*1 CAMPBELL LOUISIANA 21, 1998 20, 1998 January April Argued No. 96-1584. Decided *3 respect with Kennedy, J., delivered the for a unanimous Court opinion V, IV, to I, II, opinion respect and and the Court with to Parts Stevens, O’Connor, Souter, III, Rehnquist, J.,C. and Part in which Breyer, JJ., Ginsburg, joined. Thomas, J., opinion filed an concur- and SCALIA,J., joined, dissenting part, post, p. in in 403. which ring part in and petitioner. argued With Burnes cause for Dmitrc I. was Richard'V. Burnes. on the him briefs leyoub, Attorney Louisiana, ar of General P. Richard respondent. brief were on the for With him gued cause Hunley, Mary Assistant and Ellen E. Petersen Kathleen Attorneys General, and Paul R. Baier.* opinion of the Court. delivered the Kennedy
Justice defendant has whether a white criminal decide We must object persons black in standing to discrimination to grand jurors. requisite Finding has the of he the selection process protection claims, standing we raise and due to and remand. reverse
I Evangeline indicted Parish, Louisiana, jury in A second-degree Terry Campbell of petitioner on one count * Dratel, Kemler, Greenberg A. filed and Lisa Richard Joshua L. as amicus Lawyers Defense for Association of Criminal brief the National reversal. urging curiae Campbell, timely pretrial
murder. who is white, filed a mo- quash grounds indictment on the equal protection in was constituted violation of his and due under the Fourteenth Amendment and vio- lation of the require- Sixth Amendment’s fair-cross-section alleged Campbell practice longstanding ment. of racial grand jury forepersons selection parish. piece sole that, His of evidence is between Janu- August ary person black served no as a parish, jury foreperson though per- in the more than 20 even registered persons. cent voters were black See Brief dispute The State this Petitioner does evidence. judge quash The trial refused to the indictment because “Campbell, being killing white man another accused standing complain lacked man,” white “where all of the forepersons App. white.” were to Pet. for Cert. G-33. Campbell’s
After first trial mistrial, resulted in was second-degree murder, retried, convicted and sentenced to prison possibility parole. Campbell without life re- challenge grand jury foreperson to the newed his procedures trial, in a motion for denied. new which See Appeal id., reversed, at 1-2. The Louisiana be- Ohio, our decision in cause, under U. S. 400 (1991), Campbell object alleged had dis- *4 (1995). though he is 2d 412 crimination even white. 651 So. Appeal evidentiary of remanded the for an The Court ease hearing Campbell’s it of found evidence discrimina- inadequate. Id., at tion Supreme distinguished It
The Louisiana
Court reversed.
turning on the
Powers
“considerable and substantial im
as
discriminatory
pact”
peremptory
prosecutor’s
use of
that
challenges
integ
on a
on
has
defendant’s trial as
as
the
well
(1995).
system.
rity
judicial
of the
See
afford granted be to a Hobby, held no relief In this Court could were violated even if his due white defendant grand jury in the of a federal selection discrimination Hobby Noting on the ministerial foreperson. that turned grand jury duties, the Lou- foreperson’s federal nature of the “[t]he fore- Supreme Court held role isiana similarly appears ministerial” such to be man in Louisiana any, any effect on the de- if little, “has discrimination process right fairness.” 661 of fundamental due fendant’s Appeal had ad- Because the Court 2d, So. at 1S24. points the Louisi- Campbell’s error, other asserted dressed the Supreme the ease. After Court remanded ana Court rejected Campbell’s remaining claims, 673 So. 2d Appeal (1996), Supreme to recon- refused 1061 the Louisiana (1997). ruling grand jury issue, on 2d 140 685 So. sider its question granted narrow certiorari to address the We process, Campbell’s standing equal protection, due to raise (1997). and fair-cross-section claims. U. S.
