delivered the opinion of the court.
This is, an appeal from a decree of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, affirming a decree of the Supreme Court, establishing the title of the complainants, (now appellees) to a lot of land in the City of Washington, and granting a perpetual injunction against the further prosecution of- an action of ejectment that was brought by the appellant, Joseph Parker Camp, against Caleb C. Willard, the devisor of the complainants, to recover possession; and also enjoining Camp and all persons claiming under him from instituting any further proceedings at law or in equity for the possession of, or for asserting any claim to, the land. The cause was.heard in the Supreme Court upon a demurrer to the bill of complaint, which was overruled (37 Wash. Law Rep. 14); and the defendant having elected to stand upon his demurrer, a final decree followed as of course. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reported 38 Wash. Law Rep. 374; 35 App. D. C. 159.
Both parties claim under Samuel Blodget, Jr., who owned the property in the early days' of the Federal Capital. The bill of complaint sets forth the full history of the title, with copies of the instruments of conveyance and other documents necessary to a complete under
The property in question is described as — “Original lot numbered Twenty, in Square numbered two hundred and fifty four, in the City of Washington, in the District of Columbia, as the same is laid down on the ground plan or map of said city.” This square is bounded by E and F Streets, and by 13th and 14th Streets, in the Northwest section; Lot No. 20 being on the southerly side of F Street.
Under the act of Congress entitled — “An act for establishing the temporary and permanent seat of the Government of the United States,” passed July 16, 1790 (1 Stat. 130, c. 28), three Commissioners were appointed by President Washington, and they in the following year made a friendly agreement with the original land-holders, which resulted in laying out the city in squares and streets, and the subdivision of the squares; and, in the year 1792, a partition of the lands was made between the original proprietors and the Commissioners. In that division this lot was amongst those set off to the Commissioners, and it, with some adjoining lots, was sold by them to Blodget in the same year. But no conveyance was made to him, and he therefore acquired only an equitable interest.
Blodget about that time organized a lottery under the sanction of the Commissioners, and advertised it as done “By the Commissioners appointed to prepare the public buildings, &c., within the City of Washington for the reception of Congress, and for the permanent residence after the year 1800.” It was announced as “A lottery for the improvement of the Federal City.” It was stated that the sole design of the lottery was to facilitate other improvements together with the public buildings. The capital prize announced was — “One superb hotel, with
Thereafter, and in the year 1801, Blodget made three leases of as many several parcels of Lot 20. The lot has a frontage of 51 feet. 11 inches upon the southerly side of F. Street, and a depth of 159 feet running to an alley. One lease was dated April 13, 1801, and demised to James Daugherty the easterly portion of the whole lot, having a frontage of 20 feet upon the street, and running the- full depth to the alley; the second lease was to Edward Frethy, dated April 14, 1801, and covered the westerly portion of the lot, having a frontage of 19' feet 11^2 inches and running of that width to the alley; the third lease, covering the intervening portion .of the whole lot, having a frontage of. 11 feef. 11 inches on the street, and running the full depth, was dated April 15, 1801, and made to Edward Fennell. The Daugherty and Frethy leases were recorded within the year. The Fennell lease, for some reason, was not promptly acknowledged or recorded, and therefore a new lease was made by Blodget to Fennell, dated April 20, 1804, and recorded 'a few days later. These leases all ran for ninety-nine years from their respective dates in 1801, the terms, however, "to be renewable forever.” They were sealed instruments, elaborate in form, signed and acknowledged by lessor and lesseeJ in each instance, and recorded in the Land Records of the District of Columbia. A copy of the Daugherty lease is set forth in the margin.
