47 Ga. 414 | Ga. | 1872
Lead Opinion
In October, 1871, Schaub & Lawton, contractors on the Brunswick and Albany Eailroad, failed. On the 31st of October, they made an assignment of all their property for the benefit of their creditors, of which instrument the following is a copy:
“ GEOEGIA — Dougherty County :
“ This indenture, made, between George Schaub and Henry E. Lawton, parties using the firm name and style of Schaub & Lawton, of the one part, and Samuel Mayer, of the second part, and the creditors of Schaub & Lawton, of the third part, witnesseth, that the said Schaub & Lawton, for and in consideration of the sum of $1 00, to them in hand paid, and for
“ Attest:
“R. K. HINES, N. P. [l. s.]
(Signed) “ Schaub & Lawton, [l. s.]
“ G. J. Wright, [l. s.]
“ Attorney for Speight, Sullivan et al.
“ Samuel Mayer & Company, [l. s.]
“Yason & Davis, [l. s.]
“ Attorney for Walker & Kindrick.
“ Camp & Kemp, [l. s.]
“ Atkinson & Company et al., [l. s.] ’
“ E. M. Harper, per D. A. Yason, [l. s.]
“ Eor Dawson creditors.”
On their failure, sundry laborers, either in their own immediate employment or that of their sub-contractors, sued out fi. fas. on their alleged laborers’ liens, under the Act of 1869:— many, if not all of them, before an Ordinary. . The assignment was not signed by all of the judgment creditors of Schaub & Lawton. Upon the suing out and levy of the laborers’ fi. fas., the assignees and certain creditors, who had signed the instrument, filed a bill to carry out the assignment, and praying an injunction against the levying creditors, alleging that, “ your orators had well hoped that said parties (meaning the levying creditors) would not have acted thus to defeat the very object in making such assignment, but would have come in and accepted their debts under said assignment. But now so it is, may it please your honor, that the said parties and their confederates, on first one pretense and then another, continue their illegal course, and refuse to ” — i. e., refuse ■ to accede to the terms of the assignment. Some of the creditors, after the bill was filed, seem to have come in and signed it. All never did. The bill also prayed the appointment of a receiver. No answer was filed, but all the creditors, including one holding a United States Court fi. fa., issued on a judgment obtained April 22d, 1869, against Mosher, Thomas & Schaub,
“S. Mayer vs. Schaub & Lawton.
“And now comes Hines & Hobbs, attorneys for sundry creditors, and file the following exceptions to the said report of the said auditor:
’ “ 1st. Because said fund coming into Court under a deed of assignment, all creditors claim pro rata under that deed, and after paying Court cost, auditor’s fees and attorney’s fees, there is no preference or priority in favor of any creditor, but they must all come in pro rata, and so much of said report as gives any preference is illegal;
• “ 2d. Because if -there is any priority or preference, the lien of the fi. fa. of John Vogt & Company vs. Mosher, Thomas & Schaub, dated 1st November, 1869, for $2,315 05, is the oldest lien against said G. Schaub, and should be paid before any other debt whatever in said case and said auditor’s report, giving no lien to said fi. fa., is illegal.
“3d. That said laborer’s liens have no lien, except from the date of their foreclosure, and being subsequent to the assignment, which carried the title out of Schaub, they have no lien in this case, and that said lien fi. fas. are illegally issued, being issued by the Ordinary of Terrell county, who had no authority to issue them.
“4th. That said report does not show any testimony, show
“ 5th. And for further objections to the auditor’s report, we say that the evidence showed that the most of the laborers were the hands of the sub-contractors, and if they had any lien they only had a lien upon the property of the sub-contraetors and not a lien upon the property of Schaub & Lawton.
“ 6th. That it appeared by the testimony of Gr. Schaub and R. A. Hatcher before said master, that the laborers who claimed a lien on said firm of Schaub & Lawton worked for W. L. Burgay and other sub-contractors, that they did not work for Schaub & Lawton, but Schaub & Lawton gave due bills for the amounts by Hatcher, agent, and assumed the debts, and charged the amounts to each sub-contractor on their books.”
“exceptions to auditor’s report.
“ Samuel Mayer, assignee, Camp & Kemp, Speight et al. vs. J. W. Kemp, sheriff, and Atkinson & Company, of Dougherty county, sheriff of Terrell, and sheriff of Randolph.
