RUSSELL B. CAMPBELL, BARBARA A. DETERMAN, and GREG E. CAMPBELL, as Trustees of the Clyde E. Campbell Declaration Trust Dated March 29, 1999, as Amended and Restated, Plaintiffs, v. RUSSELL B. CAMPBELL and GREG E. CAMPBELL, Defendants (Russell B. Campbell, Defendant and Cross-Defendant-Appellant; Greg E. Campbell, Defendant and Cross-Plaintiff-Appellee).
Docket No. 3-16-0619
Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District
September 14, 2017
October 17, 2017
2017 IL App (3d) 160619
Hon. Heidi A. Benson, Judge, presiding.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Warren County, No. 14-MR-68. Judgment Affirmed.
Richard L. Whitman, of Whitman & Baber, of Monmouth, for appellant.
Timothy D. Roberts, of Anderson, Roberts, Porth, Wallace & Stewart, LLP, of Burlington, Iowa, for appellee.
Justice Schmidt concurred in the judgment and opinion.
Justice O‘Brien specially concurred, with opinion.
OPINION
¶ 1 Plaintiffs, as trustees of the Clyde E. Campbell Declaration of Trust, brought a declaratory judgment action against two of its beneficiaries, Russell B. Campbell and Greg E. Campbell, seeking to have the trial court determine which of the two beneficiaries was entitled to certain current or former trust property. During pretrial proceedings, the two beneficiaries filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment. After a hearing, the trial court granted Greg‘s motion for partial summary judgment and denied Russell‘s motion. Russell appeals. We affirm the trial court‘s ruling.
FACTS
¶ 2 The dispute in this case involves the estate plan of Clyde Campbell. Clyde was married to Helen Campbell and had three children: Barbara Determan, Greg Campbell, and Russell Campbell.
¶ 3 In 1999, as part of his estate plan, Clyde executed a declaration of trust, which established the instant living trust (Clyde‘s trust or the trust). Clyde also executed a will and other documents to form a land trust (farm trust) and a limited liability company (LLC).1 The farm trust was owned equally by Clyde‘s trust, Helen‘s trust (a trust that was established by Clyde‘s wife), and Greg. Each owned a one-third interest. The LLC was owned in the same manner.
¶ 4 In February 2012, Clyde amended and restated the declaration of trust (amended declaration). Of relevance to this appeal, the amended declaration provided that (1) Clyde was the trustee of the trust; (2) as long as he was acting as the trustee, Clyde had the power to withdraw any part or all of the net income and principal of the trust; (3) Clyde could make gifts of “trust property” to such persons and entities and subject to such terms and conditions as Clyde deemed appropriate; and (4) upon Clyde‘s death, any interest that Clyde‘s trust owned in the farm trust and the LLC was to be distributed to Helen first (either directly or in trust) and then to Greg, if Helen died before Clyde or if Helen disclaimed her interest.
¶ 5 In April 2012, while Clyde was residing in a retirement community but still serving as the trustee of his own trust, Russell‘s attorney drafted two assignments at Russell‘s direction, which purported to transfer the interest of Clyde‘s trust in the
¶ 6 After Clyde‘s death, a dispute arose as to whether Clyde‘s trust or Russell owned the one-third interests in the farm trust and the LLC that was the subject of the assignments. If Clyde‘s trust was the owner, pursuant to the terms of that trust, the one-third interests would pass to Greg upon Clyde‘s death. If Clyde‘s trust did not own the one-third interests, the interests would not pass to Greg, and Russell would remain the owner pursuant to the assignments.
¶ 7 In September 2014, plaintiffs filed the instant declaratory judgment action seeking to have the trial court determine whether Clyde‘s trust (and, ultimately, Greg) or Russell owned the one-third interests in the farm trust and the LLC. The complaint was later amended, and both Russell and Greg were named as defendants. Russell and Greg both filed answers to the complaint. In his answer, Greg asserted, among other things, that Clyde lacked the mental capacity to make the assignments and that the assignments were the product of undue influence on the part of Russell. In addition to an answer, Greg also filed a cross-claim.