1
The Daugherty lease reserved a yearly rent of $40
In October, 1802, one Robert S. Bickley began suit against Samuel Blodget and others by bill in Chancery in the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia, setting up the history of the above-mentioned lottery; the public advertisement of the scheme; that Bickley, in reliance upon the proposed plan, purchased a ticket; and that the sale and disposal of the tickets was intrusted wholly to Blodget and to William Deakins, Jr., since deceased. The bill set out the making of the indemnity agreement of September 20, 1793, by Blodget and Deakins, and the making of the mortgage by Blodget on January 28, 1794, to Thomas Johnson, Jr. (since deceased), and Thomas Peter (still surviving), covering all the lands of Blodget within the Territory of Columbia. ' That he, Bickley, drew as a prize the “Superb Hotel with baths, outhouses, &c., &c., to cost fifty thousand dollars,” as offered and promised in the advertisement, plan and scheme; “that the said hotel has never been finished and the keys thereof delivered to your orator -as by the said scheme and plan of the lottery he was assured and promised it should be.”
Annexed to this bill of complaint as exhibits were copies of the deed of trust of January 28, 1794, a transcript of the proceedings in the Pennsylvania suit, and other documents sustaining and supplementing the averments, of the bill. Among the parties named as defendants were Blodget, Thomas Munroe, Superintendent for City Affairs, Frethy, Daugherty, and other grantees of Blodget. Frethy was served with process and filed an answer setting up that he had assigned his lease to one Betz. Daugherty being a non-resident, notice appears to have been published against him. Blodget answered, admitting in part, and denying in part the averments of the bill. Annexed to the answer was a formal admission of “the execution of the various exhibits at this time filed by com- ■ plainant, and that they may be read in evidence.” Thomas Munroe, as Superintendent of the City of Washington, filed an answer admitting the principal averments of the bill and setting up that he, as Superintendent, ha,d in his hands the certificates of sale, evidencing' Blodget’s purchases of various lots from the former Commissioners; that the Commissioners had withheld the. certificates from Blodget’s possession “as security for the fortunate adventurers in the said lottery who should have claims against the said Blodget.” Lot 20 in Square 254 does not appear among the lots enumerated in this connection. Thomas Peter, the surviving trustee under the mortgage or deed of trust of January 28, 1794, does not appear among the parties named as defendants in the original bill filed by Bickiey, but he filed an answer admitting the execution of that deed, and that it was made at the instance of the then Commissioners of the City of Washington to secure the punctual payment of the prizes drawn in the lottery therein mentioned; and — “That this defendant.knows not what property is included or compre
Brent accepted the appointment as trustee, gave bond, and, after advertisement, made a public sale of the property. The notices, after describing many tracts of land by lot and square numbers, contained the following: “Also several certain ground rents reserved by said Blodget, amounting in the whole to eighty dollars per annum.” His report of sale was made under date of January 21, 1806. It mentions “Ground Rent on James Daugherty’s lease” as sold to Henry Pratt for $360, and “Ground Rent on Edward Frithy’s lease” as sold to Robert F. Howe for $400. No mention is made of the remainder of Lot 20 in Square 254, nor of the ground rent on the Fennell lease. By decree made under date June 25, 1806, the report was approved and the sales confirmed (with an exception not now material), and it was ordered that the proceeds of sale,' after paying expenses, taxes, etc., be paid over to complainant towards thé discharge of the moneys theretofore decreed to be due from the defendant Blodget to him. It further appears that the purchases made by Pratt (including the Daugherty ground rent) were made for the' benefit of Bickley, the complainant; and Pratt assigned his bids to Bickley, October 31, 1806. Brent reported this to the court and asked for leave to make deeds for the Pratt purchases to Bickley, and the court accordingly made an order that Brent, together with Thomas Peter and Thomas Munroe, should convey to Bickley all the property purchased by Pratt at the sale.
