131 Ga. 793 | Ga. | 1909
The evidence sufficiently sustained' the allegations, as to the number, description, and value of the logs, to authorize a submission of the case to the jury. There was no demurrer to the sufficiency of the description in the petition. If the plaintiff was entitled to the logs, and the defendant converted them, taking possession without the plaintiff’s permission, no demand was necessary before bringing an action of trover. If timber is unlawfully cut from land and carried away and converted by a person not entitled thereto, trover is a proper action to recover it, if the plaintiff‘is one having the right to sue. The evidence is not very clear as to just when the logs were cut — whether before or after the contract between Hight and Camp was made; but it was sufficient to authorize the jury to find that they were cut and carried away after that time.
The real question in the case was whether Camp had such a right to the logs as authorized him to bring an action of trover against one who unlawfully éntered upon xthe property, and cut and carried them away. Hid Camp' have the right to bring the suit? In Morgan v. Perkins, 94 Ga. 353 (21 S. E. 574), an owner of land on which there was standing timber executed to another an instrument by which he sold to the latter “all of the saw-timber
In tbe construction of a written instrument conveying growing trees, tbe intention of the parties derived from tbe contract is to be determined. It is possible for an owner of land to grant a mere license in relation to it. He may grant an estate in growing trees defeasible or determinable, or be may grant an absolute estate to certain trees or timber. By tbe instrument involved in tbe present case the landowner granted to tbe purchaser of the timber an interest or estate determinable if tbe latter should not take tbe timber from tbe land within tbe time limited. Tbe plaintiff, thus having an interest in tbe timber which formed a part of tbe realty, was entitled to protect it against a mere trespasser who severed a portion of tbe timber from tbe realty and carried it away. When tbe timber was cut it became personalty, and the defendant who converted it was subject to an action of trover for so doing (Woods v. McCall, 67 Ga. 506); and tbe plaintiff bad such an interest as authorized him to bring the am tion for tbe timber wrongfully severed from the realty and converted by tbe defendant. See Hartford Iron Mining Co. v. Cambria Mining Co., 93 Mich. 90 (53 N. W. 4, 32 Am. St. E. 488).
Judgment reversed.