87 Ind. 577 | Ind. | 1882
This was a suit by the appellant against the appellees in a complaint of two paragraphs. Afterwards the appellant dismissed the action as to the first paragraph of the complaint. The appellees’ demurrer to the second paragraph of the complaint, for the alleged insufficiency of the facts therein to constitute a cause of action, was sustained by the court, and to this decision the appellant excepted. Refusing to amend or plead further the court rendered judgment against him for the appellees’ costs.
In the second paragraph of his complaint the appellant alleged, in substance, that, on the 14th day of January, 1876, by the consideration of the court below, the appellant recovered a judgment against the appellee Alexander C. Martin for §2,508.42, without relief from valuation or appraisement laws, and a decree of foreclosure of mortgage on real estate in Washington county, described in said decree, and a judgment over against said Alexander C. Martin for any balance of the judgment that might remain unsatisfied after the sale of the mortgaged premises; that an order of sale was duly
A joint demurrer by all the appellees, Alexander C. Martin included, was sustained by the court to this paragraph of complaint, and this ruling is the only error complained of by the appellant in this court. The appellees have not favored this court with any brief or argument in support of the ruling below, and we confess our inability to see any ground upon which it can be sustained. It is certain that the complaint stated a cause of action against the appellee Alexander C. Martin, for it counted upon an unpaid judgment against him, recovered by the appellant in the court below. In Gould v. Hayden, 63 Ind. 443, this court said: “A jxidgment is a ‘ debt of record ’ and, whether foreign or domestic, an action may be maintained thereon for the recovery of such debt, even where it might appear that the judgment plaintiff could enforce the-collection of his judgment by an execution issued out of the court in which it was rendered. Davidson v. Nebaker, 21 Ind. 334. The judgment plaintiff, of course, controls his judgment. He may enforce its collection by the process of the court in which he obtained his judgment, or he may, if he may elect so to do, use his j udgment as an original cause of action, and bring
Clearly, therefore, the complaint was sufficient to withstand the demurrer of Alexander C. Martin thereto, and, as it was a joint demurrer, it ought to have been overruled as to all the appellees. This is so, whether the appellant was or was not entitled to the relief demanded in his complaint. Upon the facts alleged he was entitled to some relief; and, in such a case, it is error to sustain a demurrer for- the want of facts to the complaint, because it may appear that the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief prayed for. A bad prayer for relief, or a prayer for improper relief, will not vitiate a pleading otherwise sufficient; and a demurrer to a pleading for the want of facts will not reach objections to its prayer for relief. Mark v. Murphy, 76 Ind. 534; Nowlin v. Whipple, 79 Ind. 481.
The appellant’s judgment against Alexander C. Martin was rendered on the 14th day of January, 1876, in the circuit court of Washington county, and thereafter remained in full force and unsatisfied. The statutory lien of this judgment attached at once to the real estate in the same county, described in the complaint, upon the devise thereof to Alexander C. Martin by his father, Mason L. Martin, deceased, at the death of the latter on the 1st day of June, 1876. In the natural order of things, of course the lien of this judgment, in favor of the appellant, would take precedence over and be superior to the lien of the judgment which the administrator, with the will annexed, of Mason L. Martin, deceased, at the August term, 1878, of the court below, recovered against Alexander C. Martin. After the rendition of this latter judgment, in a suit by the administrator against Alexander C. Martin, the court below, at its April term, 1879, ordered the administrator to retain and hold the real estate, so devised to Alexander C., giving him credit for its appraised value on the judgment against him, in favor of the administrator. But the appellant was not a party to such suit, and, besides, by the express terms
We learn from the brief of.the appellant’s learned counsel that the decision below was made upon the following grounds: “ The executor or administrator with the will annexed had a . right to set off the devise made the son by the will with the demands or debts due the father from the son, at the time of the father’s death.” Appellant’s counsel says that the court held, “in other wordsj that the debt due the father’s estate from the son, and not reduced to judgment until two years after the father’s death, was a superior lien or equity to the plaintiff’s judgment which attached to the lands devised immediately upon the father’s death.” From the same source we learn that the court based its decision on the following language, in 2 Redf. Wills, p. 483, see. 19: “There seems to be no question of the right and duty of the executor to set off any debt due the estate from a legatee against any legacy which he may be called to pay. But this right of retainer will not extend to an indebtedness created after the deceaseuof the testator, by'the legatee giving security to the estate for the indébtedness of other parties.”
There is some reason for the application of this doctrine to the payment of legacies by the executor, and especially so where the indebtedness of the legatee to the estate might be regarded as a total or partial ademption of the legacy. But we know of no reason whatever for the extension of this doctrine, and making it applicable to devises of real estate. As a general rule, legacies are payable by the executor out of the testator’s personal estate which may come to his hands to be administered. But, ordinarily, the executor has absolutely nothing to do with the real estate devised by his testator, unless it may be needed for the payment of the testator’s debts. Otherwise, the devise of the real estate will take effect at once upon the death of the testator, without any intervening act of the executor. Upon the facts stated in the complaint, in the case at bar, we are of opinion that the lien of the appel
The judgment is reversed, with costs, and the pause is remanded with instructions to overrule the demurrer to the complaint, and for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.