¶ 8 In November 2015, Russell and Greg both filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment. Russell argued in his motion that the assignments were valid and that he was the rightful owner of the one-third interests in the farm trust and the LLC. Greg argued that the assignments were void, that Clyde‘s trust was the rightful owner of the one-third interests, and that pursuant to the terms of Clyde‘s trust, those interests passed to Greg upon Clyde‘s death.
¶ 9 In December 2015, a hearing was held on the cross-motions for partial summary judgment. By the time of the hearing, the matters at issue before the trial court had been fully briefed by the parties, and the trial court had before it as part of the pleadings or supporting documents the amended declaration of trust, a portion of Clyde‘s will, the two assignments, two certificates showing the interest of Clyde‘s trust in the farm trust and the LLC, a portion of the operating agreement for the LLC, and some deposition transcripts. Of relevance to this appeal, the certificates for both the farm trust and the LLC provided that a transfer of the interest in either of the two entities could be made on the books of that entity by surrendering the properly endorsed certificate for that entity. In addition, the farm trust certificate and the LLC‘s operating agreement both provided a right of first refusal to the other beneficiaries or members before a transfer of an interest in that particular entity could be made. At the hearing, the trial court listened to the arguments of the attorneys and then took the case under advisement.
¶ 10 The trial court later issued a ruling by letter, granting Greg‘s motion for partial summary judgment and denying Russell‘s motion. In the letter ruling, the trial court found that (1) the assignments were invalid as inter vivos gifts because there was no present delivery or transfer since the assignments were not to take effect until Clyde‘s death and Clyde had not issued a certificate for the one-third interest in the farm trust to Russell; (2) even if the assignments were properly delivered
¶ 11 After the trial court‘s ruling, Russell promptly filed a motion to reconsider (titled as a motion to vacate) and challenged all or most of the findings that the trial court had made in its letter ruling and the statement that the trial court had made about the factual history of the case. Greg filed a response and opposed the motion to reconsider. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. In so doing, the trial court stated, among other things, that (1) it was not changing any of its previous findings of fact but was expanding upon some of those findings and upon some of its prior reasoning; (2) while Clyde was a beneficiary, he was also subject to the restrictions in the instruments he was signing; (3) the attempted assignment was an ineffective attempt at an inter vivos transfer, which made the assignment a testamentary disposition under Illinois law; (4) although the LLC was in existence, a point upon which the trial court revised its previous conclusion, the court would not enforce the unsigned operating agreement of the LLC at the summary judgment stage; and (5) the court would not strike the statement that it had made about the factual history of the case, despite Russell‘s complaint about that statement.
¶ 12 A written order was later entered documenting the trial court‘s ruling on the motion to reconsider. In the written order, the trial court made an Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016) finding that the order was final and appealable. Following the entry of the order, Russell appealed.
ANALYSIS
¶ 13 On appeal, Russell argues that the trial court erred in granting partial summary judgment for Greg on the declaratory judgment complaint and in denying Russell‘s motion for the same relief.
¶ 14 Russell asserts that partial summary judgment should have been granted in his favor, instead of Greg‘s, because the assignments were valid and were sufficient for Clyde, acting in his capacity as a beneficiary of his own trust, to transfer the one-third interests in the farm trust and the LLC to Russell. In support of that assertion, Russell contends that (1) the amended declaration of trust gave Clyde the unfettered right to make gifts of the trust property in his individual capacity, a right that Clyde properly exercised when he made the gift to Russell in the two assignments; (2) pursuant to the terms of
¶ 15 Greg argues that the trial court‘s ruling was proper and should be upheld. In response to Russell‘s specific contentions, Greg maintains that (1) although Clyde had the legal authority to make gifts of the one-third interests in the farm trust and the LLC, for those gifts to be valid, he had to make the assignments in his capacity as the trustee of his own trust, not in his individual capacity, and he was subject to the limitations contained in the farm trust agreement and the LLC‘s operating agreement when doing so; (2) although a present gift of a future interest could theoretically be made by physical delivery of a written assignment of the donor‘s interest in the property gifted, such a gift was not accomplished here by Clyde because, as the trial court correctly found, the delivery of the assignments was not effective; (3) because the assignments were to take effect upon Clyde‘s death and were not intended by Clyde to pass title immediately, the assignments were testamentary dispositions, as the trial court correctly found, and were invalid since they failed to comply with the requirements for such dispositions under the law (see
¶ 16 The purpose of summary judgment is not to try a question of fact but to determine if one exists. Adams v. Northern Illinois Gas Co., 211 Ill. 2d 32, 42-43 (2004). Summary judgment should be granted only where the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on file, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is clearly entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
¶ 17 In a conventional trust, the trustee holds the legal title to the property and the beneficiary holds the equitable title. Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 2 cmt. d (2003); Espevik v. Kaye, 277 Ill. App. 3d 689, 694 (1996). That same rule applies to a common law land trust. IMM Acceptance Corp., 148 Ill. App. 3d at 954. A different rule, however, applies to a special type of land trust known as an “Illinois land trust.” See id. Unlike a conventional trust and a common law land trust, in an Illinois land trust, the trustee holds both the legal and equitable title to the property. See id.
