4 So. 2d 101 | La. Ct. App. | 1941
The defendants in this case were cast in the judgment rendered against them and in favor of the plaintiff, for damages in the sum of $125. The judgment was rendered, read and signed by the district judge, in open court, on December 21, 1940. On December 28, 1940, through their attorney, they presented a petition to the district court in which they averred that the judgment rendered against them was contrary to law and to the evidence adduced, that they were aggrieved thereby and desired to appeal therefrom suspensively, to this court. They accordingly prayed for an order granting them a suspensive appeal, fixing the return day thereof as well as the amount of the bond to be furnished by them. Acting on their petition, an order was granted by the Clerk of the district court on the same day, making the appeal returnable on February 20, 1941, upon their furnishing bond, with good and solvent security, in the sum of $200. The order also directed that a copy of the petition and order and citation of the appeal be served on the plaintiff. Service as directed was made by the Sheriff on the plaintiff, in person, on December 31, 1940.
It would seem that the defendants were most meticulous in following the provisions of Article 573 of the Code of Practice and those of Article 575 also in carrying out their intention to ask for and obtain a suspensive appeal to this Court from the judgment which had been rendered against them. Article 581 of the Code of Practice prescribes that before delivering the copy of the petition of appeal to the Sheriff for service, the security, as directed in the order of appeal, shall have been given, and then service shall be made on the appellee according to the provisions of Article 582.
We find a letter in the record addressed to the Clerk of Court by counsel for plaintiff, dated December 28, 1940, the same day on which the order of appeal was granted, in which it is stated that due to the serious illness of the district judge, he had agreed with counsel for defendants to a delay "for the filing of a suspension of appeal", which we take to mean was for a delay in filing the appeal bond. It may be that the letter was intended to dispense with the essential requirement of the bond before service and citation of the appeal, but certainly it could not have been, and was not, intended to dispense with the giving of the bond itself as it only provides for a delay in furnishing one. No time limit is fixed for the delay, but even so it was absolutely necessary that a bond be given in order to perfect the appeal. A most careful and diligent search of the record fails to disclose the filing, at any time, of any such bond. *102
In Vacuum Oil Co. v. Cockrell,
We deem it proper to state that there has been no motion to dismiss the appeal filed in this case, but as was said by the Court in the case of Gagneaux v. Desonier,
For the reasons stated, it is ordered that the present appeal be and the same is hereby dismissed at the costs of the defendants herein.