83 Ala. 512 | Ala. | 1887
— The issues of fact were tried by the court without the intervention of a jury, as provided by the act establishing the City Court of Birmingham. The conclusions and j udgment of the court on the evidence being presented for review, we are required to review them without any presumption in favor of the ruling of the court. If, on the entire evidence, the plaintiff can not recover under either count of the amended complaint, the ruling on the demurrer to the 'fourth count, if erroneous, is error without injury.
The action is brought by appellant to recover for personal injuries produced by the falling of a brick wall. Eor the purpose of "obtaining a broader and firmer foundation for a building, which the defendant was having erected on his own premises by contracts, it was deemed necessary to undermine a rear wall on the adjacent lot. In order to support the wall during the process of undermining, pieces of timber, denominated needles, were extended through it, intended to rest upon firm earth on both sides. Th®y were tightly keyed, and supported by posts. The negligence as alleged, and as the proof tends to shciw, consists in the failure to extend them through sufficiently to enable them to rest on solid ground on the inside of the wall. The necessity for this work was not discovered until after the original contracts were made, and was not included therein. It was extra work, and the mode of supporting the walls, while being undermined, was directed by the architect, who was employed to superintend the erection of the building. The architect was not an independent contractor, beyond the control of the defendant as to the manner of doing the work. It is shown that he had the ultimate power, as owner, to order how it should be done. Having reserved and possessing this power, the defendant is liable, notwithstanding the mode was left to the judgment and direction of the architect, for injuries caused by the negligent performance pf the work, the other
Tbe defendant is not responsible to tbe plaintiff,’ unless there was tbe neglect of duty owed to him — unless, as between him and tbe defendant, there was a want of due care. Tbe lot is tbe private property of tbe defendant, and tbe building was in process of construction. It was not a business bouse, nor a place where tbe public are expected or impliedly invited or induced to come, .for tbe transaction of business, or for other purposes. To trespassers or idlers, or persons visiting tbe premises merely for their individual benefit, or from curiosity, tbe defendant owed no duty other than that no willful or wanton injury should be done. To create a duty to tbe plaintiff, be must have sustained a relation to tbe business, or to tbe defendant, equivalent to an invitation or inducement to come on tbe lot. Tbe duty to keep the structure free from defect likely to produce injury only extends to persons sustaining such relation. — M. & E. Railway Co. v. Thompson, 77 Ala. 448; Pierce v. Whitcomb, 21 Amer. Rep. 120; Beach Con. Neg. 17.
Tbe duty to tbe plaintiff is founded, in tbe first count of tbe complaint, on the averment that- be was in tbe service of the defendant, and employed in tbe work of undermining tbe walls; and in the other counts, that be was there by tbe invitation and license of defendant. It is incumbent on plaintiff to establish tbe facts, oil which it is claimed that a duty arises. There can be no pretense, on tbe evidence, that tbe plaintiff was in tbe service of defendant. He was not employed nor paid by him. If at tbe place of tbe work by tbe implied invitation or inducement of defendant, it was by reason of being in tbe service of Carr, who was employee! to do tbe undermining. On this question of fact, tbe testimony of tbe plaintiff and Carr is in direct conflict; and when considered in connection with tbe corroborating evidence, what is tbe fact remains in doubt. As tbe burden of proof i's on tbe plaintiff, we should bold, if necessary to a decision, that tbe plaintiff has failed to satisfactorily prove this employment; but, as this is in doubt, we prefer to put our conclusion on other grounds.
Admitting that plaintiff was at tbe place by tbe implied invitation and license of tbe defendant, bis right to recover depends upon tbe condition, that tbe dangerous character of tbe work was unknown to him, or, if known, that be exercised ordinary care and caution to avoid injury. — Parker v.
Affirmed.