91 N.Y. 464 | NY | 1883
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *466
This action was brought to obtain a construction of the will of John P. Beaumont, the question being, whether the plaintiff, his widow, took a fee in the real, and became the absolute owner of the personal estate, or an estate for life only. The difference between the learned courts below shows that the point presents a difficulty, but we are of opinion that the conclusion of the Special Term (expressed by VAN VORST, J.), upon the first trial, should be sustained. To depart from it words must be supplied to cut down an apparent absolute gift, and this cannot be done unless the language actually used by the testator requires it. We are not to conjecture what he meant, but ascertain the meaning of his words. (Abbott v. Middleton, 7 H. of L. Cas. 68.) "I leave," says the testator, "to my beloved wife, Mary Ann, all my property * * * to be enjoyed by her for her sole use and benefit," thus vesting the whole in the wife — the fee of the real estate, and the use and power of disposition of both real and personal estate. In what other manner can the words be satisfied? The testator "leaves," that is, gives to his wife — withholds nothing — and then adds, "to be enjoyed by her for her sole use and benefit." There are no words of qualification, and giving to those used their exact sense, she is put in the place of the testator as to title, and all rights and privileges belonging to it. It is suggested by the respondent that the testator's object was to secure to her an estate free from the marital rights of any future husband. This requires not only a great modification in the general meaning of the words, but *468
imputes to the testator the exercise of unnecessary caution, for at the time of the execution of the will the statutes relating to the rights of married women fully protected her in the use of property so acquired. But the testator had in mind also, not his own son, but the son of his wife by a former husband, and after the provision referred to says, "and in case of her" (his wife's) "decease, the same, or such portion as may remain thereof, it is my will shall be received and enjoyed by her son, Charles Lewis Beaumont, requesting him at the same time that he will use well, and not wastefully squander the little property I have gained by long years of toil." This language is resorted to by the defendant as restraining the bequest to the plaintiff. It seems insufficient to limit the wife's estate or interest, and rather to have been intended to express the natural anticipation of the testator, that this property, or some of it, would, as matter of course, go from the mother to her child, and his acquiescence in such devolution, coupled with a hope that what he had painfully acquired should not be wasted. But if more was intended, then in view of the absolute gift to the wife in the preceding sentence, the bequest to her son is void. (Ross v. Ross, 1 Jac. W. 153; The Att'y-Gen'l v. Hall, Fitz-G. 314; Bull v.Kingston, 1 Meriv. 314; Patterson v. Ellis, 11 Wend. 260;Tyson v. Blake,
The judgment of the General and Special Terms should therefore, be reversed, and the plaintiff have judgment, as prayed for by her complaint with costs.
All concur.
Judgment accordingly. *470