“ Bill por Injunction, etc., Douchertt Superior Court.
“And now comes Samuel Mayer, Kemp & Camp, and...... Speight and except to the report of the auditor, William E. Smith, on the following grounds:
“1st. Because the assignment made by defendants transferred the property to the creditors generally, without any preference or priority to any party, but to be equally distributed among all the creditors; that no lien of a laborer or mechanic having been foreclosed prior to said assignment, the liens by the terms of assignment were lost, and they, therefore, except to the report so far as it prefers the laborer or mechanic to other creditors.
“ 2d. Because the report allows the laborers a priority over exceptors, when the claims are for provisions furnished — material furnished, and stand on the same footing with laborers, even without assignment.
“ 3d. Because the report allows the laborers and mechanics inore than are really due them, and we except to the report on
“ G. J. Wright,
“D. H. Pope,
“Huras & Hobbs,
“Exceptors’ attorneys.”
“And now comes Camp & Kemp and other creditors of Sehaub & Lawton, and by way of amendment to their exceptions, filed for further exception, say:
“ 1st. That said report fails to furnish the evidence on which the auditor allowed the claims reported in. the case of each and every laborer, mechanic and carpenter — that it simply calls the claimant a mechanic,, laborer, overseer or carpenter, without giving the proof necessary to constitute such a vocation or occupation — that such a thing as a laborer and other occupations cannot be made to exist by imagination in the Courts, but the fact must be made to appear by competent proof, which the report fails to show, and on which point this Court could make no decision without the evidence, and that' those laborers were laborers of sub-contractors.
“2d That if the evidence was appended to the report it would show that nearly or all the laborers or a great many of them were the laborers of sub-contractors, and not employed by Sehaub & Lawton, and that Sehaub & Lawton were not directly interested or liable for the payment of the hands, and that the auditor erred in allowing the lien.
“3d. That Sehaub & Lawton were not directly liable for the wages due laborers of sub-contractors, and the evidence, if appended, would so show.
“4th. That the report should show all the evidence on each claim, so this Court could see that all the points were legally decided by the auditor, which it fails to do, and which evi
“D. H. Pope,
“G. J. Weight,
“Hines & Hobbs,
Exceptors’ Attorneys.”
Which were submitted by agreement to the Court, without a jury, and were by him overruled, and the report made the judgment of the Court.
It does not appear that any evidence was offered to sustain the exceptions. Upon their being overruled the bill of- exceptions was sued out, and among the assignments of error the following appears:
“ 3d. That the Court after holding properly that the deed of assignment from Schaub & Lawton to Samuel Mayer was the law of the case as to priority, erred in construing the words ‘equally divide the proceeds between said creditors’ in said deed of assignment to mean equally divide according to the priorities created by law, and then holding that Vogt & Company had no lien on the fund.”
The question for this Court to determine, is whether the Court below erred in overruling each and every exception to the auditor’s report, and in making it the judgment of the Court.
• I. To determine this, it is necessary to construe the 3042d, 3082d, 3083d, 4143d, and 4144th sections of the Code. An analysis of these somewhat conflicting sections results, it appears to me, as follows, where matters in- issue are referred to a master or auditor:
1st. The referee is to hear evidence, investigate accounts, and report: Sections 3082,4143.
2d. The report so made may be objected to on the ground
3d. After allowance by the Court, the report is, prima facie, the truth as to the facts reported, but the party against whom it operates may file his exceptions within the time allowed by the Court, and the truth or falsity of the facts found by the report is submitted to a jury, who are to pass upon each exception, so far as it excepts to the -facts reported, seriatim: Sections 3042, 4144. What are the “objections” to be heard and decided by the Court under section 3083 ? None but errors of law, on the part of the master, as I understand it. No other reading suggests itself which will reconcile this section with sections 3042 and 4144. The latter part of the section would seem to warrant this interpretation. The report, when finally accepted by the Court, shall be admitted as evidence to the jury, with such instructions as to the effect to be given to it as the Court shall give under the circumstances of each case. Exceptions, then, to a -master’s or an auditor’s report, are of two classes: first, exceptions for alleged errors of law; secondly, exceptions for alleged errors of fact. Upon the first, the Court alpne is to pass, under section 3083. Upon the second,’ the Court passes, in the first instance, when, if approved by him, they are, prima facie, true, subject to be overturned by testimony before the jury. In practice, 1 have never known, where the exceptions are to facts found, the exceptions formally submitted to the Court for its approval, in the first instance, as required by section 3042. The proceedings are always conducted under section 4144, which does not require the exceptions to be approved by the Court in the first instance. This may be accounted for by the fact, that a reference is seldom had, unless the case involve matters of account, and section 4141 applies specially to that class of cases. A part of
1st. Because he found the assignment invalid as against creditors claiming liens; or, which is the same thing, because he interpreted the assignment as providing for a division among the creditors according to the priorities established by law.