Pursuant to these proceedings, Brent, Trustee, Thomas Peter, and Thomas Munroe, Superintendent, etc., joined ip. a deed dated April 3, 1807, to Bickley, reciting the decree of October 4, 1805, ordering among other things
By indenture dated January 15, 1807, Daniel C. Brent, Trustee, and Thomas Peter conveyed to Robert F. Howe the. property' purchased by the latter at the trustee’s •sale. The deed recites the decree, and the sale made thereunder, and that “among other property and ground rent so set up arid exposed to sale was the ground rent reserved by the said Blodget by Indenture made between him apd the said Edward Frethy, one of the defendants, bearing date on the fourth day of April, 1801, when the said Robert F. Howe being the highest bidder • therefor became the purchaser thereof at and for. the sum of four hundred dollars/’ and in consideration thereof, conveyance is made to Howe of “all the right, title and interest of, in and to, the, said, ground rent, reserved by the said Samuel Blodget by Indenture made between him and the"kaid Edward Frethy, dated on the fourth day of April, 1801, as aforesaid, which was in the said Samuel Blodget, previous to and at the. time of making the said decree; .^nd all the right, title and interest therein which
On May 28, 1810, a supplemental bill was filed, reciting that the sale made by Brent had fallen short of paying the money decreed to be due to Bickley, and that he had lately discovered other property not included in the former bill and decree, consisting of sundry lots particularly described, and — “That the said Samuel Blodget was also on the said 28th day of January, in the year 1794, seised and possessed of and entitled to sundry lots in the said City, which he afterwards let • on ground rent, reserving an annual rent for the said property, to divers persons, hereinafter particularly set forth, which tenants your petitioner does not wish to disturb or interfere with, but.-wishes to leave them in the quiet enjoyment of their leases under the said Blodget, under the terms and conditions expressed in the said leases respectively, but wishes and prays of this court to direct the ground rents -reserved thereon, and the reversionary interests of the said Blodget therein, whatsoever the same may be, to be sold for the benefit of your petitioner, which lots so leased on ground rent are as follows, to wit, eleven feet, eleven inches-more-or less fronting on F Street, North, extending in-depth , one hundred and fifty-nine feet to an alley, being part, of Lot No. 20 in Square No. 254, ieased to a certain Edward. Fennell, his Executor &c., for a term of years renewable from time to time forever, reserving the quarterly'.rent of twenty four dollars' payable to the said Blodget:”' Several other like leases are mentioned, and this averment follows — “To all of which ground rent's-the-said'. Blodget now claims title, and is in the ■ actual receipt thereof.” The prayer was for a sale of-' the property thus mentioned, to raise the balance due to complainant.
By indenture dated May 8, 1818, Davidson, as such Trustee, conveyed to Charles Glover, in consideration of $405.50, “all the interest claim and right of the said Samuel Blodget ” in certain lots sold by Boyd as Trustee, pursuant to the decree of November 5, 1813, and, among others, “part of Lot twenty, in square two hundred and fifty four, fronting eleven feet eleven inches on north F Street, leased to Edward Tennell (sic) for ninety nine years, renewable forever, under the annual ground rent of twenty four dollars.”
This completes the recital of the proceedings in the Chancery suit of Robert S. Bickley against Samuel Blodget and others, and of the sales and conveyances made pursuant t,o the decrees therein, so far as they pertain to the interest of Blodget in the land now in controversy. We proceed to a statement of the subsequent transfers, so far as necessary for a determination of the questions presented.
By indenture dated May 1, 1813, Bickley, in consideration of $400, conveyed to James Daugherty, his heirs and assigns, “all that part of Lot No. 20 in Square No. 254, fronting on F Street North, twenty feet ” which was leased by Blodget to Daugherty. The deed mentions the date of the lease, and recites that “all the estate, interest and claim of the said Samuel Blodget in and to the said part
Assuming the above-mentioned deed from Brent, Trustee, and others to Bickley had the effect to vest in Bickley all the reversion that was in Blodget, subject to the Daugherty lease, this deed from Bickley to Daugherty brought about a merger of the leasehold and the reversion.
By mesne conveyances, all of Daugherty’s interest came to be vested in one Benjamin F. Isherwood in the year 1852.