I I complains Campbell matter, note about As an initial we grand in the of his more than discrimination compo- alleges shaped foreperson; system grand itself. In the federal sition of the juries, foreperson is se- most which use States grand jurors. already lected from ranks seated Bryson, Beale, Elston, J. & M. Grand Felman, See W. S. (2d 1997) Jury pp. to 4-21 ed. §4:6, and Practice 4-20 Law (either judge foreperson or selects the fellow her). systems, jurors the title him or Under those elect existing jurors “foreperson” one is bestowed on change composition. grand jury’s In in the without foreperson judge from Louisiana, contrast, selects *5 remaining jury grand the venire before the members of Code Proc. have been chosen lot. La. Crim.
397 413(B)(West 1997); Supp. supra, Ann., Beale, Art. also 1 see (Ohio, Virginia 4-22, at 11 and Tennessee, n. use Oklahoma, Louisiana’s). procedures to similar to In his other addition foreperson grand jury duties, the has the the Louisiana voting powers same As full as members. other judge foreperson, result, when Louisiana selected one also selected member outside of the of the drawing system body. compose used to the balance require the ease al- These considerations to as one us treat leging discriminatory jurors. selection of
r-H HH J—I litigate Standing imprecise on often turns distinctions requires line-drawing. occasion, and however, difficult On standing by applying we ease can ascertain with relative Wright, prior rules established Allen v. 468 cases. See (1984). Campbell’s equal protection U. S. 751 claim is such an instance. supra, Ohio,
In v. defendant had we found white challenge per racial black discrimination peremptory challenges. sons in the use We determined protection rights defendant himself could raise the jurors. general Recognizing of the excluded our reluctance permit litigant party, of a third we assert the (1) preconditions found three had been defend satisfied: (2) “injury ant suffered an he had “close relation fact”; (3) ship” jurors; to the excluded was some hin there jurors rights. asserting drance to their own the excluded supra, (citing Singleton Powers, at 411 S.U. Wulff, (1976)). We white suffers a seri concluded a defendant injury ous in fact because the voir dire stage judicial process’ integrity doubt “‘easts on places proceeding ... and fairness of a criminal doubt.” deprives S.,U. This cloud of doubt certainty given that a verdict his “is in accord case by persons ance law Id., with the who fair.” at 413. are *6 398 juror defendant have a and criminal
Second, the excluded They relationship: interest elimi- share a common close nating an in- discrimination, the criminal defendant has and victory an because centive to as effective advocate serve overturning Id., may at 413-414. his conviction. result in given litigation and small Third, the economicburdens juror of race “a because available, financial reward dismissed little probably possessing incentive leave the courtroom will to vindicate his set in arduous needed motion Upon of these fac- rights.” consideration Id., own at 415. bring standing to tors, white defendant had we concluded against equal challenge protection racial discrimination an petit persons jury process. black in the selection discriminatory Although Campbell challenges selection of ap petit reasoning grand jurors, jurors, rather than Powers' standing. prior plies question Our case on to this own cases decided a white defendant’s have not whether composition rights protection are violated when jury grand black of his is tainted persons. this issue do not need to address We equal protec Campbell seeks assert well-established persons grand from black not to excluded be (Dec. jury 2, See Tr. 9 on the basis of their race. service 1993); Cty., Jury v. Greene see also Carter Comm’n (1970) (racial prospective exclusion U. S. 329-330 320, rights). grand petit jurors violates their constitutional third-party Campbell preconditions for satisfies the three standing outlined in Powers.
Regardless of accused suffers a color, his or her skin significant composition injury fact when the “[Discrimination jury racial is tainted discrimination. of a on race in the of members the basis of judicial of our . . at the fundamental values . strikes system” component of the is because the a central process. Mitchell, 443 justice U. S. criminal Rose v.
