentence “means denial of hope; it means that good behavior and charaсter improvement are immaterial; it means that whatever the future might hold in store for the mind and spirit of the convict, he will remain in prison for the rest of his days.” Id., at 70 (internal quotation marks and bracket omitted).
Because of the parallels between a sentence of death
and a sentence of life imprisonment without parole, the
Court has drawn on certain Eighth Amendment require
ments developed in the capital sentencing context to
inform the life-without-parole sentencing context. For
instance, this Court imported the Eighth Amendment
requirement “demanding individualized sеntencing when
imposing the death penalty” into the juvenile conviction
context, holding that “a similar rule should apply when a
juvenile confronts a sentence of life (and death) in prison.”
Miller
,
The “correspondence” between capital рunishment and life sentences, , 567 U. S., at 475, might similarly require reconsideration of other sentencing practices in the life-without-parole context. As relevant here, the Eighth Amendment demands that capital sentencing schemes ensure “measured, consistent application and fairness to the accused,” Eddings v. Oklahoma , 455 U. S. 104, 111 (1982), with the purpose of avoiding “the arbi trary or irrational imposition of the death penalty,” Parker v. Dugger , 498 U. S. 308, 321 (1991). To that aim, “this Court has repeatedly emphasized that meaningful appel late review of death sentences рromotes reliability and consistency.” Clemons Mississippi , 494 U. S. 738, 749 (1990); see also Parker , 498 U. S., at 321 (“We have em phasized repeatedly the crucial role of meaningful appel late review in ensuring that the death penalty is not im posed arbitrarily or irrationally”); Gregg Georgia , 428 U. S. 153, 195 (1976) (joint opinion of Steward, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (noting that “the further safeguard of meaningful appellate review is available to ensure that death sentences are not imposed capriciously or in a freak ish manner”).
In my view, this jurisprudence provides good reason to question whether §2953.08(D)(3) really “mеans what it says”: that a life-without-parole sentence, no matter how arbitrarily or irrationally imposed, is shielded from mean ingful aрpellate review. Our Eighth Amendment juris prudence developed in the capital context calls into ques tion whether a defеndant should be condemned to die in prison without an appellate court having passed on whether that determination prоperly took account of his circumstances, was imposed as a result of bias, 2 or was otherwise imposed in a “freakish manner.” And our juris prudence questions whether it is permissible that Camp bell must now spend the rest of his days in prison without ever having had the opportunity to challenge why his trial judge chose the irrevocability of life without parole over the hope of freedom after 20, 25, or 30 years. The law, after all, granted the trial judge the discretion to impose these lower sentences. See §2929.03(A)(1).
This case did nоt present either the Ohio courts or this Court the occasion to decide this important question. 3 I believe the Ohio courts will be vigilant in considering it in the appropriate case.
[2] Although the State argues that a defendant can present a claim of biаs on state postconviction proceedings, see Brief in Opposition 11, those claims are limited to claims of “a cоnsistent pattern of disparity in sentencing by the judge,” Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2953.21(A)(5). The State does not address how a defendant convicted of аggravated murder can raise a substantial claim of bias if it is not part of a “consistent pattern.” Campbell advanced his meaningful-review claim as a due process, rather than an Eighth Amendment, claim. He also argued that the Ohio statute violated the Equal Protection Clause.