2d. Because he found against the priority of the United States Court execution over all others, and especially found it-inferior to the laborers’ liens.
3d. Because he found that the laborers’ lien attached from the date of the work done, and was not postponed until foreclosure, and that the foreclosure before the Ordinary was legal.
4th. Because the auditor refused to allow proof, as to the amount due to the laborers, by the introduction of the original books of entry of Schaub & Lawton.
5th. Because the auditor failed to attach to his report the evidence upon which it is founded. The exceptions to the facts found are numerous, but may be classed under one head, towitbecause the finding is contrary to the evidence.
II. I will dispose of the last first. If it be true that any, or many, of the findings upon the facts are untrue, the report was only prima facie evidence of their truth, and the objectors should have introduced, or offered to introduce, proof to rebut it. The record fails to show any such effort on their part.
III. 'Was any error of law committed by the auditor ? If he held the assignment invalid, I think the ruling correct, because by its terms it could only be binding on any one when signed by all the creditors. The bill itself states that many refused to sign. Some signed after the filing of the bill, but all never have signed. If one refuse, it fails to bind any. If the auditor held the assignment validj but gave an erroneous interpretation to it, to-wit: that under it the debts were to be paid according to legal priorities, the error is immaterial — a correct result is arrived at.
"V. It may be well'just here to notice one of the arguments of plaintiff in error. It is urged, that as the third assignment of error alleges that the Judge held the agreement to be the law of the case, and no exception was taken to the ruling, the defendants in error are bound by it, as the Judge certifies to the truth of the bill of exceptions, that, therefore, the only point just here for this Court, is whether the Court below interpreted the language of the assignment correctly. It will be recollected, that the Judge sat as .both Judge and jury, Let us suppose a jury, and analyze his action thus: The complainants offer the assignment in evidence. It'is admitted over the objection of the'creditors who have not signed, and others who interpret it as effective only if all creditors sign it. The Judge charges the jury, that the assignment means that the division under it is to be made according to the legal priorities of the debts, and the jury render a verdict in accordance with the charge. The defendants, under the interpretation of the contract by the Court, do not except to his ruling, admitting it in evidence. Complainants except, and allege the Court erred in his construction of the instrument. This Court is of opinion, that he did err in his interpretation of the assignment, but are also of opinion, that the instrument, not having been signed by all the creditors, and Schaub & Lawton not having any power to divest laborers’ liens without the consent of the laborers, ought never to have gone to the jury, and that their verdict is legally right. Would a new trial be granted? I think not, because a new trial could be of no service to complainants, under the interpretation now placed upon the assignment by this Court. It would necessarily be rejected as evidence on the second trial, and with it complainants’ whole 'case falls. A new trial will not be granted, of course, for misdirection of the Judge, if it appears that justice has been done: 33 Georgia, 173, 207; 2 Tidd’s Pr., 908, («..,)
VI. I will next consider the third alleged error of law on the part of the auditor, as by that the second must be controlled. The laborer’s lien attaches from the time the work is done, and is not postponed until foreclosure: 43 Georgia, 9. So, at least, says one member of the Court in the case cited; and, after carefully reading the Constitution,'! am compelled to agree with him. That provides that mechanics and laborers shall have liens upon the property of their employers for labor performed or material furnished, and the Legislature shall provide for the summary enforcement of the same. But suppose the Legislature fail to provide for the summary enforcement of the lien, does it follow that it cannot be enforced ? Could not the mechanic or laborer go into a Court of law or equity, as the case might require, and ask that it be enforced ? If this is so, and the lien does not exist until foreclosure, wherein does it differ from the lien of an ordinary judgment in the case supposed ? The mere neglect of the Legislature to provide a summary remedy, would deprive this class of persons of a constitutional right. The policy of this law may be very questionable, as argued. This Court is not the judge of that. Nor does it follow, because these liens date from the time of the performance of the work, that, therefore, they override the claims of bona fide purchasers without notice. But that question is not now before us. If, then, the lien dates from the time of performance of the work, it makes little difference whether the Ordinary is a proper officer before whom to foreclose the lien or not,; so far as this case is concerned. It seemed to be conceded on the argument, that if the laborers’ liens attached from the performance of the labor, that they ante-dated the judgment of the United States Court. There is, however, another completely satisfactory reason why they should take precedence of that judgment,
VII. To-wit: partnership assets must first satisfy partnership debts before individual debts, or debts of a former part
VIII. If the fourth alleged error is true, I am inclined to think it would be a good ground for reversing the judgment of the Court below. But it is directly contradicted by the report of the auditor. He says he examined and weighed all the evidence submitted by the parties, and that it consisted, among other things, of the books of the defendants. No exception is filed to his report upon the ground that his statement is untrue in this respect, unless the one now under review be considered as inferentially charging it to be untrue, and if so, it is to that extent an exception to a fact reputed, and should have been supported by proof.