As already pointed out, the ground rents under the Frethy lease were. conveyed by Brent, Trustee, and Thomas Peter, by deed dated January 15, 1807, to Robert F. Howe. It appears that Frethy had assigned his lease to one Frederick Betz, by recorded deed,- dated September 19, 1801; Frederick Betz assigned it to George Betz by recorded deed of January 24, 1803; and George Betz assigned it to John Thorp by recorded deed of February 15, 1804. Each of these instruments transferred all right and interest of the assignor in the land, describing it by measurements and abuttals, and referring to the léase thereof made by Blodget to Frethy for “ninety-nine years, renewable forever.”
It is admitted that William Dowling probably succeeded to the ownership of this leasehold by an unrecorded assignment of Thorp’s interest. Dowling claimed in a deed made by him to Robert F. Howe, presently to be mentioned, that he was the owner of the leasehold interest.
In 1830 the corporation of the City of Washington' made a tax deed to Dowling for “Part of Lot 20 and the improvements in Square 254” for unpaid taxes assessed against it “as the property and in the name of Robert F. Howe,” for the years 1819 .to 1824, inclusive. Dowling-.
Under the will of William Dowling, and by mesne conveyances thereafter, whatever estate Dowling had in this parcel became vested in Benjamin F. Isherwood in the year 1865.
As already pointed out, the ground rents of the Fennell lease — for the word
Tennell
in the deed is obviously a mistake — became vested in Charles Glover; but that dee'd likewise included “all the interest, claim and right” of Blodget in that part of Lot 20 that was covered by the Fennell lease; thus evidently conveying the reversion. The bill avers that this part of Lot 20 was conveyed by Abraham Bradley’s heirs to Benjamin F. Isherwood in 1852. It does not appear when or how (if at all) Fennéll’s leasehold became merged in the reversion. Nor does it seem to be material, for if not merged, it lapsed on the expiration of the 99-year term and failure to renew, and this
Whatever interests Benjamin F. Isherwood may have acquired by the above-mentioned conveyances in the several portions of Lot 20 admittedly became vested in Caleb C. Willard, the devisor of the appellees, in or about the year 1882.
On the other hand, whatever reversionary rights (if any) remained in Samuel Blodget have admittedly become vested in the appellant.
The bill of complaint herein avers that the defendant, now appellant, claims to be the assignee of the heirs-at-law of Blodget; and that he claims that after the execution of the leases there remained in Blodget and his heirs a reversion in fee in Lot 20; that only a rent-charge passed under the proceedings in Bickley v. Blodget; that as the leases have expired without purchase or renewal by the lessees the reversion has come into possession, and that therefore as plaintiff in ejectment he has the right to recover possession and title in fee simple.
These contentions are in fact made here in behalf of the appellant with respect to so much of Lot 20 as was-leased to Daugherty and to Frethy respectively.
As to the Fennell lot, it is insisted that by the very language of the supplemental bill in the Bickley suit, and the decrée for sale made pursuant to it, and the terms of the deed made by Davidson, Trustee, thereunder, the purchaser acquired a legal title to the reversion, and not merely to the ground-rents; "and that therefore, on the theory that the averments of the bill are true, the appellees have an absolute fee simple title to the Fennell lot, such as to constitute a plain, adequate and complete defense
The question for decision, therefore, is whether the appellees have a good title as against the appellant; and, if so, whether the nature of their title is such as to render it unavailable at law and to require the intervention of a court of equity for their relief against appellant’s claims.
