Campbell v. Commonwealth Plan, Inc.Campbell v. Commonwealth Plan, Inc.
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- McFarland
The Commonwealth Plan, Incorporated, a Massachusetts corporation, hereinafter referred to as plaintiff, brought an action against David H. Campbell, Superintendent of the Motor Vehicle Division of the State Highway Department, State of Arizona, hereinafter referred to as defendant, to recover certain license taxes imposed under
Plaintiff purchased a number of vehicles from Arizona Public Service, and leased them back to the seller. Defendant required plaintiff to pay a license tax pursuant to
Both plaintiff and defendant moved for a summary judgment, and, after a hearing on these motions, the trial court granted plaintiff’s motion and entered judgment thereon. Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, Division One, which affirmed the trial court’s decision. 3 Ariz.App. 520, 416 P.2d 199. From this decision wc granted a petition for review. The decision of the Court of Appeals is vacated.
The sole issue in this appeal is a question of statutory construction as to whether the license tax imposed on a lessor by
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The predecessor to
“ ‘Contract motor carrier of property’ shall mean any person engaged in the transportation on any public highway by motor vehicle of property, for compensation, and not included in the term common carrier of property.”
Section 66-518 A.C.A. 1939 provided for a tax on those classified under the above-quoted definition. In 1956, § 66-501 A.C.A. 1939 was amended, and appeared in
“5. ‘Contract motor carrier of property’ means any person engaged in the transportation by motor vehicle of property, for compensation, on any public highway, and not included in the term common motor carrier of property, * * * ”A.R.S. § 40-601 , subsec. A, ¶ 5
This portion of
“ * * * and, for the purpose of taxation, the owner of any motor vehicle in excess of six thousand pounds unladen weight who leases, licenses or by any other arrangement permits the use of such vehicle by any other, other than a common or contract carrier subject to tax under articles 1 and 2 of this chapter, for the transportation of property upon the public highway for compensation or in the furtherance of any commercial or industrial enterprise.” [Emphasis added.]A.R.S. § 40-601 , subsec. A, ¶ 5
This portion of
Plaintiff contends that Part Two should be interpreted so that the lessor is a “contract motor carrier of property” if the 6,-000-pound leased vehicles (a) transport property upon the public highway for compensation, or (b) transport property upon the public highway in furtherance of any commercial or industrial enterprise. Defendant contends that this same Part Two should be interpreted so that the lessor is a “contract motor carrier of property” for the purposes of taxation, if the 6,000-pound leased vehicles (a) transport property upon the public highway for compensation; or (b) are used upon the public highway in the furtherance of any commercial or industrial enterprise. ‘ Plaintiff maintains that the last phrase of Part Two — “or in the furtherance of any commercial or industrial enterprise”- — is a disjunctive which is an alternative for the preceding words “for compensation.” Defendant maintains that this last phrase of Part Two is a disjunctive which is an alternative for the preceding phrase “for the transportation of property * * * for compensation.” The sole question to be decided here is which of these positions is correct.
It should be first noted that Part Two only expands the definition of “contract motor carrier of property” for the purposes of taxation, and the Part One definition is the sole definition in any case where tax liability is not in issue.
Plaintiff relies heavily on two Arizona cases to support its position that the vehicles must transport property before there is a license tax liability. In State v. Southwest Lumber Mills, Inc., 80 Ariz. 357, 297 P.2d 1099, this court held that parties taxed under § 66-518, A.C.A. 1939 were not liable for a tax as § 66-501, A.C.A.1939 “contract motor carriers of property” for they merely leased and repaired the vehicles, and they were not in control of those vehicles, nor did they transport property in them. This case was a proper statement of the law at that time, but it is not controlling under the facts of the instant case, because the definition of a “contract motor carrier of property” even for tax purposes was limited to Part One, because
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Part Two was not passed until after the taxes had already been imposed. Part Two is the applicable portion of the statute to decide the instant case. Plaintiff also cites Mecham Pontiac v. Williams, 94 Ariz. 144, 382 P.2d 558, and urges that this case should control because it construes
A careful reading of Part Two discloses that an owner who leases, licenses or permits another to use his vehicles can only be classified as a contract motor carrier of property if the user is neither a common nor a contract carrier subject to tax. The intent is clear. There can be only one tax levied per vehicle, and if the user qualifies as a contract or common carrier subject to the tax, then the owner cannot be liable.
There is nothing in Part One which requires ownership of the vehicle by the user; therefore, a lessee or any other user may be liable for a tax under
The state of the law is that any user of vehicles upon the public highway may be liable for a tax under
Construing
A most convincing reason for a determination that it is not required that the .user transport property under Part Two .is the fact that there can be no tax imposed under Part Two unless the vehicle ■in question weighs over 6,000 pound‘s unladen. There is no such requirement in Part .One, and the only rational explanation -fpr> this distinction -is that the legislature , recognized that heavy vehicles resulted • in’ ■ muth more wear and tear to our highway ..system. Because they were not.requiring the. transportation of property as. a ;prerequisite of taxing lessors, the legislature felt that this large minimum-weight requirement was needed to protect this táx ágainst‘claims of unconstitutional discrimination in cases where the leased vehicles ’ were not transporting property, and,were so light that they did not inflict the serious wear and tear on the public highways as did those vehicles which were transporting property.
Plaintiff contends that the phrase “ * * or in the furtherance of any commercial or industrial enterprise” modifies the preceding phrase “for compensation.” If this were true, the statute’s ending should read:
“ * * * for the transportation of property upon the public highway for compensation or for the furtherance of any commercial or industrial enterprise.” [Emphasis added.]
Placing the word “for” before “the furtherance of any commercial or industrial enterprise” would change the meaning of the sentence. Plaintiff cites authority for the proposition that any ambiguities in a taxing statute will be construed most strongly against the taxing authority, and in favor of the taxpayer. We do not disagree with this contention. In the most recent case cited for this proposition, Arizona State Tax Commission v. Staggs Realty Corporation, 85 Ariz. 294, 337 P.2d 281, this court stated:
“First, it is especially important in tax cases to begin with the words of the operative statute. We have repeatedly said that such words will be read to gain their fair meaning, but not to gather new objects of taxation by strained construction or implication. * * * (citing cases) .* * * ” 85 Ariz. at 297, 337 P.2d at 283 [Emphasis added.]
To hold lessors liable for the tax under
Plaintiff also argues that because
The case is reversed with directions to enter a judgment in accord with this opinion.
STRUCKMEYER, C. J., BERNSTEIN, V. C. J., and UDALL and LOCKWOOD, JJ., concur.