(1979).
requires
Federal Gov-
The Fifth Amendment
grand jury
eminent
prosecution,
to use
to initiate a
and 22
adopt a
States
similar rule as a matter of state law. See 1
supra,
at
(Fifth
Beale,
§1:2,
1-3; see
also Hurtado
California,
(1884)
standing are little satisfied with trouble. We find no reason why a white would be less effective as ad an jurors petit ju excluded for vocate for than excluded supra, Powers, at 413-414. The defendant and rors. See grand juror share a interest in eradi the excluded common process, cating from the selection asserting a vital the ex and the defendant has interest juror’s may his conviction be over cluded supra, supra, 264; Vasquez, Rose, as a See turned result. (1950). Texas, 339 The State con U. S. 282 551; Cassell . . Campbell’s to “the excluded class of tends connection . prior jurors serve . who were not called to ... . . years Respondent 22. is at best.” Brief for tenuous, Campbell’s argument underlying claim with This confuses *8 rights prove of To needed to it. assert the evidence venirepersons serving on the who were excluded from those Campbell prove jury in must their exclusion case, his to intentional discrimination. He seeks account of was on similarly past of venire- so treatment situated do based on Partida, 430 S. persons cases, in see Castaneda v. U. other (1977), does not mean he seeks to assert but this 482, 494 rights. matter, As a final excluded venirepersons’ those to assert grand jurors same economic disincentives have the rights jurors. Powers, petit excluded See as do their own Campbell, any white de supra, like other We find protection challenge standing to raise an fendant, has persons his in selection of black to discrimination grand jury.
IV standing litigate his or her has to It that one is axiomatic rights. explore process own need the nature due We process al- a due extent of defendant’s when he and leges discriminatory jurors, of and confine holding standing his our to to raise the issue. decision Our process question, al- in v. addressed the Peters due Kiff though agree majority of Justices a compre could not on remedy hensive of the appropriate statement rule or an (1972) any See (opinion 407 U. 493, violation. S. of Mar J.) (“[Wjhatever shall, his race, criminal defendant has challenge system standing grand... used his to select jury, ground arbitrarily it on excludes ... members thereby law”); process race, and denies him due id., (White, joined by J., Powell, JJ., Brennan and concur (“[Tjhe ring statutory judgment) strong policy [18 in C.] §243, which U. S. reflects central concern the Four permits challenge teenth Amendment” a white defendant to selection). Our more recent Hobby proceeded implied decision on the United States standing assumption that a white defendant had to raise a objection discriminatory appointment due of a fed- foreperson grand jmy skipped question to the eral ahead remedy S., was at 350. It is whether available. 468 U. unnecessary full here to discuss the nature and due extent of jmy process protection context selection. open upon it our issue, That extent is still based earlier precedents, assuming merits, be determined on the should necessary light point court finds it to reach the equal protection assump- claim. The relevant concomitant Hobby, holding and our that a has here, is litigate procured whether his conviction process. procedures or which means contravene due *9 reading Supreme Hobby The Louisiana erred in to Court Campbell’s standing bring process due to chal- foreclose lenge. Hobby, at In held 2d, 661 So. 1324. we discrimina- foreperson grand jury in did the selection of federal infringe principles of fundamental fairness because the foreperson’s Hobby, supra, were duties “ministerial.” See Supreme this at In the de- case, 345-346. Louisiana grand jury foreperson’s cided a duties were Louisiana minis- Camp- terial then its too, but couched decision in terms of litigate standing to a due bell’s lack of claim. 661 at 2d, So. 1324. Supreme wrong on