It is suggested, rather than urged, as a ground of equitable jurisdiction, that because Blodget never received a deed of conveyance from the Commissioners for Lot 20 in Square 254, his title was never more than an equitable title; and that since.both parties claim under him, the controversy is a matter proper for the cognizance of a court of equity, whatever be the grounds of controversy as between the parties. We doubt whether this view is tenable. There is no question that Blodget, and those claiming under him, have openly asserted title to the property, at least from the year 1801 down to the present time; and while the bill herein contains no averments respecting. possession, it may be assumed that, for a long time at least, possession has followed the title. Assuming Blodget and those inheriting from him, and under whom appellant claims, were equitably entitled to the reversion, subject only to the ninety-nine year terms, any possession of the lessees has been,, as against the outside world, the possession of the appellant' and his predecessors in title. Therefore it is more than probable that any legal title remaining in the Commissioners has become barred by long possession. Besides, it might perhaps, after 120 years, be presumed at law, as well as in equity, that the Commissioners had made a deed or deeds to Blodget that had since been lost. And, since both parties to the present controversy claim under Blodget, and would probably in an action of ejectment be required to trace title no further back than the common source, it is better, we think, to lay aside for
This brings us to the real controversy, which is the effect of the proceedings and decree in the Bickley suit, and the deeds made thereunder by Brent, Trustee: to the purchasers of the “ground-rents.”
For present purposes, we may accede to the contention of appellant that the bill of complaint herein shows, with respect to the parcel that was covered by the Fennell lease, the title to which passed under the supplemental bill and decree in the Bickley suit, that the effect of the proceedings, and the language of the decree, and of the deed made by Davidson, Trustee, thereunder, was such as to pass to the purchaser a legal title to the reversion.
Assuming this, however, it does not follow that the appellees, if they have the equitable as well as the legal title to the Fennell parcel, and if at the same time they have the equitable but not the legal title to the Daugherty and Frethy parcels, may not properly invoke the aid of equity against the ejectment suit. If the appellant had limited his action at law to the Fennell parcel, his contention that if the Willard title to that parcel is good at all, it is as good at law as in equity, and therefore available as a defense in the ejectment suit, would demand consideration.
But appellant brought the action of ejectment for an entire lot made up of three parcels, of which the Fennell plot lies between the other two. The appellees, if driven to invoke the aid of equity against that action because they had an equitable and not a legal title to the Daugherty and Frethy parcels, were fairly entitled to bring the entire controversy into the court of equity, so that it might be adjudicated in a single suit.
A court of equity ought to do justice completely, and not by halves.
Decker
v.
Caskey,
1 N. J. Eq. 427, 433;
One of the duties of such a court is to prevent a multiplicity of suits, and to this end a court of equity, if obliged to take cognizance of a cause for any purpose, will ordinarily retain it for all purposes, even though this requires it to determine purely legal rights that otherwise would not be within the range of its authority.
Oelrichs
v.
Spain,
In strictness of law, the deeds made by Brent, Trustee, purporting to convey the “ground rents” on the Daugherty and Frethy leases cannot be deemed to have included the reversion. The rule at law is, that by a grant of the reversion the rent reserved will pass; but that by a grant of the rent the reversion will not pass. “The incident, accessary, appendant, and regardant, shall in most cases pass by the grant of the principal, without the words cum pertinentiis, but not é converso; for the principal doth not pass by the grant of the incident, &c. Accessorium non ducit, sed sequitur, suum principals.” Shepp. Touch. 89. And see Co. Litt. 152a; Broom. Leg. Max. (7th ed.), 491, 493.
The contention of appellant is that the term “ground rents,” as employed in the decree of the court in the case of
Bickley
v.
Blodget,
has a plain and clear meaning, ascertainable without recourse to outside evidence; and it is insisted that the rents referred to were limited to the
The argument elaborates the legal status of the lessor and lessee under the leases. It is said that the import of the contract is plain; that a lease for a specific and definite term of ninety-nine years, and no longer, was created; and that an option was given in connection therewith to the respective lessees and their successors in interest for other and further terms of similar duration, and also an. option for the purchase of the demised premises during the terms created or any future term. And it is insisted that the leases extended only until the expiration of their respective terms, and did not, proprio vigore, extend or continue such terms for a definite or indefinite period; that the options made the existence of new leases in the future possible, but not certain; that the creation of future leases depended wholly on the exercise of the privilege of a repewal by each lessee or his successor in interest;' and that the privilege not having been exercised in either instance, all rights of the lessees expired at the end of ninety-nine years.
