36 Conn. Supp. 357 | Conn. Super. Ct. | 1980
The plaintiff John A. Campbell brought this action for injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as for compensatory damages by his father and next friend Anthony Campbell. The plaintiff, a senior at New Milford High School, claims that an attendance policy promulgated by the defendant, the New Milford board of education, violates various provisions of the United States and Connecticut constitutions and is preempted by General Statutes §§
The plaintiff has filed a motion for class certification, seeking certification of the class of all past, present and future students who have been, are or will be subject to the New Milford board of education. For the reasons stated below the court grants the plaintiff's motion. *359
The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that all of the requirements of the rule are satisfied.Rex v. Owens ex rel. State,
In this case the plaintiff has shown through discovery that from 450 to 800 students have been affected by the attendance policy since it became effective in 1977. The impracticality of joining such a large number of plaintiffs is obvious. Management of such a large action would be quite burdensome and could lead to unnecessary delays. More importantly, the size of the individual monetary claims of the class members is likely to be small, making it less likely that they would bother to join as plaintiffs. See Swanson v. American ConsumerIndustries, Inc.,
This case presents a classic example of the existence of common issues. The plaintiff is challenging the policy on three major grounds: (1) that it was *363
adopted ultra vires and is inconsistent with certain statutory provisions; (2) that the arbitrary reduction of grades and denial of credit violate substantive due process rights; and (3) that the exemption provisions are so discretionary as to violate due process. The major thrust of these claims attacks the policy on its face and the only concern with its application in an individual case is whether it was applied, not how it was applied. Where a representative party challenges a particular policy or regulation of an administrative body on constitutional or statutory grounds the courts have generally held that the requirement of commonality is satisfied. See, e.g., Johnson v. American Credit Co.of Georgia,
The defendant also contends that it may have to raise different defenses against different class members, noting especially that the statute of limitations may have run against former students. It is true that no class action may proceed on behalf of class members whose claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Schmidt v. InterstateFederal Savings Loan Assn.,
Here there is nothing unique about the named plaintiff's legal claims or factual situation. All members challenge the statutory and constitutional validity of the policy without regard to the way in which it was applied in a particular case. The key factor is only whether it was applied not how it was applied. The plaintiff and the putative class members are, have been or will be students at the same *366
high school with the same administration. The effect
on them will be basically the same — a reduction of their grades or a denial of credit. The fact that the plaintiff's injury may be more or less extensive than that of some of the class members is not sufficient to make his claims "markedly different" from those of the class. Thus, this case is distinguishable from those cases alleging that a defendant maintains unconstitutional or discriminatory practices in a number of different facilities; see, e.g., Hill v.Western Electric Co.,
There is no contention that the plaintiff's representation is anything but adequate. The fact that counsel for the class is experienced in this type of litigation and the quality of the pleadings and briefs lead the court to conclude that counsel is competent and diligent.7 There is no evidence that this is a collusive suit or that the plaintiff's claims are in conflict with those of the class.8 The possibility of antagonistic claims is most apparent in cases involving a significant monetary recovery from private industry where the defendant is likely to go out of business (thereby depriving class members of a service they desire) or pass the increased costs of operation on to the class members, or where the relief sought is not the type desired by all class members. See note, "Class Actions: Rule 23(a)(3) and (4)," 53 Bost. U. L. Rev. 406, 418-27 (1973). The relief sought, if granted, will benefit all members of the *368
class of students adversely affected by the policy.9
In addition this is not the type of case where any monetary award will be passed on to the class, or cause the public school system to collapse. Finally, the plaintiff has been directly and adversely affected by the application of the challenged policy. This gives him a substantial stake in the outcome of the action thereby ensuring vigorous prosecution.10 The mere fact that the plaintiff is a student at present does not disqualify him from acting as a representative of former students. See Governor's Grove CondominiumAssn., Inc. v. Hill Development Corporation,
As stated earlier, the major thrust of this action is a challenge to the defendant's attendance policy on its face, and the only concern with its application in an individual case is whether it was applied, not how it was applied. The case will turn on the common legal questions of whether the promulgation of the policy, in the first instance, was ultra vires, whether the application of the policy to a student violates due process rights, and whether the waiver provision is arbitrary and unconstitutional because of the lack of standards to guide the decision maker. The application of the policy, if unreasonable, harms a student whether that harm be loss of job opportunity or loss of the opportunity to attend the college of his or her choice. As mentioned earlier, when so many common issues exist, it is immaterial that there may be individual questions relating to damages; see Governor's Grove Condominium Assn.
v. Hill Development Corporation,
Where, as here, common issues predominate and parties are numerous, the superiority of a class action over individual lawsuits is obvious and has been recognized by the courts. See, e.g., Roper v.Consurve, Inc.,
The superiority of a class action over individual joinder pursuant to Practice Book, 1978, § 83 has already been demonstrated; the parties are so numerous that joinder is impracticable. Similarly, although some courts and commentators have suggested the desirability of deferring to an administrative agency, where appropriate, rather than proceeding *371
as a class action; see, e.g., Kamm v. CaliforniaCity Development Corporation,
Finally, in Katz v. Carte Blanche Corporation,
The above discussion indicates the superiority of a class action over other available methods. Judicial economy is best served by proceeding as a class action. Fairness requires such a procedure since it is likely that class members would be hesitant to proceed individually for fear of retaliation or because of the small economic stake of individual members in the outcome. Manageability also does not appear to be a problem because of the limited size and geographic concentration of the class members. If any problems arise as to manageability of the class, the court is empowered under Practice Book, 1978, § 90 to order an amendment to the pleadings eliminating all reference to absent parties. On the basis of those reasons, the court finds the class action to be the superior method.