11 Iowa 489 | Iowa | 1861
The errors assigned raise three or four distinct questions.
1. Whether the retention of the property mortgaged after forfeiture by the mortgagors, under the circumstances detailed in the evidence and the stipulations of the parties in in the mortgage contract, constitute a legal fraud which the court may determine, or whether they are badges of a fraud
2. Whether the mortgagors had any interest in the mortgaged property which was seizable on execution.
3. The improper introduction and exclusion of certain evidence on trial.
4. The refusal of the court to grant a new trial for the reasons assigned.
These questions will he considered in their inverse order. Aside from the questions of law involved in the three first propositions, which will be noticed in their place, we discover no sufficient reason for disturbing the verdict of the jury. It can not be claimed, under the evidence, as certified to us, that it is so clearly against the weight of the same as to authorize a reversal of this case on that account. Admitting the defense as to the five buggies, fairly made out, and that the sale of the four matched horses, under the Hirschel execution, was legally justified, still there was enough of other property taken and sold by the defendant, which would reasonably justify the verdict of the jury. Under such circumstances we can conceive of no legal necessity making it incumbent upon the jury to return a special verdict, justifying the defendant in selling the'match horses and buggies. Practically, such a verdict could be of no benefit to him, if in fact he was guilty in wrongfully seizing and selling other property at the same time to the full value of the verdict found by the jury; and this we think the evidence shows they had reasonable grounds for believing.
Upon a closer examination of the testimony of Messrs. Corbin and Mitchell, we have concluded to pass the questions raised in regard to the admission of the one an'd the exclusion of the other, as not being well taken in the first place; and secondly, as possessing no practical importance in the final result of the case, even if the ruling of the court in the premises was technically incorrect.
The question whether a mortgagor has any interest in
The most important, as well as the most difficult question in this case, is the one first above suggested, involving a construction of the statute regulating and defining the rights of parties to chattel mortgages. Wo have so fully considered this question at the present term in the case of Torbert v. Hayden, ante, that we deem it unnecessary again to go over the same ground.
It is only necessary for us to say that before writing the opinion in that case, the very able arguments filed by counsel in this cause 'were carefully examined; and it is believed that the several phases of the question as presented and argued in this case have been considered and passed upon in the one to which reference is now made for an exposition of our views in the matter. These views aré adverse to the doctrine contended for by the learned counsel for the appellant. We are satisfied that on the trial of this case below, the court in the main ruled the law of the case correctly.
Affirmed.