The Court was both counts. Louisiana Hobby implicit interpretation of Its is inconsistent with the just assumption our we have and with ex- noted plicit reasoning Hobby, jury grand in case. In a federal that jurors, existing grand foreperson from the was selected so juror pick grand at another, to over least decision one only foreperson arguably, if the affected the significant given duties that would not have had some juror. Against regular grand swpra, See at 396. this as a rejected background, the defendant’s claim be- the Court grand foreperson of a federal role cause ministerial appoint- in vital discrimination “is not such a one significantly post invades” due of an individual ment Campbell’s process. Hobby, supra, challenge is dif- at 346. implicates impermis- degree it ferent in kind and because grand jury. appointment of a member of the See sible Campbell is supra, not the fore- at 396-397. What concerns preside, performance person’s performance duty his but voting charge Campbell namely, with grand juror, as a second-degree murder. acknowledged by significance this distinction was previous Mitchell,
Hobby’s ease, of a Rose discussion (1979). Rose, could be In we assumed relief S. 545 U. challenge in granted discrimination a constitutional jury foreperson. id., at See appointment of a state part distinguished because it involved Hobby Rose in jury system. the Tennessee law Under Tennessee’s were selected effect, members then judge appointed 13th who random, member then the Hobby, foreperson. 347. As S., 468 U. See also served as Hobby pointed out result, foreperson more than was much serious Tennessee the com- system the former can affect federal position latter cannot: whereas the “So *10 long properly there constituted, as the itself is appointment is no its risk that the one of members composition array as foreman will distort overall operation judicial process.” or otherwise taint By Hobby its own does not Id., terms, then, address Campbell’s. like claim
V questions Camp- One of raised on is whether certiorari standing has bell also raise a claim. It fair-cross-section appears Supreme neither the Louisiana Court nor the Louisi- Appeal 'very ana this Court discussed contention. “With exceptions,’... petitioner’s rare will we not consider a fed- pre- properly eral claim unless it was either or addressed sented court that have state rendered decision we been asked to v. Robertson, review.” Adams U. S. curiam). (1997) (per Campbell no has made effort to showing pre- properly meet his this burden issue was appellate courts, to the sented Louisiana even after State pointed out this this Court. See Brief for omission before Respondent Campbell no than fact, 29-30. In devotes more page text in claim. one his brief to his fair-eross-seetion See Brief for Petitioner 31-32. We to address the decline issue. judgment Supreme
The of the Louisiana is Court reversed. proceedings remanded case is for further inconsist- opinion. ent with this
It is so ordered. Justice with Scalia Thomas, whom Justice joins, concurring part dissenting part. fail to
I understand how the from of blacks excluded letting service can be vindicated white murderer (1991), go Ohio, inYet, free. 499 U. S. 400 held that white criminal had challenge upon alleged his viola criminal conviction based protection rights ju- prospective tions of the of black *11 404 Today’s merely reaffirming decision,
rors. rather than Pow- misguided third-party standing, applies ers’ doctrine of that to a doctrine in context which Powers’ even rationales are inapplicable. Because Powers is both incorrect an initial as inapposite respectfully hand, matter and to the case at I dis- join opinion. Part sent from III of the Court’s I I, II, Parts reversing judgment IV, and andV concur in the and remand- ing Supreme to the Louisiana Court. ground by holding
Powers broke new for the first time may equal protection criminal raise an chal defendant lenge peremptory jurors to the use of strikes to exclude of a (ex dissenting) at id., (S race. different See calia, J., 422 plaining body with “a that Powers was inconsistent vast precedents). Recognizing that the statement” clear our equal protection own could not claim that his defendant rights held that the defendant denied, been had protection rights of venire to assert had jury. Id., 410-416. The Court from the men excluded party stand had such “third that the defendant concluded ing” had met: he had suffered an three been criteria excluded “injury a “close relation” to the fact”; had jurors’ ability jurors; to the and there “some hindrance” 410-411. protect Id., at their to own interests. equal protection standing principles and
Powers distorted
ex-
As
should be overruled.1
law and
Justice
Scalia
in Powers
dissent,
length in his
the.
plained at
1
Bat
elsewhere,
following
line of eases
the entire
explained
As I have
(1986)
Protection
Equal
Kentucky,
(holding that
U.
79
v.