IX. Lastly, I know of no rule under our practice, requiring the auditor to append to his report the evidence upon which it is based. The report is, prima facie, true, and the onus is upon the party attacking it to produce the evidence to overthrow the presumption in its favor. Hence this ground must also be overruled, and the judgment of the Court below affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
This was a bill filed by the complainants against the defendants praying an injunction, and for the appointment of a receiver to take charge of the property and effects, specified in a deed of assignment, executed on the 31st day of October, 1871, by Schaub & Lawton to 'Samuel Mayer, in trust for the payment of all their creditors. The allegations in the bill are, that the creditors were numerous, the property scattered along the line of a railroad, in different counties, and that some of the creditors were proceeding to enforce their respective liens upon the property, whereby, great damage would result to the property conveyed, as well as- loss to the credi
The property of Schaub & Lawton, specified in the deed of assignment, was sold by the receiver, under the order of the Court. The auditor made his report of the amount of the sale of the property, and of the amount and priority of each claim on the fond, giving to the claimants who were mechanics and laborers a priority of lien on the fund, and reported in favor of the payment of their claims in preference to the other creditors of Schaub & Lawton. Exceptions were filed to the auditor’s report. When the case came before the Court for trial, it was argreed by the counsel representing the parties before it, that the presiding Judge should act both as Judge and jury — reserving all right of exceptions they might have
The property specified in the deed of assignment was the property of Sehaub & Lawton, and they had the legal right, to convey it to Mayer in trust for the payment of all theircredito-rs in the manner therein stipulated, provided their cred
If a judgment creditor of Schaub & Lawton had filed a bill against Mayer, the trustee, to enforce the trust for the benefit of their creditors generally, it would have been a waiver of his judgment lien upon the fund: Jones vs Dougherty, 10 Georgia Reports, 274. So, if their creditors who
It will be noticed that the auditor is not only required by the order to hear proof of the amount and priority of each claim, but he is also required by the order to report the amount of the funds which the receiver’s sale shall show subject to distribution, and the amount that may be due each creditor, according to the evidence and the law. Although some of the creditors of Schaub & Lawton may have had prior liens upon their property independent of the deed of assignment conveying their property in trust for the benefit of all their creditors, still, when they claim under that deed of assignment, the law is, that they must take in accordance with its terms; they cannot claim under the deed of assignment and repudiate any essential part of it. The order of the Judge directing the auditor to hear proof of the amount and priority of each claim, did not necessarily require him to report in favor of the payment of any particular class of claims in preference to others, out of the fund in the hands of the receiver • but he was required to report the amount that may be due each creditor according to the evidence and the law, and if the evidence showed that he was a creditor of Schaub & Lawton, then, under the law as applicable to this deed of assignment, he was tó be paid in accordance with its terms and provisions, and not otherwise. It would be an unreasonable and forced construction to hold that the words in the deed of assignment, to equally divide the proceeds of the sale of the property conveyed thereby between said creditors of Schaub & Lawton, meant to be equally divided according to the priorities oi'eated by law.
The exceptions to the auditor’s report, and the assignment of errors thereon to the rulings of the Court, are all specially and distinctly set forth in the bill of'exceptions presented to the Judge for his signature, and he has certified that the same are true — one of which is, “that the Court, after holding that the deed of assignment from Schaub & Lawton to Samuel Mayer was the law of the case as to priority, erred in constru