122 Tenn. 208 | Tenn. | 1909
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The bill in the present case was filed to recover a one-eighth undivided interest in a tract of land described. This land was sold, or the greater part of it in 185B, to James S. Murray, complainant’s father, by a title bond executed by one J. M. Cooper. In 1861, fifty acres additional were -added, and
On July 7, 1906, the complainant, joined by her husband, Wyatt F. Campbell, filed the present bill against the said J. S. Bartlett, H. M. La Follette, and the La Follette Coal, Iron & Railroad Company, in whicfr she asserted her right to a one-eighth undivided equitable interest as heir at law of James S. Murray, deceased, in the land, covered by the title bond made to her father in 1861, on the ground that she had never consented to the surrender of that bond, expressing a willingness to pay out of her share any of the purchase money remaining unpaid. She learned about the year 1880, or shortly thereafter, that the title bond had been surrendered. She made no complaint until 1890, when she told her brother, F. M. Murray, that she still claimed her one-eighth interest. She also made the same statement, in substance, to William Baird, about the time he was negotiating his purchase of the land. In 1890 she employed an attorney to bring suit; but he was the son-in-
Tbe present defendants bad no actual knowledge of complainant’s claim when they purchased and obtained deeds in fee to tbe lands; but there was, perhaps, sufficient reference to a title bond or bonds, in tbe deeds made by tbe Cooper heirs to P. M. Murray, which were in their chain of title, to start them upon an inquiry which would have led to a discovery of tbe existence of the title bond of 1861, and of tbe fact that complainant bad no band in surrendering that bond, and that sbe was still claiming an interest in tbe land; that is, if we can assume that tbe parties indicated, tbe Coopers and •F. M. Murray, were willing to make true replies to inquiries, and would have done so. Tbe title bond was not registered; but it seems to have been banded, with tbe unpaid notes, as papers no longer useful, to F. M. Murray, by tbe Coopers, when they made tbe deeds to him, and tbe bond was by him handed over to William Baird, along with tbe deed made to him and bis co-purchasers. Tbe Cooper deeds did not describe any special title bond, but stated in geiieral terms that title bonds bad been executed on tbe lands and never paid for, and that they did not warrant against such incumbrances.
In disposing of tbe case, we shall assume, without deciding, that tbe facts stated were sufficient to fix tbe defendants with constructive notice, under our registration laws (Teague v. Sowder, 121 Tenn., 132, 114 S. W., 484), though it is worthy of remark that after such a great length of time as bad ensued when Bartlett bought be might perhaps assume'that any outstanding title bonds, not already enforced, had been abandoned, and, in that event, his defense of innocent purchaser would be available. We shall not consider the general subject of estoppels against married women arising out of conduct on their part deceiving and misleading persons relying thereon, upon different phases’ of which we have cases. Galbraith v. Lunsford, 87 Tenn., 89, 9 S. W., 365, 1 L. R. A., 522; Pilcher v. Smith, 2 Head, 208; Cooley v. Steele, Id., 605; Fletcher v. Coleman, Id., 384; Stephenson v. Walker, 8 Baxt., 289; Howell v. Hale, 5 Lea, 405; Berrigan v. Fleming, 2 Lea, 271; Fogg v. Yeatman, 6 Lea, 580; Anderson v. Akard, 15 Lea, 192; Gates v. Card, 93 Tenn., 341, 24 S. W., 486; Johnson City v. Wolfe, 103 Tenn., 277, 52 S. W., 991;
We are of the opinion, howeyer, that the controversy must be decided adversely to complainant, on the ground that the present bill is in effect one to enforce a specific performance of the contract of sale evidenced by the title bond. Such rights must be enforced with reasonable promptness, even where the writing does not in terms make time of the essence of the contract, especially when there has been a great increase in the value of the property. Smith’s Heirs v. Christmas, 7 Yerg., 565. In that case eight months wTas held too long a delay, although the complainants were infants, who had succeeded to the rights of their father, who had died before the maturity of the contract. The uncle of the infants assumed to act in their behalf after the death of their father. He testified that on the 1st day of January, the time when the purchase money .was due, under the contract, he did not consider it an advantageous contract. It seems to have been thought better then to. lie by and speculate on the advantages of the contract. The property might rise, or it might fall, in value, or remain stationary. In either of the latter two events, the friends of the infants did not intend to execute the contract. The court said they could not, after waiting-eight months and willfully neglecting to do anything, and by their backwardness authorizing the inference
In another opinion in the same case the English doctrine was stated to be: “When a court of equity holds that time is not of the essence of the contract, it pro
Upon the subject of the infancy of the complainants, the court said: “But it is said that laches cannot be imputable to these complainants, because they are infants. Upon this part of the cáse we cannot better express the views we. entertain than in the language of the, chancellor. ‘It is true,’ he says, fin many cases this answer to the objection of time elapsed would be good for some reasonable delay on the part of the infants. In all cases, depending on the question of abandonment
In the case we have before us, the purchase money had long been due when the father of complainant died. In this class of cases, at least, we think the same rule should apply to a married woman as to an infant, to say nothing of the more stringent rule laid down in Smith’s Heirs v. Christmas, supra. We are, however, further
The present decision is confined to cases wherein specific performance is sought. We do not impair the authority of Dodd v. Benthal, 4 Heisk., 601, and Moore v. Walker, 3 Lea, 656, and similar cases wherein a married Avoman seeks to set aside deeds made by her, or to recover property the title to which has been vested in her.
On the grounds stated, we are of the opinion that the decree of the chancellor dismissing the bill should he affirmed.
The chief justice, while concurring, is of the opinion that the court should go further, and authoritatively determine that, after such a lapse of time, one examining the records in the register’s office', and seeing such a statement concerning title bonds as appears in the deeds referred to, would have the right to presume conclusively that such title bonds had been abandoned, and were hence no longer in the way of his making a purchase. In brief, he is of the opinion that after such a length of time, recitals of the character above referred to would not put the purchaser upon inquiry.