All this may be assumed, as matter of law, without advancing ufe far towards the solution of the real question presented. If the appellant is entitled to the reversion, the question whether the appellees or their predecessors in title have lost the right of renewal or purchase by failure to exercise the option,'and whether equity will relieve them by decreeing a renewal on proper terms, may require consideration.
But the question must first be answered whether, in the, sight of equity, the appellant is entitled to the reversion. The appellees, besides showing a title to the leasehold interests of Daugherty and Frethy, respectively claim
In
Bosley
v.
Bosley’s Exrs.
(1852),
“In the case before us, the interest which the testator had in this land at the time of making his will, was converted into money by his contract with Armstrong. It was a sale and an agreement to convey his whole interest in the land. It is, therefore, unlike the case of a lease for years, or of ninety-nine years, renewable forever, in which the lessor retains the reversion, and does not bind himself to convey it on any .terms to the lessee. The form of the contract adopted in this instance, between the testator and Armstrong, is in familiar use in the sale of lots in the city of Baltimore and the adjacent country. It has nearly, if not altogether superseded the old forms of contract, where the vendor conveyed the lands, and took a mortgage to secure the payment of the purchase money — or gave his bond for the conveyance, and retained the legal title in himself until the pinchase money was paid. And it has taken the place of these forms of contract, because it is far more convenient, both to the seller and the purchaser. For it enables the vendee to postpone the payment of a large portión of the purchase moneyuntil he finds' it entirely convenient to pay it; and, at the same time, it is more advantageous to the vendor, as it gives him a better security for the punctual payment of the interest; and while an extended credit is given to the vendee, it is to the vendor a sale for cash. For if his ground rent is well secured, he can, at any time, sell it in the market for the balance of the purchase money left in the hands of the vendee. It will be observed that the rent reserved is precisely the interest on the amount of the purchase money remaining unpaid.”
That leases for ninety-nine years, renewable forever, were common in Maryland, and therefore presumably well understood in Washington at the time of the Bickley foreclosure, appears from
Banks
v.
Haskie
(1876),
The contention of the appellant that the term ground rents as used in the proceedings and. deeds in question, imported, only the. rents that, were to accrue during the residue of the 99-year terms of the. Daugherty and Frethy leases, respectively, will not bear analysis.
In the first place, it was of the essence of both leases, that the terms were “ninety-nine years,
renewable for
ever.” The rent was to be the same for the extended terms as for the initial term of ninety-nine years. It certainly cannot have been within the contemplation of
Moreover, the theory that it was intended to separate the right to the rentals until the year 1900 from the right to those that would accrue under renewals of the term, presupposes that the parties intended to separate the ground rents from the reversion. But such a separation is hardly conceivable. The only real security that the lessor had for the payment of. the rents was the right reserved to him to enter'and repossess the land until the arrearages were paid, or to terminate the lease should they not be paid. It is obvious that if the owner of the ground rents had no right to the estate upon the termination of the lease, his action in terminating it would benefit not himself, but the owner of the reversion. In short, this view would leave the payments to accrue during the residue of the ninety-nine years, no longer entitled to be designated as “ ground rents.” They would in effect stand as ordinary choses-in-action, resting for security upon the- personal responsibility of the lessees, or their assignees in possession; subject to be rendered valueless by the insolvency of the lessee, or perhaps defeated, so far as the assignee’s liability was cqncerned, by an assignment to a pauper. Valliant v. Dodemede, 2 Atk. 546; 26 Eng. Reprint, 728; Lekeux v. Nash, 2 Stra. 1221.
Nor is it reasonable to-suppose that the parties intended to reserve in Blodget any estate in the lands, present or future. We say the parties, because in equity the decree, and the deed made thereunder, must, we think, be deemed to be the act of Blodget as well as of Bickley and the other parties to the cause.