¶ 18 Courts will generally demand that a person dealing with trust property strictly observe the trust features. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts, pt. 4, ch. 11, intro. note (2003) (noting that the voluntary or involuntary transfer of a beneficiary‘s interest in a trust does not refer to a transfer of the trust property itself because the beneficiary cannot assign more than the beneficiary has); Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 51 cmt. b (2003) (stating that a purported transfer of an interest that a beneficiary does not have is
¶ 19 In the present case, after having considered the above legal principles and having reviewed the record, we find that partial summary judgment was properly granted for Greg. Although the parties have made numerous assertions in support of their respective positions on appeal, the simple fact is that at the time of the assignment, Clyde in his capacity as trustee of his trust—and not Clyde individually—was the holder of the legal title to the one-third interests in the farm trust and the LLC. Clyde, in his individual capacity, therefore, had no ability to assign the legal title to the farm trust and the LLC to Russell, only Clyde acting in his capacity as the trustee of the trust could do that. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts, pt. 4, ch. 11, intro. note (2003); Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 51 cmt. b (2003); Kortenhof, 18 Ill. App. 3d at 7-8. There was nothing before the trial court or in the record on appeal in this case to support that such a transfer had been made by Clyde as the trustee of his trust. The trial court, therefore, properly determined that the two assignments were invalid or ineffective; that Clyde‘s trust was the owner of the one-third interests in the farm trust and the LLC; and that the interests were to pass to Greg, upon Clyde‘s death, pursuant to the terms of Clyde‘s trust.
¶ 20 Having reached that conclusion, we must take a moment to comment upon Russell‘s contention that under Illinois law, Clyde could validly assign his beneficial interest in his trust to Russell. We agree that Russell‘s contention in that regard is well established in the law. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 51 cmt. b (2003) (recognizing that a beneficiary of a trust can voluntarily transfer during his life the whole or part of his beneficial interest in the trust); Victor v. Hillebrecht, 405 Ill. 264, 269 (1950) (stating that there is
¶ 21 Having found that the two assignments were invalid because they were not executed by Clyde in his capacity as the trustee of his own trust, we need not determine whether the assignments were also invalid because they failed to comply with the right of first refusal or because they did not comply with the statutory requirements for testamentary dispositions.
CONCLUSION
¶ 22 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Warren County.
¶ 23 Affirmed.
¶ 24 Affirmed.
¶ 25 JUSTICE O‘BRIEN, specially concurring.
¶ 26 I write separately because I agree with the disposition but not the entire rationale set out in the majority. Unlike the majority, I believe the Campbell Farms land trust was an Illinois land trust, and as such, Clyde E. Campbell, in his capacity as the beneficiary of that land trust, had the power to dispose of the trust property. See First National Bank of Barrington v. Oldenburg, 101 Ill. App. 3d 283, 287 (1981). However, Campbell‘s power to dispose of the trust property in his capacity as beneficiary was limited as set forth by the majority. Since those limitations apply in this case regardless of whether the trust was a conventional trust or a land trust, I concur in the remainder of the opinion.