S.
son
Powers,
strikes),
is a
including
of peremptory
to the use
applies
Clause
the Con
wrong
using
societal
general
remedy
effort
misguided
peremp
traditionally discretionary exercise
regulate
stitution
doctrine,
helping
rather
than
ensure
tory challenges. The Batson
fairness
em
undercut
trials,
only
serves
criminal
fairness of
expense of the traditional
jurors at the
excluded
phasizing the
McCollum,
Georgia
all races. See
criminal defendants of
accorded
protections
(1992)
J.,
(Thomas,
concurring
judgment).
. S.
U
60-62
satisfy
standing injury
could
even
first element of
—
though
Id.,
certainly
in fact.
defendant,
426-429. The
displeased with his conviction, failed to demonstrate that the
alleged discriminatory
peremptory challenges against
use of
veniremen of
race
another
had
effect on the outcome of
his trial. The Court instead found that the defendant had
“cognizable” injury
suffered
because racial discrimination
“
integrity
judicial
doubt
‘casts
on the
”
process’
cynicism respecting
jury’s
and “invites
*12
neutral-
obligation
ity and
to
its
adhere
at
Id.,
to
law.”
411-412.
severity
alleged wrong
perception
But the
anof
and a
“
injury
‘[i]n~
do not
in fact.
Indeed,
unfairness
constitute
perception’
very
be
would seem to
antithesis of
‘injury
Id.,
dissenting).
at
J.,
fact.’”
427 (Scalia,
Fur-
why
par-
thermore,
is no
a
a
there
reason
violation of
third
ty’s right
grounds
to
a
be
serve on
should
for reversal
third-party rights,
obtaining
when other violations of
as
such
per-
evidence
the defendant in violation
another
rights,
Id.,
are not.
son’s Fourth or Fifth Amendment
at
dissenting).
J.,
(Scalia,
alleged
relationship]”
Powers further rested
anon
“close
arises between a defendant and
because voir
that
veniremen
permits
relation,
them “to
if
dire
establish a
not a bond of
throughout
Id.,
411,
the trial.
at
continues
413.
trust,”
According
Court,
to the
excluded veniremen share
ac-
eliminating
cused’s interest
racial discrimination because
upon
peremptory
“profound
strike
a
inflicts
venireman
public
personal
heightened
humiliation
its
character.”
simply
Id., at 413-414. But there
no
basis
finding
relationship]”
Court’s
of a “close
or “common inter-
est,” id.,
at
between black veniremen and white defend-
Regardless
ants.
of whether black veniremen wish to serve
jury, they
particular
aon
do not share the white defendant’s
Surely
obtaining
interest
revei’sal of his
conviction.
dismayed
black venireman
be
would
learn that a white
the venireman’s
as a
defendant used
constitutional
conviction.2
means to overturn
defendant’s
Finally,
ob-
concluded that there are substantial
Powers
including the costs
veniremen,
stacles to suit
excluded
difficulty
individually
proceeding
establishing
and the
Id.,
These obsta-
recurrence.
at 414-415.