It was clearly the purpose to sell all the beneficial interest that Blodget had in the several plots in question, subject to the leases. This reserved interest was denominated “ground rents,” (using a phrase evidently in. popular use), without distinction as to their duration, and therefore presumably meaning that they should be perpetual, as well as the leases under which they were derived; but subject, of course, to commutation by the exercise, of the lessee’s option of .purchase at an amount of which the annual rental was the equivalent of eight per centum.
The proceedings in the Bickley-Blodget suit show beyond cavil or question that it was the purpose not. only of the parties to the action, but of the court, that all of Blodget’s right, title and interest in Lot 20 should be sold towards paying the debt he owed to the complainant. The. reservation of any interest in Blodget was inconsistent with
Nor is there any room to doubt that bidders at the sale, including the successful bidders who became the purchasers, supposed that in buying the “ground rents ” they were buying an investment security representing the substantial fruits, and the entire fruits, of ownership reserved by Blodget on the leases; — and not for mere terms of ninety nine years, but for such terms “renewable forever.” That the interest of Blodget sold for its fair market value is beyond question, for otherwise the court would not have confirmed the sales.
After the sales were confirmed, only two things remained to be done in order to carry the decree of the court into effect so far as concerned the passing of title. One was — “The payment of the whole purchase money for the respective parts of the said property so sold;” the other was that “the said trustee by a deed or deeds good and operative in law, to be acknowledged, etc., shall give, grant, bargain and sell, release and confirm to the respective purchasers and their heirs respectively” the property sold; with Peter and Munroe joining, in order to make sure that no legal title should remain outstanding.
There is no doubt that the purchase price was paid; indeed, one of the purchasers in question was Bickley, the complainant, for whose benefit the sale was made. Such payment being made, the purchasers at once became the owners, in equity, of the reversionary interest of
And deeds of conveyance were made in order to carry out the decree. But one thing was lacking; the deeds were not “good and operative in law,” because, although they described well enough according to the common intent what was intended to be conveyed, they did not define it according to the legal formula. And so the form of the deeds was undoubtedly defective. This, upon all the evidence, was a mistake, pure and simple. And it was the mistake of a public officer. To say that when such a mistake occurs in carrying out the decree of a court of equity, — a court possessed of full jurisdiction over the subject-matter and all the parties — harmful consequences shall be permitted to fall upon the purchasers who, in reliance upon the apparent regularity of the proceedings, have paid the purchase-money to the officer of the court in the belief that they would get as good a title as the court could give them, and as good as the court could require any of the parties before it to give them,- - would be nothing less than a reproach upon the administration of justice.
The equitable principles upon which our decision must turn, are simple and fundamental. Equity regards that as done which ought to be done. It looks to the true intent and meaning, rather than to the form. It relieves against the consequences of accident and mistake, as well as of fraud.
In
Lytle
v.
State of Arkansas,
In our opinion the averments of the bill herein, admitted by the demurrer, show that, with respect to the Daugherty and Frethy lots, the appellees have a good title in equity, but not at law, as against the appellant, and therefore are entitled to restrain him, and those claiming under him, from prosecuting an action of ejectment, or otherwise asserting title to those plots. And, with respect to the Fennell plot, the same result follows, for reasons above given, although appellees’ title, besides being good in equity as against that of the appellant, is also good at law, and therefore might have been availed of as a legal defense.
Decree affirmed.
Notes
[Cory op Lease — Samuel Blodget to James Daugherty.]
This indenture made the thirteenth day of April in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and one Between Samuel Blodget of Philadelphia. State of.Pennsylvania of the one'part and James Daugherty of the City of Washington in the Territory of Columbia of the other part witnesseth that the said Samuel Blodget for and in con-' sideration of the payment of the rent and performance of the Covenants hereinafter mentioned on the part of the said James Daugherty his executors administra! ors and assigns to be paid and performed Hath
Sam Blodget. [seal.]
James Daugherty, [seal.]
Signed, sealed and delivered, etc.