a likelihood of
though
present
perhaps
in the context of Batson
cles,
often
(1986),
Kentucky,
Even inapplicable wholly case, which involves still be to this would in the selec- peremptory strikes nor discrimination neither allegedly present jury. “injury in petit fact” wholly Pow- absent from the context hand. in Powers is repeated peremptory strikes members ers reasoned wrong, apparent an often of one “overt race constituted “cas[tj doubt over jury panel,” that threatened the entire parties, jury, the court indeed obligation of the throughout of the cause.” the law the trial to adhere to judge contrast, Powers, S., Here, in 499 U. *13 jury to serve as grand of venire member the selected one grand remaining were of the members the foreman, and discriminatory, judge’s at random. Even if selected exclusion) (rather single member of the of a selection than wrong hardly grand jury “overt” that could constitute an jury proceedings, of the the remainder would affect subsequent therefore resorts less trial. The Court much allegation of racial dis- emphasizing the seriousness of the (as though repetition conveys talismanie some crimination injury course, power), that, of cannot substitute but fact. allegation injury petitioner’s Powers, of unlike case,
In this directly merely unsupported; it is foreclosed. in fact is not composition allegation of in this case that the There is no 2 course, if the dismay same sense of defendant and Of would arise were of the same race. the excluded venireman
407 petitioner’s by trial was affected discrimination. In- allegation merely stead, the is that there was discrimination (and member). grand jury only in the of one properly petit jury’s guilt constituted beyond verdict way by doubt reasonable was in no affected compo- jury. sition Indeed, the extent that race any part played composition petitioner’s in the petit jury, by petitioner’s petitioner it was own as actions, used 5 of his peremptory 12 strikes to eliminate blacks from petit jury attempt injured Petitioner’s venire. to assert that alleged jury stage exclusion blacks at the is peremptory belied own use his strikes blacks petit jury stage. at the no suggest alleged
It would be to avail to that the discrimi- grand jury nation selection could have caused an indict- improperly petit jury’s to be rendered, ment because the ver- conclusively grand jury dict establishes that no reasonable petitioner.3 failed have to indict can the could Nor precedents support allowing our a defendant chal- find upon lenge his based discrimination in conviction selection, all of those cases involved defendants’ rights. g., See, Mitchell, their own e. Rose v. assertions of (1950). (1979); Texas, 339 U. 282 S. Cassell S. 443 U. Although require a criminal defendant to often do we proce- relationship between the a eause-and-effect establish subsequent illegality and the conviction when de- dural rights, see U. at S., of his own a denial fendant asserts (SCALIA, dissenting) (noting government J., 427-428 establishing harmlessness of generally the burden bears errors), acknowledged majority even the such *14 ultimately prevail will on reason, unlikely petitioner it is this For However, I with the Court’s agree daim. process his due merits of peti raise that daim because has petitioner condusion I join Part IV of the Court’s Ms own right. due process tioner asserts “the only standing and does not address it addresses opinion Ante, process right. of due petitioner’s and extent” nature a such is the foremost of showing requirement third-party as evidenced it went an which standing, lengths its of fact. finding injury attempt justify (an of The Court’s a close ambient fra- finding relationship sorts) black between and the veniremen ternity petitioner seeks to vindicate is whose likewise rights unsupported. Court, course, identifies never whose precisely were seeks to vindicate. Is it all who veniremen petitioner nonwhite All not chosen as foreman? Is it all veniremen? black veniremen who were black veniremen? Or just for chosen aside grand jury? Leaving ultimately I fails to the fact that the Court identify rights-holders, have how a could fail to see “close developed relationship” “bond,” aif and the veniremen. Even between petitioner supra, Ohio, could between venire- develop dire, such a bond could not voir men and defendants during a grand in the context of a judge’s develop role. the defendant no plays foreman —a which context between defendant Nor can “common interest” humiliation based excluded veniremen arise upon public latter, because unlike exercise suffered peremp- fore- strikes, Parish’s of selecting Evangeline tory action ve- “overt” against particular does not constitute men (all one) but those not chosen Rather, veniremen niremen. se- randomly chances at being left to take their are simply on the lected seats grand jury. for remaining ju- there are prospective Finally, ample opportunities violated to vin- have been rors whose protection rights than dicate those rather relying upon rights, to the Batson for them. In contrast race do so another concern discrimination an eases, line of where allegation may alone, in this case alleges in the defendant’s case petitioner fore- selection of discrimination systematic Parish. Such men in systematic Evangeline and the opportu- class plaintiffs large potential provides *15 declaratory repeated nity injunctive prevent or relief violations. petitioner hold reasons,
For I would does these —who against or that he discriminated al- not claim leged effect on the out- others had protec- raise trial —lacks come of his Accordingly, join I excluded black veniremen. opinion and IV, concur II, and V Court’s I, Parts judgment.